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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of amendments to Australian accounting standards 
governing the classification and reporting of non-recurring components of earnings on 
firms’ classification shifting practices, and on the propensity to engage in other earnings 
management such as accrual-based and real earnings manipulation to improve core 
earnings. The study investigates the impact of three regulatory changes which have the 
potential to affect firms’ earnings management behaviour and thus the quality of 
earnings. I first investigate whether the amendments to the standard AASB 1018 Profit 
and Loss Accounts, effective for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002 and 
which restricted the scope for reporting and classifying abnormal items on the income 
statement, reduced the incidence of classification shifting. I then investigate whether the 
implementation of AASB 101 Presentation of Financial Statements, effective for 
financial periods starting on or after 1 January 2005 (upon IFRS adoption), and which 
relaxed prior restrictions on classifying and reporting non-recurring items, induced 
greater classification shifting. I also examine whether AASB 5 Noncurrent Assets Held 
for Sale and Discontinued Operations (effective at the same time as AASB 101), which 
increased the scope for classifying and reporting discontinued operations on the income 
statement, resulted in firms opportunistically misclassifying these items to increase core 
earnings. 
I then investigate the impact of each of the three regulatory reforms on firms’ use of 
alternative earnings manipulation methods, because there is evidence that a change in 
regulatory regime could impact firms’ alternative earnings management behaviour. For 
example, Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) document an increase in the use of real earnings 
management to improve earnings following the reduction in accrual-based earnings 
management as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. Therefore, there is potential 
for firms to substitute earnings management methods as a result of the changes to the 
scope for classification shifting. I expect that the restriction on classification shifting 
provided by AASB 1018 in 2002 may give rise to greater accrual-based and/or real 
earnings management by firms, whilst the greater scope for classification shifting 
provided by the later reforms may result in the reduction in use of accrual-based and/or 
real earnings management. 
To examine the first three research questions, I develop models of classification shifting 
from McVay (2006) and Barua, Lin and Sbaraglia (2010). I then use difference in 
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differences designs to investigate the extent of firms’ classification shifting in the post-
reform periods relative to the pre-reform periods. I also use a difference in differences 
design and develop models to test the impact of the regulations on firms’ alternative 
earnings management behaviour. 
My results show that there is no evidence of classification shifting following the 2002 
amendment while there is indirect evidence of firms engaging in classification shifting 
using abnormal items, and strong evidence of classification shifting using discontinued 
operations following the 2005 amendments. However, tests of the impact of the reforms 
on alternative earnings management behaviour show that the restriction on classification 
shifting by the 2002 reform resulted in greater accrual-based manipulation to increase 
core earnings, while there is no such evidence of real earnings manipulation. There is 
evidence of a reduction in accrual-based manipulation and sales manipulation following 
the increased scope for classification shifting (post-2005) but there is no such evidence 
of real earnings management via discretionary expenditure reduction.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Accounting standards allow firms considerable discretion in the presentation of 
financial statements. Managers may use their discretion over the classification of 
earnings components to signal the transitory nature of certain revenues and expenses, 
thus providing potentially useful information about firms’ earnings persistence and 
predictability to users of financial reports (Athanasakou, Strong and Walker 2007; Riedl 
and Srinivisan 2010). However, managers may also abuse their discretion over the 
identification and reporting of non-recurring items to engage in ‘classification shifting’, 
and thereby manipulate measures of recurring or ‘core’ earnings (Peasnell, Pope and 
Young 2000; Cready, Lopez and Sisneros 2010).1,2  
Managers are motivated to attempt to manipulate measures of ‘core’ earnings because 
sophisticated market participants place more emphasis on these metrics3  than on GAAP 
(Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) earnings when valuing the firm (Kinney 
and Trezevant 1997; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Gu and Chen 2004; Barua, Lin and 
Sbaraglia. 2010). Measures of core earnings provide a more persistent and predictable 
measure of performance than GAAP earnings, allowing investors and other users make 
better informed decision making (Francis, Hanna and Vincent 1996; Ramakrishnan and 
Thomas 1998). There is a large amount of evidence that, at least in the short-run, the 
stock market rewards firms whose reported core earnings meet or exceed certain levels 
of market expectations (e.g. analyst forecast earnings) while firms who miss those 
expected targets experience decreasing stock prices (e.g. Lin and McNichols 1998; 
Irvine 2000; Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan 2006; Baik, Farber and Petroni 2009; 
Byard, Li and Wu 2011; Christensen, Merkley, Tucker and Venkataraman 2011). Firms 
1 For example, “Bond Corporation was criticized by the National Companies and Securities Commission 
for treating recurring losses on the sale of investments/businesses as extraordinary (Australian Financial 
Review, 6 March 1985, p.52). This classification is claimed to have saved Bond Corporation from 
disaster more than once (Australian Financial Review, 14 March 1985, p.52)” (cited in Godfrey and Jones 
1999, p.231). 
2 ‘Core earnings’ refers collectively to a set of earnings metrics derived from firms’ financial statements 
that seek to identify the continuing or persistent component of income. I discuss these metrics later in the 
chapter. 
3 For instance, analysts use core earnings or similar measures that include depreciation, to value the firm, 
and exclude items that they judge to be non-recurring from their measure of core earnings (Lougee and 
Marquardt 2004). 
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thus strive to report generally higher core earnings (McVay 2006) or core earnings 
numbers that either meet or exceed certain thresholds (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 
1999; Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005; McVay 2006).  
Given the market emphasis on core earnings metrics, and generally acknowledged 
incentives to manipulate these measures, regulation has attempted to constrain 
opportunistic classification shifting (Athanasakou, Strong and Walker 2009). My thesis 
examines the impact of Australian regulatory changes affecting the scope for 
classification shifting via the reporting of non-recurring earnings components, upon 
firms’ observed classification shifting behaviour, and upon firms’ use of alternative 
earnings management techniques. These issues are important for the following reasons. 
First, the amendment to AASB4 1018 Profit and Loss Accounts to restrict the scope for 
classification shifting was partly prompted by criticisms by regulators (e.g. Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC)) and the Australian financial media (e.g. 
McLean 1999; Saunders 1999; Parker and Porter 2000) of the abusive reporting of 
abnormal items.  However, there has been no empirical evidence to ascertain whether 
the regulation actually constrained classification shifting, and what impact this 
constraint may have on the quality of earnings. Although earnings quality may be 
improved if regulatory restrictions effectively constrain managerial opportunism, 
Cameron and Gallery (2008) argue that earnings quality may be impaired if the 
restrictions constrain managers’ ability to highlight the temporary nature of noncore 
items.  
Second, prior research documents that constraining earnings management behaviour 
may have even greater undesirable side-effects, in that  firms may be induced to use 
alternative earnings management methods (accrual-based and real earnings) to improve 
earnings (e.g. Cohen, Dey and Lys 2008). This may have greater adverse effect on the 
quality of earnings than classification shifting avoided. Accrual-based and real earnings 
management affect future earnings and/or cash flows through accrual reversal and 
forgone opportunities from cutting research and development, whereas classification 
shifting only impacts sub-totals within current year earnings. Hence, understanding 
whether restricting the scope for classification shifting induces firms’ use of alternative 
earnings management, provides valuable information to evaluate the impact of 
regulation on the perceived quality of earnings, and in users’ decision making including 
standard setters. 
4 The acronym AASB stands for Australian Accounting Standards Board. 
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1.2 Objectives of study and research questions 
The primary objective of this study is therefore to examine the impact of regulatory 
amendments in Australia governing the classification and reporting of non-recurring 
components of earnings on firms’ classification shifting practices, and on the propensity 
to use other earnings management mechanisms such as accrual-based and real earnings 
management to improve core earnings. Specifically, I examine the impact of three 
regulatory amendments, the first of which was partly a result of growing concerns about 
the abusive reporting of abnormal items, while the later reforms resulted from 
Australia’s adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter ‘IFRS’).  
The first reform I examine relates to amendments to AASB 1018 Profit and Loss 
Accounts, effective for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002. Separate 
amendments in 2001 and 2002 combined to outlaw the separate reporting of profit sub-
totals before and after abnormal items, and introduced restrictions on the emphasis 
given to other sub-headings and sub-totals used in explaining a firm’s financial 
performance. These amendments restricted the incentive and scope for opportunistic 
classification shifting using abnormal items. However, it is questionable whether 
restricting the scope for classifying and reporting earnings components reduced 
classification shifting behaviour, an issue which has not been empirically investigated, 
and is therefore my first research question:  
R1: Did the amendment to restrict the scope for the classification and reporting of non-
recurring components of earnings reduce classification shifting? 
The second amendment whose impact I examine is AASB 101 Presentation of 
Financial Statements, introduced as a consequence of IFRS adoption, and which 
became effective for financial periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. AASB 101 
superseded AASB 1018, and effectively reversed restrictions on the reporting of 
additional line items and sub-headings on the income statement, and was silent 
regarding precisely where on the income statement these items may be presented. This 
amendment may have increased the scope for classifying and reporting non-recurring 
items, and consequently encouraged greater classification shifting, leading to my second 
research question: 
R2: Did the amendment that removed the restrictions on reporting non-recurring items 
on the income statement induce greater classification shifting?      
12 
 
I next examine the impact of AASB 5 Noncurrent Assets Held for Sale and 
Discontinued Operations, also effective for firms with financial periods starting on or 
after 1 January 2005. This standard superseded AASB 1042 Discontinuing Operations 
and provided more scope for opportunistic classification of items as discontinuing and 
discontinued operations to increase core earnings.5 Compared to AASB 1042, AASB 5 
defines discontinued operations more broadly, including the requirement for ‘assets held 
for sale’ to be recognised as discontinued operations and  not  subject to depreciation 
charges, giving rise to more frequent recognition of gains or losses from discontinued 
operations. Further, AASB 5 is silent as to precisely where on the income statement the 
single net-of-tax amount from discontinued operations may be reported, again giving 
more scope for opportunistic classification shifting. My third research question is 
therefore: 
R3: Did the amendment to the classification and reporting of discontinued items induce 
greater classification shifting? 
Finally, the fourth research question explores the impact of each of these three 
regulations on firms’ use of alternative earnings management techniques to improve 
core earnings. There is evidence that restricting one form of earnings management may 
induce the use of another (e.g. Nelson et al. 2003; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Lin et 
al. 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012). Similarly, restricting the scope for 
classification shifting may result in firms engaging more in accruals and/or real earnings 
management. On the other hand, increasing the scope for classification shifting may 
have an impact on firms’ use of alternative earnings management tools. These practices 
may equally impair the quality of financial information. My fourth research question is 
therefore as follows: 
R4: Did the amendments relating to the classification of non-recurring components of 
earnings affect the use of alternative earnings management mechanisms?  
The Australian environment regarding the amendments to classificatory standards 
provides an excellent setting to examine the possibility of firms using multiple earnings 
management methods and the impact of regulations which has virtually been 
unexplored, which will enhance our understanding of earnings management and the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of regulations in calibrating earnings management. 
5 For brevity, I use ‘discontinued operations’ to refer to ‘discontinuing and discontinued operations’ 
collectively throughout this thesis. 
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1.3 Motivation for the research 
The research questions identified in Section 1.2 are interesting and important, and they 
motivate this study for the following reasons. First, McVay’s (2006) study demonstrates 
that US firms misclassify core expenses to special items to increase core earnings, 
providing evidence of another earnings management mechanism used by firms. 
Subsequent studies provide further evidence of the prevalence of this practice in the US 
(e.g. Lin et al. 2006; Barua et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2010; Siu and Faff 2013; Lail et al. 
2014), the UK (e.g. Athanasakou, Strong and Walker 2009) and East Asia (e.g. Haw, 
Ho and Li 2011). However, there is scant empirical evidence available from Australia6 
although there was growing criticism of the opportunistic reporting of abnormal items 
by the financial media and regulators (e.g. Australian Security and Investment 
Commission (ASIC)) that arguably led to the prohibition of the separate reporting of 
profit before and after abnormal items on the income statement (Parker and Porter 
2000). This amendment was met with mixed reaction as opponents argued that it could 
constrain firms’ ability to signal the transitory nature of abnormal items (Cameron and 
Gallery 2008). Further amendments were implemented upon the adoption of IFRS in 
2005, which also affected the classification and reporting of earnings components, and 
potentially the quality of information provided to decision makers. Whilst the 2002 
amendment may have reduced the scope for classification shifting, the 2005 
amendments (AASB 101 and AASB 5) may have increased the scope for classification 
shifting. To date, no prior Australian research has robustly examined the impact of these 
regulations on firms’ classification shifting practices which could potentially impair the 
quality of earnings.  
Second, although Australian regulators attempted to restrict opportunistic classification 
through regulatory amendments, Cohen et al. (2008) argue that a reduction in using an 
earnings management mechanism may not necessarily be a reflection of effective 
regulation, but rather may simply reflect the substitution of one earnings management 
mechanism for another. Hence, if changes to Australia’s classification rules in 2002 
constrained classification shifting but otherwise led to the increased use of alternative 
6 Cameron and Gallery (2008) provide frequency analyses of the change in large Australian firms’ 
abnormal and extraordinary items reporting following the amendment to the definition of extraordinary 
items in 1990. They examine data from 1994 to 2000 and find that following the amendment, firms 
started reporting abnormal items more frequently. However, they do not empirically test whether this 
change in reporting behaviour is due to classification shifting. Similarly, Houghton (1994) reports that 
following the amendment in 1990, firms report abnormal items more frequently than extraordinary items, 
a reversal of the pre-1990 practices.  
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earnings management mechanisms, the changes may have inadvertently exacerbated 
earnings management rather than reduced it. This could impair the quality of earnings, 
thus undermining the objective of financial reporting prescribed in the conceptual 
framework, 7  as well as the ostensible purpose of the amendment. Similarly, it is 
interesting whether the increased scope for classification shifting derived from the 2005 
amendments to AASBB 101 and AASB 5 provided a substitute for accruals and/or real 
earnings management post-2005. The extent of any substitution effect as a result of 
regulatory amendments has not been empirically ascertained which could further our 
understanding of earnings management as well as provide an evaluation of the 
accounting standards’ effectiveness. These issues are of clear interest to financial 
reporting stakeholders because they potentially impact the quality of financial reports 
which stakeholders rely on for decision making.     
1.4 Research design and methodology 
I undertake my investigation by examining the behaviour of firms listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) during the years 1994 to 2010, and for which data is 
available on the Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium (hereafter Morningstar) database. 
The empirical models of classification shifting that I use require lead and lag data, thus 
my empirical tests of hypotheses are performed using observations from 1995 to 2009. I 
exclude observations from 2001, because the first amendment to AASB 1018 was 
effective only for one period from 30 June 2001 to 29 June 2002. I divide the study 
period into three sub-periods to identify the effect of each regulation: pre-2001/2002 
period (1995 – 2000), pre-IFRS period (2002 – 30 December 2005) and post-IFRS 
period (31 December 2005 – 2009). 
I start my investigation by analysing the frequency and magnitude of non-recurring 
items to identify and report the types of items that firms typically classify as abnormal 
or resulting from discontinued operations during the study period (Chapter 6).  For this 
purpose, I use additional hand-collected quantitative and qualitative information from 
firms’ annual reports which is not available in the archival data. I examine the research 
questions detailed in Section 1.2 by adapting McVay’s (2006) regression models of 
classification shifting to first document whether firms engage in classification shifting 
7 According to the conceptual framework, high quality earnings should provide users with useful and 
reliable information to assist them in assessing the current operating performance of firms, and predicting 
firms’ future cash flows (AASB, 2001, para.29, p.12) 
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to increase core earnings prior to the first reforms in 2001/02, and whether the incidence 
of such opportunistic behaviour is reduced following the 2001/02 reforms (AASB 
1018). I then use a similar approach to investigate whether there is an increase in 
classification shifting following the more relaxed standards introduced in 2005 (AASB 
101 and AASB 5). I estimate regression models using three alternative samples: all 
Morningstar firms with available data; only firms that reported income-decreasing non-
recurring items in at least one year within the sample period; and a propensity score 
matched sample comprising all firm-years from firms that reported income-decreasing 
abnormal items in the pre-amendment period regardless of their post-amendment 
behaviour, and similar firm-years from firms that did not report income-decreasing 
abnormal items pre-amendment regardless of their post-amendment behaviour. 
I then use a difference-in-differences design to investigate whether restricting 
classification shifting (in 2001/02) induced greater use of alternative earnings 
management methods (accruals and real earnings management) to inflate core earnings,  
and whether there was a reduction in those alternative earnings management methods as 
a result of the increased scope for classification shifting arising from the 2005 
amendments. For these tests I examine propensity score matched samples comprising 
firms that reported income-decreasing abnormal items in the periods in which greater 
classification shifting was hypothesised to have occurred (1 Jan 1995 – 30 December 
2005 and 31 December 2005 – 31 December 2009, respectively). 
1.4.1 Key Measurement Issues 
Core earnings, and the unexpected component thereof are of critical importance to my 
study. Prior research has identified and examined several measures of continuing or 
core earnings, including: COMPUSTAT-derived core earnings, street earnings, and pro-
forma earnings.8 Core earnings determined by reference to COMPUSTAT data apply a 
consistent and standard measurement rule across all firm-years. For example, McVay 
(2006) defines core earnings as Sales less Cost of Goods Sold and Selling, General and 
Administration Expenses (each excluding depreciation and amortisation). 9  Street 
earnings are non-GAAP measures of earnings determined and used by analysts and are 
8 Some studies used the terms ‘street earnings’ and ‘pro-forma earnings’ interchangeably (e.g. Bradshaw 
and Sloan 2002), however, Christensen et al. (2011: 502) distinguish between ‘street earnings’ and ‘pro-
forma earnings’ according to the identity of the party reporting each earnings measure.  
9 Note that this is different from another variable specifically labelled ‘core earnings’ by COMPUSTAT 
after 2002 which does not exclude some non-recurring items such as restructuring charges (Christensen et 
al. 2011). 
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reported by analyst forecast tracking services such as the Institutional Brokers Estimates 
Service (hereafter I/B/E/S) (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Abarbanell and Lehavy 2007; 
Baik et al. 2009; Barth, Gow, and Taylor 2012; Christensen et al. 2011). Whether or not 
particular non-recurring items reported on the face of the income statement or in the 
notes are included in measures of street earnings is determined by the majority decision 
of the analysts following a particular firm (Gu and Chen 2004). Pro-forma earnings are 
non-GAAP earnings reported by managers when discussing firm performance, and 
exclude items that managers assert to be non-recurring or otherwise less relevant to 
valuation (Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Larson 2003, 2007; Doyle, Lundholm 
and Soliman 2003; Black and Christensen 2009).   
For the purpose of my thesis, I define core earnings as earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) as recorded in the Morningstar database. This 
measure excludes the effect on profit of items identified by the Morningstar analyst 
assigned to the firm as ‘abnormal’ or arising from ‘discontinued operations’. The items 
excluded from the determination of this measure of core earnings may have been 
reported as a line item on the income statement or disclosed in the notes to accounts. 
Because my measure of core earnings reflects exclusions based on analyst opinion, 
rather than as reported by firms on the face of their income statements, it is technically a 
variant of ‘street earnings’. Extant US research uses the COMPUSTAT-derived 
measure of core earnings , which is purely a function of amounts recorded on the face of 
the income statement, and which excludes a standard (rather than analyst-determined) 
list of items classified by COMPUSTAT as ‘special items’ (e.g. McVay 2006; Barua, et 
al. 2010; Fan et al.2010; Siu and Faff 2013).10 My measure of core earnings therefore 
differs from McVay’s (2006) core earnings in two respects: 1) my measure includes 
both sales and sundry revenues (but excludes interest revenue and abnormal gains), 
whereas McVay’s (2006) measure includes only sales, and 2) the identification of non-
10 Items that COMPUSTAT identifies as special items and are reported above taxes include: adjustments 
applicable to prior years (except recurring prior year income tax adjustments); after-tax adjustments to net 
income for the purchase portion of net income of partly pooled companies (when the adjustment is carried 
over to retained earnings); any significant non-recurring items; bad debt expense/provisions for doubtful 
accounts/allowance for losses if non-recurring; current year’s results of discontinued operations and 
operations to be discontinued; flood, fire and other natural disaster losses; interest on tax settlements 
(when reported separately from other interest expense); items specifically called 
‘restructuring/reorganization’, ‘special’ or ‘non-recurring’ regardless of the number of years they are 
reported; inventory write-downs when separate line item or called non-recurring; non-recurring profit or 
loss on sale of assets, investments and securities; profit or loss on the repurchase of debentures; recovery 
of allowances for losses if original allowance was a special item; relocation and moving expenses; 
severance pay when a separate line item; special allowance for facilities under construction; transfers 
from reserves provided for in prior years; write-downs or write-offs of receivables and intangibles; year 
2000 expenses regardless of the number of years they are reported. 
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recurring items to be excluded from EBITDA is determined by an analyst, whereas 
McVay’s (2006) measure results from a standard algorithm applied to US firms’ 
reported results.  Thus, my measure focuses on core earnings as they are perceived in 
the market, whereas McVay’s (2006) focuses singularly on firm’s reporting behaviour.  
Consistent with my measure of core earnings, I use ‘abnormal items’ as identified by 
the Morningstar analyst assigned to the firm.  Items identified by analysts as abnormal 
may have been reported either on the face of the income statement or in the notes under 
several possible descriptors: ‘abnormal items’; ‘significant items’; ‘unusual items’; or 
‘non-recurring items’; or simply items that are reported separately on the face of the 
income statement or in the notes. 
Proxies for accrual-based manipulation and real earnings management are estimated 
using the performance-adjusted modified-Jones model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
2005), and Roychowdhury’s (2006) models of real earnings management, respectively. 
Details of these regression models and the measures generated by them are provided in 
Chapters Four and Five.  
1.5 Summary of key findings 
My descriptive analysis of the frequency and magnitude of non-recurring items is 
consistent with prior evidence (Cameron and Gallery 2008) that firms report negative 
abnormal items and discontinued operations more frequently in periods in which 
regulations are less restrictive. Hence, the reporting of abnormal items and discontinued 
operations superficially appears to be affected by the regulatory conditions. Moreover, 
how and where on the income statement non-recurring items are reported also appear to 
have been influenced by the amendments, with firms reporting non-recurring items on 
the face of the income statement (rather than in the notes to accounts) more frequently 
in periods where regulation is at its most relaxed. 
The results of my multivariate tests suggest that Australian firms increase core earnings 
by opportunistically misclassifying core expenses as abnormal items in the pre-2001/02 
amendment period (i.e. 1995 – 2000), consistent with the concerns expressed in the 
press and by regulators. There is no evidence of this practice following the 2001/02 
regulatory reforms (AASB 1018), suggesting that the reforms restricted the scope for 
classifying and reporting non-recurring components of earnings. Although there is no 
direct evidence that classification shifting is reduced in the post-2001/02 reforms period 
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relative to the pre-2001/02 reforms period, the lack of evidence of the presence of 
classification shifting in the post-2001/02 period provides indirect evidence that 
restricting the scope for opportunistic classification shifting may have discouraged this 
practice during the post-reform period.    
For the tests of whether firms engaged in greater classification shifting to improve core 
earnings by opportunistically misclassifying abnormal items and/or discontinued 
operations as a result of adopting AASB 101 and AASB 5, respectively, tests using 
samples of all Morningstar firms, and only firms that reported income-decreasing non-
recurring items within the sample period provide no evidence of an increase in 
classification shifting behaviour in the post-reform period (i.e. post-IFRS) relative to the 
pre-reform period (i.e. pre-IFRS). Moreover, there is no evidence of the incidence of 
opportunistic classification shifting occurring following the implementation of the two 
amendments. The propensity score matched samples also produce no evidence of 
greater classification shifting in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS period. 
However, the propensity score matched samples produce evidence consistent with firms 
engaging in classification shifting via abnormal items and/or discontinued operations to 
improve core earnings in the post-IFRS period.  Thus, there is some, albeit indirect, 
evidence that relaxing the restrictions on the reporting of additional line (abnormal) 
items and sub-totals, and discontinued operations on the income statement may have 
encouraged opportunistic classification shifting post-IFRS. 
Tests of whether the 2001/02 amendments restricting the scope for classification 
shifting affected alternative earnings management behaviour find that firms that 
reported abnormal items in the pre-2001/02 amendments period (1995-2000) substitute 
accrual-based earnings management for classification shifting in the post-2001/02 
amendments period (2002-30 December 2005) to a greater extent than firms that did not 
report abnormal items in the pre-2001/02 amendments period. There is, however, no 
evidence of any substitution towards real earnings management. The findings suggest 
that any benefit from the 2001/02 reforms reflecting no classification shifting is offset 
by an increased use of accrual-based earnings management.   
My examination of whether the greater scope for classification shifting provided by the 
adoption of AASB 101 resulted in the reduction in use of accrual-based and/or real 
earnings manipulation show that there is significant reduction in the manipulation of 
accruals and sales in the post-IFRS period relative to pre-IFRS. I find no evidence on 
the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure to increase core earnings. 
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Although these findings appear to suggest that firms that reported abnormal items post-
IFRS may use accrual-based earnings management, real earnings manipulation (via 
sales transactions) and classification shifting as substitutes, caution should be exercised 
when interpreting these results as although there is some evidence of classification 
shifting behaviour after the adoption of AASB 101, the results from tests on whether 
there was greater classification shifting post-IFRS following the amendment, produced 
no evidence to that effect.  
Finally, tests of whether the increased scope for classification shifting presented by the 
implementation of AASB 5 in 2005 resulted in the reduction of accrual-based and/or 
real earnings management show no significant reduction in both alternative earnings 
management. Thus, the increased scope for classification shifting via discontinued 
operations had no effect on firms’ alternative earnings management practices. 
1.6 Contributions of the study 
This study has both practical and theoretical contributions. Its primary significance is to 
provide evidence to inform standard setters on the effectiveness of the regulations 
affecting classification shifting. While concerns about firms opportunistically 
misclassifying core expenses prior to the year 2001 appear to have been valid, and my 
results suggest that the 2001/02 amendments restricted opportunistic classification 
shifting, my findings also show evidence of substitution to accrual-based earnings 
management. Accrual-based earnings management is likely to present potentially more 
adverse effect on the quality of earnings than classification shifting because accrual-
based earnings management affects future earnings and/or cash flows due to the reversal 
of accruals, whereas classification shifting only affects current earnings. Therefore, it 
may not have been worth restricting the scope for classification shifting.  
My results should inform investors regarding the mechanisms through which earnings 
management is likely to affect reported firm performance, potentially enabling them to 
make more informed assessments of firm value. Analysts would be interested in the 
results as they care about the quality of earnings for firm valuation and their earnings 
predictions, as well as stock recommendations. This study should also inform auditors 
of other potential earnings management-affected elements of financial reports that will 
assist them with audit procedures and allocation of audit resources. My findings will 
also inform boards of directors and other corporate monitors about the extent to which 
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managers manipulate firm performance, so that other useful monitoring strategies and 
remuneration can be established. Moreover, my results should assist regulators such as 
ASIC better distribute limited resources for the enforcement of standards. Finally, 
jurisdictions that are in the process of converging with IFRS will find the results of this 
study useful in making decisions regarding the scope for classificatory choices, given 
that IFRS prohibit the separate classification of extraordinary items and the reporting of 
profit sub-totals before and after abnormal items. Thus, the findings of this study are of 
potential relevance to jurisdictions outside Australia, particularly those considering 
restricting the scope for classification shifting.   
My study also contributes to the earnings management literature in several ways. First, 
it extends the extant limited research on classification shifting by providing evidence on 
the impact of regulations affecting the scope for classification shifting, and enhances 
knowledge about other consequences of such regulations. Second, it provides further 
support for the validity of the McVay (2006) models of expected core earnings which 
have been criticised for being subject to design bias rather than showing evidence of 
earnings management (Barua and Cready 2008). 11  Classification shifting has only 
recently become a focus of interest and thus, the McVay (2006) design has been  
employed and adapted relatively sparingly, showing evidence of classification shifting 
as an earnings management tool (e.g. Lin et al. 2006; Athanasakou et al. 2009; Fan et al. 
2010; Haw et al. 2011; Siu and Faff 2013). Third, it provides support for current limited 
evidence that firms substitute between a portfolio of earnings management techniques to 
opportunistically increase earnings (e.g. Lin et al. 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Athanasakou 
et al. 2009; Haw et al. 2011; Zang 2012; Siu and Faff 2013). Overall, my study furthers 
our understanding and knowledge of firms’ earnings management practices.  
1.7 Organisation of the study 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two discusses the 
institutional background underpinning this study, describing the history of accounting 
11 When McVay (2006) removes accruals from the expected core earnings model, the sign of the relation 
between unexpected core earnings and special items becomes the opposite of what is predicted. Fan et al. 
(2010) suggest that this could be due to either insufficient control for performance or the possible bias 
acknowledged by McVay (2006). Barua et al. (2010) who do not exclude accruals from their expected 
core earnings and change in core earnings models include control variables in their test models and 
provide evidence of classification shifting using discontinued operations. My study which uses models of 
expected core earnings and change in core earnings without accruals, and includes control variables in the 
test models, provide further evidence to support that the flipped sign documented by McVay (2006) is due 
to insufficient controls and not model bias. 
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standards that govern the classification and reporting of non-recurring components of 
earnings in Australia and related jurisdictions where evidence of classification shifting 
has been documented.  Chapter Three then provides a review of the relevant earnings 
management literature and develops hypotheses to test the research questions identified 
in Section 1.2.  Chapter Four describes the research method used to test the hypotheses 
followed by Chapter Five, which describes the sources and nature of my data and the 
derivation of the samples used to test hypotheses. Next, Chapter Six provides 
preliminary descriptive analyses of firms’ reporting of non-recurring items across the 
three test periods, detailing the types of non-recurring items reported and the precise 
manner in which they are reported. Chapter Seven reports and discusses the findings of 
tests of the impact of the regulatory reforms on firms’ classification shifting behaviour. 
Chapter Eight then reports and discusses the findings of tests of whether the regulatory 
reforms affecting the scope for opportunistic classification shifting affected firms’ use 
of alternative earnings management techniques. Finally, Chapter Nine provides a 
conclusion and discusses the implications and contributions of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the recent history of the accounting standards central to my 
thesis: those governing the reporting of non-recurring components of earnings, such as 
extraordinary items, abnormal items and discontinued operations. While I focus on 
standards effective in Australia, I also briefly discuss the development of comparable 
standards in related jurisdictions to clarify the extent to which my results may 
generalise, and to provide necessary context for the literature review presented in the 
next chapter. Reporting choices regarding these items potentially affect the reliability of 
reported earnings and financial reports (e.g. McVay 2006; Cameron and Gallery 2008; 
Barua et al. 2010). The Australian conceptual framework (effective at the beginning of 
the study period) asserts that the objective of financial reports is to communicate 
relevant and reliable information to investors and other users about a firm’s 
performance, in order to facilitate informed decision making (AASB, 1995).12  Central 
to the presentation of reliable information and the understanding of such information, is 
the need to distinguish between the different components of earnings on the income 
statement because “a company’s activities may differ in stability, risk and the 
predictability of financial performance” (Cameron and Gallery 2008: 64). The different 
components of earnings include items expected to be recurring, which relate to the 
firm’s regular operating activities (e.g. sales and expenses from normal operations), and 
the non-recurring or temporary component which derive from activities that are not 
expected to occur every year (e.g. income from sale of noncurrent asset or the write-off 
of goodwill). The recurring component of earnings is more stable and more predictable 
than its non-recurring component, hence, the predictability of financial statements is 
improved if abnormal or temporary income and expense items are separately classified 
and reported from ordinary income (Rapaccioli and Schiff 1993).  
12 The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) conceptual framework under Statement of 
Accounting Concepts SAC 2 Objective of General Purpose Financial Reporting asserts a similar 
objective: “to provide users with information about the reporting entity which is useful for making and 
evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources” (IASB 2001). 
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Prior research documents that the separate classification and disaggregation of earnings 
information induces investors to values the specific components differently, thereby 
influencing their decision making (e.g. Davis 2002; Riedl and Srivinasan 2010). The 
apparent usefulness of disaggregating earnings according to the perceived transience of 
items is reflected in specific accounting standards that have been developed for the 
recognition and disclosure of non-recurring components of earnings such as 
extraordinary items (e.g. AAS 1), abnormal items (e.g. AASB 1018; AASB 101), and 
discontinuing and discontinued operations (e.g. AASB 1042; AASB 5), each of which 
are discussed in the following sections.  
Due to the diversity in the operations of reporting entities, accounting standards allow 
managers to exercise judgment over the recognition and/or classification of transactions. 
However, this flexibility may allow managers to misrepresent firms’ financial 
performance by selecting reporting methods, estimates, classifications, and disclosures 
that do not accurately reflect the firms’ underlying performance (Healy and Wahlen 
1999). Prior research provides evidence that firms manipulate the classification of 
earnings components to alter investor perceptions rather than to facilitate their 
understanding of firm performance (e.g. Ronen and Sadan 1975; McVay 2006; Barua et 
al.2010). Concerns about such practices, described in the literature as ‘classification 
shifting’, has led to the evolution of changes in accounting standards including those 
affecting the disclosure and recognition of extraordinary and abnormal items, in order to 
reduce management’s opportunistic application of those standards. For example, 
following the abusive reporting of abnormal items by firms identified by ASIC in its 
1998 surveillance of listed companies’ accounts, Jan McCahey (1999b), ASIC’s chief 
accountant at that time, stated that ASIC would support the issue of an accounting 
standard that would eliminate the classification of items as abnormal. Hence, despite a 
dearth of large sample empirical evidence, these concerns partly prompted standard 
setters to amend accounting standards to restrict such behaviour (Cameron and Gallery 
2012). Therefore, while accounting standards facilitate the communication to external 
users of relevant information about firms’ performance, standards do not guarantee the 
credibility of reported information. Consequently, standard setters continue to review 
and revise standards to improve the quality of financial reporting. 
My discussion begins with a review of standards affecting the reporting of non-
recurring items in Australia, starting with extraordinary items (EI), restrictions on which 
may have affected the reporting of abnormal items (AI), in Section 2.1. I then discuss 
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the evolution of standards affecting the classification and reporting of AI in Section 2.2, 
followed by discontinuing and discontinued operations (DO) in Section 2.3. Next, in 
Section 2.4, I discuss the evolution of equivalent standards in other jurisdictions in 
which empirical evidence of the manipulation of the classification and presentation of 
the non-recurring components of earnings has been reported (the United States of 
America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK)). Finally, I provide a chapter summary in 
Section 2.5.  
2.2 Reporting extraordinary items (EI) 
The evolution of accounting standards relating to EI in Australia flows partly from 
criticisms of firms’ practices in reporting EI, which were argued to have been motivated 
by the subjectivity of EI’s initial definition and disclosure requirements. Amendments 
to standards governing EI to calibrate their opportunistic classification however, 
resulted in the abusive reporting of AI.  
Reporting EI was initially prescribed in AAS13 1 Profit and Loss Statement, effective on 
1 December 1974. It defined EI at the time as “items of revenue and expense and other 
gains and losses brought to account in the period, which are attributable to events or 
transactions outside the ordinary operations of the business” (ASRB 1974, para. 4(d)), 
and EI were required to be reported below ordinary results.  This broad definition of EI 
and its placement below ordinary profit on the income statement encouraged firms to 
opportunistically shift ordinary expenses to EI to increase earnings from ordinary 
activities (Godfrey and Jones 1999). This contention was supported by empirical 
evidence consistent with firms opportunistically classifying large losses as EI, and 
thereby increasing operating profit (e.g. Craig and Walsh 1989; Walsh, Craig and 
Clarke 1991; Houghton 1994; Godfrey and Jones 1999).   
The Australian Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) then amended AAS 1 and 
issued ASRB 1018 (later AASB 1018) Profit and Loss Accounts, effective from 31 
December 1989. The amended standard redefined EI as revenues and expenses 
attributable to events or transactions external to the ordinary activities of the firm or 
group of firms, and are not recurring (ASRB 1989, para. 6). Thus, the definition of EI 
was tightened by requiring items to have been both non-ordinary activities and non-
recurring in nature, limiting firms' ability to report items as extraordinary (Parry 
13 The acronym AAS stands for Australian Accounting Standard. 
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1990).14 While relatively frequent reporting of EI persisted for a couple of years, the 
reporting of EI by Australian listed firms was subsequently very rare, with just 339 
firm-years out of 16,883 firm-years between 1993 and the adoption of IFRS in 2005 
reporting these items. Further changes were implemented when the adoption of AASB 
101 Presentation of Financial Statements, the Australian equivalent of (International 
Accounting Standard) IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements, effective for 
reporting years beginning on or after 1 January 2005, explicitly proscribed the separate 
disclosure of EI anywhere in the financial report (AASB 2004, para. 85).   
The next section elaborates on the disclosure requirements for AI and how the change in 
the definition of EI triggered the reform regarding the disclosure of AI. 
2.3 Reporting abnormal items (AI) 
Accounting standards relating to reporting AI also changed throughout the years, 
largely as a result of criticisms over the alleged opportunistic reporting of AI, which 
derived partly from changes to the definition and reporting of EI. AAS 1 paragraph 4(c), 
effective on 1 December 1974, defined AI then as revenues and expenses, and other 
gains and losses arising from ordinary activities of the entity, which are considered 
abnormal because of their size and effect on the firm’s performance in that period. The 
standard required abnormal items to be reported separately on the income statement 
within ordinary results. The definition and disclosure requirements for AI remained the 
same following the amendment that resulted in the more stringent definition of EI in the 
initial issue of ASRB 1018 (later AASB 1018), effective for financial years 
commencing 31 December 1989 and later. However, the more stringent definition of EI 
resulted in firms emphasizing profit before AI more frequently than before (Parker and 
Porter 2000; Houghton 1994; Cameron and Gallery 2008). Houghton (1994) provides 
evidence that Australia’s largest firms reported EI more frequently than AI in the pre-
ASRB 1018 period, but this trend reversed after the introduction of ASRB 1018. The 
typical sign of AI also changed, with pre-amendment average AI representing net gains 
and post-amendment average AI representing net losses.  
Criticism of such alleged opportunistic behaviour, whereby the financial media 
condemned the abusive use of AI to improve profits before AI (e.g. McLean 1999; 
14  This amendment brought the Australian definition for extraordinary items then, in line with the 
definition used in the US. The UK amended the definition of extraordinary items to also include that they 
should not recur, effective 23 June, 1993.  
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Saunders 1999; Parker and Porter 2000), and the inclusion of immaterial items in AI in 
direct conflict with the definition of AI in AASB 1018, became a concern for ASIC. Jan 
McCahey, ASIC’s chief accountant at the time, claimed that companies were 
misclassifying items as abnormal in order to improve reported profit ‘before AI’ 
(McCahey 1999a, 1999b),15 and thus declared that ASIC would support the issue of an 
accounting standard that constrained the opportunistic presentation of AI. Subsequently, 
an amended AASB 1018 Statement of Financial Performance was issued in October 
1999, operative for financial years ending on or after 30 June 2001. The amended 
standard no longer specifically referred to ‘abnormal items’, but prohibited reporting 
profit sub-totals before and after AI (Parker and Porter 2000; Cameron and Gallery 
2008). AASB 1018 paragraph 5.4 simply required that a material revenue or expense 
from ordinary activities whose disclosure is relevant to understanding the firm’s 
performance, must be reported separately, either on the face of the income statement or 
in the notes to financial reports. However, the standard was silent on precisely where on 
the income statement these additional items may be reported. Thus, while the standard 
prohibited the reporting of profit sub-totals before and after ‘abnormal items’, there was 
ambiguity as to the classification of items of that nature. 
Given the lack of restrictions placed on the positioning within the income statement of 
the  additional disclosures in paragraph 5.4, many large firms made no substantive 
change to their reporting behaviour, and ASIC noted that some firms continued to use 
the term ‘abnormal’ on the income statement (Parker and Porter 2000; Mackintosh 
2002). Other terms identified by the media that were used in place of abnormal included 
‘unusual’, ‘non-recurring’ and ‘significant’ (Dunn 2002; Wilson 2002). 16 , 17 
Accordingly, ASIC suggested that AASB 1018 be further revised (Mackintosh 2002).  
AASB 1018 was then further modified, operative for financial periods ending on or 
after 30 June 2002. The main effect of this amendment was to introduce restrictions on 
the placement and prominence given to additional line items (such as those that may 
 15 Specific areas of concerns identified for listed companies with balance dates from 1 July 1998 to 31 
December 1998 were: (a) many firms provided inadequate information to enable users to identify the 
nature of reported abnormal items; (b) operating expenses were classified as abnormal items even though 
they were of a similar size from year to year; and (c) mining exploration firms often classified all write-
offs of exploration expenditures as abnormal (McCahey 1999b: 72). 
16 A review of the annual reports for firms in the data shows that many firms used the term ‘abnormal 
items’ and reported them on the face of the income statement and below an earnings sub-total in their 
2001 financial reports. Examples include Cable & Wireless Options Ltd, Longreach Group Ltd, Metcash 
Ltd, Neo Resources Ltd, Sigma Company Ltd, and Webfirm Corporation Ltd. 
17 Examples from the data of firms that reported ‘significant items’ on the face of the income statement 
include China West International Holdings Ltd, SPC Ardmona Ltd, and Webster Ltd. A large number of 
companies reported items under the heading ‘significant items’ in the notes.  
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formerly have been reported as AI), sub-headings and sub-totals necessary for 
explaining the firm’s financial performance. These must be reported separately on the 
face of the income statement, provided that they be presented before, and less 
prominently than sub-totals such as: (i) profit or loss/result from ordinary activities 
before income tax expense (income tax revenue), and (ii) net profit or loss/result. 
Further, AASB 1018 (para 4.2(c)) provides that sub-totals of profit must not be reported 
immediately before ordinary revenues and expense items prescribed under paragraph 5.4 
(i.e. items requiring separate disclosure due to their ‘size, nature or incidence’).18 In 
essence, these restrictions prohibited firms from reporting sub-totals of profit before 
abnormal (or similarly named) items. In principle, this amendment should have limited 
the ability of firms to manipulate measures of core (or continuing) earnings 
opportunistically.   
Further changes affecting the scope for the manipulation of perceived core earnings by 
the opportunistic classification of abnormal or similar items occurred with Australia’s 
adoption of IFRS for financial periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005, whereby 
AASB 1018 was superseded by AASB 101 Presentation of Financial Statements. The 
new standard was also silent regarding use of the term ‘abnormal items’, and its 
requirement to report separately ordinary revenues and expenses of such a ‘size and 
nature’ as to be relevant to explaining performance remained similar (AASB 101, para. 
83) to that in the superseded standard.19 However, AASB 101 effectively removed 
restrictions on the placement and the prominence given to additional line items, sub-
headings and sub-totals that had been introduced in AASB 1018 in 2002. Where 
paragraph 4.2 of AASB 1018 (2002) specifically prescribed where on the income 
statement additional line items, sub-headings and sub-totals could be presented (i.e. 
profit sub-totals could not appear immediately before the line items of particular 
relevance to understanding the entity’s performance), AASB 101 contains no such 
express restriction.  Instead, firms are encouraged (AASB 101, para. 83.1) to follow the 
income statement format presented in the appendix of the standard, and are asked 
18 According to AASB 1018, paragraph 5.4, firms must not report sub-totals of profit immediately before 
items of ordinary revenues and expenses that are of such a size, nature or incidence that its disclosure is 
relevant in explaining the financial performance of the entity. There is nothing prohibiting the reporting 
of sub-totals immediately after these items. 
19 AASB 101, paragraph 86 also requires the nature and amount of material revenues and expenses to be 
disclosed separately either on the face of the income statement or in the notes. Examples provided in 
AASB 101 of circumstances that would give rise to separate disclosure include: write-downs of 
inventories or property, plant and equipment (PPE) as well as reversals of those write-downs; 
restructuring activities and reversals of any provisions relating to restructuring; disposals of PPE, and 
investments; and litigation settlements (AASB 2004, para. 87).  
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(AASB 101, para. 84) to amend the descriptions and the ordering of additional line 
items disclosed separately on the income statement when necessary in explaining the 
firm’s performance.20 The absence of a restriction on the placement and prominence of 
additional line items, headings and sub-totals on the face of the income statement may 
motivate firms to present additional income and expense line items of an abnormal 
nature, or headings and sub-totals below profit from ordinary activities and/or highlight 
these items more prominently than others, with a view to influencing the market’s 
perception of the firms’ core (continuing) earnings.21  
The next section describes the development of reporting requirements for DO, which 
may have provided another opportunity for classification shifting to improve core 
earnings when IFRS were adopted in 2005.  
2.4 Reporting discontinuing and discontinued operations (DO) 
Prior to IFRS adoption in 2005, the recognition and reporting of DO in Australia was 
prescribed in AASB 1042 Discontinuing Operations, which became effective for 
financial periods beginning on or after 1 July 2001. AASB 1042 defined a discontinuing 
operation as a major component of a firm which: (a) the firm, pursuant to a single plan 
was disposing of the operation entirely, or abandoning or terminating; (b) represented a 
separate major activity or geographical area of operations; and (c) could be separately 
identified for operational and financial reporting purposes (AASB 2000, para. 5.1.1 & 
10.1). Satisfying all these three tests suggested that DOs were not expected to occur 
frequently. Once the plan for discontinuance had been executed, regardless of the 
occurrence of settlement the operation was then regarded as ‘discontinued’. 
AASB 1042 required revenues and expenses derived from a DO to be classified within 
ordinary activities above profit from EI, while an item that met the definition of an EI 
must be classified as an EI (AASB 2000, para. 6.3 & 6.4). Further, a firm was required 
to report or make a disclosure relating to a DO only when the initial disclosure event 
occurred (AASB 2000, para 7.1.1), whereby the initial disclosure event occurred only 
when (a) the enterprise entered into a sale agreement for all the assets attributable to the 
discontinuing operation; or (b) an approved detail, formal plan had been announced for 
20 The profit and loss format in the appendix highlights profit before income tax which generally includes 
all revenues and expenses except results from discontinuing and discontinued operations. 
21 Examples of firms that reported abnormal items under different names or as one-off line items below 
certain earnings sub-totals following the adoption of IFRS include Autron Corporation Ltd, Asciano Ltd, 
Queensland Gas Company Ltd, Quay Magnesium Ltd, Southern Cross Exploration Ltd, and Webster Ltd. 
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the discontinuance (AASB 2000, para 10.1). A gain or loss from that actual disposal of 
the discontinuing operation was required to be disclosed only in the notes to financial 
reports. Thus, it appears there was little opportunity at the time to misclassify ordinary 
expenses as DO to influence earnings because there were strict conditions required for 
an item to be classified and reported as a DO, unlike EI or AI which were required at 
the time to be reported below profit from ordinary activities. Later in my thesis I present 
evidence that the recognition of DO under the pre-2005 regime was exceptionally rare.  
The introduction of AASB 5 Noncurrent Assets Held for Sales and Discontinued 
Operations on IFRS adoption, effective for financial periods beginning on or after 1 
January 2005, however, may have changed the scope for classifying items as DO. First, 
the definition of DO under AASB 5 is broader than in AASB 1042. AASB 5 defines 
DO as a component of an entity that has either been ‘disposed of’ or is classified as 
‘held for sale’ (AASB 2004, para. 3.2), whereas assets ‘held for sale’ were not part of 
the DO definition in AASB 1042. This broader definition which requires assets ‘held 
for sale’ to be recognised as DO, is likely to give rise to the more frequent recognition 
of DO than under AASB 1042, although they will generally be disclosed as DO later in 
the disposal process (see, for evidence of this expectation the ‘Accounting Alert’ issued 
by Deloitte in April 2004 (Deloitte 2004)).22 Moreover, ‘held for sale’ assets are not 
depreciated, but are measured at the lower of their carrying amount and fair value minus 
costs to sell. Impairment must be recognised in profit or loss for an initial or subsequent 
write-down of a ‘held for sale’ asset to fair value less selling costs, but a gain for any 
subsequent increase in fair value less costs to sell of an asset can be recognised in the 
profit or loss so long as it does not exceed cumulative impairment loss that has been 
previously recognised.  
The non-depreciable nature of assets ‘held for sale’ provides an incentive for managers 
to classify operating assets as ‘held for sale’ and report them under DO, thus increasing 
the likelihood of DO occurring more frequently under AASB 5 (post-IFRS) than it did 
previously. Furthermore, recognising impairment on write-down of assets ‘held for sale’ 
in profit or loss, which under AASB 1042 was required to be disclosed only in the 
notes, provides further incentive to classify operating assets as ‘held for sale’ and 
22 Assets must satisfy the following criteria in order for them to be classified as ’assets held for sale’: 
commitment to a plan to sell; asset is available for sale immediately; firm is actively locating a buyer; sale 
is highly probable within 12 months of classification as held for sale; asset is being actively marketed for 
sale; and the plan to sell is unlikely to be significantly changed or withdrawn. 
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misclassify impairment of operating assets as impairment on ‘held for sale’ assets, once 
more increasing the frequency of DO after AASB 5.   
Second, where under AASB 1042 disclosures as DO were required only when the initial 
disclosure event occurs, this is not a trigger for disclosure of DO under AASB 5. 
Reporting DO may take place where a firm has disposed of the operation or when 
criteria for classification as DO are met, including assets ‘held for sale’. Unlike AASB 
1042 whereby firms were required to report DO within ordinary activities on the face of 
the income statement, AASB 5 requires the separate presentation on the face of the 
income statement of a single net-of-tax amount of DO,23 while an analysis of this single 
amount should be disclosed either on the face of the income statement or in the notes, 
and if presented on the face of the income statement, should be separate from 
continuing operations (AASB 2004, para. 33). AASB 5, however, is silent on where on 
the face of the income statement the single amount of DO should be reported, nor does 
it proscribe the reporting of DO below a certain sub-total. This, together with the likely 
greater incidence of the recognition of DO, may have provided increased opportunity 
for classification shifting using DO whereby firms could report DO below a sub-total of 
results from ordinary activities and misclassify ordinary expenses as DO in order to 
increase profit from ordinary activities or core earnings. The majority of DO reporting 
firms in my data report DO below profit from continuing operations.  
Overall, the broader definition of DO to include either components disposed of or ‘held 
for sale’, and the less restrictive classification and presentation of DO under AASB 5, 
may give rise to DO being classified and reported more frequently than under AASB 
1042. Hence, AASB 5 provided incentives for firms to report DO opportunistically to 
boost core earnings. 
In the following section, I explore the equivalent of the disclosure requirements for non-
recurring items discussed above, in the UK and the US where empirical evidence of the 
manipulation of the classification and presentation of these non-recurring items has 
been reported. 
 
 
23 This single amount is comprised of the post-tax profit/loss of discontinued operations, and the post-tax 
gain/loss recognised on the disposal of the DO or on the measurement to fair value less costs to sell a DO. 
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2.5 Definition and disclosure of non-recurring items in the UK and US 
In this section, I briefly discuss the reporting requirements in the UK and US to explain 
the degree to which my results may be generalised because the empirical evidence on 
the opportunistic classification of earnings components is based largely in these two 
jurisdictions. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the definitions and disclosure 
requirements of AI and DO that were applicable during the period of this study, in 
Australia, the UK and US, and are elaborated on in this section. 
2.5.1 Extraordinary items, exceptional items, and discontinued operations in the 
UK 
The UK standards governing the disclosure of EI, AI and DO have also evolved over 
the past decades. Extraordinary items were known in the UK by the same term as in 
Australia and were similarly defined; AI were referred to as ‘exceptional items’ but 
similarly defined as AI in Australia.  Similar to Australia’s AAS 1, the UK’s Statement 
of Standard Accounting Practice 6 (SSAP 6) Extraordinary Items and Prior Year 
Adjustments required firms to report extraordinary items separately on the face of the 
income statement below profit/loss from ordinary activities. Exceptional items were 
required to be reported within profit/loss from ordinary activities (i.e. below operating 
profit), and above extraordinary items.  The placement of extraordinary items on the 
financial statement, and the fact that earnings per share (EPS) was calculated on 
ordinary profit after exceptional items, potentially motivated many firms to misclassify 
income-decreasing exceptional items as extraordinary (Athanasakou et al. 2007). 
Partly in response to concerns over the perceived abuse of extraordinary items, the UK’s 
Accounting Standards Board (UK ASB) revised the disclosure rules for extraordinary 
and exceptional items by issuing Financial Reporting Standard 3 (FRS 3) Presentation 
of Financial Statements (Athanasakou, Strong and Walker 2010), effective for financial 
periods ending on or after 23 June 1993, superseding SSAP 6 which had been in force 
since 1971.  FRS 3 redefined some components of earnings and introduced changes to 
the format of the income statement that had several implications on the disclosure of 
both extraordinary and exceptional items.  
First, FRS 3 redefined ordinary activities to include the effects of any event in any 
environment the reporting entity operates in regardless of its frequency or unusual 
nature (UK ASB 1992, para. 2), whereas they were restricted to usual, frequent and 
32 
 
regular activities under SSAP 6.24 FRS 3 also tightened the definition of extraordinary 
items to include only activities that were both outside the firm’s ordinary activities and 
were not expected to recur (UK ASB 1992, para. 6),  causing many items previously 
classified as extraordinary to now be considered as exceptional items (Athanasakou et 
al. 2007). The effect of the redefinition of extraordinary items in the UK on the 
disclosure of extraordinary and exceptional items (Choi, et al.  2007; Athanasakou et al. 
2007) was similar to that observed in Australia following the introduction of ASRB 
1018 in 1989:  the variety, frequency and magnitude of reported exceptional (abnormal) 
items increased while those of extraordinary items declined following the redefinition.25  
While this trend in Australia was seen by the media, regulators and academics as 
opportunistic classification (e.g. McLean 1999; Mackintosh 2002; Cameron and Gallery 
2008), Athanasakou et al. (2007) claim that it reflected the practice of classificatory 
smoothing which coincided with the increased persistence of earnings for UK firms.   
Second, FRS3 required firms to distinguish between operating and non-operating 
exceptional items, and non-operating exceptional items were required to be presented 
under separate categories below operating profit26 (See Fig. 1 in Athanasakou et al. 
2007). Exceptional items that did not fit these categories were required to be disclosed 
separately under a statutory format heading in accordance with its nature, above profit 
from ordinary activities (UK ASB 1992, para. 20 & 46). FRS 3 further required firms to 
indicate whether each exceptional item was attributed to continuing or discontinued 
operations (UK ASB 1992, para. 47). Thus, a post-FRS3 income statement could show 
more than one category of exceptional items. In contrast, the Australian standard at the 
time (AASB 1018), only required the aggregate amount of AI to be disclosed on the 
face of the income statement or in the notes, and did not distinguish between operating 
and non-operating AI. 
Third, FRS 3 required firms to calculate basic EPS from ‘net profit’ (attributable to 
equity shareholders) (UK ASB 1992, para. 25 & 52), not from ‘ordinary profit’ as 
24 Ordinary activities were defined in SSAP6 as “those usually, frequently, and regularly undertaken and 
any related activities incidental or arising therefrom. They include, but are not confined to trading”. This 
definition is limited to activities that occur frequently and regularly whereas the definition under FRS3 is 
more inclusive: “any activities which are undertaken by a reporting entity as part of its business and such 
related activities in which the reporting entity engages in furtherance of, incidental to, or arising from 
those activities” (UK ASB 1992, para. 2) 
25 Choi et al. (2005) observed a gradual increase in the magnitude of negative exceptional items post-
FRS3, similar to that observed by Houghton (1994) and Cameron and Gallery (2008) for abnormal items 
by Australian firms following the redefinition of extraordinary items in 1989. 
26 These separate categories are: (a) profits/losses on the sale or termination of an operation; (b) costs of a 
fundamental reorganisation or restructuring; and (c) profits/losses on the disposal of fixed assets. 
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previously allowed under SSAP 3. However, firms could report alternative EPS based 
on other levels of earnings as long as they reconciled to the basic EPS, were presented 
consistently over time, and not be more prominently highlighted than basic EPS (UK 
ASB 1992, para. 25). Firms could exclude exceptional items from alternative EPS to 
highlight other earnings measures. Prior studies argue that the disclosure of alternative 
EPS reflected managerial perceptions of persistent and predictable earnings (e.g. Walker 
and Louvari 2003; Choi, Lin, Walker and Young 2005; Athanasakou et al. 2007).  
FRS 3 also redefined DO and required firms to disclose results from these DO 
separately in the income statement. FRS 3 defined DO as “operations of the reporting 
entity that are sold or terminated and that satisfy all of four conditions: (a) the sale or 
termination is completed either in the period or before the earlier of three months after 
the commencement of the subsequent period and the date on which the financial 
statements are approved; (b) if a termination, the former activities have ceased 
permanently; (c) the sale or termination has a material effect on the nature and focus of 
the reporting entity’s operations …; and (d) … operations and activities are clearly 
distinguishable, physically, operationally and for financial reporting purposes” (UK 
ASB 1992, para. 4). Meeting all these conditions meant that DO was expected to be a 
rare occurrence. FRS 3 (para.14) required the aggregate results of DO to be disclosed 
separately from continuing operations on the face of the income statement down to the 
operating level (i.e. above ordinary activities).  An analysis of the aggregate amount 
should be given either on the income statement or in the notes. Given these 
requirements, there was relatively little scope for using DO to manage core earnings 
under FRS 3, similar to the situation in Australia under AASB 1042.  
Further amendments relating to the disclosure of non-recurring items were implemented 
when the European Union (EU) required its member countries to adopt IFRS for 
preparing consolidated accounts of listed companies, effective from 1 January 2005. 
Consequently, UK listed firms were explicitly prohibited under IAS 1 (as adopted by 
the EU) from reporting the term ‘extraordinary items’ anywhere in their consolidated 
financial statements while the term ‘exceptional items’ was removed altogether from the 
standard.  The disclosure requirements for DO (IFRS 5) however were similar to those 
in FRS 3 except that IFRS 5 neither specified that DO be reported above ordinary 
profit/loss nor gave an illustrative example of where on the income statement DO 
should be reported. The adoption of IFRS brought UK requirements for reporting non-
recurring earnings components by listed firms in harmony with Australia who also 
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adopted IFRS at the same time. The UK ASB however, maintained its standards for the 
use of unlisted firms and small companies. Thus, during the study period, FRS 3 was 
still applicable when preparing financial statements for firms that were not required to 
follow IFRS (UK ASB 2004; Selfridge 2010).  
2.5.2 Extraordinary items, special items and discontinued operations in the US 
Since the issuance of APB (Accounting Principles Board) 30 Reporting the Results of 
Operations, the US has required extraordinary items to be both outside ordinary 
activities and non-recurring (Godfrey and Jones 1999). This standard also prescribed the 
disclosure requirements for disposal of a business segment (i.e. DO), and unusual and/or 
infrequently occurring items.  
The US standards have not formally defined a comprehensive category akin to 
‘abnormal items’, instead, APB 30 paragraph 26 required items that are either ‘unusual’ 
or ‘infrequent’ (but not both), to be disclosed as a separate component of earnings from 
continuing operations either on the face of the income statement or in the notes 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 1973). With a few exceptions, 
including items relating to DO, these items are as aggregated by the data service 
COMPUSTAT, and described as ‘special items’.27 However, APB 30 did not specify 
whether these unusual or infrequent items be reported above or below ordinary results, 
nor provide examples of transactions or events that could be classified as ‘unusual’ or 
‘infrequent’, thus leaving it to the discretion of managers.28  Nevertheless, there is a 
growing amount of evidence in the US of firms opportunistically misclassifying 
ordinary expenses as special items to improve core earnings (e.g. McVay 2006; Fan et 
al. 2010; Siu and Faff 2013). The requirements for disclosing special items in the US 
are dissimilar to the treatment of ‘abnormal’/‘significant’ items in Australia if they are 
relevant to understanding firm performance (AASB 101, para. 83), but consistent with 
the ‘material’ items clause (AASB 101, para. 86) which only necessarily requires 
disclosure.  
27 Special items exclude the three major classes of non-recurring item that are required under GAAP to be 
reported separately from income from continuing operations: (1) disposals of a segment of a business that 
satisfy the requirements in APB30; (2) extraordinary items; and (3) cumulative effects of changes in 
accounting principles (Burgstahler et al. 2002).   
28 Gu and Chen (2004: 147, Table4) provide a list of non-recurring items (which include restructuring 
charges as the most frequently reported item) that First Call analysts judge whether to include or exclude 
from street (core) earnings and therefore may be classified as special items. Some of the items identified 
by Gu and Chen (2004) are listed in paragraph 23 of APB 30 as not comprising extraordinary items.  
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The disclosure of DO in the US was, from 1973 up to 2001, also prescribed in APB 30. 
Under APB 30, only dispositions of business ‘segments’ qualified to be reported as 
DO,29  and  results from DO and the gain/loss from the disposal of the DO were to be 
reported separately on the face of the income statement as a component of income 
before extraordinary items, but below results of continuing operations (FASB 1973, 
para. 8). 30   In August 2001, the FASB issued SFAS 31  144 Accounting for the 
Impairment and Disposal of Long-lived Assets, effective 15 December 2001, 
superseding the APB 30 provisions relating to DO (FASB 2001; Barua et al. 2010). 
SFAS 144 broadened the definition of DO by replacing the ‘business segment’ 
requirement with the ‘component of an entity’ concept (FASB 1973, para. 41).32 It 
required both the aggregate results of DO and any gain or loss from the disposal of the 
DO to be reported separately on the face of the income statement below income from 
continuing operation33 but above income before extraordinary items (FASB 1973, para. 
43).34 The standard reduced the tightness of the recognition criteria for DO, requiring 
that it be a ‘component of an entity’ disposed of or ‘held for sale’, allowing more asset 
disposals to be classified as DO (Barua et al. 2010). Moreover, the ‘below the line’ 
reporting requirement of disposals of long-lived assets as DO presents more opportunity 
for misclassification to improve core earnings where firms may misclassify disposals of 
assets as long-lived assets and report as DO. To date, Barua et al. (2010) provides the 
only known evidence that US firms engage in classification shifting using DO to 
influence core earnings, thus highlighting the negative effect of the standard.  
 
 
29 Business segments were defined as a major line of business or a class of customer in the form of a 
subsidiary, a division, or a department, and in some cases a joint venture or other non-subsidiary investee 
(APB30, para 13).  
30 This requirement was inconsistent with that for Australian firms under AASB 1042 between 1 July 
2001 and 30 December 2005 which did not require the separate disclosure of DO below results from 
continuing operations. 
31 The acronym SFAS stands for Statement of Financial Accounting Standard. 
32 A component of an entity may be a reportable segment or an operating segment; a reporting unit; a 
subsidiary; or an asset group (SFAS 144, para. 41). 
33 This caption must be modified appropriately when there are extraordinary items reported (SFAS 144: 
13, footnote 24). 
34 Under SFAS 144, the gain or loss for DO comprises three amounts. The first amount is the results from 
the operations of the component being discontinued, to be reported separately on the face of the income 
statement. The second amount is the net gain or loss from disposal, which can be disclosed either on the 
face of the income statement or in the notes. The third amount is an impairment loss on the ‘assets held 
for sale’ if the component is not disposed in the same year as the decision to discontinue, which must be 
disclosed on the face of the income statement (SFAS 144, para. 43 & 44). 
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the development of the Australian accounting standards 
relating to the classification and reporting of non-recurring items that are examined in 
this study, namely, abnormal items and discontinuing and discontinued operations, in 
comparison with the UK and US. Over the years, and during the course of my study 
period, each jurisdiction has implemented reforms to their accounting standards partly 
in response to criticisms over the alleged opportunistic reporting of these items in order 
to inhibit their alleged misapplication to inflate core earnings, in addition to enhancing 
guidelines for a more credible reporting environment.  
I discussed the progression of disclosure requirements for extraordinary items in 
Australia which allegedly affected the classification of AI. This was followed by a 
discussion of the changing disclosure requirements for abnormal items in response to 
their alleged misclassifications. Next, I discussed the standard governing DO disclosure 
which underwent revisions that, in contrast to those for AI between 2002 and 2005, but 
similar to those for AI post-2005, could encourage classification shifting. The effect of 
these amendments on the classification of non-recurring items is, however, unclear. I 
then discussed the evolution of disclosure requirements for the same non-recurring 
items in the UK and US where empirical evidence of their opportunistic classification 
has been documented.  
In the next chapter, I present a review of the earnings management literature in which I 
will elaborate and provide further empirical evidence on the use of classification 
shifting as an earnings management technique. 
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TABLE 2.1 
Comparison of the Reporting Requirements for Abnormal Items and Discontinuing and Discontinued Operations  
(applicable during the study period) between Australia, the UK and US 
  
  
 
Australia 
 
U.K. 
 
U.S. 
Accounting  
Standards 
ASRB1018 (AASB1018) Profit 
and Loss Accounts 
FRS3 Reporting Financial Performance APB30 Reporting the Results 
of Operations 
Effective date 31 December 1989 23 June 1993 30 September 1973 
Non-
recurring 
item 
Abnormal items Exceptional items 
 
Unusual/Infrequent (Special) items 
 
Definition 
  
Items of revenue and expense attributable 
to ordinary activities which are considered 
abnormal by reason of their size and 
effect on the results for the period. 
Material items which derive from events or 
transactions that fall within the ordinary 
activities and need to be disclosed due to their 
size or incidence. 
 
Special items are not defined, but the 
standard requires 'unusual' or 'infrequent' 
items (not both) to be reported separately.  
Unusual items are those that are abnormal 
and significantly different from the ordinary 
activities of the firm.  
Infrequent items are transactions or events 
not reasonably expected to recur in the 
foreseeable future. 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Disclosure 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
On the face of the income statement or in 
the notes. 
Sub-totals of earnings before abnormal 
items and earnings after abnormal items 
were allowed. 
 
Disclosed individually or in aggregate in the 
notes or on the face of the income statement in 
two ways: 
(1) immediately below operating profit but 
above profit from ordinary activities under its  
natural statutory format heading; 
(2) operating exceptional items to be disclosed  
above operating profit, and non-operating  
exceptional items to be disclosed under three  
categories below operating profit but above 
ordinary profit: 
(i) profit/loss on the sale or termination of an  
operation; 
(ii) costs of a fundamental reorganisation or 
restructuring; 
(iii) profit/loss on disposal of fixed assets. 
Items that relate to continuing operations must 
be distinguished from items relating to 
discontinued operations, and disclosed 
individually. 
 
Material unusual or infrequent items should 
be reported as a separate component of 
income from continuing operations on the 
face of the income statement. 
Gains or losses of similar nature not 
individually material should be aggregated 
and reported in the notes.  
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Examples 
provided in 
standards 
  
  
  
  
 
Large:  
- bad debt write-offs; 
- inventory write-downs; 
- write-offs of research & development 
expenses; 
- depreciation adjustments; 
- gains/losses from sale of properties or 
investments. 
Profit/loss on the sale or termination of an 
operation; 
costs of a fundamental reorganisation or  
restructuring; 
profit/loss on disposal of fixed assets. 
None, however, empirical studies provide 
the following: 
- restructuring charges; 
- natural disaster losses; 
- non-recurring profits/losses on sale of 
assets, investments and securities; 
- write-downs or write-offs of receivables, 
inventories, PPE or R&D costs. 
Restrictions 
regarding 
disclosure 
  
None Exceptional items should not be aggregated on 
the face of the income statement under one 
heading of exceptional items but each item 
should be included within its natural statutory 
formal heading and separately disclosed. 
Prohibits the presentation of sub-totals before 
'special' items. 
  
    
 
Accounting 
Standards 
AASB1018 Profit and Loss Accounts FRS3 Reporting Financial Performance 
 
APB30 Reporting the Results of 
Operations 
 
Effective date 
  
  
Financial year ending 30 June 2001. 
Amended and effective for financial year 
ending 30 June 2002. 
23 June 1993 30 September 1973 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
 
Non-
recurring 
item 
Specific revenues and expenses. 
The term 'abnormal items' is absent from 
the standard. 
 
 
Exceptional items Unusual/Infrequent (Special) items 
  
Definition 
  
  
  
  
  
The term 'abnormal items' is not defined. 
The standard requires the reporting of  
‘specific’ revenues and expenses from  
ordinary activities that are of such a size,  
nature or incidence that their disclosure is 
relevant in explaining the firm's 
performance  
Material items which derive from events or 
transactions that fall within the ordinary 
activities and need to be disclosed due to their 
size or incidence. 
Special items are not defined, but the 
standard requires 'unusual' or 'infrequent' 
items (not both) to be reported separately.  
Unusual items are those that are abnormal 
and significantly different from the ordinary 
activities of the firm.  
Infrequent items are transactions or events 
not reasonably expected to recur in the 
foreseeable future. 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Disclosure 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Nature and amount of 'material' specific 
items must be presented separately on the 
face of the income statement or in the 
notes (2002 version). 
Line items, sub-headings and sub-totals 
necessary for explaining the firm’s 
financial performance must be disclosed 
separately on the face of the income 
statement provided that: 
(a) such sub-totals are presented 
before results from ordinary 
activities; 
(b) such sub-totals are presented 
less prominently than results 
from ordinary activities; and 
(c) a profit/loss sub-total not 
presented immediately before 
the ‘material revenue/expense 
from ordinary activities.  
Disclosed individually or in aggregate in the  
notes or on the face of the income statement in  
two ways: 
(1) immediately below operating profit but 
above profit from ordinary activities under its 
natural 
statutory format heading; 
(2) operating exceptional items to be disclosed 
above operating profit, and non-operating  
exceptional items to be disclosed under three 
categories below operating profit but above 
ordinary profit: 
(i) profit/loss on the sale or termination of an  
operation; 
(ii) costs of a fundamental reorganisation or 
restructuring; 
(iii) profit/loss on disposal of fixed assets. 
Items that relate to continuing operations must 
be distinguished from items relating to 
discontinued operations and disclosed 
individually. 
Material unusual or infrequent items should 
be reported as a separate component of 
income from continuing operations on the 
face of the income statement. 
Gains or losses of similar nature not 
individually material should be aggregated 
and reported in the notes.  
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Examples 
provided in 
standards 
  
  
  
 
Litigation settlements; restructuring of 
operations; net gain/loss on disposal of 
receivables, investments, PPE and 
intangible assets; net increment and/or 
decrement from revaluation of noncurrent 
assets. 
(2002 version) 
Profit/loss on the sale or termination of an 
operation; costs of a fundamental 
reorganisation or restructuring; profit/loss on 
disposal of fixed assets. 
None, however, empirical studies provide 
the following: 
- restructuring charges; 
- natural disaster losses; 
- non-recurring profits/losses on sale of 
assets, investments and securities; 
- write-downs or write-offs of receivables, 
inventories, PPE or R&D costs. 
 
    Restrictions 
regarding 
disclosure 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Removed abnormal items from standard, 
thus, the presentation of results before and 
after abnormal items was no longer 
required.  
Additional line items, sub-headings and 
sub-totals must be disclosed before and 
less prominently than results from 
ordinary activities, results from 
extraordinary items, and net profit/loss. 
(2002 version) 
 
No express prohibitions, however, disclosure 
requirements imply prohibition of exceptional 
items below ordinary profit. 
 
Prohibits the presentation of sub-totals before 
'special' items. 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Accounting 
Standards 
AASB101 Presentation of 
Financial Statements 
IAS1 (as adopted by EU) Presentation 
of Financial Statements 
 
APB30 Reporting the Results of 
Operations 
 
Effective date 
  
Financial periods beginning on or after 1 
January 2005. 
Financial periods beginning on or after 1 
January 2005. 
30 September 1973 
  
Non-
recurring 
item 
  
  
No generic term provided but the standard 
requires the reporting of additional line 
items, headings and sub-totals that are 
'material' and of such a nature that their 
disclosure is necessary. 
No generic term provided but the standard 
requires the reporting of additional line items, 
headings and sub-totals that are 'material' and 
of such a nature that their disclosure is 
necessary. 
Unusual/Infrequent (Special) items 
 
    Definition 
  
  
  
  
  
The term 'abnormal items' is not defined. 
An item is 'material' if its omission or 
misstatement could, individually or 
collectively influence the decisions of 
users. 
Materiality depends on the size and nature 
of the omission or misstatement. 
The term 'exceptional items' is no longer 
defined. 
An item is 'material' if its omission or 
misstatement could, individually or 
collectively influence the decisions of users. 
Materiality depends on the size and nature of 
the omission or misstatement. 
Special items are not defined, but the 
standard requires 'unusual' or 'infrequent' 
items (not both) to be reported separately.  
Unusual items are those that are abnormal 
and significantly different from the ordinary 
activities of the firm.  
Infrequent items are transactions or events 
not reasonably expected to recur in the 
foreseeable future. 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Disclosure 
  
  
  
  
Nature and amount of 'material' additional 
line item must be presented separately on 
the face of the income statement or in the 
notes. 
Additional line items, headings and sub-
totals are allowed to be presented on the 
face of the income statement if necessary. 
 
Nature and amount of 'material' additional line 
item must be presented separately on the face 
of the income statement or in the notes. 
Additional line items, headings and sub-totals 
must be presented in the statement of 
comprehensive income and the separate 
statement of comprehensive income (if 
presented). 
Material unusual or infrequent items should 
be reported as a separate component of 
income from continuing operations on the 
face of the income statement. 
Gains or losses of similar nature not 
individually material should be aggregated 
and reported in the notes.  
 
    Examples 
provided in 
standards 
  
  
  
  
Write-downs of inventories and PPE and  
reversals of such write-downs; 
restructuring of activities and reversals of 
provisions for restructuring; 
disposals of items of PPE; 
disposals of investments; 
discontinued operations; 
litigation settlements; 
other reversals of provisions. 
Write-downs of inventories and PPE and 
reversals of such write-downs;  
restructuring of activities and reversals of 
provisions for restructuring;  
disposals of items of PPE; 
disposals of investments; 
discontinued operations; 
litigation settlements; 
other reversals of provisions. 
None, however, empirical studies provide 
the following: 
- restructuring charges; 
- natural disaster losses; 
- non-recurring profits/losses on sale of 
assets, investments and securities; 
- write-downs or write-offs of receivables, 
inventories, PPE or R&D costs  
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Restrictions 
regarding 
disclosure 
  
  
  
No restriction placed on the presentation 
of additional sub-totals. 
Prohibits the presentation of extraordinary 
items either anywhere in financial 
statements. 
 
Prohibits the presentation of extraordinary 
items either on the face of the financial 
statements or in the notes. 
Removes 'exceptional items' from the standard, 
thus no more reporting of sub-totals before and 
after exceptional items. 
 
Prohibits the presentation of sub-totals before 
'special' items. 
  
  
 
 
 
Accounting 
Standards 
  
 
AASB5 Noncurrent Assets Held for 
Sale and Discontinued Operations 
 
 
IFRS5 (as adopted by EU) Noncurrent 
Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued 
Operations 
 
 
SFAS144 Accounting for the 
Impairment and Disposal of Long-Lived 
Assets 
 
Effective date 
 
1 January 2005 1 January 2005 15 December 2001 
Non-
recurring 
Item 
 
Discontinuing and Discontinued 
operations 
  
Discontinuing and Discontinued operations 
  
 
 
 
Discontinuing and Discontinued operations 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Definition 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
A component of an entity that either has 
been disposed of or is classified as held 
for sale and: 
(a) represents a separate major line of  
business or geographical area of 
operation; (b) is part of a single co-
ordinated plan to dispose of a separate 
major line of business or geographical 
area of operations; or (c) a subsidiary 
acquired exclusively for resale 
A component of an entity that either has been  
disposed of, or is classified as held for sale, 
and 
(a) represents a separate major line of business 
or geographical area of operation;  
(b) is part of a single co-ordinated plan to 
dispose of a separate major line of business or 
geographical area of operations; or 
(c) a subsidiary acquired  exclusively for resale 
A component of an entity that can be clearly 
distinguished, operationally and for financial 
reporting, from the rest of the entity, that is to 
be disposed of by sale, abandonment, or 
purchased exclusively with a view for resale. 
Component of an entity can be reporting 
segment, reporting unit, subsidiary, or asset 
grouping. 
 
 
    Disclosure 
  
  
  
  
  
A single aggregate net of tax amount 
shall be disclosed separately on the face 
of the income statement. 
Analysis of aggregate amount to be either 
on the income statement or in the notes. If 
presented on income statement, must be 
separate from continuing operations. 
A single aggregate net of tax amount shall be 
disclosed separately on the face of the income 
statement. 
Analysis of aggregate amount to be either on 
the income statement or in the notes. If 
presented on income statement, must be 
separate from continuing operations. 
Aggregate results of DO and gain/loss from 
disposal of DO must be disclosed separately 
below results from continuing operations but 
above results from EI. 
Three amounts of DO must be disclosed  
separately on the income statement: 
(i) results from operations of component 
being discontinued; (ii) net gain/loss from 
disposal; (iii) impairment loss on asset held 
for sale if not yet disposed of. 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Examples 
provided in 
standards 
  
None 
  
  
  
None 
  
  
- a product group for a manufacturing firm  
where operations and cash flow can be clearly  
distinguished 
- a loss making beauty care products group 
committing to a plan to sell the product group 
with its operations. 
 
Restrictions 
regarding 
disclosure 
None None 
  
None 
  
    Previous 
Accounting 
Standard 
AASB1042 Discontinuing Operations 
FRS3 Presentation of Financial 
Statements 
SFAS144 Accounting for the 
Impairment and Disposal of Long-Lived 
Assets 
Effective 
Date 
1 July 2001 23 June 1993 15 December 2001 
Non-
recurring 
item 
Discontinuing and Discontinued 
operations 
Discontinuing and Discontinued operations Discontinuing and Discontinued operations 
  
 
 
 
    
48 
 
TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Definition A major component of an entity that 
management has developed a single plan 
to dispose of in its entirety, or abandon, or 
terminate through a combination of one or 
more transactions and abandonment. 
The component of an entity must 
represent a separate major activity 
geographical area of operations, and can 
be separately identified for operational 
and financial reporting purposes. 
Operations of the reporting entity that are sold 
or terminated and that satisfy all of these 
conditions: 
(a) the sale or termination is completed either 
in the period or before the earlier of three 
months after the commencement of the 
subsequent period on which the financial 
statements are approved; 
(b) if a termination, the former activities have 
ceased permanently; 
(c) the sale or termination has a material effect 
on the entity's operation; 
(d) operations and activities of the disposed 
reporting entity are clearly distinguishable, 
physically, operationally, and for financial 
reporting purposes. 
A sale or termination must have a material 
effect on the nature or focus of the firm's 
operations and represents a material reduction 
from its operating facilities. 
Operations of a ‘segment of a business’ that 
has been sold, abandoned, spun off, or 
otherwise disposed of or, although still 
operating, is the subject of a formal plan for 
disposal. 
A segment may be in a form of subsidiary, 
a division, or a department, and in some cases 
a joint venture or other non-subsidiary 
investee that is clearly distinguished from 
results and operations of the entity. 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) 
Disclosure Each DO to be reported individually on 
the face of income statement within 
ordinary activities. 
Detailed information about the DO must 
be reported in the income statement. 
Aggregate results to be disclosed separately on 
the face of the income statement, below results 
from continuing operations, down to operating 
profit but above ordinary profit. 
Analysis of the aggregate amount to be either 
on the income statement or in the notes.  
 
Amount of results from DO and gain/loss 
from disposal should be disclosed separately 
from results from continuing operations on 
the face of the income statement, as a 
separate component of income before 
extraordinary items. 
 
Examples 
provided in 
standard 
None A hotel company which had traditionally 
served the lower end of the hotel market sold 
its existing chain and bought luxury hotels, or 
the same company sold its hotels in the US and 
buy hotels in Europe. 
 
None 
Restrictions 
regarding 
disclosure 
  
No disclosure required until the 
occurrence of the initial disclosure event. 
   
None 
  
None 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REVIEW OF THE EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
LITERATURE, AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the earnings management literature and develops hypotheses to 
test the research questions examined in this thesis. The central research questions in this 
thesis examine: (i) whether the amendments to regulations affecting the scope for the 
classification and reporting of non-recurring components of earnings on the income 
statement (in 2002 and 2005) affected firms’ classification shifting behaviour, and (ii) 
whether such amendments affected firms’ use of other earnings manipulation techniques 
(accrual-based and real earnings manipulation) to influence core earnings.  Such 
manipulations are broadly described in the literature as ‘earnings management’, which 
has been found to distort financial information available to users, thus negatively 
affecting their decision making (e.g. Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dey 2008; Zang 2012). 
For example, poor earnings quality as a consequence of earnings management impede 
the flow of investment through capital markets (Jackson and Pitman 2001), resulting in 
investors and debt holders suffering wealth losses (Wilson 2011), or induce inaccurate 
estimates of firms’ future earnings and cash flow by analysts (Byard, Li and Yu 2011). 
Moreover, impaired information as a result of earnings management may make financial 
contracting more restrictive and costly (Bartov 1993, Peasnell 1998). 
Concerns about the negative effects of earnings management, and more egregious 
reporting distortions,  have prompted regulators to amend existing regulations (e.g. 
amended AASB 1018 in Australia, effective 31 December 1989) and/or implement new 
regulations (e.g. the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act) in an attempt to curb those practices. The 
impact of those regulations on earnings management practices has become a topic of 
much academic debate and research, and is the focus of my thesis. Whilst evidence of 
accrual-based earnings management and real earnings manipulation have been well-
documented in the literature, there is relatively little research examining classification 
shifting as a viable alternative to influence earnings, and this research has only come to 
prominence following McVay’s (2006) study.  Because my study examines the impact 
of regulatory amendments relating to non-recurring components of earnings (between 
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1995 and 2009) on the use of all three earnings management methods to influence 
earnings, I therefore review the literature pertaining to all three methods. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 defines earnings 
management as identified in the literature. Next, Section 3.3 discusses why earnings 
management occur, focusing on the agency theory perspective as the underlying driving 
force. I then discuss specific incentives that motivate earnings management in Section 
3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the different earnings management methods identified in the 
literature, followed by the factors that affect management’s choice of earnings 
management method(s) in Section 3.6. Next, Section 3.7 develops the hypotheses, 
followed by a chapter summary in Section 3.8. 
3.2 Defining earnings management                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Healy and Wahlen (1999) provide a comprehensive definition of earnings management, 
subsuming the method by which earnings are managed, and the broad motivation for 
this behaviour. They define earnings management as occurring “when managers use 
judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen 1999: 368). 
This definition of earnings management is shaped by earnings management research 
relevant to standard setting (Healy and Wahlen 1999), an issue of core relevance to my 
thesis. Because I study the impact of several changes to accounting standards, I focus 
my attention on earnings management effected within the limits of those standards (i.e. 
within GAAP). 35 Earnings management may be effected intra-period, whereby earnings 
components are opportunistically misclassified within a single period’s financial reports 
(e.g. McVay 2006; Barua et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2010), or inter-period where earnings 
are shifted from one period to another through the manipulation of accruals or real 
35 There are numerous categorisations of earnings management according to its level of egregiousness. 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)  referred to  ‘abusive’ or ‘aggressive’ 
earnings management as that which falls within GAAP limits (Securities and Exchange Commission 
1999; Mulford and Comiskey 2002) and as ‘fraudulent accounting’ when GAAP is violated (Dechow and 
Skinner 2000; Ronen and Yaari 2008).  The SEC (1999: 84) defines ‘abusive’ earnings management as 
“involving the use of various forms of gimmickry to distort a company’s true financial performance in 
order to achieve a desired result”. The National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (1993: 12) 
cited in Dechow and Skinner (2000: 238) defines fraud as “the intentional, deliberate, misstatement or 
omission of material facts, or accounting data, which is misleading and, when considered with all the 
information made available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or decision”.  
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transactions. I extend this literature by examining the impact of regulatory amendments 
affecting the scope for the classification and reporting of non-recurring items in 
Australia, on firms’ use of all three methods of earnings management to improve core 
earnings. The following sections review the key literature relevant to understanding 
each of these major forms of earnings management examined in my thesis.  
3.3 Why does earnings management occur? 
Explanations for the broad phenomenon of earnings management draw heavily upon 
agency theory, which suggests that earnings management is problematic and that those 
who prepare financial reports may act opportunistically, distorting financial information 
released to stakeholders (e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983; Dey 2008), and potentially 
transferring wealth to the agent (typically management).36   
Agency theory, developed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) most commonly focuses on the contractual relationship between principals 
(shareholders) and agents (management) who have conflicting interests (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989), due to the separation of corporate ownership and 
control in modern corporations (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Demski and Feltham 1978; 
Fama and Jensen 1983). Shareholders delegate decision making rights to managers who 
are compensated for their effort. However, managers may act in their own interests at 
the expense of shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983, Dey 2008) by misallocating 
corporate funds and resources for their own use (Degeorge et al. 1999; Huang and 
Zhang 2012), or refraining from making investment decisions that increase firm and 
shareholder value because of perceived private risks (Eisenhardt 1989). Managers may 
also withhold or distort information in pursuit of their personal aims (Huang, Chang and 
Yu 2006). Withholding information impairs the ability of the uninformed investor to 
make optimal decisions about their investments (Easley and O’Hara 2004; Francis et al. 
2004). Less reliable or uncertain information may result in investors making inaccurate 
estimates of a firm’s future performance and potential (Barry and Brown 1985; 
36 Other perspectives suggest that not every managerial action that affects accounting information is of an 
opportunistic nature. Certain circumstances call for actions that are not opportunistic (Zimmer 1986; 
Christie and Zimmerman 1994; Parfet 2000; Drymiotes and Hemmer 2013), where managers make 
accounting choices that best reflect the underlying performance of the firm, and that maximise the value 
of the parties in the contract including the managers themselves (Zimmer 1986; Christie and Zimmerman 
1994; Parfet 2000), and which result in more informative financial reports (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner 1994; Subramanyam 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Bartov et al. 
2002; Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Riedl and Serafeim 2011) even if the benefit to stakeholders is only for 
the short-term (Badertscher, Collins and Lys 2012).  
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Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Graham et al. 2005). These increase the risk of costly 
resource allocation by investors (Francis et al. 2004), which directly affects the cost of 
equity capital (Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson and Schipper 2012).  
To reduce these agency problems, shareholders attempt to control managerial self-
interest through monitoring and bonding mechanisms. Monitoring refers to the 
observation and evaluation of the agents’ performance, while bonding describes 
mechanisms designed to align incentives, is carried by the board of directors (on behalf 
of shareholders more broadly), who hold decision control rights including the authority 
to reward or punish management performance (Fama and Jensen 1983). Managers enter 
into contracts that specify their roles in the firm and the rewards and/or punishments 
they face based on performance (Armstrong, Guay and Weber 2010).37 Implementing 
monitoring and bonding requires shareholders to pay a price (i.e. compensation) to 
boards of directors (and auditors) for their time and effort (Pfeffer 1981; Eisenhardt 
1989). However, monitoring and bonding are likely to be imperfect and incentives for 
opportunistic behaviour still exist. They are imperfect because although board directors 
are compensated for their monitoring roles, their ability to act as an effective monitoring 
mechanism depends on their independence from management (Beasley 1996; Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney1996). Yet, board members are often nominated by management 
(Fama and Jensen 1983), who may not recommend to the board those they view as 
potential obstacles to their self-interests. Moreover, board directors are themselves 
agents of shareholders and may well collude with management to misappropriate firm 
resources. Although litigation and upholding their ‘reputation’ may prevent board 
members from acting against shareholders’ interest (Fama and Jensen 1983), they may 
not always have perfect incentives to perform in the best interest of shareholders 
(Carcello and Neal 2003; Kent, Routledge and Stewart 2010), particularly because it is 
costly for shareholders to monitor them. 38   Furthermore, some of the mechanisms 
implemented to reduce agency problems (e.g. management and board remuneration) 
have the potential to induce earnings management, because management performance is 
37 Lenders also have control rights with respect to debt contracting whereby managers, on behalf of the 
firm enter into debt contracts with lenders who provide funds to the firm. Lenders thus act as monitors, 
and bond managers through contracting that punishes managers should the terms of the contract be 
violated.  
38 Baysinger and Butler (1985) suggest that nonexecutive directors who are entirely independent from 
management are expected to offer shareholders the greatest protection in monitoring management. 
Research evidence however, has been inconsistent. Peasnell et al. (2000) and Davidson et al. (2005) 
report that earnings management reduces when the majority of the board directors are nonexecutive. In 
contrast, Chtourou et al. (2000) do not find board independence as a deterrent for earnings management. 
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often evaluated against benchmarks that include reported earnings numbers which 
management have control over (Healy 1985; Zimmer 1986; Dechow 1994).  
3.4 Specific incentives for managing earnings 
Applying the broad agency framework summarised above, the literature identifies 
numerous specific incentives for earnings management. These incentives include 
earnings benchmark beating, income smoothing, other capital market incentives, and 
contracting incentives (Dechow et al. 1995), which are discussed in turn below.39 
Managers may manipulate earnings because they believe that they will personally and 
directly benefit as a consequence (Graham et al. 2005; Bergstresser and Phillipon 2006; 
Roychowdhury 2006). Managers may also manage earnings in the firms’ 
(shareholders’) interest when those interests align with their personal interests 
(Degeorge et al. 1999; Graham et al. 2005). 
3.4.1 Meeting or beating earnings benchmarks 
One of the most frequently examined motivations for earnings management in recent 
literature reflects incentives to meet or beat earnings benchmarks,   including analyst 
earnings forecasts, zero earnings, and prior year earnings. Managers try to meet/beat 
benchmarks because stakeholders use these benchmarks to evaluate firm (and thus 
managerial) performance (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999). The 
incentive to achieve the benchmarks is to maximise stock price (in the short run at 
least), because meeting/beating the benchmark(s) may improve the stock price of a firm 
while missing the benchmark may negatively affect the stock price, increasing the cost 
of capital (Graham et al. 2005; Bergstresser and Phillipon 2006). These have 
implications for managers because not only is part of their compensation often based on 
achieving those benchmarks (Hirst et al. 1995), their reputations and job security also 
hinges on it (Graham et al. 2005). For instance, some firms award bonuses and stock 
options to management if the stock price improves to or beyond a targeted number, 
while no rewards are made if that certain target is not achieved (DeFond and Park 1997; 
Graham, Harvey and Puri 2013).  Therefore, managers may strive to meet/beat one or 
all of the earnings targets to accrue personal benefits (e.g. improve chances of achieving 
39 An additional motivation for earnings management, reflecting incentives to temporarily or permanently 
depress reported profit to avoid political attention is not discussed in detail as it has little potential 
relevance to my research question. 
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compensation such as bonus), or suffer loss as a consequence of missing the target (e.g. 
missing out on compensation) (Dye 1988; Fudenberg and Tirole 1995; DeFond and 
Park 1997; Graham et al. 2005; Wilson 2011). The order of importance of meeting the 
targets may vary over time.  
3.4.1.1 Analysts’ earnings forecasts   
Survey-based evidence in the US (e.g. Graham et al. 2005) and the UK (e.g. Choi et al. 
2006) reveals that meeting analyst forecasts is a fundamental earnings target. Brown 
and Caylor (2005) claim that meeting analyst forecasts is at the top of managers’ agenda 
due to increased media coverage on analyst forecasts, more analyst following, more 
firms covered by analysts, and increased accuracy of analyst forecasts.  
Managers are motivated to manage earnings to meet/beat analyst earnings forecasts  
because missing the forecast (even by a small amount) adversely affects the firm’s stock 
price and is detrimental to firm and shareholder value (Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin 
2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002; Athanasakou et al. 2009) as well as to management 
interests (Degeorge et al. 1999). That is, managers risk forgoing their performance-
based compensation or losing their jobs and damaging their reputation if analyst 
forecasts are not met (Degeorge et al. 1998; Graham et al. 2005). On the other hand, 
meeting the forecasts entices a positive market response that increases firm and 
shareholder value (Kasznik and McNichols 2000; Bartov et al. 2002; DeFond and Park 
2002; Dutta and Gigler 2002), in favour of management interests such as security of 
their jobs and reputations, earning their bonuses or selling stocks at a higher price 
(Graham et al. 2005; Bergstresser and Phillipon 2006). Prior research documents that 
managers inflate earnings to meet/beat analyst forecasts using accrual-based earnings 
management (e.g. Payne and Robb 2000; Peasnell, Pope and Young 2000; Brown 2001; 
Skinner and Sloan 2002; Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin 2002; Barua, Legoria, and 
Moffitt 2006; Bhojraj et al. 2009; Herbohn, Tuttici, and Khor 2010; Badertscher et al. 
2012), real activities manipulation (e.g. Frank and Rego 2006; Hribar et al. 2006; 
Roychwdhury 2006; Carter, Lynch and Tuna. 2007; Chen, Rees, and Sivaramakrishnan 
2010), classification shifting (e.g. McVay 2006, Athanasakou et al. 2009, Barua et al. 
2010; Fan et al. 2010), or a portfolio of two or more of these techniques  (e.g. 
Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Lin et al. 2006; Haw et al. 2011; Siu and Faff 2013).  
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3.4.1.2 Prior period earnings (avoiding earnings decreases) 
Managers also strive to meet/beat prior period earnings (i.e. avoid earnings decreases), 
which according to the survey by Graham et al. (2005) is the top priority for managers. 
Consistently meeting/beating prior period earnings may give the impression of solid 
firm performance from persistent earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002) and thus, 
testifies to prudent management performance which translates to management job 
security and achieving benchmark-based remuneration (Graham et al. 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006). Missing the target may signal poor firm performance, which may 
negatively portray the reputation of management and their chances of receiving 
benchmark-based compensation (Degeorge et al. 1999). Prior research provides 
evidence consistent with meeting/beating prior period earnings using discretionary 
accruals management (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Barth et al. 1999; Dechow et 
al. 2003; Holland and Ramsay 2003; Barua et al. 2006; Koh 2007; Chen, Lin, Wang and 
Wu 2010; Badertscher et al. 2012), real activities manipulation (e.g. Matsunga 1995; 
Myers, Myers and Skinner 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen, 
Mashruwala and Zach 2010; Gunny 2010), or classification shifting (e.g. Barua et al. 
2010; Fan et al. 2010).  
3.4.1.3 Zero or positive earnings (avoiding losses) 
Managers may also manage earnings to meet/beat zero earnings (i.e. avoid reporting 
negative earnings) because stakeholders such as lenders use earnings numbers to 
evaluate firm performance in relation to their debt covenants (Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997; Roychowhdury 2006), and the market overreacts to companies with earnings that 
just miss the zero threshold (Dechow and Schrand 2004). Missing the zero earnings 
target may result in stricter conditions for debt covenants and/or the stock price may 
take a hit, and managers may suffer personally as a result. For example, should the 
company fail to make profit, the lenders may restrict dividend payout depriving 
management of their dividends in the event that they are awarded shares as part of their 
compensation, or the value of their stocks decreases, restricting their ability to profit 
from shares in the company (Bergstresser and Phillipon 2006). Thus, it is in managers’ 
personal interests to manage earnings to beat zero earnings.  Prior research reports that 
firms avoid negative earnings by manipulating accruals (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997; Gore et al. 2007; Jiang 2008; Badertscher et al. 2012), real activities (e.g. 
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Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2010; Dierynck, Landsman, and 
Renders 2012), or by classification shifting (e.g. Barua et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2010).  
3.4.2 Income smoothing 
Managers may be motivated to report a smooth time-series of earnings as a signal of 
stability, which is preferred in capital and labour markets (Mulford and Comiskey 
2002). Smooth earnings portray a lower level of earnings uncertainty and risk 
(Beidleman 1973; Barnea et al. 1975; Mulford and Comiskey 2002; Dichev and Tang 
2009), and therefore a lower cost of capital (Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper 
2004; Graham et al. 2005; Verdi 2006) which result in managerial benefits. Smooth 
earnings help avoid concerns arising from volatile earnings such as lenders concerned 
about firm’s ability to service debts, investors concerned about the predictability of the 
company’s future performance, or suppliers and customers questioning future stability. 
It is to the managers’ personal interests that these concerns are avoided so they can 
maintain good reputations and avoid threats of being replaced, (Dye 1988; Fundenberg 
and Tirole 1995; DeFond and Park 1997; Graham et al. 2005; Wilson 2011).  
The large body of evidence on income smoothing can be divided into two streams. One 
stream argues that income smoothing is desirable and appropriate because it portrays 
information about persistent and sustainable future earnings (e.g. Subramanyam 1996; 
Hunt, Moyer and Shevlin 2000; Sankar and Subramanyam 2001; Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad 2002; Arya, Glover and Sunder 2003; Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Cahan, Liu 
and Sun 2008; Athanasakou et al. 2010; Jung, Soderstrom and Yang 2013). The other 
stream, documents that income smoothing involves opportunistic manipulation that 
distorts information provided to stakeholders (e.g. Healy 1985; Bartov 1993; DeFond 
and Park 1997; Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker 2003; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 
2003; Liu and Ryan 2006; LaFond, Lang and Ashbaugh-Skaife 2007; Barth, Landsman 
and Lang 2008; LaFond and Watts 2008; McInnis 2010). These studies argue that 
smoothing earnings, on average, garbles information reported to stakeholders, and is 
negatively associated with stock returns. Hence, they do not reduce the cost of capital.  
3.4.3 Other capital market incentives 
In addition to benchmark beating and income smoothing incentives, an array of 
transaction-specific capital market incentives for earnings management are identified in 
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the literature, including those relating to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), initial public 
offerings (IPOs), and acquisitions or mergers.40 The objective on these occasions is to 
improve the firm’s share price because it is the currency that enables firms to acquire 
capital for their operations (Dechow and Schrand 2004). The higher the share price (at 
least in the short-term), the greater the cash receipts from shares issued, making it 
cheaper for a firm to raise capital (Kellogg and Kellogg 1991; Aharony, Lin and Loeb 
1993; Dechow and Schrand 2004), while making it more expensive for acquirers to 
acquire the firm, thus, enabling the security of management’s jobs (Christie and 
Zimmerman 1994).  Overall, if management can inflate earnings to achieve ‘higher than 
expected earnings’ prior to capital market transactions, they may be able to increase 
firm wealth (or existing shareholder wealth) and by extension their own wealth. 
3.4.3.1 Seasoned and initial public offerings (SEOs and IPOs) 
Research evidence indicates that SEOs (new equity issues by companies with existing 
public stock), provide an incentive for managers to manage earnings upward to increase 
stock prices. Managers may manipulate earnings prior to an SEO to increase the price at 
which the new shares are offered and the likelihood that all will be subscribed, 
providing job security for themselves (Siu and Faff 2013). Prior research documents the 
use of accrual-based earnings management (e.g. Rangan 1998; Teoh, Welch and Wong 
1998, 2002; Shivakumar 2000; Ducharme, Malatesta and Sefcik 2004), real earnings 
management (e.g. Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury 2016), both accruals and real 
earnings management (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Alhadab, Clacher and Kasey 
2015), or classification shifting and accruals (e.g. Siu and Faff 2013) to improve 
earnings before SEOs. 41  Shivakumar (2000) however, claims that tests by Rangan 
(1998) and Teoh, Wong and Rao. (1998), which argued that investors were misled by 
earnings management prior to equity issues, were mis-specified, and finds that investors 
efficiently identify and discount managed earnings around the time of an offering.   
Initial public offerings (IPOs), where shares of a public company are sold to the general 
public on a securities exchange for the first time, also motivate managers to manipulate 
earnings upward, as the apparent profitability of the issuer affects the perceived value of 
40 Managers may also be motivated to influence the stock price in the event of management buyouts 
whereby their interest is to reduce the price for them to buy the firm from its shareholders (Beneish and 
Vargas 2002; Core, Guay, Richardson and Verdi 2006).. 
41 These studies also reveal that the earnings for SEO issuers that manage earnings decline in the years 
following the SEO, compared to other firms. However, they are not consistent regarding the stock price 
after the SEO. 
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the stock offers, which also affects management’s personal wealth (Teoh et al. 1998). 
That is, the higher the earnings, the higher the stock price which improves 
management’s job security as well as their compensation rewards. Previous studies 
provide consistent evidence that managers manipulate accruals (e.g. Friedlan 1994; 
Teoh, et al. 1998; DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik 2001; Marquardt and Wiedman 
2004; Fan 2007) or real activities (e.g. Darrough and Rangan 2005) prior to IPOs. More 
recently, however, research provides no evidence of earnings management by IPO 
firms, suggesting that prior results were subject to biases in discretionary accrual tests 
(e.g. Armstrong, Forster, and Taylor 2016), because firms are constrained by high 
quality auditors (whom are subject to litigation risks) from managing earnings before an 
IPO (e.g. Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg 2008), or by greater regulatory 
scrutiny and litigation risks (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar 2005). According to 
Wongsunwai (2013), firms’ choice of accruals and real earnings management to 
manipulate earnings before and IPO depends on the quality of the venture capitalist, 
whereby higher quality venture capitalists constrain firms’ accruals and real earnings 
manipulation.  
3.4.3.2 Takeovers and mergers 
A share-for-share merger or takeover may also motivate managers to increase earnings. 
Management of the acquiring firm may increase earnings prior to the takeover/merger 
because the number of shares issued by the acquirer to gain control is determined based 
on its stock price, so that the higher the acquirer’s stock price, the fewer the number of 
shares issued for the purchase of the target firm (Erickson and Wang 1999), and the 
chances of achieving stock-based compensation improve while jobs and reputations are 
safe. Thus, acquiring firms may overstate earnings in the period preceding the merger 
(Louis 2004; Botsari and Meeks 2008; Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008). In contrast, Heron 
and Lie (2002) find no evidence of earnings management by acquirers before 
acquisitions, arguing that the results by Erickson and Wang (1999) may be attributable 
to different samples or different procedures for estimating unexpected accruals.  On the 
other hand, a takeover/merger would bring loss of wealth and control over the firm for 
managers of target firms including losing their jobs (Walkling and Long 1984). 
Therefore, managers of target firms are motivated to increase earnings in an effort to 
gain shareholder confidence in their performance (or to mask their non-value 
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maximising performance) (Christie and Zimmerman 1994; Easterwood 1998), making 
the offer price appear less attractive and perhaps induce a revised offer (Wilson 2011).42  
3.4.4 Contracting incentives  
Compelling research evidence shows that a range of contracting arrangements induces 
managers to engage in earnings manipulation. Such contracts include debt covenants 
and remuneration contracts where rewards and punishments for meeting or violating the 
contracts are determined based on earnings information (Ball 2001; Hotlhausen and 
Watts 2001; Mulford and Comiskey 2002).43 For example, a compensation contract for 
the CEO may require that certain profit numbers or stock price are achieved before a 
bonus or other compensation can be awarded (Healy 1985; Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997; Ittner, Larcker and Rajan 1997).  Therefore, managers are motivated to manage 
earnings upward to avoid costs derived from violation of covenants or to maximise 
compensation benefits.  Executive compensation has been discussed in conjunction with 
meeting or beating the earnings benchmarks in Section 3.4.1 because part of executive 
remuneration is often based on meeting earnings benchmarks (Ittner et al. 1997; 
Dechow, Myers and Shakespear 2010). To that end, I will not discuss again incentives 
relating to executive compensation, but focus in this section on debt contracting 
incentives. 
3.4.4.1 Avoiding debt covenant violation 
Firms frequently raise capital by issuing debt which requires entering into a lending 
contract. The lending agreement include debt covenants that specify particular 
accounting numbers or ratios that must be met by the borrower, and stipulate a number 
of restrictions on the borrower (e.g. payment of dividends) to minimise risks of non-
payment to the lender (Begley 1990; Smith 1993; Anderson, Mansi and Reeb 2004; 
Asquith, Beatty and Weber 2005). Failure to meet these covenants results in severe 
consequences for the borrower such as further restrictions on corporate activities, or an 
42 In contrast, Christie and Zimmerman (1994) find that although some opportunistic behaviour exists in 
target firms, these firms’ choice of accounting methods (i.e. inventory valuation, depreciation method, 
and investment tax credit) is primarily due to efficiency. Dechow and Schrand (2004) suggest that the 
evidence in these studies is not conflicting but that companies are managing discretionary accruals which 
may be unobserved, rather than manipulating more visible accounting choices such as depreciation 
method. 
43  A company’s regulatory environment can also motivate earnings management, because some 
regulations such as capital requirements are explicitly based on earnings (e.g. banking industry), and 
because a company’s profitability may be associated with regulatory pressure (e.g. extra taxes on profits) 
(Dechow and Schrand 2004). 
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increase in interest rate (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Prior research reports that 
managers of firms that are in danger of violating debt covenants manipulate accruals to 
increase earnings so as to avoid strict conditions, and loss of wealth to themselves 
through non-receipt of dividends and other reward (e.g. Press and Weintrop 1990; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Beatty, Ramesh and Weber 2002; Dichev and Skinner 
2002; Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson 2007; Rodriguez-Perez and van Hemmen 2010). 
Jaggi and Lee (2002) document that firms whose financial distress is temporary, use 
income-increasing discretionary accruals to avoid violation, whilst firms that are in 
severe financial distress are more likely to manage accruals downward to highlight their 
financial difficulties so as to obtain better loan terms. Other studies however, report 
evidence that is inconsistent with the debt covenant hypothesis (e.g. Liberty and 
Zimmerman 1986; Healy and Palepu 1990; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). 
3.5 Earnings management techniques used to manipulate earnings   
Having identified the major incentives for managers (firms) to engage in earnings 
management, I now discuss the literature examining the techniques by which earnings 
are managed. As discussed in Section 3.2, I focus on earnings management occurring 
within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), with 
particular emphasis on the standards affecting the scope for classification shifting. 
GAAP are standards and other pronouncements that define acceptable methods of 
measuring performance and position and the disclosure of these to stakeholders, allow 
managers to choose among alternative accounting policies and practices in the 
preparation of financial statements (Schipper 1989; Mulford and Comiskey 2002). 
GAAP, however, are often ambiguous (Dechow and Skinner 2000), 44  and are 
intentionally flexible in application (Levitt 1998), and managers are required to exercise 
judgement and make estimates in measuring and reporting earnings based on GAAP 
(Dechow and Skinner 2000; Parfet 2000; Jackson and Pitman 2001).  
The flexible and ambiguous nature of GAAP allows managers to communicate their 
private information (Levitt 1998: 3), however, the choice afforded to them to make 
44  GAAP are often ambiguous and subjective in terms of the materiality of amounts and estimates 
required. The accounting standard AASB 1031: Materiality provides thresholds for determining whether 
an amount is considered material, but at arbitrary levels and are not mandatory since they are part of the 
commentary to AASB 1031. It states that an “amount equal to or greater than 10 percent of the 
appropriate base may be presumed to be material”, while an amount “equal to or less than 5 percent of the 
appropriate base may be presumed not to be material” (AASB 1031, para. 4.1.6). No guidance is provided 
for amounts that fall within the range of five to ten percent. This results in a situation where materiality 
becomes a matter of judgement, and thus provides opportunity for managers to misrepresent transactions.   
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judgements and estimates, and select from a set of accounting procedures (e.g. 
depreciation methods), provides scope for them to choose techniques that optimise their 
own interests (Schipper 1989; Francis, Hanna and Vincent 1996; Scott 1997). The 
flexibility provided to managers is not restricted to accrual measurements but also 
extends to classification issues. For example, since the adoption of IFRS, there are no 
restrictions placed on where on the income statement ‘material items’ useful in 
understanding firm performance (AASB 101), and discontinued operations (AASB 5), 
may be reported, leaving it to the judgement of the preparer of financial statements. On 
the other hand, there may be less flexibility with regards to real earnings management 
because these involve real transactions.  
The remainder of this section discusses the various techniques identified in the literature 
that managers may use to manipulate earnings when taking advantage of accounting 
standards’ suppleness, such as classification shifting and accrual-based earnings 
management. I also discuss real earnings management which can be a viable alternative 
method when there are constraints on the other two methods. Methods used by 
researchers to detect the various forms of earnings management are discussed in 
Chapter Four.  
3.5.1 Classification shifting 
My thesis focuses on the impact of changes to accounting standards that affected the 
scope for opportunistic classification shifting. Earnings management through 
classification shifting typically refers to the deliberate misclassification of items within 
the periodic income statement, in an attempt to increase core earnings (McVay 2006). 
As noted in Chapter One, ‘core earnings’ refers to measures of earnings from recurring 
normal business activities which exclude non-recurring and non-operating activities (i.e. 
extraordinary activities) and activities that might be attributable to normal operations 
but are considered abnormal by reason of their size and effect on the results in the 
period (i.e. abnormal activities).45 Managers manipulate core earnings because market 
participants (e.g. analysts and investors) pay more attention to core earnings than 
bottom line GAAP earnings, and core earnings are more closely aligned with equity 
45 McVay (2006) defines core earnings as sales – cost of goods sold – selling, general, and administrative 
expenses (excluding depreciation and amortisation). The measure of core earnings employed in my thesis 
differs from McVay (2006) in that the ‘non-core’ items excluded from its sum are implicitly those 
identified by the Morningstar analyst following the firm, rather than by direct reference to the amounts  
reported on the face of the firms’ income statement, and as such these items may have been reported on 
the face of the income statement or in the notes to the accounts. I discuss this in detail in Chapter Four. 
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values than non-core earnings (Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Larson 2003; Gu 
and Chen 2004; McVay 2006; Hsu and Kross 2011). This section discusses how 
earnings are managed through classification shifting.  
3.5.1.1 How earnings are managed through classification shifting 
Research documents that firms manipulate the positioning of income statement items in 
an attempt to influence user judgment of firm performance. In general, the further 
(closer) an income statement line item is from (to) sales, the less (more) persistent the 
item tends to be (Lipe 1986; Fiarfield, Sweeny and Yohn 1996), and there is evidence 
that investors price each line item differently (e.g. Elliot and Hanna 1996; Francis et al. 
1996; Davis 2002; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Riedl and Srivinasan 2010). For instance, 
abnormal/special items reported below profit from operations are typically excluded 
from measures of ‘street’ earnings used by analysts and other users (Lougee and 
Marquardt 2004), because they are considered to be less value relevant (Ali and 
Zarowin 1992; Elliott and Hanna 1996; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). Management may 
take advantage of market participants’ fixation on core earnings to misclassify (i.e. shift 
downward) recurring operating expenses as non-recurring expenses, or misclassify non-
recurring gains (i.e. shift upward) as recurring operating revenue (McVay 2006). For 
example, early studies report that US firms reclassify operating losses and gains as 
extraordinary items, or extraordinary gains and losses as ordinary items to smooth 
earnings (Ronen and Sadan 1975; Barnea et al. 1976). Moreover, Kinney and Trezevant 
(1997) show that managers wishing to highlight the transitory nature of expenses are 
more likely to show income-decreasing special items as line items on the income 
statement, whilst income-increasing special items are more likely to be reported in the 
notes to financial reports. Johnson, Lopez and Sanchez (2011), document that the 
frequency, magnitude and persistence of negative special items increased significantly 
over thirty years (1980-2009). 
The use of classification shifting as a tool to manage earnings has been brought to 
greater academic attention by the work of McVay (2006), who developed empirical 
models designed to detect abnormal behaviour in core earnings and correlated 
unexpected core earnings with the incidence of special items. She documents that 
managers opportunistically shift items from core expenses (i.e. cost of goods sold, and 
selling, general and administration expenses) to special items to improve core earnings. 
Other recent studies apply the McVay (2006) model in different environments, 
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producing further evidence of classifications shifting. Fan et al. (2010) show that firms 
classify core expenses as special items more often in the fourth quarter than in other 
quarters, to increase core annual earnings when accrual-based earnings management is 
constrained by prior accrual-based earnings management. Lin et al. (2006) examine a 
portfolio of earnings management choices and management guidance of forecasts and 
find that firms misclassify core expenses as special items more frequently, compared to 
using any other methods (although managers use all three types of earnings 
management). Lail et al. (2014) also report that firms shift expenses from core segments 
to other segments to increase core earnings. Siu and Faff (2013) find that SEO issuers 
also misclassify core expenses as special items in addition to accrual-based earnings 
management in order to increase core earnings in the fourth quarter. In a non-US study, 
Haw et al. (2011) report that firms across East Asia with controlling shareholders, 
opportunistically classify core expenses as income-decreasing special items.46  
There is also evidence that the use of classification shifting reflects changes in 
regulations relating to the scope for the classification of non-recurring components of 
earnings. For example, Barua, et al. (2010) find that firms shift operating expenses to 
income-decreasing discontinued operations, and the frequency of reporting discontinued 
operations has increased since the introduction of SFAS 144. Also, Athanasakou et al. 
(2008) report that following the implementation of FRS 3, a subset of large UK firms 
shifted core expenses to other non-recurring items to improve core earnings. 
Preliminary evidence in Australia by Houghton (1994) and Cameron and Gallery (2008) 
show that firms classified and reported items as abnormal more frequently after the 
AASB 1018 was amended in 1989 to tighten the definition of extraordinary items.47  
3.5.2 Earnings management using discretionary accruals manipulation 
The importance of accruals in accounting has been well documented in the literature. 
Accruals adjust for the effects of transitory cash flows and thereby improve earnings’ 
ability to measure firm performance (Dechow 1994; Dechow, Kothari and Watts 1998; 
Dechow and Skinner 2000; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2004), improving 
value relevance and contracting utility (Dechow 1994; Subramanyam 1996; Dechow 
and Dichev 2002; Ball and Shivakumar 2006). The inclusion of accruals in reported 
46 Hsu and Kross (2011) provide evidence that firms also shift positive special items to core earnings 
when accrual levels are low, hence, classification shifting does not only involve negative items but also 
positive items. 
47 Refer to Chapter 2 for discussion of the regulations mentioned: SFAS 144, FRS 3 and AASB 101. 
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earnings allows scope for managers to use their discretion in the recognition of these 
items to either signal their private information (consistent with the informational 
perspective) (Dechow 1994; Subramanyam 1996; Degeorge et al. 1999; Kangaretnam et 
al. 2004; Louis and Robinson 2005) or to opportunistically bias earnings (consistent 
with agency theory) (Dechow 1994; Dechow and Skinner 2000; Jensen 2005; Revsine 
et al. 2005; Baderstcher 2011). If managers exercise their discretion to manage accruals 
opportunistically in order to influence earnings, stakeholders are at risk of receiving 
unreliable information that impairs their ability to predict future cash flows (Teoh, et al. 
1998; Badertscher et al. 2012). The discretionary management of accruals has thus 
become the focus of the large number of studies that attempt to identify earnings 
management by using models that distinguish discretionary accruals from accruals 
arising from the unbiased application of GAAP, known as ‘non-discretionary accruals’ 
(Ball and Shivakumar 2006, Dechow et al. 2010). 48  
3.5.2.1 How accruals are used in earnings manipulation 
Accruals are used to manipulate earnings because although earnings includes both a 
cash flow and accrual component (Mc Nichols & Wilson 1988, Sloan 1996), the cash 
flow component of earnings is less susceptible to manipulation through accounting 
practices (Dechow 1994), and management is therefore alleged to influence the more 
susceptible accrual component (Schipper 1989; Sloan 1996). 49  Although management 
can determine the timing of cash transactions to manage cash flow, they have little 
accounting latitude regarding cash transactions to alter earnings (Beneish 1997, 1998) 
because cash is verified against source documents. In contrast, managers have more 
scope to exercise discretion over accrual estimates, which flow through to reported 
earnings (Dechow and Schrand 2002; Dechow and Dichev 2002). For example, 
managers may choose different methods and life cycles for depreciating fixed assets 
and/or reduce the amount of expected bad debts, to increase current earnings (DeFond 
and Park 2001).50   
48 Discretionary accruals also are referred to in the literature as abnormal accruals (e.g. DeFond and Park 
2001; Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010) and ‘unexpected accruals’ (e.g. Healy and Wahlen 1999). These 
terms are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
49 Sloan (1996) reports results that suggest that the cash flow component of earnings is more persistent 
than the accruals component. This may imply that the cash flow component is less vulnerable to 
manipulation. 
50 The literature identifies several specific accounts subject to accruals management, including: bad debts 
(e.g. McNichols and Wislon 1988; Teoh et al. 1998); depreciation (e.g. Beneish 1998; Teoh et al. 1998; 
Young 1999; Keating and Zimmerman 2000); loan loss provision (e.g. Wahlen 1994; Collins, 
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Moreover, the reversible nature of accruals makes them vulnerable to manipulation and 
allows managers to shift earnings between periods.51 The effect of accruals reverses in 
subsequent periods that by exercising discretion over judgement and estimates, 
managers influence not only current year earnings, but future earnings (Barton and 
Simko 2002; DeFond and Park 2001; Mulford and Comiskey 2002). Prior studies 
consistently document that in fundamentally poor years or in the initial year of a CEO’s 
tenure firms may bring forward expenses to the current period to ‘take a bath’52 and 
thereby create accrual reserves which are then reversed in the future to increase earnings 
(e.g. John, Land and Netter 1992; Elliot and Hanna 1996; Gill et al. 1996; Moehrle 
2002; Baber et al. 2011; Dechow, Hutton, Kim and Sloan 2012). For instance, mangers 
may overstate bad debt allowance in the current period which will increase future 
period’s earnings when the over-provision is reversed. Conversely, managers may 
understate allowance for bad debts to improve current period earnings, which 
subsequently reduces future earnings when adjustments to the provisions are made 
(Dechow and Schrand 2002). Baber et al. (2011) and Dechow et al. (2012) assert that 
the speed at which past accruals reverse, affects the timing of managers’ earnings 
manipulation efforts. That is, accruals that reverse quickly (within one year) are more 
susceptible to earnings management. 53  Therefore, the reversible nature of accruals 
allows managers to manipulate earnings up or down between periods.  
Managers also have discretion over the timing of when irregular accruals are 
recognised, which can be exploited to manipulate earnings (Roychowdhury 2006, 
Xiong 2006). For example, managers may delay the recognition of expenses such as 
Shackelford and Wahlen 1995; Beaver and Engel 1996; Liu, Ryan and Wahlen 1997; Kanagretnam, Lobo 
and Yan 2004; Fonesca and Gonzalez 2008; Bushman and Williams 2012; El Sood 2012); insurance 
claim loss provision (e.g. Beaver and McNichols 1998; Petroni, Ryan and Wahlen 2000; Beaver, Nelson 
and McNichols. 2003; Gaver and Paterson 2004; Browne, Ma and Wang 2009; Eckles and Halek 2010; 
Grace and Leverty  2011; Eckles, Halek, He, Sommer and Zhang 2011; Fiordelisi, Meles, Monferra and 
Starita 2013); tax expenses (e.g. Visvanatahn 1998; Lu 2000; Mills and Newberry 2001; Joost, Pratt and 
Young 2003; Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills 2004; Phillips, Pincus, Rego and Wan 2004; Hanlon 2005; 
Francis and Rego 2006; Badertscher, Phillips, Pincus and Rego 2009); and asset write-offs/write-downs 
(e.g. Kinney and Trezevant 1995; Francis, Hanna and Vincent 1996; Nelson et al. 2003; Riedl 2004; 
Beatty and Weber 2006; Duh, Lee and Lin 2009; Allen, Larson and Sloan 2013). 
51 Accrual reversals may represent both earnings management and genuine estimation errors, where an 
accrual estimation error is the difference between the accrual estimate and the subsequent realised amount 
(McNichols 2002), and is not exactly the same as an accrual misstatement which is a GAAP violation 
(Allen et al. 2013). 
52 Such behaviour occurs when earnings are already low that no accounting method will increase them to 
the targeted earnings amount (Healy 1985). 
53 Dechow et al. (2012: 276) suggest that accrual reversals should be included in earnings management 
models to improve the test power as well as reduce misspecification arising from correlated omitted 
variables, provided the researcher knows the timing of reversal. Gerakos (2012) agrees that the model 
provides improvement to the customary models used to detect accrual-based earnings manipulation, 
although no guidance is given on how to identify the timing of reversals.  
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writing down obsolete inventory and/or asset impairment if they wish to increase 
current period earnings.  
3.5.3 Real earnings management 
Managers can also manipulate earnings by changing the timing, scale, or structuring of 
real economic activities concerning operating, investing or financing decisions (Ewert 
and Wagenhofer 2005; Zang 2012). Such manipulations are generally referred to as real 
earnings management. 54  Roychowdhury (2006: 337) describes real earnings 
management as deviations from normal business practices, “undertaken with the 
primary objective of achieving certain earnings targets, and the desire to mislead at least 
some stakeholders into believing these targets have been met in the normal course of 
operations”.55   
3.5.3.1 How real activities are managed 
Research evidence has identified a range of real economic activities that firms 
manipulate to alter earnings. These activities entail operating, investing, and financing 
decisions. In this thesis, I focus my investigation of real earnings management on the 
use of operating activities hence, for brevity I only discuss real earnings management 
using those activities.  
3.5.3.1.1 Manipulation of operating activities 
Operating activities are activities that relate to the provision of goods and services 
which include (ordinary) discretionary expenditure, production costs and sales revenue. 
Managers have control over firms’ operating activities with only intermittent direct 
oversight by the board of directors and shareholders. There is thus considerable scope 
for managers to exercise discretion over the timing and structuring of operating 
activities in order to influence earnings, which can be achieved by executing either one 
or a combination of these activities: reducing discretionary expenditures; overproducing 
goods which lead to lower cost of goods sold (COGS) but higher production costs; and 
54 Throughout this document, real earnings management will be used interchangeably with ‘real activities 
manipulation’, ‘real transactions manipulation’ or ‘real earnings manipulation’. 
55 Price discounts and reduction of discretionary expenditures may, of course, be economically optimal 
actions. However, if managers engage in these activities more frequently than is normal given their 
financial conditions, with the objective of meeting or beating an earnings target they are engaging in real 
activities manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006). 
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offering discounts/more lenient credit terms or otherwise bringing sales forward into the 
current period (Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012).  
Under IFRS and US GAAP, discretionary expenditures such as advertising, selling, 
general and administration (SGA) and some research and development (R&D) are 
expensed when they are incurred.56 Firms can easily cut these expenditures to reduce 
overall expenses and increase earnings, particularly those expenditures that do not 
immediately produce income (Perry and Grinaker 1994; Roychowdhury 2006). A large 
number of studies find that mangers reduce R&D expenditure  to increase current 
earnings (e.g. Bange and De Bondt 1998; Bushee 1998; Bens, Nagar, and Wong 2002; 
Darrough and Rangan 2005; Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 
2008; Gunny 2010; Badertscher 2011). Other research documents that managers reduce 
advertising expenses to increase earnings (e.g. Cohen, Mashruwala and Zach 2010), and 
that firms reduce aggregate discretionary expenditure (i.e. the sum of R&D, SGA and 
advertising expenses) to achieve earnings targets (e.g. Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 
2010; Badertscher 2011; Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee and Soderstrom 2011; Zang 2012).  
Real earnings management can also be achieved through the manipulation of production 
costs, which are defined as the sum of COGS and change in inventory during the year 
(Roychowdhury 2006). Manufacturing firms may opportunistically increase production 
relative to expected sales, thereby lowering COGS and increasing earnings. When 
production levels are higher, the fixed overhead costs can be spread over a large number 
of units, decreasing fixed and total costs per unit (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 
2008). Recent research finds that manufacturing firms overproduce inventory to 
improve earnings (e.g. Thomas and Zhang 2002; Kinney and Wembe 2004; 
Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Gunny 2010; Zang 
2012).  
Finally, sales activities can be manipulated in an attempt to temporarily increase sales, 
thereby increasing earnings. This can be achieved by offering (excessive) limited-time 
price discounts or more lenient credit terms (Roychowdhury 2006), usually toward the 
end of the fiscal year (Graham et al. 2005; Xu et al. 2007). Additionally, managers may 
announce during the fourth quarter of the current financial period that prices will 
increase in the first quarter of the next period in an attempt to boost current sales 
56 IFRS allow for the development component of R&D to be capitalised. Pre-IFRS Australian standards 
(AASB 1011) allowed for both research and development expenditures to be capitalised if recognition 
criteria were met.  
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(Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006). These activities may temporarily increase 
sales volumes but are likely to disappear when the firm reverts to the old prices 
(Roychowdhury 2006), or increase prices in the next period. However, the temporary 
increase in sales may decrease cash flow from operation in the current period as net of 
discount cash sales from the additional sales is lower as margins and/or cash collections 
decline (Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010; Gunny 2010; Badertscher 2011).57  
3.6 Choosing between earnings management methods 
The above section discusses a vast literature that identifies evidence of the use of the 
three major earnings management methods to opportunistically increase or stabilise 
earnings. However, the literature on firms’ choice among and between the different 
earnings management methods is more modest. The various earnings management 
techniques are potentially both complements and substitutes. Each method has 
particular relative costs that management must consider when deciding what, if any, 
type of earnings management to implement (Badertscher 2011; Haw et al. 2011). 
Because the costs of implementing a particular earnings management strategy are 
affected by firm attributes, such as institutional ownership, market leadership and 
financial distress, and by the strength of existing regulation, there will likely be cross-
sectional and time-series variation in the relative use of each method (Zang 2012).  
In this section I discuss the factors posited in the literature to induce cross-sectional 
variation in the use of different earnings management techniques. The decision to 
manage earnings, and the method(s) by which they do so, reflect both the specific 
incentives for earnings management discussed in Section 3.4, and relative costs of each 
method. The relative costs of each earnings management method reflect their impact on 
firms’ cash flows and operations, restrictions on the timing of the earnings management 
decision, and regulatory and other constraints. 
 
57  Managers may also manipulate investing activities such as timing the sale of fixed assets or 
investments near the fiscal year end (e.g. Poitras, Wilkins and Kwan 2002; Herrmann, Inoue and Thomas 
2013), or postponing (accelerating) investment projects or asset acquisition (e.g. Penman and Zhang 
2002; Graham et al. 2005). Financing activities are also manipulated such as changing the size and 
composition of the capital structure of the firm (e.g. Trotman and Gibbins 2005); timing debt-equity 
swaps (e.g. Hand et al. 1990) or stock repurchases (e.g. Hribar, Jenkins and Johnson 2006; Myers et al. 
2007) to increase earnings. 
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3.6.1 Cash flow and operational impact of earnings management methods 
While the aim of earnings management is typically to increase earnings, the choice of 
technique to be used may depend on its relative impact on firms’ cash flow and 
operations. There is empirical evidence that increasing current earnings artificially may 
adversely affect firms’ future earnings and cash flow, potentially harming future 
managerial and/or shareholder wealth. For example, Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010) espouse that real activities management consume real resources and 
has severe cash flow consequences such as reduction in the firm’s long-term value. 
Although price discounts can increase current period sales and thus, current earnings, it 
however, reduces future cash flows. The increased sales due to the discounts are likely 
to disappear when the firm reverts back to the old prices, and the cash inflow per sale, 
net of discounts from these additional sales is lower as margins decline (Roychowdhury 
2006). Moreover, cutting R&D costs to increase current earnings bears the risk of 
forgoing development of a product or innovation that may boost future earnings and 
cash flows. Hence, there is loss of potential future income and cash flow due to forgone 
R&D opportunities (McVay 2006). Furthermore, overproduction lowers fixed costs per 
unit, therefore lowering COGS and resulting in higher operating earnings, however, the 
firm incurs production and holding costs on the unsold over-produced items 
(Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012), resulting in lower cash flows from operations. Thus, 
real activities manipulation imposes greater long-term costs on the firm because they 
negatively affect firms’ future economic benefits (Dechow and Schrand 2004; 
Roychowdhury 2006; Fan et al. 2010).58  
Accrual-based earnings management may also affect firms’ current and future earnings 
due to the reversing nature of accruals. For example, an underestimation 
(overestimation) of the bad debts allowance in the current period may increase 
(decrease) current earnings but may reduce (improve) future earnings when the 
allowance is reversed in a subsequent period. Managers can also transfer earnings from 
future periods to the current period by accelerating (decelerating) the recognition of 
revenues (expenses) in order to improve current earnings (McVay 2006), but at the 
expense of having lower future earnings. However, unlike real earnings manipulation, 
58 Despite these costs, Graham et al. (2005) report that the financial executives they surveyed prefer 
managing earnings by taking real economic actions than making within-GAAP accounting decisions. 
Even if it results in adverse effects of firm value in the long run, managers may be more interested in their 
own short-term benefits. 
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Badertscher (2011) suggest that accrual-based earnings management does not affect 
cash flows and is therefore less likely to destroy long-term firm value.    
Unlike real activities and accrual-based manipulation, classification shifting only affects 
core earnings but not bottom-line (GAAP) earnings (McVay 2006).  Classification 
shifting does not reduce future (or past) earnings, unlike accrual management and real 
activities manipulation (McVay 2006). Therefore, classification shifting appears to have 
the least costly effect on firms’ cash flow and operations, and thus, may be the most 
preferred earnings management choice. 
3.6.2 Timing of the earnings management decision 
The time within the reporting process at which the earnings management decision can 
be executed can affect the choice of method to be used. A method that can be executed 
anytime, including after the financial period end may be preferred over a method that is 
constrained by a time limit. Real earnings management decisions are made during the 
reporting period because they require changing the firms’ real economic activities 
occurring during that period. For example, to reduce discretionary expenses, actual 
R&D activity occurring during the reporting year must be cut. Similarly, only sales 
discounts effective during a particular reporting period have potential to increase current 
earnings.  
In contrast, accrual-based earnings management can be executed after the financial 
period-end and before earnings announcement, once the amount of pre-accrual (i.e. real 
activities) management earnings is known (Badertscher 2011; Zang 2012). Zang (2012) 
finds that managers manipulate real activities and accruals sequentially, that is, real 
activities are manipulated first since they have to occur during the financial period, 
followed by accrual-based earnings management after the financial period. Thus, rather 
than the trade-off between the two methods during the year based on their relative 
costliness, there is a direct substitution at year-end after real activities manipulation. The 
timing of classification shifting decisions may not be a concern for managers as it can 
be made any time a non-recurring item is recognised.  It can also be executed after the 
financial period-end whereby managers may shift core expenses to noncore items after 
reviewing the status of core earnings. Therefore, classification shifting and accruals 
manipulation are less restricted by the timing of execution compared to real activities 
manipulation. 
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3.6.3 Regulatory and other constraints 
Regulation and other constraints may also affect the choice of earnings management 
techniques. Prior research documents that managers may use a certain type of earnings 
management to improve earnings when the use of another has been constrained either 
by regulation or by some other mechanism such as auditors (e.g. Schipper 2003; Ewert 
and Wagenhofer 2005; Cohen et al. 2008).  
3.6.3.1 Effect of regulations on the choice of earnings management techniques 
Throughout my study period (1995-2009), a number of regulations have been 
implemented in Australia and abroad that research has found to have affected the choice 
among earnings management methods. For example, the US Congress passed into law 
the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002 while the Australian Parliament passed 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Programme (CLERP - Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Act in 2004 in an attempt to mitigate opportunistic reporting behaviour.59 
Lobo and Zhou (2006), report that there was reduction in opportunistic accruals 
reporting after SOX compared to pre-SOX. Cohen et al. (2008), document that the 
passage of SOX 2002 resulted in the decline of accrual-based earnings management, but 
a rise in real activities manipulation. They attribute the decline in accrual-based 
earnings management post-SOX to either the greater exposure to litigation of managers 
and auditors by SOX, or because of the adverse consequences faced by executives and 
firms (e.g. loss of job or lower stock price). Other studies however, document that 
managers continue to manage accruals after SOX (e.g. Gosh, Marra and Moon 2010; 
Cazier, Rego, Tian and Wilson (2015). 
Accounting standards have also been amended to restrict opportunistic earnings 
management. For example, AAS 101 was amended, effective for periods ending on or 
after 31 December 1989 to restrict the opportunistic reporting of extraordinary items. 
Preliminary evidence suggests that firms switched from reporting extraordinary items 
more frequently pre-1989 amendment to reporting abnormal items (AI) more frequently 
post-1989 amendment (e.g. Houghton 1994). However, no study has investigated the 
59  These statutes contain provisions that impose more severe punishment on management, board 
members, and auditors in an attempt to encourage independence and vigilance by directors and auditors, 
and mitigate management opportunistic behaviour. SOX for example requires that at least one audit 
committee member has financial expertise, that all members be independent directors, and that the 
committee oversees the accounting and financial reporting processes as well as the audit of financial 
statements. Australia’s CLERP 9 has similar requirements. 
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impact of similar standards on alternative earnings management such as accrual-based 
and real earnings manipulation. The wide adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) by many countries including Australia, also affected the choice of 
earnings management accounting techniques. IFRS were adopted with the view that it 
would reduce diversity in financial reporting (Jones and Finley 2011) and help produce 
high quality financial reports (Barth, Landsma and Lang 2008). There is evidence that 
IFRS did contribute to the improved quality of financial reports by constraining the use 
of accrual-based earnings management (e.g. Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Barth et al. 
2008; Lee and Chen 2010; Barth, Landsman, Lang and Williams 2012; Florou and Pope 
2012).  However, some studies, find no association between IFRS adoption and 
decreased earnings management (e.g. Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008; Ahmed, Neel and 
Wang 2014).  
A small number of studies report that tightening accounting standards restricts earnings 
management through accounting choices, but has no significant restriction on real 
activities manipulation (Nelson et al. 2003; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005) argue that accounting standard setters can do little to restrict real 
earnings management but the tighter accounting standards induce greater value 
relevance, which increases the marginal benefits of real earnings management. 
Enomoto, Kimura and Yamaguchi (2015) find that firms are more likely to manipulate 
earnings through real transactions in countries with strong investor protection. Research 
on the impact of accounting standards (including IFRS) on the use of other alternative 
earnings management such as classification shifting, is very sparse, however, it provides 
a potential fruitful area for research. For example, the adoption of IFRS in Australia 
may have discouraged the use of accruals manipulation but may encourage the greater 
use of classification shifting via discontinued operations (DO) as a result of the adoption 
of AASB 5 or other non-recurring items due to the implementation of AASB 101. This 
thesis provides evidence on this issue, which did not previously exist. 
3.6.3.2 Effect of other constraints on the choice of earnings management techniques 
Other earnings management constraints identified in the literature include the quality of 
external audit and board of directors attributes. While there is a large amount of 
research on the effect of auditor quality and board of directors on earnings management 
in general, there is little evidence on the impact of these two monitoring mechanisms on 
the relative use of different earnings management methods. Recent research suggests 
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that accrual-based earnings management is subject to greater auditor or regulatory 
scrutiny than other types of earnings management because aggressive accruals 
accounting choices and estimates in the previous periods face a risk of violating GAAP 
with more accrual-based earnings management (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin 2010; 
Badertscher 2011; Zang 2012).60 In contrast, real earnings management does not breach 
GAAP because overproduction and sales discount for example, are legitimate business 
activities, and is therefore less subject to auditor scrutiny (McVay 2006; Roychowdhury 
2006; Si and Faff 2013). Enomoto et al. (2015) find that firms are more likely to 
manipulate earnings through real transactions in countries with strong investor 
protection. Chi, Lisic and Pevezner (2011) report that although big N auditors constrain 
accruals manipulation, this results in an increase in costly real earnings manipulation. 
With regards to classification shifting, auditors may have limited ability to verify 
classifications of earnings components because the allocation of expenses to specific 
accounts can be subjective (Nelson et al. 2002; McVay 2006). Also, because 
classification shifting does not change GAAP net profit, auditors may not expend much 
energy and resources on identifying or adjusting these accounts (McVay 2006; Fan et 
al. 2010). However, Haw et al. (2011) argue that big N auditors are effective monitors 
of classification shifting practices in East Asian countries, particularly in countries with 
strong investor protection. Nevertheless, classification shifting may draw much less 
auditor and regulator attention relative to the other methods (as long as market 
participants are interested in core earnings), while real earnings management may be 
preferred to boost GAAP earnings given the susceptibility of discretionary accruals 
manipulation to greater auditor and regulator scrutiny. 
The composition and characteristics of the board of directors has also been found to 
have an impact on firms’ choice of earnings management technique. Prior research 
documents that board independence, audit committee independence, financial 
sophistication of both board and audit committee reduces the likelihood of accruals 
manipulation (e.g. Klein 2002; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 2003; Davidson, Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent 2005; Hutchinson, Percy, and Erkurtoglu 2008; Marra, Mazzola and 
Prencipe 2011; Chen, Cheng and Wang 2015). However, there is virtually no research 
on whether the reduction of accrual-based earnings manipulation as a result of board 
60  Management remuneration contracts are more likely to be affected by aggressive accrual-based 
earnings management, especially when executive compensation is based on earnings numbers because 
auditors are more likely to easily detect discretionary accruals manipulation, and thus may insist on 
adjusting earnings management.    
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and audit committee composition triggers the use of alternative earnings management. 
Other constraints on accruals manipulation include institutional investors (Chung, Firth 
and Kim 2002; Koh 2007), which are also a constraint on real activities manipulation 
(Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012). However, once more, there is virtually no evidence 
on whether the reduction in real earnings management as a result of these constraints 
induces increased use of alternative earnings management. 
Other recent research provides general evidence of firms using two or more of the 
earnings management methods as substitutes or complements although not a reflection 
of any particular monitoring mechanism but a reflection of inherent features of each 
method and the incentives discussed in Section 3.4. For example, research documents 
that managers substitute accrual-based earnings manipulation with classification 
shifting when accruals manipulation is constrained, particularly in the fourth quarter 
(when aggressive accrual-based earnings management in the third quarter reduces the 
chances of further discretionary accruals manipulation in the fourth quarter) (e.g. Lin et 
al. 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 2011). Lin et al. (2006) and Haw et al. (2011) 
report that classification shifting and discretionary accruals can be substitutes to meet 
analyst forecasts, but that firms are more likely to use classification shifting. 
Badertscher (2011) documents that overvalued firms start initially by managing 
accruals, and then resort to real earnings manipulation when the choices for accruals 
manipulation are exhausted. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) report that firms use both real 
and accrual-based earnings management to increase earnings around SEOs. Gunny 
(2010) finds that real earnings management is positively associated with firms just 
meeting earnings benchmarks. Therefore, managers are likely to manipulate real 
transactions in order to bias earnings when the opportunity to manage accruals is 
constrained, and because real earnings management are harder to detect relative to 
accrual-based earnings management. Lin et al. (2006) also report that classification 
shifting and real earnings management can be complements. Zang (2012) reveals that 
real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management are substitutes.  
The above discussion reveals that the choice of earnings management method depends 
on the costs associated with each method. Evidence suggests that firms may prefer 
classification shifting over accrual-based earnings management and real activities 
manipulation to manage core earnings because it is the least costly of the three methods 
in terms of its effect on firms’ operations and cash flow, the timing of earnings 
management, and regulatory and other constraints. Although there is a small but 
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growing number of studies reporting that accrual-based earnings management can be 
substituted with real earnings management or classification shifting, there is a dearth of 
research on whether regulatory constraints on the use of one earnings management 
induces the increasing use of other methods. To date, Cohen et al. (2008) and Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005) provide the only empirical evidence. To the best of my knowledge, 
no research has examined the impact of regulations relating to the scope for 
classification and reporting of non-recurring earnings components (e.g. AASB 1018 and 
AASB 5) on the use of classification shifting and alternative earnings management 
methods. This is a central issue of interest in my thesis, and I develop hypotheses in the 
next section to formally investigate this issue.  
3.7 Hypothesis development 
I focus my investigation on the impact of three regulatory changes affecting the scope of 
classification and reporting of noncore earnings components in 2002 and 2005 on firms’ 
earnings management practices. I first develop hypotheses to examine the effect of the 
2002 amendment followed by the effect of the 2005 amendments on firms’ 
classification shifting behaviour. I then develop hypotheses to test whether these 
regulatory amendments to restrict classification shifting induce increased engagement in 
alternative earnings management. 
3.7.1 Effect of regulations relating to the scope for classification shifting 
Concerns over the opportunistic classification of non-recurring items partly prompted 
regulators in Australia, the UK and US to amend accounting rules to restrict 
classificatory choices. In the US, several studies produce results which suggest that 
Regulation G (imposed by SEC in 2003) inhibited managers’ opportunistic behaviour in 
pro-forma disclosures, but reduced firms’ use of pro-forma earnings to convey 
persistent profitability and obscure the meaning of special items by shifting recurring 
expenses to special items (e.g. Marques 2006; Heflin and Hsu 2008; Kolev, Marquardt 
and McVay 2008).  
In the UK, studies of classification shifting focus on the implications of the introduction 
of FRS 3 in 1993, which outlawed extraordinary items and required a clearer distinction 
between components of exceptional items. Additionally, FRS 3 allowed discretion over 
the disclosure of material exceptional items in the income statement as either operating 
77 
 
or non-operating where non-operating items are to be presented below operating profit 
(Athanasakou et al. 2009). Hence, while FRS 3 restricted classification concerning 
extraordinary items, it increased UK firms’ discretion in classifying exceptional items 
(Athanasakou et al. 2010). Therefore, there is potential that firms could exploit this 
greater discretion to manipulate earnings through exceptional items misclassification.  
Research evidence, however, does not support this misclassification hypothesis. One 
stream of studies documents that UK firms significantly engage in classificatory 
smoothing to emphasise persistent earnings following the introduction of FRS 3 (e.g. 
Athanasakou et al. 2007; 2010). Another stream reports that FRS 3 inhibited 
classification shifting, and managers managed accruals post-FRS 3 to meet earnings 
thresholds (Peasnell et al. 2000; Gore, Pope and Singh 2007). These authors conclude 
that FRS 3 altered firms’ earnings management strategies. Also, Athanasakou et al. 
(2009) replicates McVay (2006) to investigate the relative incidence of classification 
shifting, accrual-based earnings management and downward forecast guidance after 
FRS 3. They find that only a subset of larger firms use classification shifting to meet 
analyst forecasts post-FRS 3, firms in the sample do not manipulate discretionary 
accruals post-FRS 3, and that the most commonly used method to meet analyst forecasts 
is downward forecast guidance.  However, Athanasakou et al. (2009), do not examine 
pre-FRS 3 data, therefore their results cannot be interpreted as conveying evidence of 
any change in firms’ earnings management behaviour due to regulation. 
Research in Australia focuses on the change to the definition of extraordinary items 
effective 31 December 1989. Houghton (1994) examines the impact of the change in the 
definition of extraordinary items (AASB 1018) by analysing reporting patterns of firms’ 
extraordinary and AI pre- and post-restriction, and documents a shift from frequent 
reporting of extraordinary losses in 1988 - 1989 to frequent reporting of abnormal losses 
in 1990 – 1991, but offers no formal test of the impact of the regulatory change.  
Hoffman and Zimmer (1994) report that managers who are relatively highly 
remunerated, selectively classify recurring extraordinary items to either increase or 
decrease operating earnings. Also, Godfrey and Jones (1999) present evidence of 
classificatory smoothing using extraordinary items to avoid political costs. Cameron and 
Gallery (2008) provide an analysis of the frequency of reported AI from 1994 to 2000 
before firms were prohibited from reporting profits before and after AI. They find that 
the frequency of reporting abnormal losses increased from 1994 onwards, concluding 
that the results may justify the subsequent removal of AI. However, they caution that 
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the restriction may harm firms’ ability to communicate the temporary nature of AI to 
users. Like Houghton (1994), Cameron and Gallery (2008) do not test the association 
between AI reporting and the regulatory change.  
These Australian-based studies examine the impact of one change to classification rules 
however, further changes that restricted the scope for classification were implemented 
in 2002 and 2005. Moreover, these studies do not establish an association between the 
regulatory amendments and the change in firms’ classificatory and other earnings 
management choices.  
3.7.2 Restricting the scope for classification shifting via AASB 1018 
As discussed in Section 3.6, recent research reveals that classification shifting is 
potentially a less costly way of managing core earnings relative to accrual-based and 
real earnings management. A small but growing number of studies consistently find that 
firms use classification shifting to improve core earnings (Lin et al. 2006; McVay 2006; 
Athanasakou et al. 2009; Barua et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 2011; Siu and 
Faff 2013). However, these studies are based mainly in the US, with Athanaskou et al. 
(2009) and Haw et al. (2011) being the only non-US studies, while no such study has 
been conducted in Australia.61  
Although there is evidence of classification shifting by US firms, the US accounting 
standards board has not reacted with any swift changes to accounting standards 
governing the reporting of abnormal/special items. In contrast, the AASB reacted to 
media concerns about the abusive reporting of AI by Australian firms by issuing an 
exposure draft that led to the reform to AASB 1018 which prohibited firms from 
reporting profit sub-totals before and after AI. 
However, prior research reveals that regulation can either reduce or increase earnings 
management. Cohen et al. (2008) report that following the introduction of SOX, the 
manipulation of accruals declined, while real earnings management increased. Barua et 
al. (2010) report that since the implementation of SFAS 144 in the US, the reporting 
frequency of DO has increased although the extent of classification shifting decreased.62 
Athanasakou et al. (2009) document that a subset of larger UK firms engage in 
61  Godfrey and Jones (1999) and Hoffman and Zimmer (1994) provide Australian evidence of 
classification shifting using extraordinary items, however, their designs are different from McVay (2006) 
and they examine extraordinary items, not AI. 
62 SFAS No. 144 Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-lived Assets (enforced in 2002) does 
not restrict the scope for classification shifting, presenting a perfect opportunity for classification shifting.  
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classification shifting post-FRS 3 to meet/beat earnings benchmarks, indicating that 
FRS 3 still provided the opportunity for  firms to engage in classification shifting 
despite its greater transparency requirements.  In Australia, Houghton (1994) documents 
a shift from frequently reported extraordinary losses in the period prior to the 1989 
amendment to AASB 1018, to frequently reported abnormal losses following the 
regulatory amendment.63 Cameron and Gallery (2008) report that more than half of the 
top 500 firms reported AI from 1994 to 2000, where almost two thirds of AI 
observations in each year were abnormal losses. Moreover, abnormal losses steadily 
increased every year from 56 percent in 1994 to peak at 71 percent in 1998.  
Partly in response to alleged opportunistic reporting of AI, the AASB amended AASB 
1018 effective for periods ending on or after 30 June 2002 (following the amendment 
effective for periods ending on or after 30 June 2001 that prohibited the reporting of 
sub-totals before and after abnormal items). In addition to prohibiting the presentation 
of profit sub-totals before and after AI, the amendments introduced restrictions on the 
placement and prominence given to additional line items (such as those that may 
formerly have been reported as AI), sub-headings and sub-totals necessary for 
understanding the firm’s performance. The standard permitted these items to be reported 
separately on the face of the income statement, but they must be presented before, and 
less prominently than profit or loss from ordinary activities before income tax expense 
(income tax revenue), and net profit or loss/result.64, 65 In principle, the 2001/02 reforms 
reduced the scope for classification shifting.  To date, no prior research has investigated 
the effect of this amendment to determine its effectiveness in reducing earnings 
management, which therefore leads to my first hypothesis specified in alternative form:  
H1a: The use of classification shifting to improve core earnings decreases after the 
2002 prohibition of the separate reporting of profit before and after abnormal items. 
This hypothesis implies that classification shifting was prevalent prior to the 2001/2002 
amendments. Hence, empirical tests of H1a jointly examine both the prevalence of 
63 Recall that the 1989 amendment to AASB 1018 tightened the definition of extraordinary items to 
include only those items that are both material and non-recurring, not one or the other. 
64 Refer to Chapter 2 about the details of the 2002 amendments. 
65 Paragraph  6.1.2 of exposure draft (ED) 93 provides examples of accounting transactions and/or events 
that are relevant to users of financial reports in understanding firm performance: write-down of 
inventories to net realisable value or PPE to recoverable amount and, the reversal of such write-downs; 
restructuring charges and reversal of provisions for restructuring costs; disposal of PPE; disposals of 
long-term investments; litigation settlements; and other reversals of provisions. 
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classification shifting pre-2001/02 amendments and any reduction post-2001/02 
amendments.   
3.7.3 IFRS adoption and the increasing scope for classification shifting 
The adoption of IFRS in 2005, effective for financial periods starting on or after the 1st 
January 2005, resulted in further changes affecting the reporting of non-recurring items 
in the income statement. The new standard was issued as AASB 101 Presentation of 
Financial Statements, superseding AASB 1018, and it removed the 2002 restrictions on 
the placement and the prominence given to additional line items.  Under AASB 101, 
firms were required to disclose the nature and amount of material income or expense 
items separately on the income statement (para. 97).66 Additionally, it required the 
presentation of additional headings and sub-totals in the statement of comprehensive 
income when relevant to understanding the entity’s financial performance (para. 85).  
However, unlike AASB 1018, AASB 101 was silent on precisely where on the income 
statement the material items and additional headings and sub-totals should be presented.  
Instead, managers were asked to amend the descriptions and the ordering of items when 
necessary in explaining the firm’s performance (para. 84) and encouraged firms to 
follow the income statement format in the appendix of the standard, which highlights 
profit before income tax. The absence of a restriction on the placement and prominence 
of disclosing ‘material’ items on the face of the income statement may encourage firms 
to present additional ‘material’ income and expense line items, headings, and sub-totals 
below profit from ordinary activities and highlight them prominently. 67  Therefore, 
AASB 101 may have increased the scope for classification shifting.   Whether firms 
exploited this opportunity to improve core earnings is an empirical question of interest, 
thus leading to my next hypothesis stated in alternative form: 
H1b:  The use of classification shifting to improve core earnings increases after the 
removal in 2005 of the restrictions on the placement of additional line items, headings 
and sub-totals on the income statement. 
66 Circumstances that give rise to the separate disclosure of items include: write-down of inventories, 
property, plant and equipment and reversals; restructuring and reversals; disposal of property, plant and 
equipment, and investments; discontinued operations; litigation settlements; and other provisions and 
reversals.  
67 Examples of firms that reported AI under different names or as one-off line items below certain 
earnings sub-totals following the adoption of IFRS include Autron Corporation Ltd, Asciano Ltd, 
Queensland Gas Company Ltd, Quay Magnesium Ltd, Southern Cross Exploration Ltd, and Webster Ltd. 
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The adoption of IFRS in 2005 also introduced AASB 5 Noncurrent Assets Held for 
Sales and Discontinued Operations which modified the definition of DO and changed 
the disclosure requirements from that in the superseded AASB 1042. Under AASB 
1042, firms were required to classify DO separately within ordinary activities (AASB 
1042 para. 6.3 & 6.4).  However, AASB 5 required the presentation and disclosure of a 
single net-of-tax amount of DO68 on the face of the income statement, but is silent on 
where on the income statement this may be presented. This requirement appears to have 
increased the scope for classification shifting and may have provided firms with another 
opportunity to artificially improve core earnings. 69  Moreover, the inclusion of a 
component ‘held for sale’ as a DO may increase the frequency of reporting DO, also 
increasing the opportunities for classification shifting. Because the reporting of DO in 
the pre-IFRS period was exceptionally infrequent (just 3 firm-years identified in the 
Morningstar data), testing a hypothesis regarding the ‘change’ in classification shifting 
behaviour is impractical, and thus my hypothesis (stated in alternative form) concerns 
behaviour in the post-IFRS period only:  
H1c:  Following the 2005 amendments to the reporting of discontinued items, firms 
engage in opportunistic classification shifting using discontinued operations to improve 
core earnings.  
3.7.4 Effects of regulatory amendments on alternative earnings management 
Section 3.6 provides evidence that firms use multiple earnings management methods as 
substitutes to improve core earnings (e.g. Lin et al. 2006; Fan et al. 2010; Haw et al. 
2011; Zang 2012; Siu and Faff 2013). Also, a small number of studies document that 
firms substitute between earnings management methods in response to new regulation 
or changes to regulations that constrain one form of earnings management (e.g. Cohen 
et al. 2008; Athanasakou et al. 2009). Schipper (2003) claims that more precise 
accounting standards may lead to a substitution effect, whereby declining accrual-based 
earnings management is offset with increasing real earnings manipulation, thereby 
undermining the standard setter’s intention. To the best of my knowledge, no such 
evidence is available for Australian firms although amendments to accounting 
standards, and new accounting standards have been introduced over the years. 
68 This single amount is comprised of the post-tax profit/loss of DO, and the post-tax gain/loss recognised 
on the disposal of the DO or on the measurement to fair value less costs to sell a DO. 
69 Examples of firms that reported DO post-IFRS adoption are Breville Group Ltd, GBM Gold Ltd, 
Macmahon Holdings Ltd, Primary Healthcare Ltd, and Specialty Fashion Group Ltd. 
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While there is evidence of firms using discretionary accruals and real earnings 
management techniques as substitutes to improve earnings following regulatory 
changes, there is no evidence on whether firms switch from classification shifting to 
either accrual-based or real earnings manipulation when the scope for classification 
shifting has been constrained. The reforms in Australia in which amendments were 
made to AASB 1018 in 2001/02 to restrict classification shifting provide an excellent 
setting to examine this important issue. This issue is of interest because if the regulatory 
amendment restricted classification shifting but resulted in the subsequent use of 
alternative earnings management methods, then any benefit resulting from restricting 
classification shifting such as more objective identification of non-recurring items, may 
be off-set by a decline in earnings quality caused by other earnings manipulation 
methods. To examine whether firms engage in alternative earnings management 
following the restrictions on classification shifting, I specify the following hypotheses 
in which I examine the use of accrual-based earnings management, and real earnings 
management using two proxies - the manipulation of sales and discretionary 
expenditure: 
H2a(i): The manipulation of discretionary accruals to improve core earnings increases 
after the 2002 prohibition of the separate reporting of profit before and after abnormal 
items. 
H2a(ii): The manipulation of sales transactions to improve core earnings increases 
after the 2002 prohibition of the separate reporting of profit before and after abnormal 
items. 
H2a(iii): The manipulation of discretionary expenditure to improve core earnings 
increases after the 2002 prohibition of the separate reporting of profit before and after 
abnormal items. 
AASB 101 and AASB 5 which were introduced in 2005 were expected to have 
contemporaneous effects on firms’ earnings management behaviour. Similar to H1b and 
H1c, I attempt to separate the effects of the two reforms by focussing on the behaviour 
of firms most likely to have been affected by each reform. In H1b, I predicted that the 
2005 amendment in AASB 101 which relaxed the restrictions on the placement of 
additional line items, headings and sub-totals on the income statement, would increase 
the scope for classification shifting, resulting in greater classification shifting post-2005 
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to improve core earnings. These firms are then expected not to engage in accrual-based 
earnings management, sales manipulation, and the opportunistic reduction of 
discretionary expenditure because it is less costly to use classification shifting than the 
other alternatives. I test this argument using the following hypotheses stated in 
alternative form:  
H2b(i): The manipulation of discretionary accruals to improve core earnings decreases 
after the removal of the restrictions on the placement of additional line items, headings 
and sub-totals on the income statement in 2005. 
H2b(ii): The manipulation of sales activities to improve core earnings decreases after 
the removal of the restrictions on the placement of additional line items, headings and 
sub-totals on the income statement in 2005. 
H2b(iii): The manipulation of discretionary expenditure to improve core earnings 
decreases after the removal of the restrictions on the placement of additional line items, 
headings and sub-totals on the income statement in 2005. 
H1c proposed that firms may also engage in classification shifting using DO to improve 
core earnings following the introduction of AASB 5 in 2005. Thus, because 
classification shifting is a low costly way to improve core earnings, firms may refrain 
from using discretionary accruals and real earnings management techniques to increase 
earnings. I investigate this contention using the following hypotheses stated in 
alternative form: 
H2c(i): The manipulation of discretionary accruals to improve core earnings decreases 
after the 2005 amendments which increased the scope for classifying and reporting 
items as discontinued operations. 
H2c(ii): The manipulation of sales activities to improve core earnings decreases after 
the 2005 amendments which increased the scope for classifying and reporting items as 
discontinued operations. 
H2c(iii): The manipulation of discretionary expenditure to improve core earnings 
decreases after the 2005 amendments which increased the scope for classifying and 
reporting items as discontinued operations. 
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Note that while H1c focussed purely on the reporting of DO post-IFRS, H2c(i-iii) are in 
‘changes’ form. This is because, unlike the case with DO, there is potential for 
significant accrual-based and real earnings management prior to the adoption of IFRS. 
Tests of these hypotheses focus on differences in the behaviour of firms who did and 
did not report DO in the post-IFRS period. 
3.8  Chapter summary  
This chapter reviewed the earnings management literature and developed hypotheses to 
test the research questions identified in Chapter One. It defined earnings management; 
provided an overview of the theoretical perspective on earnings management most 
applicable to this study; explained the different methods used to manage earnings and 
the incentives driving earnings management; and reviewed the factors that could 
constrain earnings manipulation.  
The review reveals that earnings management is defined and generally perceived as an 
undesirable phenomenon that could undermine the credibility of financial reports. 
Agency theory suggests that attempts to align the interests of managers (agents) with 
those of shareholders (principals) through monitoring and bonding consequently 
promulgate earnings management, as monitoring and bonding are imperfect, because 
the contracts are often based on benchmarks derived from an earnings process which 
managers control. Managers are motivated by a number of incentives to manage 
earnings such as meeting/beating earnings targets, other capital market incentives, and 
contracting incentives. Firms have a choice of three earnings management methods: 
accrual-based, real activities, and classification shifting to manipulate earnings, which 
they may use individually or contemporaneously. The choice between these earnings 
management techniques depends on the relative costs of using each method (together 
with the firm’s operational and accounting environment).  
Concerns over the detrimental effects of earnings management resulted in regulators 
implementing a number of mechanisms to help constrain earnings management. These 
constraints include regulations, the board and audit committee, external auditors and 
institutional investors. However, there is relatively sparse empirical evidence on the 
effect of these regulatory amendments on firms’ earnings management behaviour, with 
virtually none in Australia. This provides the basis for the hypotheses for this study 
which focused on the effect of regulatory reforms affecting the scope for classification 
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shifting on firms’ classification shifting behaviour, and whether the reforms affected the 
use of alternative earnings management techniques to influence core earnings. The 
methods used in testing these hypotheses are explained in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research method used to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter Three. Section 4.2 describes the study period, while Section 4.3 presents and 
discusses the regression models used to test the hypotheses. This includes the models 
used to measure the various forms of earnings management and the determination of the 
samples used in the tests. Section 4.4 addresses the design limitations while Section 4.5 
provides a summary of the chapter.   
4.2 Study period – delineation of regulatory regimes 
This study examines the impact of regulatory amendments affecting the reporting of 
abnormal items and discontinued operations on the scope for classification shifting and 
the impact of these amendments on the use of alternative earnings management to 
increase core earnings. My study examines reporting behaviour across financial years 
with end dates from 1995 to 2009 (inclusive), subsuming the periods before and after 
the amendments studied. The study period begins in 1995 because archival data for 
earlier years are limited, and terminates at the end of 2009 to allow broadly equivalent 
pre-event and post-event sample periods. Because tests involving the following year 
change in unexpected core earnings lag the ‘levels’ model by one year, the samples used 
in these tests use data through to the end of 2010. The study period comprises three 
regulatory regimes, hence, the cut-off period of 2010 allows each post-amendment 
regime to consist of the same number of years. 
To test my hypotheses, I focus on firms’ classification of expenses as recurring (core) 
expenses or non-recurring items (abnormal items and discontinued operations) across 
three regulatory regimes, as shown in Figure 1. The first period spanning financial years 
ending between 1995 and 2000 (inclusive), is the ‘pre-2001/02 amendments’ period 
(hereafter referred to as the pre-2001/02 period) in which firms were permitted to report 
abnormal items on the face of the income statement (or in the accompanying notes), and 
to disclose separate  measures of earnings before and after abnormal items. The second 
period, from 30 June 2002 to 30 December 2005 (known as the ‘post-2001/02 
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amendments period’ when discussing H1a/H2a(i-iii) and the ‘pre-IFRS period’ when 
discussing other hypotheses relating to adoption of IFRS) follows the AASB 1018 
amendment that prohibited the separate reporting of results before and after abnormal 
items. Financial years ending between 1 January 2001 and 29 June 2002 (for brevity, I 
hereafter describe these collectively as ‘2001 observations’) are excluded from the study 
period because AASB 1018 was amended after a single year of operation, and thus the 
operative period of that particular regime is too short to allow meaningful analysis.70 
Finally, the third period (the ‘post-IFRS’ period) is the period following the adoption of 
IFRS, which was effective for financial periods starting on or after 1 January 2005, 
which spans 31 December 2005 to end of 2009.  
 
FIGURE 1 
Event Periods Analysed 
1995          2000   2002               2005               2009
    
 
     Pre-2001/02 amendments           Post-2001/02 amendments/      Post-IFRS period 
       period         Pre-IFRS period 
 
4.3 Measures and models for hypothesis testing 
In this section, I describe the models used to formally test my hypotheses. I first briefly 
explain the McVay (2006) measure of classification shifting, before describing the 
regression models used in hypothesis testing. 
4.3.1 Measuring classification shifting  
I follow McVay (2006) and measure opportunistic classification shifting by estimating 
unexpected core earnings, and unexpected change in core earnings, and then 
investigating the relationship between these measures and firms’ reporting decisions. 
70 Recall from Chapter Two that the prohibition on the separate reporting of profit sub-totals before and 
after abnormal items became operative for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2001. However, 
there was concern, particularly by ASIC that firms continued to separately report abnormal items as such 
or under a different name on the income statement. Subsequently, AASB1018 was further amended by 
restricting firms from presenting additional ‘material’ specific items and/or subheadings before and more 
prominently than profit/loss from ordinary activities; net profit/loss; and net profit/loss attributable to 
members. A sub-total of profit/loss should not be presented immediately before ‘material’ specific items. 
This second amendment became operative for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002. 
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The focus on measures of ‘core earnings’, reflects their importance to market 
participants. Professional investors and analysts focus on core earnings when estimating 
the value of the firm because this measure is believed to better represent the firms' 
ability to generate distributable cash flows in the future (Kinney and Trezevant 1997; 
Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Gu and Chen 2004). Also, there is considerable evidence  
that analysts typically exclude items reported as ‘abnormal’ from their measure of 
forecast earnings (Fan et al. 2010) and so managers have taken an active role in defining 
‘core’ or ‘street’ earnings when communicating their results to investors (Bradshaw and 
Sloan 2002; Christensen et al. 2011). Hence, managers may have incentive to take 
advantage of the market’s focus on core earnings instead of bottom line GAAP earnings 
to misclassify some core expenses opportunistically. As explained in Chapter One, my 
measure of core earnings is different from McVay’s (2006) core earnings in that the 
non-recurring items (i.e. abnormal items and discontinued operations) I exclude from 
core earnings are determined by analysts, whereas McVay’s (2006) measure reflects 
exclusions of a standard list of items classified as non-recurring (i.e. special items) by 
COMPUSTAT. Thus, my measure of core earnings is determined by analysts whereas 
McVay’s (2006) is a function of amounts reported on the face of the income statement 
and therefore reflects firms’ reporting behavior. Consistent with my measure of core 
earnings, I examine ‘abnormal items’ as identified by the Morningstar analyst assigned 
to the firm.   
Following McVay (2006), I focus on income-decreasing abnormal items (i.e. expenses), 
because firms who wish to improve core earnings will more often classify core expenses 
as abnormal items rather than shifting abnormal revenues upward to operating revenue 
to be netted against core expenses,71 and because firms  are significantly more likely to 
present income-decreasing abnormal items (AI) on the face of the income statement 
while income-increasing AI are more often disclosed in the notes to the financial 
statements (Kinney and Trezevant 1997; Weiss 2001). I expect core earnings for firms 
that opportunistically misclassify core expenses as AI to be overstated in the period that 
the AI are reported. Thus, I estimate a model of core earnings and anticipate unexpected 
71 McVay (2006: 502) reports evidence consistent with “managers classifying core expenses as special 
items, increasing both core earnings and income-decreasing special items”. She leaves classification 
shifting using income-increasing special items to future studies. Houghton (1994) and Cameron and 
Gallery (2008) present anecdotal evidence that Australian firms reported more income-decreasing 
abnormal items than income-increasing abnormal items following the change in the definition of 
extraordinary items. Moreover, Chapter Six of this thesis presents statistical evidence that Australian 
firms report significantly more income-decreasing abnormal items than income-increasing abnormal 
items. 
89 
 
                                                          
core earnings (reported core earnings less predicted core earnings) in year t to increase 
with the magnitude of income-decreasing AI. However, while a positive association 
between unexpected core earnings and AI is consistent with opportunistic classification 
shifting, it is also consistent with immediate benefits of real economic events such as 
efficient restructuring (McVay 2006). To extricate these real economic effects from 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour, I examine whether the higher than expected core 
earnings in the current period (year t) reverse in the subsequent period (year t+1). A 
reversal of unexpected core earnings in year t+1 is consistent with firms engaging in 
classification shifting because core expenses that are misclassified as abnormal in year t, 
should be recorded as core expenses in year t+1 when there are no AI reported.  To 
identify this effect, a model of change in core earnings in year t+1 is estimated where 
the unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1 (reported change in core earnings 
less predicted change in core earnings) is expected to decrease with AI.  
In the next subsection I present the models of the unexpected core earnings and changes 
therein, which are the dependent variables for my subsequent hypotheses tests. I then 
present the regressions to test Hypotheses 1a (H1a) in Sub-section 4.3.3, 1b (H1b) in 
Sub-section 4.3.4, and 1c (H1c) in Sub-section 4.3.5. Next, I describe models used to 
identify alternative samples for tests of H1(a-c) and main tests of H2(a-c) in Sub-section 
4.3.6. I then discuss in Sub-section 4.3.7 models required to estimate the proxies for 
alternative EM behaviour (i.e. accrual-based and real earnings management) which are 
the main explanatory variables in tests of H2(a-c). Models for tests of H2a(i) through to 
H2b(iii) are then provided in subsection 4.3.8 followed by the model to test H2c(i-iii) in 
Sub-section 4.3.9. Finally, I discuss sensitivity tests in Sub-section 4.3.10. 
4.3.2 Models of core earnings and change in core earnings 
McVay (2006) develops a method of identifying classification shifting by estimating 
unexpected core earnings and unexpected changes in core earnings. To this end, McVay 
(2006) first estimates models of expected core earnings in year t and the expected 
change in core earnings in the subsequent year (t+1). These models of expected core 
earnings and change in earnings, adapted for the purpose of my research question, are 
described in Equations (1) and (2) below, which are estimated within industry-year 
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subsamples and exclude the focal firm i (the firm for which expected CE and ΔCE are 
being estimated):72 
     CEt = β0 + β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3∆SALESt + β4NEG_∆SALESt + εt                       (1)                     
∆CEt+1 = δ0 + δ1CEt + δ2∆CEt + δ3∆ATOt+1 + δ4∆SALESt+1 + δ5NEG_∆SALESt+1 + υt+1         
                                                                                                                                        (2)      
Where variables are as described below: 
CEt = EBITDA (#8000)/Sales (#1), both in year t, where EBITDA is 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. 
∆CEt+1 = CEt+1 – CEt 
CEt-1 = EBITDAt-1 (#8000)/Salest-1 (#1)  
∆CEt = CEt – CEt-1 
ATOt = Salest (#1)/((NOAt + NOAt-1)/2), where NOA is net operating 
assets, and NOA = Operating assets – Operating liabilities. 
Operating assets = Total assets (#5090) – Cash (#4990) – Short 
term investments (#5010). Operating liabilities = Total assets 
(#5090) – Total debt (#6000 + #6020) – Book value of 
common and preferred equity (#7010) 
∆SALESt = (Salest (#1) – Salest-1)/Salest-1 
NEG_∆SALESt = Percent change in sales (∆SALESt) if ∆SALESt is less than 0, 
and 0 otherwise. 
∆ATOt+1 = ATOt+1 - ATOt, where ATOt is as calculated for Model (1) 
above. 
∆SALESt+1 = (Salest+1 (#1) – Salest)/Salest 
NEG_∆SALESt+1 = Percent change in sales in year t+1 (∆SALESt+1) if ∆SALESt+1 is 
less than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
72 Morningstar data item numbers are indicated in parentheses.  
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The dependent variable for Equation (1) is the current year’s level of core earnings 
(CEt) calculated as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA)73 scaled by sales, both in year t. Core earnings (EBITDA) is measured as 
recorded in the Morningstar database. The first independent variable is lagged core 
earnings (CEt-1) which controls for earnings persistence over time (Schipper 1989; 
McVay 2006). Hence, CEt-1 and CEt are expected to be positively correlated. The 
definition of CEt in this study is strongly correlated with a firm’s net profit margin, 
which in turn has been shown to be negatively related to asset turnover ratio (ATO) 
(McVay 2006; Nissim and Penman 2001). Therefore ATOt is included and is expected 
to be negatively associated with CEt. Sales growth (∆SALESt) is included because the 
relation between sales and  sales-deflated CEt is expected to be positive as fixed costs 
become smaller per sales dollar (McVay 2006). Finally, negative sales growth 
(NEG_∆SALESt) is included to allow the slope to differ between periods of sales growth 
and decline because costs increase by a greater amount when activity increases than the 
amount by which they are reduced when activity decreases by an identical amount 
(Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman 2003). Both ∆SALESt and NEG_∆SALESt are 
expected to be positively associated with CEt. 
In Equation (2) the dependent variable is change in core earnings in between years t and 
t+1 (∆CEt+1), calculated as core earnings in the year after the reporting of non-recurring 
items less core earnings in the year of non-recurring items were reported (∆CEt+1 = 
CEt+1 – CEt). Both current core earnings (CEt) and the change in core earnings from 
year t-1 to year t (∆CEt) are included as explanatory variables in Equation (2) because 
the extent of any mean reversion may be affected by the prior year’s level of core 
earnings (McVay 2006). This is important because the mean reversion is expected only 
if opportunistic classification shifting has occurred. Both CEt and ∆CEt are expected to 
be negatively correlated with ∆CEt+1. The change in asset turnover ratio (∆ATOt+1) is 
included instead of the level of ATOt because the growth in net operating assets is likely 
to result in an increase in revenues and therefore earnings (McVay 2006; Penman and 
Zhang 2002); ∆ATOt+1 is expected to be positively associated with ∆CEt+1. For the same 
73 McVay (2006, 2008) defines core earnings as sales – (cost of goods sold (COGS) + selling, general and 
administrative expenses (SGA)), where COGS and SGA exclude depreciation and amortisation. In effect, 
the definition of core earnings in this thesis, i.e. EBITDA, differs from McVay’s definition in that 
EBITDA includes both sales and sundry revenues (other than interest and abnormal gains) whereas 
McVay’s (2006) measure includes only sales, and the non-recurring items excluded from EBITDA are 
determined by an analyst, whereas McVay’s measure results from a standard applied to US firms’ 
reported results. 
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reasons as in Equation (1), ∆SALESt+1 and NEG_∆SALESt+1 are included, and both 
variables are expected to be positively associated with ∆CEt+1.   
Each of McVay’s (2006) original models includes regressors representing lagged 
accruals and current accruals, because accruals affect the time-series of firms reported 
performance. Specifically, the accrual component of earnings exhibits lower persistence 
and unusually strong performance is associated with large increase in accruals. 
Although McVay (2006) finds evidence of classification shifting, she acknowledges a 
possible mechanical bias in her results by including accruals in the expected core 
earnings models, and does not ‘back-out’ accruals from her measure of special items in 
the hypotheses tests.  Thus, the positive association observed between special items and 
unexpected core earnings may reflect a bias. As some of my hypotheses seek to 
separately identify the manipulation of core earning using accruals, it is important to 
avoid this bias. I therefore exclude lag and current accruals from my main models of 
expected core earnings.74  
The expected values of core earnings and change in core earnings are the predicted 
values from Equations (1) and (2), respectively. The difference between the reported 
and predicted values from Equations (1) and (2), are the unexpected core earnings 
(UE_CEt) and unexpected change in core earnings (UE_∆CEt+1), respectively. Thus, the 
dependent variables in the regressions used in hypotheses testing, are described in the 
following equations: 
       UE_CEt = Reported CEt – Predicted CEt                   (1a)        
  UE_ΔCEt+1 = Reported ΔCEt+1 – Predicted ΔCEt+1        (2a)  
Where Reported CEt are the actual core earnings reported by firms, whilst Predicted CEt 
is calculated using the coefficients from model (1) described above. Similarly, Reported 
ΔCEt+1 are actual changes calculated as the difference between reported core earnings in 
74Fan et al. (2010: 1306) provides detailed discussion of the potential biases for using contemporaneous 
accruals in the expectation models of core earnings. That is, unexpected core earnings (the dependent 
variable in the test model) are partially determined by special items accruals which are included in the 
core expectations model (McVay 2006). These unexpected core earnings are then regressed on income-
decreasing special items which are also partially determined by special items accruals. This potentially 
creates a positive relation between unexpected core earnings (dependent variable) and income-decreasing 
special items (independent variable). On the other hand, removing accruals from the expectations model 
without sufficient control for firm performance may create omitted variable bias. Future extension of this 
study could, similar to Fan et al. (2010), include returns in the expected core earnings models to control 
for firm performance while removing accruals.  
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year t+1 and reported core earnings in year t. Predicted ΔCEt+1 is calculated using the 
coefficients from model (2) described above. 
4.3.3 Hypothesis testing of H1a – effect of AASB 1018 amendment on classification 
shifting 
H1a examines whether classification shifting using AI, which was presumed by many 
commentators to be prevalent in the pre-2001/02 period, reduced after the 2001/02 
amendments. To examine H1a, unexpected core earnings are regressed against AI and 
control variables. I use AI as identified by the Morningstar analyst assigned to the firm. 
These items identified by Morningstar as abnormal may have been reported by firms in 
a variety of forms (e.g. as 'abnormal', 'significant', 'unusual', or ‘non-recurring’).75 A 
positive association between unexpected core earnings and AI is expected if firms use 
opportunistic classification shifting to influence core earnings. If an observed positive 
association between AI and unexpected core earnings in year t derives from 
opportunistic classification shifting rather than genuine economic events, the high 
unexpected level of core earnings associated with AI in year t should reverse in year 
t+1. Thus, the unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1 is expected to be 
negatively associated with AI in year t. Therefore, classification shifting firms are 
expected to have both (i) a high unexpected level of core earnings in year t, and (ii) a 
low unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1 (McVay 2006). To test whether the 
extent of classification shifting reduces after the 2002 amendment, I estimate the 
following regressions, using various samples comprising observations from 1995 to 
2005:  
     UE_CEt = α0 + α1%AIt + α2POSTt + α3%AIt*POSTt + α4SIZEt + α5ROAt + α6CFOt  
                      + α7LEVt + α8LOSSt + α9AUDITORt + εt                   (3a)     
 
75 Reconciliation of all the abnormal items identified by Morningstar against the firms’ annual reports 
show that abnormal items recognised by Morningstar in the pre-2001/02 amendments period (1995–2000) 
are consistent with the abnormal items reported on the face of the income statement. In the post-2001/02 
amendments period (2002–2009), the items identified by analysts as abnormal may have been reported by 
firms as: (a) items recognised as ‘abnormal items’ on the face of the income statement;  (b) items reported 
under one of these headings: ‘significant items’, ‘unusual items’ and ‘non-recurring items’ either on the 
face of the income statement or in the notes; (c) single items of revenue or expense reported as line items 
(above and/or below profit from ordinary activities) on the income statement but under none of the 
specific headings in (b); or (d) items that are disclosed in the notes but under no specific heading. The 
specific reporting choices are discussed in Chapter Six. 
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UE_∆CEt+1 = η0 + η1%AIt + η2POSTt + η3%AIt*POSTt + η4SIZEt + η5ROAt + η6CFOt  
                      + η7LEVt + η8LOSSt + η9AUDITORt + vt+1        (3b) 
 Where variables are as defined below:                                                                                                    
UE_CEt = The difference between reported and predicted core earnings, 
where the predicted value is calculated using the coefficients 
from core earnings estimated in Model (1)  
UE_∆CEt+1 = The difference between reported and predicted change in core 
earnings, where the predicted value is calculated using the 
coefficients from change in core earnings estimated in Model 
(2)  
%AIt = (Abnormal items (#86) * -1)/Sales, both in year t, when 
abnormal items are income decreasing (i.e. negative), 0 
otherwise. Income-increasing AI and firm-year observations 
with zero or no AI reported are set to zero. 
POSTt = An indicator variable = 1 for financial periods ending 30 June 
2002 to 30 December 2005, 0 otherwise. 
%AIt*POSTt = The interaction of %AIt and POSTt 
SIZEt = Natural log of total assets (#5090) in year t. 
ROAt = Net profit or earnings before extraordinary items scaled by 
average total assets: (EBEI) (#8036)/[(TAt (#5090) + TAt-1)/2]. 
CFOt = Cash from operations (#9100)/ Total assets (#5090), both in 
year t. 
LEVt = Total debt (#6000 + #6020)/Average total assets (#5090), 
both in year t. 
LOSSt = Indicator variable = 1 if firm reports negative EBEI (#8036), 
0 otherwise. 
AUDITORt = Indicator variable = 1 if the firm’s external auditor is a big N 
firm, 0 otherwise.  
95 
 
All models also include untabulated industry fixed effects, using the classifications 
provided by the Centre for Research in Finance (CRIF). The general form of these 
models is similar to that used in Barua et al. (2010) when testing the impact of SFAS 
No. 144.76 %AIt measures the level of income-decreasing AI in year t, and is interacted 
with a dummy variable indicating observations of AI occurring after the 2001/02 
amendments (%AIt*POSTt). 77  If firms use classification shifting to increase core 
earnings in the pre-2001/02 period, then the main effect (%AIt), which measures the pre-
2001/02 associations between unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) and AI, is expected 
to be positively associated with UE_CEt. The interaction term (%AIt*POSTt) measures 
the extent to which the association between UE_CEt and %AIt differs in the post-
2001/02 amendments period, 78  relative to the pre-2001/02 period.  Model (3b) is 
estimated to ascertain whether a higher than expected level of core earnings estimated in 
Model (3a) reflects classification shifting rather than fundamental economic 
improvement. If a higher than expected level of core earnings in the pre-2001/02 period 
is due to classification shifting, the coefficient for %AIt in Model (3b) is expected to be 
negative. That is, firms that engage in classification shifting in year t should have 
negative unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1. 
If the 2001/02 amendments were effective in curbing classification shifting, I expect at 
least one of the following 2 conditions to hold: 
1) the coefficient for %AIt*POSTt  in the unexpected core earnings model (3a) is 
significantly negative, and/or 
2) the coefficient for %AIt*POSTt is significantly positive in the unexpected change 
in core earnings model (3b).  
That is, even if tests of the levels model (3a) suggest that there is no reduction in the 
association between AI and unexpected core earnings after the 2001/02 amendments, if 
the extent to which this association reverses in t+1 weakens significantly, then there is 
evidence of a reduction in classification shifting. I also test the total effect size (sum of 
the main effect and interaction terms) and estimate regression restricted to the pre-
2001/02 (post-) amendments period to provide confirmatory evidence regarding the 
impact of the reforms.   
76 I use leverage in preference to book-to-market (used by Barua et al. 2010) as this results in superior 
model fit when applied to Australian firms. 
77 Income-increasing abnormal items are set to zero. 
78 Throughout the remainder of this thesis, I use the terms post-2001/02 amendments, post-2001/02 
reforms and post-2001/02 interchangeably to refer to the period after the 2001/02 reforms and before the 
adoption of IFRS in 2005 (i.e. 2002-30 December 2005). 
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Control variables are included in both regressions to account for the effect of firm 
characteristics that are associated with earnings management and firm performance, and 
are broadly consistent with those used in Barua et al. (2010), the study closest in nature 
to mine. SIZEt is included to control for the effect of firm size on earnings management 
where size has been found to be negatively associated with earnings management 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Bartov, Gul and Tsui 2000; Davidson et al. 2005). 
Specifically, large firms have less flexibility and weaker incentives to overstate earnings 
because they are subject to more scrutiny from regulators and market participants 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978, Bartov et al. 2000; Davidson et al. 2005; Lobo and Zhou 
2006). In this case, a negative association is expected between UE_CEt and SIZEt. 
However, large firms have diverse and complex operations that may also allow them 
more opportunity to manipulate earnings that external users may find difficult to detect 
(Lobo and Zhou 2006). To that end, UE_CEt is expected to be positively correlated with 
SIZEt.  
Return on assets (ROAt) is included to control for the possibility that unexpectedly good 
performers may improve earnings through earnings manipulation (Brown 2001; Brown 
and Higgins 2001; Barua, Legoria and Moffitt 2006). Barua et al. (2006) document that 
strong performers use income-increasing abnormal accruals to just meet or beat analyst 
forecasts. Moreover, Brown (2001) and Brown and Higgins (2001) document that 
strong performers are more likely to report small positive earnings surprises. LOSSt is 
included to control for possible differences in earnings management incentives for loss 
and profit firms (Brown 1997, 1998; Brown and Higgins 2001; Beaver, McNichols and 
Nelson2007). Beaver et al. (2007) find that on average, loss firms recognise more 
special items overall, and report more negative special items than profit firms. Also, 
loss firms attempt to avoid extreme negative surprises while profit firms are more likely 
to report small positive earnings surprises (e.g. Brown 2001; Brown and Higgins 2001). 
CFOt is cash from operation scaled by total assets, both in year t, and controls for 
performance level effects not captured by LOSSt where changes in firms’ CFO are likely 
to be associated with change in core earnings (Wilson and Wu 2011).  
High leverage firms are more likely to manage earnings than other firms in order to 
avoid debt covenant violations (Beasley and Salterio 2001; Klein 2002; Davidson et al. 
2005). This effect is controlled for by LEVt. Finally, prior studies provide evidence that 
big N audit firms are more likely to constrain earnings management (e.g. DeFond and 
Subramanyam 1998; Bartov et al. 2000; Lee and Mande 2003; Cahan and Zhang 2006; 
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Francis and Wang 2008). More directly, Haw et al. (2011) find that big N auditors 
effectively reduce classification shifting in East Asian countries with strong legal 
institutions. Therefore, auditor size (AUDITORt), is included in the regressions.  
4.3.4 Hypothesis testing of H1b – classification shifting following the adoption of 
AASB 101 
The adoption of AASB 101 in 2005 provided greater opportunities for classification 
shifting than existed in the pre-IFRS period (2002–30 December 2005), as this new 
standard permits the reporting of ‘material’ specific revenues and expenses and 
additional sub-totals of profit on the face of the income statement. This may have 
encouraged firms to report non-recurring items opportunistically under a variety of 
names. Thus, H1b examines whether the less restrictive nature of the 2005 amendment 
may have encouraged greater classification shifting in the post-IFRS period relative to 
the pre-IFRS period. I examine this contention by estimating the following models on 
various samples drawn from the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods (2002-2009):            
UE_CEt = ψ0 + ψ1%AIt + ψ2IFRSt + ψ3%AIt*IFRSt + ψ4SIZEt + ψ5ROAt + ψ6CFOt +  
ψ7LEVt + ψ8LOSSt + ψ9AUDITORt + εt              (4a)  
UE_∆CEt+1 = κ0 + κ1%AIt + κ2IFRSt + κ3%AIt*IFRSt + κ4SIZEt + κ5ROAt + κ6CFOt + 
                       κ7LEVt + κ8LOSSt + κ9AUDITORt + vt+1              (4b)             
 Where variables are as defined below:      
UE_CEt = As defined for Model (3a) in the previous section.  
UE_∆CEt+1 = As defined for Model (3b) in the previous section. 
%AIt = As defined for Models (3a) and (3b) in the previous 
section. 
IFRSt = An indicator variable = 1 for financial periods ending 31 
December 2005 to 2009, 0 otherwise.  
%AIt*IFRSt = The interaction of %AIt and IFRSt 
Control Variables = As defined for Models (3a) and (3b) previously  
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The interpretation of coefficients is similar in nature to that described in tests of H1a, 
with the exception that classification shifting is expected to be more prevalent in the 
later time period (i.e. post-IFRS period). If firms exploit the relaxation of restrictions on 
reporting additional line items and sub-totals on the income statement accompanying 
the introduction of the 2005 standard to opportunistically classify core expenses to 
increase core earnings, I expect that either (or both) the  coefficient for %AI*IFRSt to be 
positive in Equation (4a) or negative for Equation (4b). The vector of control variables 
employed is identical to that used in tests of H1a.   
4.3.5 Hypothesis testing of H1c – classification shifting following the adoption of 
AASB 5 
H1c predicts that the introduction of AASB 5 in 2005, which broadened the definition 
of discontinued operations (DO) by including as DO assets ‘held for sale’, increases the 
scope for firms to opportunistically classify core expenses as DO, and thereby increase 
core earnings. If firms report DO opportunistically, I expect unexpected core earnings to 
increase with the magnitude of income-decreasing DO. However, as is the case with AI, 
a positive association could also arise from enhanced operations after the 
discontinuation of a loss-making operation (Barua et al. 2010). In this case, the 
improvement in core earnings should persist in the following period. However, if the 
improvement is due to classification shifting, I expect a negative association between 
the unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1 and DO in year t.  
To test H1c, I examine samples from the post-IFRS period (31 December 2005-31 
December 2009) only, because the separate reporting of DO ‘below the line’ was 
extremely rare prior to the adoption of AASB 5.79 The models below are based on those 
of Barua et al. (2010): 
      UE_CEt = γ0 + γ1%DOt + γ2SIZEt + γ3ROAt + γ4CFOt + γ5LEVt + γ6LOSSt + 
                        γ7AUDITORt + εt                                                       (5a)                            
UE_∆CEt+1 = ω0 + ω1%DOt + ω2%DOt+1 + ω3SIZEt + ω4ROAt + γ5CFOt + ω6LEVt  
                       + ω7LOSSt + ω8AUDITORt + νt+1                                                    (5b)      
79 There are only 3 such Australian-domiciled firm-years identified in the Morningstar data in the pre-
IFRS period. 
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 Where variables are as defined below:                                
UE_CEt = As defined for Model (3a) in Section 4.3.3.  
UE_∆CEt+1 = As defined for Model (3b) in Section 4.3.3. 
%AIt = As defined for Models (3a) and (3b) in Section 4.3.3. 
IFRS t = An indicator variable = 1 for the period 31 December 
2005 to 31 December 2009, 0 otherwise.  
%DOt = The value of the net gains from DO (i.e. gains less 
expenses from DO) in year t (#8033) multiplied by -1, 
scaled by sales in year t 
Control Variables = As defined for Models (3a) and (3b) in Section 4.3.3 
Because a positive value of %DOt indicates that net losses were treated as DO, I expect 
%DOt to be positively associated with UE_CEt if firms engage in classification shifting 
using DO to inflate core earnings.  If such relationship is due to opportunistic 
classification shifting, I expect the higher than expected UE_CEt in year t estimated in 
Model (5a), to reverse in year t+1. Thus, I expect a negative association between %DOt 
and UE_∆CEt+1 in Model (5b) as core expenses recur in year t+1 as part of core 
earnings.80 Consistent with Barua et al. (2010), I control for the level of DO in year t+1 
by adding %DOt+1 in Equation (5b), and predict a positive coefficient for ω2.81 The 
remaining control variables are identical to those used in tests of H1a and H1b. 
I follow Barua et al. (2010) and further distinguish the effects of negative DO from 
reported DO because a firm’s classification shifting behaviour could vary depending on 
the sign of DO. For example, managers might be more likely to engage in greater 
classification shifting if net DO already represent losses and are less likely to 
misclassify items as DO if they represent profits (Barua et al. 2010). 82    Thus, I 
80 A negative association is expected only if the coefficient for %DOt in the ‘levels’ model was positive. 
81 Barua et al. (2010) explains that a positive association between unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) and 
discontinued operations (%DOt) can arise mechanically due to the use of lagged core earnings (CEt-1) in 
the expected core earnings model to determine unexpected core earnings. Discontinued operations (DO) 
are more often loss-making operations that a firm’s core earnings can improve when a loss-making 
operation is discontinued, therefore mechanically creating a positive association between UE_CEt and 
%DOt. Barua et al. (2010) addresses this problem by using restated data to calculate variables for firms 
reporting DO. Future replication of this study could explore this option. 
82 For example, a manager may blame poor firm results on DO sold at a loss by increasing the operating 
loss of the DO (Barua et al. 2010).  
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substitute %DO_NEGt (DO with aggregate losses) for the net variable %DOt in the 
following equations: 
    UE_CEt = π0 + π1%DO_NEGt + π2SIZEt + π3ROAt + π4CFOt + π5LEVt  
                     + π6LOSSt + π7AUDITORt + ψt                                                     (6a)                     
UE_∆CEt+1 = λ0 + λ1%DO_NEGt + λ2%DO_NEGt+1 + λ3SIZEt + λ4ROAt + λ5CFOt  
+ λ6LEVt + λ7LOSSt + λ8AUDITORt + ωt+1                 (6b)
                                  
Where variables are as defined below: 
%DO_NEGt = DO (i.e. gains less expenses from DO) (#8033) multiplied 
by -1, scaled by sales, both in year t when reported 
aggregate DO are income-decreasing, and 0 otherwise. 
Other Variables = As previously defined. 
If firms opportunistically classify income-decreasing DO, I expect π1 to be positive and 
λ1 to be negative.  I also control for DO in year t+1 by adding %DO_NEGt+1 in Equation 
(6b) and expect positive coefficients for λ2.  
4.3.6 Models used to identify propensity score matched (PSM) sample 
I test each of my hypotheses using a variety of samples, including samples in which I 
match firms that reported AI or DO in a period hypothesised to encourage classification 
shifting (treatment firms), to fundamentally similar firms that didn’t report AI/DO in 
that period (control firms). I examine samples of treatment and control firms because 
my initial samples in tests of H1a to H1c include all firms in the test period pertaining to 
each hypothesis which could potentially introduce noise and spurious correlation, as 
each sample includes firms that may exist only in one of the regulatory periods (e.g. in 
the pre-2001/02 period only (1995-2000) or post-2001/02 amendments only (2002-30 
December 2005)), and because there may be time series variation in the extent to which 
firms are inherently likely to report AI or DO. Similarly, my tests of H2a(i-iii) to H2c(i-
iii) focus only on propensity score matched samples of treatment and control firms. 
I first estimate a logit regression from which propensity scores are calculated for each 
firm, and match treatment and control firms on a one-to-one basis, subject to a model-
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specific maximum difference in propensity scores.83 The general regression which may 
vary based on the definition of ‘treatment’ firms is as follows: 
Prob(TREATMENTi,t = 1|X) = F(β0 + β1SIZEi,t + β2ROAi,t + β3CFOi,t + β4LEVi,t +  
β5LOSSi,t + β6AUDITORi,t + ΣINDUSTRY+ ui,t)    (7) 
Where TREATMENTi,t is an indicator variable = 1 for a treatment firm, and 0 for control 
firms. The definition of treatment firms depend on the hypothesis and the period it 
relates to. All other variables are as defined for previous regressions. 
For H1a and H2a(i-iii) tests, treatment firms are those that exist in both the pre- and 
post-2001/02 amendments periods and report AI in the pre-2001/02 period regardless of 
their post-2001/02 behaviour, and control firms are those that do not report AI pre-
2001/02 regardless of their post-2001/02 behaviour. Firms are matched based on their 
behaviour and attributes in the pre-2001/02 period, but data from the matched firms 
over the pre- and post-2001/02 amendments periods is used in testing hypotheses. For 
tests revolving around the adoption of IFRS, treatment firms are identified by their post-
IFRS behaviour (as this is the period in which opportunistic classification shifting is 
predicted).  
4.3.7 Measurement of alternative earnings management behaviour 
My second set of hypotheses examine whether changes to the regulatory scope for 
opportunistic classification shifting induce substitution affects between the 
manipulation of AI (or DO) and alternative earnings management practices (accrual-
based and real earnings management). Before discussing models and methods used to 
test the remaining hypotheses, I discuss the models used to estimate accrual-based and 
real earnings management behaviour.  
4.3.7.1 Accrual-based management 
The earnings management literature proposes numerous models to detect accruals 
management, all of which have limitations. The most widely used models are variants 
of the Jones (1991) model by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) (Healy and 
83 The maximum tolerable difference in propensity scores in a given model is the largest difference that 
generates a balanced sample of treatment and control firms, and does not exceed 25% of the standard 
deviation of the propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).  
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Wahlen 1999; DeFond 2010). This study employs the performance-adjusted modified-
Jones model by Kothari et al. (2005) to estimate discretionary accruals, because these 
provide the best specified measures of discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005). I 
therefore estimate the following cross-sectional models for each year and industry 
group.  
(TACi,t/TAi,t-1)  =  b1(1/TAi,t-1) + b2[(∆REVi,t - ∆RECi,t)/TAi,t-1] + b3(PPEi,t/TAi,t-1)    
        + b4ROAi,t-1 + εi,t                          (8)
               
 Where variables are as defined below: 
TACi,t = Total accruals for firm i in year t, calculated as the 
difference between earnings before extraordinary items 
(EBEI) (#8036) and cash flow from operations (#9100). 
ΔREVi,t = Change in total revenues (#7090 + #8014) for firm i 
between years t-1 and t. 
ΔRECi,t = Change in accounts receivable (#5028) for firm i between 
years t-1 and t. 
PPEi,t = Gross property, plant and equipment (#5030) for firm i in 
year t. 
ROAi,t-1 = Lagged return on assets measured as EBEI (#8036) scaled 
by average total assets (#5090)  both in year t-1. 
TAi,t-1 = Lagged total assets (#5090). 
The inclusion of change in revenues controls for the firm’s economic environment 
(Jones 1991), and the change in accounts receivable is subtracted from change in 
revenues to control for any potential accounting discretion arising from credit sales84  
(e.g. Dechow et al. 1995; Cohen et al. 2008). Gross property, plant and equipment 
(PPEt) is included to control for the effect of depreciation and other accruals 
proportional to a firm’s investment in fixed assets.  Lagged return on assets (ROAt-1) is 
84 The modified-Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales 
in the event period are due to earnings management. This is based on the reasoning that it is easier to 
manage earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than by 
exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales. 
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included to control for the possibility that discretionary accruals may be correlated with 
previous year’s performance given the reversal nature of accruals (Kothari et al. 2005). 
The residual, εi,t, represents the proportion of a firm’s accrual which cannot be 
explained by its economic fundamentals, and is thus my measure of discretionary 
accruals (DAt).  
4.3.7.2 Real earnings management 
I use two measures of real earnings management developed by Roychowdhury (2006): 
sales manipulation (i.e. abnormal cash from operations: SLSMAN) and discretionary 
expenditure manipulation (i.e. abnormal discretionary expenses: DISXMAN).85 These 
proxies have been used in several subsequent studies such as Cohen et al. (2008), 
Gunny (2010), and Zang (2012).  
4.3.7.2.1 Real sales manipulation (i.e. abnormal cash from operations (SLSMAN)) 
Roychowdhury (2006) argues that firms may inflate current earnings by accelerating the 
timing of sales through a variety of mechanisms including excessive price discounts or 
offering more lenient credit terms. These strategies temporarily increase sales volumes, 
but are likely to reverse when normal prices or credit terms are reinstated in the 
following period. Although total earnings in the current period increase as sales 
increase, both price discounts and more lenient credit terms have negative effects on the 
current period’s cash flow from operation (CFO) relative to the level of sales. That is, 
the cash inflow per sale (net of discounts) from the additional sales is lower as margins 
and/or collections decline (Roychowdhury 2006). Thus, the manipulation of sales 
activities is expected to lead to lower CFO in the current period relative to sales volume. 
To estimate abnormal cash from operation, the normal level of CFO is modelled as a 
linear function of sales and change in sales. Thus, the following cross-sectional 
regression is estimated for each industry and year: 
(CFOi,t/TAi,t-1) = k1(1/ TAi,t-1) + k2(SALESi,t/TAi,t-1) + k3(∆SALESi,t /TAi,t-1) + εi,t     (9)          
85  Roychowdhury (2006) derives three measures of real earnings management, abnormal cash from 
operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs. I do not examine abnormal 
production costs because the sector for which production costs are of greatest relevance is manufacturing, 
and this sector is relatively small in Australia,  For the majority of Australian listed firms the production 
cost manipulation methods described by Roychowdhury (2006) are either unfeasible or of economically 
insignificant magnitudes. 
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Where variables are as defined below: 
CFOi,t = Cash flow from operations (#9100) for firm i in period t 
SALESi,t = Sales (#1) for firm i in period t 
ΔSALESi,t = Change in total sales (#1) for firm i between years t-1 and 
t. 
TAi,t-1 = Lagged total assets (#5090) for firm i. 
An increase in current period sales (SALESi,t) as a result of price discount and lenient 
credit terms86 increases earnings, however, it reduces the level of CFOi,t generated by 
each dollar of sales as margin declines (Roychowdhury 2006). Thus the coefficient for 
SALESi,t is expected to be negative. Change in sales (∆SALESi,t) is included to control 
for the effect of sales growth on cash flow given that sales also include accruals (i.e. 
credit sales). An increase in sales constituted largely of accruals due to real sales 
manipulation near the financial year end implies lower level of CFO generated by each 
sales dollar.87 Consequently, a negative association is expected between CFOi,t and 
∆SALESi,t. The abnormal level of cash from operations which is my measure of sales 
manipulation: SLSMANt, is measured as the negative of residuals from Equation (9).  
4.3.7.2.2 Abnormal discretionary expenditure (DISXMAN) 
My second proxy for REM is abnormal discretionary expenses derived from the 
opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure (DISXMAN), estimated by 
modelling discretionary expenses in year t, on sales. Firms may cut discretionary 
expenditure such as advertising expense, R&D, and SG&A expenses to boost current 
period earnings, at the (potential) cost of lower long-run profitability. These firms are 
expected to have abnormally low discretionary expenses during the period for 
manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006). However, Roychowdhury (2006) argues that 
modelling discretionary expenses as a linear function of current period sales creates a 
problem. If firms manage sales upward to increase earnings, it results in significantly 
86 Both price discount and lenient credit terms lead to an increase in sales volume, thus resulting in an 
overall increase in sales. These increased sales volume are likely to vanish when firm revert to the old 
prices (Roychowdhury 2006). 
87 While a negative association is predicted, Roychowdhury (2006) finds that contrary to expectation, 
CFO is significantly positively related with ∆SALESt. The result suggests that conditional on 
contemporaneous sales, a higher change in sales implies higher CFO. The author offers no other 
explanation for the contrary result. 
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lower residuals even when firms do not reduce discretionary expenses. To address this 
issue, normal levels of discretionary expenses are estimated as a function of lagged sales 
(Roychowdry, 2006). Thus, the following cross-sectional model is estimated for each 
year and industry:  
 (DISXi,t/TAi,t-1)   =  k1(1/ TAi,t-1) + k2(SALESi,t-1/ TAi,t-1) + εit     (10)      
Where variables are defined below: 
DISXi,t = Discretionary expenditure for firm i in period t, defined as 
the sum of research and development (R&D) (#51 + #52 + 
#53), advertising (#50), and selling, general and 
administrative (SGA) (#58 + #59) expenses in year t. 
SALESi,t-1 = Lagged sales (#1) for firm i. 
TAi,t-1 = Lagged total assets (#5090) for firm i. 
 
Firms cut expenditure to increase earnings, hence, abnormal reduction in discretionary 
expenditure in year t is associated with an earnings increase in year t. However, in 
Model (10), it is assumed that an increase in sales in year t-1 may encourage firms to 
increase discretionary spending in year t, thus DISXi,t is expected to be positively 
associated with SALESi,t-1. Abnormal discretionary expenditure (DISXMANt) are 
calculated as the negative of residuals from Equation (10), and is the explanatory 
variable in the regressions to test H2a(iii), H2b(iii) and H2c(iii) (described below in the 
next two sections), which examine whether changes to the scope for classification 
shifting affected real earnings management via the reduction of discretionary 
expenditure. 
4.3.8 Hypothesis testing: H2a(i) through to H2b(iii) 
H2a(i-iii) and H2b(i-iii) examine whether changes to the regulatory scope for 
opportunistic classification shifting induced substitution affects between the 
manipulation of AI and alternative earnings management practices. H2a(i-iii) examine 
whether the restriction of scope for classification shifting implied by the 2002 
amendment to AASB 1018 induced an increased use of alternative earnings 
management methods (i.e. discretionary accruals (H2a(i)) and/or real activities 
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management (H2a(ii-iii)) to increase core earnings. H2b(i-iii) examine whether there is 
decreased use of discretionary accruals and/or real earnings management following the 
2005 amendment to AASB 101 which increased the scope for opportunistically 
classifying non-recurring items.   
To test these hypotheses, I employ a difference-in-differences design. For H2a(i-iii), I 
focus on the pre-2001/02 (1995-2000) and post-2001/02 amendments (2002-30 
December 2005) periods. The difference-in-differences design examines the differences 
in the accrual-based earnings management (DAt) and the real earnings management 
behaviour between firms that report income-decreasing AI in the pre-2001/02 period 
(treatment firms), and firms that do not report income-decreasing AI pre-2001/02 
(control firms). To reduce statistical noise and the possibility of spurious correlation, I 
estimate all of these tests using a propensity score matched (PSM) sample of treatment 
and control firms with similar characteristics such as size, performance, and leverage, 
using same logit models as those used to develop the PSM sample for tests of H1. For 
H2b(i-iii), I focus on the pre-IFRS (2002–30 December 2005 and post-IFRS (31 
December 2005-2009) periods. In this case, I defined treatment and control firms by 
reference to their post-IFRS reporting behaviour, as that is the period in which greater 
abuse of AI reporting is expected. 
4.3.8.1 Hypotheses testing of H2a(i-iii) – substitution effects after the 2002 reform  
To examine H2a(i-iii), I estimate regressions of unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) on 
proxies for accrual-based and real earnings management for the period 1995 to 30 
December 2005 (excluding 2001), using a PSM sample of firms that report income-
decreasing AI in the pre-2001/02 period regardless of their post-2001/02 amendments 
behaviour (treatment firms) and similar firms that do not report AI in the pre-2001/02 
period (control firms) irrespective of their post-2001/02 reforms behaviour. I do not 
estimate a model of the unexpected change in core earnings because the impact of 
earnings management via methods such as accrual-based earnings management may not 
fully reverse in a single period. The unexpected change in core earnings model is 
required when examining classification shifting because AI are temporary components 
of earnings and their effects are expected to reverse in the subsequent period (i.e. when 
there are no AI reported). In contrast, income increasing accruals may take more than 
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one year to reverse, and cuts to discretionary expenditure may persist for more than one 
year.88   
I expect firms that reported income-decreasing AI in the pre-2001/02 period to engage 
in increased accrual-based earnings management and/or real earnings management as a 
result of the 2002 restriction on reporting non-recurring items which may have reduced 
classification shifting. To test this conjecture, I first examine H2a(i-iii) by estimating 
separate variants of the full model below which model accrual-based and real earnings 
management effects separately. I then estimate the full model as there are likely to be 
dependencies among the variables for accrual-based and real earnings management. The 
general form of the full model is described below: 
UE_CEt  =  φ0 + φ1TREAT1t + φ2DAt + φ3SLSMANt + φ4DISXMANt + φ5POSTt + 
                    φ6TREAT1t*POSTt + φ7POSTt*DAt + φ8POSTt*SLSMAN + 
        φ9POSTt*DISXMANt + φ10TREAT1t*DAt + φ11TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt +  
        φ12TREAT1t*SLSMANt + φ13TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt +  
        φ14TREAT1t*DISXMANt + φ15TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt + Controls + εt 
                                        (11) 
Where each of the variables is described below:  
UE_CEt = Unexpected core earnings calculated as in Equation 3(a) 
TREAT1t = An indicator variable = 1 if a firm operates in both the 
pre-2001/02 (1995-2000) and post-2001/02 
amendments/pre-IFRS (30 June 2002-30 December 2005) 
periods, and reports income-decreasing AI in the pre-
2001/02 period regardless of post-2001/02 behaviour, and 
0 if a firm reports no income-decreasing AI in pre-
2001/02 period.  
88 For example, firms are required to depreciate property, plant and equipment (PPE) for the duration of 
their useful life, thus an asset will incur depreciation expenses during its useful life and not just in one 
period. Moreover, it is likely that firms acquire PPE in subsequent years that will also incur depreciation 
expenses. Managers have discretion over the depreciation method to use which they choose arbitrarily to 
manage earnings. Hence the effect of accrual management through depreciation in year t is not 
immediately reversible in year t+1. Similarly, firms who manipulate sales via discounting late in a 
particular year may repeat this practice the following year. 
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DAt = Discretionary accruals in year t, measured as residuals 
from Equation (8). 
SLSMANt = Sales manipulation (abnormal cash flow from operation) 
measured as the negative of residuals from Equation (9). 
DISXMANt = Abnormal discretionary expenditure, measured as the 
negative of residuals from Equation (10). 
POST1 = An indicator variable = 1 for observations in the years 
starting 30 June 2002 to 30 December 2005, and 0 
otherwise. 
Control variables = As defined in previous test models. 
The dependent variable is the unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt), calculated as for 
Equation (3a). The two-way interaction terms are the interaction of POSTt and each of 
the alternative EM proxies, and the interaction of TREAT1t and each of the alternative 
EM proxies. The three-way interaction terms, which are the main variables of interest, 
are the interactions of TREAT1t, POSTt and each of the alternative EM proxies. Table 
4.1 summarises the interpretation of the estimated coefficients’ main effect for each of 
the alternative earnings management proxies and their respective interaction terms.  
The key variables indicating whether firms that report income-decreasing AI in the pre-
2001/02 period demonstrate increased use of accruals manipulation and/or real earnings 
management to inflate core earnings after the 2001/02 amendments, are the three-way 
interaction terms:  TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt, TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt, and 
TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt. If the 2002 amendment induced firms that previously 
reported AI to manage accruals to increase core earnings, then φ11 is expected to be 
positive. One interpretation of this coefficient is that it measures the difference in the 
association between UE_CEt and DAt for treatment firms in the post-2001/02 
amendments period, relative to the association between UE_CEt and DAt for the same 
firms in the pre-2001/02 amendments period. Alternatively, the coefficient may be 
viewed as representing the difference in the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and DAt during the post-2001/02 period across treatment and control firms. If treatment 
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TABLE 4.1 
Interpretation of Coefficients for Main and Interaction Effects  
for Tests of H2a(i-iii) 
TREAT1t Measures the unexpected core earnings for treatment 
firms (i.e. firms that report income-decreasing AI in the 
pre-2001/02 period regardless of post-2001/02 
behaviour) relative to control firms (i.e. firms that 
report no income-decreasing AI in pre 2001/02 period 
irrespective of their post 2001/02 behaviour) in the pre-
2001. 
DAt Measures the association between unexpected core 
earnings (UE_CEt) and income-increasing accruals 
management for control firms in the pre-2001/02 
period. 
SLSMANt Measures the association between UE_CEt and the 
income-increasing management of sales activities for 
control firms in the pre-2001/02 period. 
DISXMANi,t Measures the association between UE_CEt and the 
opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure for 
control firms in the pre-2001/02 period. 
POSTt Mesures the unexpected core earnings of control firms 
in the post-2001/02 amendments period relative to their 
behaviour pre-2001/02. 
TREAT1t*POSTt Measures the unexpected core earnings of treatment 
firms in the post-2001/02 amendments period, relative 
to their behaviour pre-2001/02 and the behaviour of 
control firms post-2001/02. 
POSTt*DAt Measures the incremental association between the 
UE_CEt and discretionary accruals of control firms in 
the post-2001/02 amendments period relative to pre-
2001/02. 
POSTt*SLSMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and the income-increasing management of sales 
activities for control firms in the post-2001/02 
amendments period relative to pre-2001/02. 
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TABLE 4.1 (continued) 
POSTt*DISXMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and abnormal discretionary expenditure of control 
firms in the post-2001/02 amendments period relative 
to the pre-2001/02 period. 
 
TREAT1t*DAt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and accruals management for treatment firms relative 
to control firms in the pre-2001/02 period. 
 
TREAT1t*POST1t*DAt, Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and accruals management for treatment firms in the 
post-2001/02 amendments period, relative to their 
behaviour pre-2001/02 and the behaviour of control 
firms post-2001/02. 
TREAT1t*SLSMANt  Measures the incremental association between UE_CE 
and abnormal operating cash for treatment firms 
relative to control firms in the pre-2001/02 period. 
TREAT1t*POST1t*SLSMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and sales transaction manipulation for treatment firms 
in the post-2001/02 amendments period, relative to 
their behaviour pre-2001/02 and the behaviour of 
control firms post-2001/02. 
TREAT1t*DISXMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and abnormal discretionary expenditure of treatment 
firms relative to control firms pre-2001/02. 
TREAT1t*POST1t*DISXMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and abnormal discretionary expenses for treatment 
firms in the post-2001/02 amendments period, relative 
to their behaviour pre-2001/02 and the behaviour of 
control firms post-2001/02. 
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firms have a greater propensity to manipulate real transactions by increasing sales 
activities to inflate core earnings in the post-2001/02 period, then I expect φ13 to be 
positive (as low SLSMANt is associated with higher core earnings). Similarly, if 
discretionary expenditures are reduced opportunistically, φ15 is also expected be 
positive. I include the same control variables as in Models (3a) and (3b): SIZEt, ROAt, 
CFOt, LEVt, LOSSt, and AUDITORt.   
4.3.8.2 Hypothesis testing of H2b(i-iii) – substitution effects after amendments to 
AASB 1018 upon IFRS adoption 
H2b(i-iii) propose that the increased scope for classification shifting implied by the 
introduction of AASB 101 on IFRS adoption in 2005, resulted in a reduction in firms’ 
use of alternative earnings management methods to increase core earnings. To test these 
hypotheses, I first estimate regressions focussing separately on the effects upon accrual-
based and real earnings management in period 2002 to 2009. I then estimate a full 
model which includes all accrual-based and real earnings management proxies in a 
single regression. I estimate these regressions on a PSM sample of firms that exist in 
both periods and report income-decreasing AI in the post-IFRS period (31 December 
2005-2009) irrespective of their pre-IFRS (2002-30 December 2005) behaviour 
(treatment firms), and firms with similar characteristics but do not report AI in post-
IFRS regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour (control firms). The propensity score 
matching method uses the same first-stage model as employed in generating the sample 
for tests of H1b.  
I expect firms that reported income-decreasing AI in the post-IFRS period (i.e. 
treatment firms) to engage in a lower degree of accrual-based earnings manipulation 
and/or real earnings management as a result of the 2005 introduction of AASB 101. As 
such, I expect DAt, SLSMANt and DISXMANt to each have a relatively negative 
association with UE_CEt and for treatment firms in the post-IFRS period, compared to 
those firms’ behaviour in the pre-IFRS period (or compared to control firms in the post-
IFRS period). The general form of the regression used to test these hypotheses is as 
follows: 
UE_CEt = χ0 + χ1TREAT2t + χ2DAt + χ3SLSMANt + χ4DISXMANt + χ5IFRSt +  
      χ6TREAT2t*IFRSt + χ7IFRSt*DAt + χ8IFRSt*SLSMANt + 
      χ9IFRSt*DISXMANt + χ10TREAT2t*DAt + χ11TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt + 
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      χ12TREAT2t*SLSMANt + χ13TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt +  
      χ14TREAT2t*DISXMANt + χ15TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt  
     + Controls + εt                              (12)     
Where the variables are as described below: 
UE_CEt = Unexpected core earnings calculated as in Equation 3(a) 
TREAT2t = An indicator variable = 1 if a firm operates in both the pre-
IFRS (30 June 2002-30 December 2005) and post-IFRS (31 
December 2005-31 December 2009) periods, and reports 
income-decreasing AI in the post-IFRS period regardless of 
their pre-IFRS behaviour, and 0 if a firm reports no income-
decreasing AI in post-IFRS irrespective of pre-IFRS 
behaviour.  
DAt = Discretionary accruals in year t, measured as residuals from 
Equation (8). 
SLSMANt = Sales manipulation (abnormal cash flow from operation), 
calculated as the negative of residuals from Equation (9). 
DISXMANt = Abnormal discretionary expenditure, calculated as the negative 
of residuals from Equation (10). 
IFRSt = An indicator variable = 1 for observations in the years 31 
December 2005 to 2009, and 0 otherwise. 
Control 
variables 
= Same variables as in previous test models. 
Table 4.2 summarises the main effect for each of the alternative earnings management 
proxies and their respective interaction terms. The main test variables indicating 
whether firms that report income-decreasing AI in the post-IFRS period demonstrate 
decreased use of accrual-based and/or real earnings management to inflate core earnings 
after the less restrictive 2005 amendment on classifying non-recurring items, are the 
three-way interaction terms:  TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt, TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt, and 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt. If the 2005 amendment resulted in an increased use of 
classification shifting to improve core earnings, then I expect firms to engage in a lower 
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degree of accrual-based and real earnings manipulation in the post-IFRS period. Hence, 
χ11,χ13 and χ15 should all be negative. 
 
TABLE 4.2 
Interpretation of Coefficients for Main and Interaction Effects  
for Tests of H2b(i-iii) 
TREAT2t Measures the unexpected core earnings for treatment 
firms (i.e. firms that report income-dereasing AI in the 
post-IFRS period irrespective of their pre-IFRS 
behaviour) relative to control firms (i.e. firms that do not 
report income-decreasing AI post-IFRS regardless of 
their pre-IFRS behaviour) in the pre-IFRS period. 
DAt Measures the association between unexpected core 
earnings (UE_CEt) and income-increasing accruals 
management for control firms in the pre-IFRS period. 
SLSMANt Measures the association between UE_CEt and the 
income-increasing management of sales activities for 
control firms in the pre-IFRS period. 
DISXMAN,t Measures the association between UE_CEt and the 
opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure for 
control firms in the pre-IFRS period. 
IFRSt Measures the unexpected core earnings of control firms 
in the post-IFRS period relative to pre-IFRS. 
TREAT2t*IFRSt Measures the unexpected core earnings for treatment 
firms in the post-IFRS period, relative to their behaviour 
pre-IFRS and the behaviour of control firms post-IFRS. 
IFRSt*DAt Measures the incremental association between the 
UE_CEt and discretionary accruals of control firms in the 
post-IFRS period relative to pre-IFRS. 
IFRSt*SLSMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and the income-increasing management of sales activities 
for control firms post-IFRS period relative to pre-IFRS. 
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TABLE 4.2 (continued) 
IFRSt*DISXMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and abnormal discretionary expenditure of control firms 
in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS period. 
TREAT2t*DAt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and accruals management for treatment firms relative to 
control firms in the pre-IFRS period 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt, Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and accruals management for treatment firms in the post-
IFRS period, relative to their behaviour pre-IFRS and the 
behaviour of control firms post-IFRS. 
TREAT2t*SLSMANt  Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and abnormal operating cash for treatment firms relative 
to control firms in the pre-IFRS period. 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and sales transaction manipulation for treatment firms in 
the post-IFRS period, relative to their behaviour pre-
IFRS and the behaviour of control firms post-IFRS. 
TREAT2t*DISXMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and abnormal discretionary expenditure of treatment 
firms relative to control firms pre-IFRS. 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt Measures the incremental association between UE_CEt 
and abnormal discretionary expenses for treatment firms 
in the post-IFRS period, relative to their behaviour pre-
IFRS and the behaviour of control firms post-IFRS. 
 
4.3.9 Hypothesis testing for H2c(i-iii) – substitution effect after the introduction of 
AASB 5          
H2c(i-iii) predict that firms that report DO in the post-IFRS period are less likely to 
manage discretionary accruals and real activities to increase core earnings. Following 
the introduction of AASB 5 in 2005 that increased the scope of reporting items as DO, 
firms may engage in classification shifting using DO to increase core earnings as 
predicted in H1c. In that case, those firms are expected to engage in less accrual-based 
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earnings management and real earnings manipulation as these alternative methods are 
more costly than classification shifting.  While H1c was tested by observing behaviour 
in post-IFRS period only, because there was an extremely low incidence of DO in the 
pre-IFRS period, H2c(i-iii) are tested using a pre-post sample, because there is scope to 
meaningfully measure differences in alternative earnings management behaviour after 
the reform. To test H2c(i-iii), I employ a difference-in-differences design similar to that 
for H2b(i-iii), within which measures of DO reporting are substituted for measures of 
AI reporting.  I examine the differences in the accrual-based and real earnings 
management behaviour between firms that report DO in the post-IFRS period (treatment 
firms), and firms of similar characteristics that do not report DO post-IFRS (control 
firms). I therefore estimate the following model on a PSM sample of treatment and 
control firms (as per matching method for H1c) for the period 2002 to 2009:  
UE_CEt = θ0 + θ1TREAT_DOt + θ2DAt + θ3SLSMANt + θ4DISXMANt + θ5IFRSt + 
                  θ6TREAT_DOt*IFRSt + θ7IFRSt*DAt + θ8IFRSt*SLSMANt +  
      θ9IFRSt*DISXMANt + θ10TREAT_DOt*DAt + θ11TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DAt +  
      θ12TREAT_DOt*SLSMANt + θ13TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*SLSMANt +  
      θ14TREAT_DOt*DISXMANt + θ15TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DISXMANt +  
      Controls + εt               (13) 
Where the variables are as described below: 
UE_CEt = Unexpected core earnings calculated as in Equation 3(a) 
TREAT_DOt = An indicator variable = 1 if a firm operates in both the 
pre-IFRS (30 June 2002-30 December 2005) and post-
IFRS (31 December 2005-31 December 2009) periods, 
and reports DO in the post-IFRS period regardless of their 
pre-IFRS behaviour, and 0 if a firm reports no DO in 
post-IFRS irrespective of pre-IFRS behaviour.  
DAt = Discretionary accruals in year t, calculated as residuals 
from Equation (8). 
SLSMANt = Sales manipulation (abnormal cash from operations), 
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calculated as the negative of residuals from Equation (9). 
DISXMANi,t = Abnormal discretionary expenditure, calculated as the 
negative of residuals from Equation (10). 
IFRS1 = An indicator variable = 1 for observations in the period 
starting 31 December 2005 to 2009, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables = Same variables as in previous test models. 
Table 4.3 summarises the main effect for each of the alternative EM proxies and their 
respective interaction terms. The three-way interaction terms, TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DAt, 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*SLSMANt, and TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DISXMANt are the key 
variables that measure whether there is incremental difference in the manipulation of 
accruals and/or real transactions to inflate core earnings by firms that report DO in the 
post-IFRS period, relative to (i) their behaviour pre-IFRS, and (ii) the behaviour of 
control firms post-IFRS. If firms that report DO in the post-IFRS period use 
classification shifting to improve core earnings post-IFRS, then I expect them to engage 
in a lower degree of accrual-based and/or real earnings manipulation in that period. I 
therefore expect θ11,θ13 and θ15 to be negative.   
TABLE 4.3 
Interpretation of Coefficients for Main and Interaction Effects  
for Tests of H2c(i-iii) 
TREAT_DOt Measures the unexpected core earnings of treatment 
firms (i.e. firms that report discontinued operations in 
the post-IFRS period regardless of their pre-IFRS 
behaviour) relative to control firms (i.e. firms that do 
not report discontinued operations post-IFRS 
irrespective of pre-IFRS behaviour) pre-IFRS. 
DAt Measures the association between unexpected core 
earnings (UE_CEt) and income-increasing accruals 
management for control firms in the pre-IFRS period. 
SLSMANt Measures the association between UE_CEt and the 
income-increasing management of sales activities for 
control firms in the pre-IFRS period. 
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TABLE 4.3 (continued) 
DISXMANi,t Measures the association between UE_CEt and the 
opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure 
for control firms in the pre-IFRS period. 
IFRSt Measures the unexpected core earnings of control 
firms in the post-IFRS period relative to pre-IFRS. 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt Measures the unexpected core earnings for treatment 
firms in the post-IFRS period, relative to their 
behaviour pre-IFRS and the behaviour of control 
firms post-IFRS. 
IFRSt*DAt Measures the incremental association between the 
UE_CEt and discretionary accruals of control firms in 
the post-IFRS period relative to pre-IFRS 
IFRSt*SLSMANt Measures the incremental association between 
UE_CEt and the income-increasing management of 
sales activities for control firms in the post-IFRS 
period relative to pre-IFRS. 
IFRSt*DISXMANt Measures the incremental association between 
UE_CEt and abnormal discretionary expenditure of 
control firms post-IFRS relative to pre-IFRS. 
TREAT_DOt*DAt Measures the incremental association between 
UE_CEt and accruals management for treatment firms 
relative to control firms in the pre-IFRS period. 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DAt Measures the incremental association between 
UE_CEt and accruals management for treatment firms 
in the post-IFRS period, relative to their behaviour 
pre-IFRS and the behaviour of control firms post-
IFRS. 
 
TREAT_DOt*SLSMANt  Measures the incremental association between 
UE_CEt and abnormal operating cash for treatment 
firms relative to control firms in the pre-IFRS period. 
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TABLE 4.3 (continued) 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*SLSMANt Measures the incremental association between 
UE_CEt and sales transaction manipulation for 
treatment firms in the post-IFRS period, relative to 
their behaviour pre-IFRS and the behaviour of control 
firms post-IFRS. 
TREAT_DOt*DISXMANt Measures the incremental association between 
UE_CEt and abnormal discretionary expenditure of 
treatment firms relative to control firms pre-IFRS. 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DISXMANt Measures the incremental association between 
UE_CEt and abnormal discretionary expenses for 
treatment firms in the post-IFRS period, relative to 
their behaviour pre-IFRS and the behaviour of control 
firms post-IFRS. 
 
4.3.10 Sensitivity analyses 
To check the robustness of my main test results, I perform sensitivity tests for each 
hypothesis.   
H1a 
In my main test of H1a, I assume that the coefficients for control variables are constant 
across the sample period (1995–30 December 2005). To check the robustness of these 
results, I estimate separate ‘levels’ and ‘changes’ regressions of unexpected core 
earnings on %AIt within each of the pre-2001/02 (1995-2000) and post-2001/02 reforms 
(2002-30 December 2005) periods. I estimate these regressions using one of the samples 
used in the main tests (the PSM sample) and I include the same control variables as in 
the main tests. I expect %AIt to be positive (negative) for the ‘levels’ (’changes’) model 
if firms use classification shifting to increase core earnings in the pre-2001/02 period 
(1995-2000). I expect the opposite to occur in the post-2001/02 amendments period 
(2002-30 December 2005).  
H1b 
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My sensitivity test for H1b is similar to that for H1a. I therefore estimate separate 
‘levels’ and ‘changes’ regressions of unexpected core earnings on %AIt within each of 
the pre-IFRS (2002-30 December 2005) and the post-IFRS (31 December 2005-2009) 
periods. I estimate these regressions on the PSM sample of treatment and control firms 
which is one of the samples used in the main tests. Consistent with the main predictions, 
if firms engage in classification shifting in post-IFRS following the 2005 amendment, I 
expect %AIt to be significantly positive in the ‘levels’ model and significantly negative 
in the ‘changes’ model in post-IFRS. I expect insignificant coefficients from both 
models in the pre-IFRS period.  
H1c 
In the sensitivity analysis for H1c, I add %AIt to both the ‘levels’ (Equations (5a)) and 
‘changes’ (Equation (5b)), to control for the possibility that firms that report DO 
opportunistically are likely to be the same firms that report AI opportunistically. I 
estimate these regressions on the PSM sample using post-IFRS observations only.  If 
firms engage in classification shift using DO in the post-IFRS period after the 
introduction of AASB 5, I expect a positive coefficient for %AIt in the ‘levels’ model 
and a negative coefficient in the ‘changes’ model. 
H2a(i) – H2c(iii)  
I use two alternative tests to examine the robustness of findings regarding substitution 
between earnings management methods. In the first test, I re-estimate the singular and 
full models of substitution behaviour (Equations (11), (12) and (13)) on an alternatively 
defined sample of PSM treatment and control firms. Treatment firms are defined as 
firms that exist in both the pre-and post-2001/02 reform periods but report income-
decreasing abnormal items or discontinued operations only in the period in which there 
is greater regulatory scope for classification shifting (i.e. the pre-2001/02 period for 
H2a(i-iii); the post-IFRS period for H2b(i-iii) and H2c(i-iii)). Control firms are defined 
as per the main tests. 
In the second sensitivity test, I follow the approach by Matsumoto (2002), Lin et al. 
(2006) and Haw et al. (2011) and replace the ‘signed’ observations of accruals and real 
earnings management with indicator variables that equal 1 if DAt are positive and 0 
otherwise, and 1 if SLSMANt and DISXMANt are negative, and zero otherwise.  
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4.4 Research design limitations 
Although every effort has been made to address and minimise limitations of the 
research design, however, some remaining weaknesses may threaten the validity of the 
results. First, as previously acknowledged, the restriction of the sample to cases with 
sales above $500,000, while reducing the impact of outliers (since sales is used as the 
scalar for variables in the core earnings models), may reduce the generality of the 
findings. This sample selection decision eliminates small firms and firms that do not 
report sales but report other revenues and income-decreasing AI which may engage in 
classification shifting. 89  Prior research provides evidence that firms with low sales 
epitomise poor performers (Brown 2001; Beaver et al. 2007). Thus this exclusion may 
bias the results in favour of H1a because the effect of firms that report income-
decreasing AI but have low sales that are below the cut-off are technically eliminated. 
However, the bias is expected to reduce the variation in the classification shifting metric 
(McVay 2006). 
Second, the AI observations examined in this study are as reported by Morningstar and 
are based on the judgment of analysts following each firm. These do not necessarily 
equate in all cases to what firms report in their financial statements as AI, because my 
measure of core earnings excludes items that the analyst following the firm identifies as 
abnormal but which the firm has not reported as abnormal in its financial statements. On 
the other hand, a firm may report in its financial statement an abnormal item which in 
the analyst’s opinion is recurring and which therefore is included in my measure of core 
earnings.  Therefore, the research method may only capture classification shifting 
behaviour as reflected in core earnings identified by Morningstar analysts, rather than 
managers’ actual reporting behavior as reflected in their financial reports.  
Third, the concerns in the literature about the models of discretionary accruals are also 
applicable to the model used in this study. Hence, there is a possibility that the results 
may not fully capture discretionary accruals management. Moreover, in my tests for real 
earnings management, I use abnormal cash flow from operations as my proxy for sales 
manipulation. Problems could arise from this measure as cash flows from operations 
can be affected in different directions by other real activities manipulation like 
89 An analysis of the sample data reveals that many poor performers or firms that report no or low sales 
and subsequently negative EBITDA continue in operation for long periods of time. 
121 
 
                                                          
overproductions. Nevertheless, these limitations are not expected to have serious 
implications for the validity of the results. 
McVay (2006) acknowledges that the association between income-decreasing special 
items and unexpected core earnings documented in her study may be biased by the 
inclusion of accruals in the models of expected core earnings as accruals include 
noncash special items. To address this problem, I exclude accruals in my models of 
expected core earnings and change in core earnings. However, this may create omitted 
variable bias problems and inflate unexpected core earnings. 
Finally, during the post-2001/02 reforms period (or pre-IFRS period), ASIC undertook a 
regulatory review and the Corporate Law Economic Reform Programme 9 (CLERP 9) 
was introduced which made changes that would have improved the financial reporting 
environment during this period. I do not control for these factors in the test models and 
therefore cannot rule them out as alternative explanations for some of the results. 
4.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the research design that is used to test the hypotheses developed 
in Chapter Three. The regression models to test the hypotheses (including sensitivity 
tests) were discussed, including defining the variables and their measurements as well 
as explaining the main effects and the variables of primary interests. The test models for 
H1a, H1b, H2a(i-iii) and H2b(i-iii) adapted the McVay (2006) models of unexpected 
core earnings and unexpected change in core earnings. Tests of H1c and H2c(i-iii) 
adapted the Barua et al (2010) models which were also based on the McVay (2006) 
models. H2a(i-iii) to H2c(i-iii) tests included deriving proxies for alternative EM 
methods which were estimated using the models that have been widely accepted in the 
literature such as the performance-adjusted modified-Jones model by Kothari et al 
(2005) for estimating discretionary accruals, and the Roychowhdury (2006) models for 
real earnings management for estimating sales manipulation via abnormal cash from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenditure. The regressions were estimated on 
variant samples.  Sensitivity tests for each hypothesis were also explained which 
included for H1a to H1b, estimating separate regressions for each of the regulation 
periods. The sensitivity test for H1c added %AIt to the model as a control variable. For 
H2a(i) and H2c(iii), two alternative tests were proposed.  Finally, limitations of the 
research design were acknowledged.  
122 
 
In the next chapter, I present the process of data collection and sources, sampling 
procedures for hypotheses tests, preliminary descriptive statistics for the hypotheses 
tests and empirical results for regressions of ‘levels’ core earnings and ‘changes’ in core 
earnings. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SAMPLE, ESTIMATION OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
PROXIES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the source and nature of the data used in my thesis and the 
derivation of the samples used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter Three. 
Section 5.2 describes the various types of data used and their sources, followed by an 
explanation of data validation methods employed in Section 5.3. The sample derivation 
procedure is described in Section 5.4, followed by Section 5.5 which provides 
descriptive statistics and summaries of the estimation of the various models of earnings 
management employed in my thesis. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
the main hypotheses tests are reported and discussed in Section 5.6. The chapter is then 
summarised in Section 5.7.   
5.2 Overview of data types and sources  
Archival accounting data were obtained from the Morningstar database. Prior to 
conducting multivariate analysis of firms’ classification shifting behaviour (Chapters 
Seven and Eight), I conduct a detailed descriptive analysis of firms’ reporting practices 
regarding non-recurring items such as abnormal items and discontinued operations 
(Chapter Six). To this end, additional quantitative and qualitative information was hand-
collected from firms’ annual reports available on the Connect4 and Morningstar 
databases. This information includes details of individual revenue or expense items 
comprising aggregate non-recurring items, which is not available in the archival data. 
These details are used to identify and analyse the types of items that firms typically 
classify as abnormal or resulting from discontinued operations during the study period. 
Other information obtained includes audit firm size, which is used as a control variable 
in the regressions; the firms’ countries of domicile so that foreign-domiciled firms are 
excluded from the sample; and firms’ industry membership.  
Firm-year data collected for each company include information from profit and loss 
statements, balance sheets, cash flow statements, and related disclosure notes.  Items 
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obtained from the profit and loss statements are abnormal items; sales revenue; earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA); earnings before/after 
income tax (EBIT/EBEI); total revenue; research and development (R&D) expenses; 
advertising expenses, selling, general and administration (SGA) expenses; cost of goods 
sold (CGS); and discontinued operations (DO). Balance sheet information include 
shareholders’ equity and total number of shares; total assets; accounts receivable; cash 
and short-term investments; inventories; gross property, plant and equipment (PPE); and 
total debts. Cash from operations (CFO) is obtained from the cash flow statement, while 
information from the disclosure notes includes details of individual abnormal items that 
are reported in aggregate on the income statement. 
5.3 Data validation 
Prior to conducting large sample archival analyses, all abnormal items (AI) and items 
relating to discontinued operations (DO) recorded in the Morningstar database from 
1994 to 2010 were verified against annual reports to ensure the reliability of the data. 
The verification of archival non-recurring item data to annual reports revealed instances 
of discrepancies, exclusively pertaining to AI (rather than DO entries), which were most 
frequent in the pre- and post-IFRS periods. There are three common reasons for this. 
First, values in the Morningstar data are often rounded up or down to the nearest 
thousand or million. Second, AI recorded by Morningstar is based on the judgment of 
the analyst following the firm who may disagree with a firm’s decision to recognise or 
disclose an item as being of abnormal nature90 For example, in the year 2000, IM 
Medical Ltd presented in its income statement the following AIs: write-down of 
noncurrent investment in associates, write-down of current investment, recognition of 
prior year employee entitlements, and write-off of intellectual property, collectively 
totalling -$510,241. However, Morningstar identified AI for this firm-year of $12,000. 
Finally, a small number of differences appear to reflect data entry errors made by 
Morningstar, such as the reversal of the sign of the item reported, or errors in the order 
of magnitude (e.g. the amount recorded in Morningstar is $100,000, but $1,000,000 is 
reported on the income statement). Where AI amounts are inconsistent due to the first 
two reasons, I accept the Morningstar values as indicative of the market understanding 
90 Verifying abnormal items against annual reports revealed that analysts’ judgment of what to recognise 
as abnormal items is ad hoc. For example, an analyst following a particular firm may treat write-downs of 
PPE for that firm as abnormal in the current year, but not recognise it as such in the next period. In 
contrast, an analystsfollowing another company may treat that company’s write-down of PPE as 
abnormal in both years. 
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of the nature of firms’ revenues and expenses. For those amounts that clearly appear to 
be data entry errors, I amend the archival data accordingly.  
5.4 Sample derivation 
The initial population consists of 27,288 firm-year observations for firms listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) between 1994 and 2010. Table 5.1 summarises the 
procedures used in identifying the samples for the analysis of firms’ non-recurring items 
reporting, and hypothesis tests. Panel A reports the derivation of the sample used for 
non-recurring items reporting analysis. For this analysis (and all other analyses), I 
exclude the following observations: (i) foreign-domiciled firm-year observations 
(3,023) because these firms are subject to different reporting regulations; (ii) firm-year 
observations for which country of domicile cannot be ascertained (26); observations for 
firms in the financial sector91 (4,314) because they are subject to additional financial 
reporting regulations; observations for which industry classifications are unavailable 
(17);92 current year observations from the years 1994 (824), 2001 (1,111), and 2010 
(1,382);93 and firm-year observations with sales less than $500,000 (6,884, with 5,453 
of these being firm-years with zero sales) to reduce the impact of outliers, since sales 
are used as the deflator for the majority of variables used in hypotheses tests. Also, 
firms with sales below $500,000 are typically young, loss making firms (such as 
exploration companies) with little incentive to engage in classification shifting at this 
stage of their life cycle.94,95 These exclusions yield a sample of 9,707 useful firm-year 
observations used in my descriptive analysis of firms’ non-recurring items reporting. 
Empirical tests of hypotheses are performed using observations from 1995 to 2009 
(excluding 2001) and require one year of lead and lag data. Each firm-year observation 
is required to have sufficient data to calculate variables in all the test models. Industries 
91  Financial sector firms include firms in the banking; diversified financials; insurance; real estate 
investment trusts; and real estate development industries (CRIF industry codes 16 to 20). 
92 For firms whose designated industry is not provided in the data, this information is obtained from the 
annual reports. Also, where the industry information provided in the data is not the same as in the annual 
report, the annual report takes precedence. 
93 1994 and 2010 data are used exclusively to calculate lead and lagged measures used in empirical tests.  
94 McVay (2006) uses a low-sales threshold of $1 million. I use a cut-off point of $500,000 as average 
sales for Australian firms are much lower than that of US firms. Average sales for US firms used in 
McVay (2006, see Table 1) are $1,566.37 million. In this study, the average sales for Australian firms 
(excluding financial sector firms) are $628 million. 
95 This restriction likely introduces a sample bias toward larger and more successful firms. The restriction 
excludes from the sample many exploration firms in the Metals and Mining Industry (CRIF 3) which do 
not report sales for most of their operational lives but frequently report abnormal items in their financial 
statements. However, the bias is expected to reduce the variation in the classification shifting metric 
(McVay 2006). 
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are classified using the 2-digit CRIF Industry classification codes which are based on 
the old ASX Industry Schema. In addition to the sample reductions affecting my 
descriptive analysis, I exclude from all hypothesis tests firm-years with insufficient data 
available to estimate unexpected core earnings and unexpected change in core earnings 
(2,011), and control variables (111). Finally, observations for industries that have less 
than 10 firm-year observations (96) are also omitted because a minimum of 10 
observations per industry in each fiscal year is required when estimating expected core 
earnings and alternative earnings management measures.96  These exclusions yield a 
total sample of 7,309 firm-year observations to estimate regressions for core earnings 
and change in core earnings (Equations (1) and (2)).  
Panel C of Table 5.1 explains the derivation of the samples used to test H1a to H1c. For 
brevity, I focus my discussion on the main sample used to test each hypothesis. To test 
H1a, I exclude from the total of 7,309 firm-year observations of core earnings, those 
observations occurring in the post-IFRS era (2,290 financial years ending December 31 
2005 and later). This leaves 5,019 firm-year observations to perform the main test. To 
test H1b, I exclude pre-2002 observations, spanning the period 1995 to 2000 (2,833) 
and firm-years with unavailable data to estimate regressions (19). This yields a sample 
of 4,457 firm-year observations to test H1b. For the main test of H1c, I exclude 
observations for both the pre-2001/02 and pre-IFRS periods from 1995 to 30 December 
2005 (5,123) as this test examines only post-IFRS data. This leaves a sample of 2,186 
firm-year observations. 
To test H2a(i-iii), I use firm-year observations for the period 1995 to 30 December 2005 
(excluding 2001), hence post-IFRS observations are omitted (2,290). Additionally, as 
these tests are based on a propensity score matched sample of treatment and control 
firms, unmatched observations (2,551) are excluded from the sample (the propensity 
score matching models and properties of the matched sample are described in Section 
5.6.5). This yields a sample of 2,468 firm-year observations for the main tests of H2a(i-
iii). My main tests of H2b(i-iii) employ a matched sample of treatment and control firms 
for the period 2002 to 2009, thus omitting pre-2001/02 (1995-2000) observations 
(2,833) as well as unmatched observations (2,225). This yields a sample of 2,251 firm- 
96 McVay (2006) and recent studies that follow McVay (e.g. Barua et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2010) require a 
minimum of 15 firm-year observations per industry. The minimum for this study is set at 10 as several 
Australian industries are relatively small. Excluding firms from industries with between 11 and 15 
observations makes no substantive difference to my test results.  
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year observations for the main tests of H2b. Finally, the tests for H2c(i-iii) comprise 
2,196 firm-year observations. 
TABLE 5.1   
Determination of Samples Used for Analyses   
  Firm-year 
Panel A: Sample for Non-recurring Items(a) Reporting Analyses Observations 
Number of observations from initial data (1994 – 2010) 27,288 
less: 
 Foreign domicile firm-year observations (3,023) 
Financial sector firm-year observations (4,314) 
Firm-year observations with unconfirmed domicile (26) 
Firm-year observations with unconfirmed industry (17) 
1994 firm-year observations (824) 
2001 firm-year observations (1,111) 
2010 firm-year observations (1,382) 
Firm-year with sales observations < $500,000 (including zero sales) (6,884) 
Sample used in Non-recurring Items reporting analyses  9,707 
  
 Panel B: Sample for Core Earnings & Changes in Core Earnings 
(Equations (1) and (2)) 
 Sample used in analysis of non-recurring items reporting 9,707 
less: 
 Firm-years with insufficient data for core earnings and change in core 
earnings (2,011) 
Firm-years with unavailable data for control variables (111) 
Industry population < 10 firm-years (96) 
Number of observations to estimate Equations (1) and (2) 7,309 
  Panel C: Main Samples to test H1a, H1b & H1c  
 Number of observations to estimate Equations (1) and (2)             7,309 
less: 
(2,290) Post-IFRS observations (31 December 2005-2009) 
Total Main Sample to test H1a (1995-30 December 2005)            5,019 
  Number of observations to estimate Equations (1) and (2)             7,309 
less: 
 Firm-years with unavailable data  (19) 
Pre-2001/02 amendments observations (1995-2000) (2,833) 
Total Main Sample to test H1b (2002-2009)            4,457 
  Number of observations to estimate Equations (1) and (2)             7,309 
less: 
 Pre-2001/02 and pre-IFRS observations (1995-30 December 2005) (5,123) 
Total Main Sample to test H1c (31 December 2005-2009)            2,186 
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 TABLE 5.1 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Main Samples to test H2a(i-iii) & H2b(i-iii)  
 Number of observations to estimate Equations (1) and (2)             7,309 
less: 
 Post-IFRS period firm-year observations (31 December 2005-2009) (2,290) 
Unmatched observations for treatment and control firms (2,551) 
Total Main Sample to test H2a(i-iii) (1995-30 December 2005)             2,468 
  
 Number of observations to estimate Equations (1) and (2)            7,309 
less: 
 Pre-2001/02 amendments observations (1995-2000) (2,833) 
Unmatched observations for treatment and control firms (2,225) 
Total Main Sample to test H2b(i-iii) (2002-2009)             2,251 
  
 Panel E: Main Sample to test H2c(i-iii) (2002-2009)  
 Number of observations to estimate Equations (1) and (2) 7,309 
less: 
 Pre-2001/02 amendments observations (1995-2000) (2,833) 
Unmatched observations for treatment and control firms (2,280) 
Total Main Sample to test H2c(i-iii) (2002-2009)            2,196 
 
(a): Non-recurring items refer collectively to abnormal items and discontinued 
operations whose financial statement reporting is analysed in Chapter Six.Thus 
abnormal items are a subset of non-recurring items  
 
5.5 Estimation and descriptive statistics for EM measures 
In this section I describe the estimation of the various earnings management metrics 
used in my thesis. 
5.5.1 Measuring classification shifting: descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used to estimate expected core 
earnings (Model (1)) and expected change in core earnings (Model (2)). The total 
number of firm-year observations with available data to estimate both regressions is 
7,309 (see Panel B of Table 5.1). The mean (median) sales (SALESt) is $628 ($52) 
million which is considerably smaller than that of USD$1,566.37 (USD$132.52) million  
129 
 
TABLE 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample used in the Models of Expected Core Earnings 
and Expected Change in Core Earnings (1995 – 2009) 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
SALESt (in millions) 628.00 52.00 2,800.00 12.00 246.00 
∆SALESt-1,t 26.43% 12.02% 0.426 -3.97% 5.58% 
NEG_∆SALESt-1,t -6.07% 0.00% 0.145 -2.64% 0.00% 
CEt -0.004 0.099 0.502 0.016 0.216 
ΔCEt+1 -0.029 -0.001 0.379 -0.055 0.041 
ABNORMAL ITEMSt (in 
millions) -7.802 0.000 257.00 -0.328 0.000 
%AIt 2.14% 0.00% 0.051 0.00% 0.38% 
ATOt 2.046 1.421 1.845 0.671 2.842 
∆ATOt+1 0.012 0.000 0.710 -0.258 0.205 
N                                                      7,309 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample of observations for the period 1995 to 2009 excluding 
2001, that are used to estimate regressions of expected core earnings and expected change in core earnings. The 
sample includes only firm-year observations with available data for each variable included in the test regressions. 
Firms in the financial sector (CRIF industries 16 to 20) are excluded from the sample because they are subject to 
different reporting regulations. Firm-year observations with sales less than 500,000 are also excluded from the sample 
to avoid the presence of outliers as sales is the deflator for many of the variables in the regressions. Observations for 
the year 2001 are also omitted because the first amendment to AASB 1018 was operative only for the financial period 
ending 30 June 2001 and provide no meaningful analysis. AASB 1018 was again amended, operative for financial 
periods ending on or after 30 June 2002. Hence the first amendment was only effective for one year. CEt are core 
earnings in year t defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) scaled by sales in 
year t. The model of expected core earnings and expected change in core earnings are as follows, estimated by fiscal 
year and industry: 
CEt = β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt                                           (1) 
∆CEt+1 = β0 +  β1CEt + β2∆CEt + β3∆ATOt+1 + β4ΔSALESt+1 + β5NEG_ΔSALESt+1 +νt+1         (2) 
%AIt is income-decreasing abnormal items as a percentage of sales calculated as [abnormal itemst * -1]/Salest when 
abnormal items are income-decreasing, and 0 otherwise. All variables are winsorised at 5% and 95% levels. See 
Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2 for the variable definitions and Morningstar data item numbers. a = winsorising the 
variables have resulted in the means shown for these variables. The means are zero without winsorisation. 
 
for US firms reported in McVay (2006, Table 1).  The mean AI is -$7.802 million,97 
suggesting that AI (ABNORMAL ITEMSt) for Australian firms are typically income-
decreasing. The mean income-decreasing AI as a percentage of sales (%AIt) is 
approximately 2.14 percent98 which is similar to 2.7 percent for US firms reported in 
97 The mean abnormal items for US firms reported in McVay (2006) is -USD$13.062 million. Throughout 
my study period, the USD/AUD exchange rate varied between approximately 0.48/1.00 and 0.98/1.00, 
with an average of approximately 0.72/1.00.  
98 Income-increasing abnormal items are not included and have been set to zero for the purpose of this 
calculation. 
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McVay (2006). The mean core earnings (CEt) is -0.004, which indicates that during the 
sample period (1995 – 2009), Australian firms report core losses on average.99 The 
mean change in core earnings from year t to t+1 (∆CEt+1) is negative (-0.029), similar to 
the (-0.03) reported in McVay (2006). 
Table 5.3 compares the descriptive statistics for firms with and without large income-
decreasing AI, using a threshold of five percent of sales to split the sample (similar to 
prior studies: McVay 2006; Haw et al. 2011). Firms with large income-decreasing AI 
have significantly lower core earnings than firms without large AI (-0.028 versus 
0.040),100 consistent with these large AI firms performing poorly (Elliott and Shaw 
1988; DeAngelo et al. 1994; Carter 2000; McVay 2006).  The change in core earnings 
from the year AI is recognised to the subsequent period (t to t+1) is significantly more 
negative for large AI firms (-0.042 versus -0.005), suggesting that poor performers 
subsequently reverse core earnings more than other firms (Brooks and Buckmaster 
1976; McVay 2006).  
TABLE 5.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Abnormal Item Subgroups 
1995 - 2009 
Variables 
Firms without 
income- 
decreasing 
abnormal items 
>= 5% of Sales 
Firms with income- 
decreasing 
abnormal items 
>= 5% of Sales 
p-value for 
statistical difference 
between firms with 
and without 
abnormal items 
>= 5% of sales 
(1) 
Mean 
(2) 
Median 
(3) 
Mean 
(4) 
Median t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank 
Sum Test 
SALESt (in millions) 680 114 599 35 0.118 0.000 
∆SALESt-1,t 26.80% 13.04% 26.23% 11.26% 0.329 0.000 
CEt 0.040 0.100 -0.028 0.098 0.000 0.020 
ΔCEt+1 -0.005 0.001 -0.042 -0.002 0.000 0.016 
%AIt 0.19% 0.00% 3.22% 0.00% 0.000 0.000 
ATOt 2.559 1.937 1.760 1.184 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 4,693 2,616 
 
This table compares the descriptive statistics for firms with and without large income-decreasing abnormal items, where large is 
defined as 5% of sales. The full sample consists of 7,309 firm-year observations for the period 1995 to 2009 (excluding 2001). 
Observations for the year 2001 are also omitted because the first amendment to AASB 1018 was operative only for the financial 
period ending 30 June 2001 and provide no meaningful analysis. Observations for the financial sector firms (CRIF Industry Code 
16-20) are excluded from all samples as they are subject to different regulations. All of the variables are winsorised at the 5% and 
95% levels. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2 for variable definitions. 
99 The mean core earnings for all US firms as reported by McVay (2006) is positive at 0.070. The weaker 
Australian performance reflects the large number of smaller, loss-making firms in the sample.  
100 For US firms reported in McVay (2006), it is -0.140 versus 0.095, thus the behaviour of US firms 
appears comparable to that of Australian firms in this study. 
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Table 5.4 reports correlation among the variables for the models of expected level of 
core earnings and change in core earnings, and with unexpected core earnings and 
unexpected change in core earnings. SALESt are positively correlated with CEt (0.368), 
consistent with an increase in core earnings as a result of sales increase. Core earnings 
and lagged core earnings (CEt-1) are positively correlated (0.742), indicating that core 
earnings are very persistent (McVay 2006). Core earnings and asset turnover ratio 
(ATOt) are negatively correlated (-0.137), consistent with asset turnover ratio being 
inversely related to profit margin (Nissim and Penman 2001). Furthermore, sales growth 
(∆SALESt) is positively correlated with CEt (0.082), consistent with an increase in core 
earnings due to sales growth while fixed costs reduce per sales dollar (McVay2006). 
Finally, change in core earnings in t+1 (ΔCEt+1) is negatively correlated with core 
earnings in t (CEt) (-0.207), consistent with mean reversion (Freeman et al. 1982). 
TABLE 5.4 
Spearman Correlation Matrix for Variables in Core Earnings and Change in Core 
Earnings Models 
 SALESt ∆SALESt CEt CEt-1 ΔCEt ΔCEt+1 %AIt ATOt 
SALESt 1.000        
∆SALESt -0.004 
(0.7471) 
1.000       
CEt 0.368 
(0.000) 
0.082 
(0.000) 
1.000      
CEt-1 0.384 
(0.000) 
-0.064 
(0.000) 
0.742 
(0.000) 
1.000     
ΔCEt -0.078 
(0.000) 
0.250 
(0.000) 
0.171 
(0.000) 
-0.325 
(0.000) 
1.000    
ΔCEt+1 0.003 
(0.822) 
-0.041 
(0.001) 
-0.207 
(0.000) 
-0.116 
(0.000) 
-0.080 
(0.000) 
1.000   
%AIt 0.047 
(0.000) 
-0.120 
(0.000) 
-0.041 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.905) 
-0.056 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.137) 
1.000  
ATOt 0.278 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.002) 
-0.137 
(0.000) 
-0.144 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.585) 
0.000 
(0.987) 
-0.076 
(0.000) 
1.000 
This table reports the correlation for the variables used in models of expected core earnings and expected change in 
core earnings (Models (1) and (2), respectively). There are a minimum of 7,309 firm-year observations. P-values are 
shown in parentheses. All variables are winzorised at 5 percent and 95 percent. See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2 for 
variable definitions. 
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5.5.2 Measuring classification shifting: estimation of unexpected core earnings and 
unexpected change in core earnings 
The summarised results for 252 industry-years specific regressions of the model of 
expected core earnings (Model 1) are reported in Table 5.5, Panel A. The mean adjusted 
R2 is 69.7 percent; similar to the adjusted R2 of 75.5 percent for US firms reported in 
McVay (2006, Table 4). Haw et al. (2011) report an adjusted R2 of 38.8 percent for East 
Asian firms (Table 9) which, similar to my Model (1), excludes accruals.101 Consistent 
with prediction, core earnings is significantly correlated with lagged core earnings 
(0.481, t = 14.205). This indicates that prior year core earnings are a strong predictor of 
current core earnings, consistent with McVay (2006). Also consistent with prior studies 
(e.g. Anderson et al. 2003; McVay 2006), the slope coefficient on sales growth is 
significantly larger for firms experiencing a sales decline (0.092 versus 0.203, where 
0.203 is obtained by summing ∆SALESt (β3) and NEG_∆SALESt (β4)). Finally, asset 
turnover (ATOt) is not significantly associated with core earnings (0.007, t = 0.966).102 
Similar to McVay (2006), ATOt does not appear to be strongly associated with core 
earnings within industry-years, where only 37 percent of the 252 year regressions are 
significantly positive. Panel B of Table 5.5 shows that the mean (median) unexpected 
core earnings is 0.011 (0.012), indicating that on average, firms in the sample report 
higher unexpected core earnings when firms with sales below $500,000 are excluded 
from the sample. Thus larger firms (based on sales) report abnormally high unexpected 
core earnings. 
I re-estimate Model (1) and include lagged and current accruals (ACCRUALSt) in 
replication of McVay (2006). The results are reported in Appendix A. The adjusted R2 
is 82.10 percent which is higher than the adjusted R2 of 75.50 percent for US firms in 
McVay (2006). Haw et al (2011) report adjusted R2 of 39.60 percent for East Asian 
firms. Except for ATOt and NEG_∆SALESt, all other variables are significant in the 
predicted direction. CEt-1 is significantly positive (0.512, t = 20.712); ACCRUALSt-1 is 
significantly negative (-0.159, t = -6.124); ACCRUALSt is significantly positive (0.354, t 
= 11.393); and ∆SALESt is significantly positive (0.070, t = 4.191) with the slope 
coefficient on sales growth being significantly larger for firms with decreased sales  
101 The low level of explanatory power for Haw et al. (2011) partially reflects the cross-country nature of 
their sample which includes eight countries with diverse institutional settingsTheir sample includes only 
profitable firms. 
102 McVay (2006) reports only weakly significant ATOt (in the predicted direction) using a one-tailed test. 
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TABLE 5.5 
Model of Expected Level of Core Earnings  
 
Panel A: Regression Model Coefficients 
 
Dependent Variable: CEt 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Mean 
coefficient 
(one-tailed 
t-statistics) 
Percent 
Significant 
t-statistics 
one-tailed test 
Percent with 
Sign in the 
Predicted 
Direction 
Intercept 
 
0.026** 
(1.994) 
  CEt-1 + 0.481*** 
(14.205) 
94.74 94.74 
ATOt - 0.007 
(0.966) 
36.84 52.63 
ΔSALESt + 0.092*** 
(4.053) 
57.89 78.95 
NEG_ΔSALESt + 0.111 
(0.393) 
73.68 78.95 
Number of observations               7,309 
Adjusted R2                                  69.70% 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Unexpected Core Earnings (UE_CEt) for the Full Sample 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
UE_CEt 0.011 0.012 0.209 -0.059 0.109 
 
This table reports the regression coefficients for the model of expected core earnings (Model 1) (Panel A) and the 
descriptive statistics for unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) which is the dependent variable for the hypotheses tests 
derived from the expected core earnings model (Panel B). There are 7,309 observations and 252 industry-year 
regressions for the period 1995 to 2009 excluding 2001 observations.  Observations for the year 2001 are excluded 
because they are omitted from the hypotheses tests as the first amendment to AASB 1018 was operative only for the 
financial period ending 30 June 2001. AASB 1018 was again amended, operative for financial periods ending on or 
after 30 June 2002. Hence, the first amendment was only effective for one year. Regressions are estimated by 
industry and fiscal year following equation (1) that is based on the model of expected core earnings developed by 
McVay (2006):  CEt = β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt (1); where CEt is core earnings, 
calculated as EBITDAt/Salest, where EBITDAt is earnings before interest, income tax, depreciation, amortisation, 
abnormal items and discontinued operations. ATOt is asset turnover ratio, defined as Salest/((NOAt + NOAt-1)/2), 
where NOAt, net operating assets, is equal to operating assets - operating liabilities. Operating assets is calculated as 
total assets - cash and short term investments. Operating liabilities is calculated as total assets - total debt - book value 
of common and preferred equity - minority interests, where average net operating assets is required to be positive. 
∆SALES is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t: ((Salest - Salest-1)/Salest-1). NEG_∆SALESt is 
∆SALESt if ∆SALESt is negative, and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. Test results use a one-tailed t-test. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All variables are winsorised at 
5% and 95% level. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2 for Morningstar data item numbers.  
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 (0.070 versus 0.171, where 0.171 is obtained by summing ∆SALESt and 
NEG_∆SALESt). Overall, the results from estimating this model on Australian firms are 
consistent with those for US firms reported in McVay (2006).103 
In Table 5.6, Panel A, I present the summarised results for 252 industry-years specific 
regressions for Equation (2), the model for expected change in core earnings in year 
t+1. The mean adjusted R2 is 61.50 percent which is higher than the 51.70 percent 
reported in McVay (2006) for US firms. All variables are statistically significant in the 
predicted direction except for the change in asset turnover ratio (∆ATOt+1) which is 
insignificant. Consistent with mean reversion, the level of core earnings is negatively 
associated with the change in core earnings from t to t+1 (∆CEt+1) (-0.123, t = -3.131) 
(Freeman et al. 1982; McVay 2006). The change in core earnings from t-1 to t (∆CEt) is 
also negatively associated with ∆CEt+1 (-0.072, t = -1.607), consistent with mean 
reversion being stronger for poor performing firms (Brooks and Buckmaster 1976).  The 
slope coefficient for sales growth is significantly larger for firms that experience a sales 
decline (0.089 versus 0.468, where 0.468 is the sum of ∆CEt and ∆CEt+1). The change 
in asset turnover ratio (∆ATOt+1) is insignificant (δ3 = 0.016, t = 0.860) and is only 
significantly positive in 31.58 percent of the 252 industry-year regressions.104 Panel B 
of Table 5.6 shows that the mean (median) unexpected change in core earnings is 0.004 
(0.003), indicating that on average, firms in the full sample (when firms with sales 
below $500,000 are excluded from the sample) report positive unexpected change in 
core earnings thus, core earnings do not subsequently reverse.105  
The differences between reported core earnings and predicted core earnings estimated 
using Equation (1), and between change in core earnings and predicted change in core 
earnings estimated using Equation (2) represent the unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) 
and unexpected change in core earnings (UE_∆CEt+1), respectively.   
I also re-estimate Model (2) and include ACCRUALSt and future accruals 
(ACCRUALSt+1) in replication of McVay (2006) as a robustness check for findings in 
Table 5.6. The results are reported in Appendix A. The adjusted R2 is 76.60 percent 
whereas McVay (2006) reports an adjusted R2 of 51.70 percent. All variables are 
103 In descriptive results not tabulated, the mean UE_CEt for firms with large income-decreasing AI 
where large income-decreasing AI is equal to 5% of sales (0.012) is similar to the mean for firms without 
large income-decreasing AI (0.011).  
104 McVay (2006) reports a significance rate of 41.1 percent in the predicted direction. 
105 In untabulated descriptive results, the mean UE_ΔCEt+1 for firms with large income-decreasing AI 
(0.004) is the same as the mean of firms without large income-decreasing AI (0.004). Thus, both subsets 
of income-decreasing AI reporting firms do not subsequently reverse unexpectedly high core earnings. 
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TABLE 5.6 
Model of Expected Change in Core Earnings  
Panel A: Regression Model Coefficients 
Dependent Variable: ∆CEt+1 
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Mean 
coefficient 
(one-tailed 
t-statistics) 
Percent 
Significant 
t-statistics 
one-tailed test 
Percent with 
Sign in the 
Predicted 
Direction 
Intercept  0.015 
(1.623) 
  
CEt - -0.123*** 
(-3.131) 
84.21 89.47 
ΔCEt - -0.072* 
(-1.607) 
63.16 78.95 
ΔATOt+1 + 0.016 
(0.860) 
31.58 63.16 
ΔSALESt+1 + 0.089** 
(2.157) 
42.11 57.89 
NEG_ΔSALESt+1 + 0.379*** 
(4.602) 
78.95 89.47 
Number of observations                                      7,309 
Adjusted R2                                                        61.50% 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Unexpected Change in Core Earnings (UE_ΔCEt+1 )for the 
Full Sample 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
UE_ΔCEt+1 0.004 0.003 0.193 -0.067 0.084 
This table presents the regression coefficients for the model of change in core earnings (Model 2) in Panel A, and the 
descriptive statistics for unexpected change in core earnings (UE_ΔCEt+1) which is the dependent variable for the 
hypotheses tests derived from the expected core earnings model in Panel B. There are 7,309 observations and 252 
industry-year regressions for the period 1995 to 2009 excluding 2001 observations. Observations for the year 2001 
are excluded because they are omitted from the hypotheses tests as the first amendment to AASB 1018 was operative 
only for the financial period ending 30 June 2001, and provide no meaningful analysis. AASB 1018 was again 
amended, operative for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002. Hence, the first amendment was only 
effective for one year. Regressions are estimated by industry and fiscal year following equation (1), based on the 
model of expected change in core earnings developed by McVay (2006): ∆CEt+1 = δ0 +  δ1CEt + δ2∆CEt+1 + 
δ3∆ATOt+1 + δ4ΔSALESt+1 + δ5NEG_ΔSALESt+1 +νt+1 (2), where CEt is core earnings, calculated as EBITDAt/Salest, 
where EBITDAt is earnings before interest, income tax, depreciation, amortisation, abnormal items and discontinued 
operations. ATOt is asset turnover ratio, defined as Salest/((NOAt + NOAt-1)/2), where NOA, net operating assets, is 
equal to operating assets - operating liabilities. Operating assets is calculated as total assets - cash and short-term 
investments. Operating liabilities is calculated as total assets - total debt - book value of common and preferred equity 
- minority interests, where average net operating assets is required to be positive. ∆SALES is the percentage change in 
sales from year t-1 to year t: ((Salest - Salest-1)/Salest-1). NEG_∆SALESt is ∆SALESt if ∆SALESt is negative, and 0 
otherwise. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Test results use a one-tailed t-test. T-
statistics are shown in parentheses. All variables are winsorised at 5% and 95% level. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2 
for Morningstar data item numbers.  
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significant in the predicted direction except for ∆CEt which is insignificant. CEt is 
significantly negative (-0.171, t = -4.715); ACCRUALSt is significantly negative (-
0.141, t = 3.696); ACCRUALSt+1 is significantly positive (0.261, t = 9.107); and both 
∆SALESt+1 and NEG_∆SALESt+1 are significantly positive (0.094, t = 1.672 and 0.214, t 
= 2.350, respectively) with the slope coefficient on sales growth being significantly 
larger for firms experiencing a reduction in sales (0.094 versus 0.308, where 0.308 is 
obtained by summing ∆SALESt+1 and NEG_∆SALESt+1). Overall, the results from this 
model show that the behaviour of Australian firms is similar to US firms as reported in 
McVay (2006). 
5.5.3 Estimation of discretionary accruals 
Table 5.7 reports the mean regression coefficients for the performance-adjusted 
modified-Jones model of discretionary accruals estimated across industry-years for the 
period 1995-2009 (excluding 2001). Firm-years with sales below $500,000, financial 
sector firms, and firm-years without sufficient data to calculate the necessary variables 
were excluded from the sample used. This resulted in a total sample of 12,159 firm-
years observations. The average adjusted R2 for regressions of accruals across industry-
years is 24.00%. 
The mean coefficients for the explanatory variables are significant in the predicted 
directions. The change in revenue less the change in receivables in period t (scaled by 
lagged total assets), which proxies the growth in cash and collected revenue, is 
significantly positively associated with current total accruals (scaled by lagged total 
assets) (0.023, t = 2.581). The higher the difference in change in revenues and change in 
receivables, the higher is total accruals, thus, any increase to accruals might be a result 
of management attempts to increase revenues artificially. The coefficient for property 
plant and equipment (PPE) in year t (scaled by lagged total assets) is significantly 
negative (-0.043, t = -2.926), suggesting that as the amount of PPE increases total 
accruals decreases, where PPE is related to the income- decreasing accrual, depreciation 
expense (Jones 1991). Finally, return on assets in t-1 (ROAt-1) is significantly positive 
(0.175, t = 11.124), consistent with firms’ accruals being correlated with their previous 
year’s performance. Hence, firms’ current accruals are significantly influenced by their 
past performance (Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005). My measure of accrual-
based earnings management is the residuals from the performance-adjusted modified-
Jones model. 
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TABLE 5.7 
Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
 
(TACi,t/TAi,t-1) = b1(1/TAi,t-1) + b2[(ΔREVi,t - ΔRECi,t)/TAi,t-1] + b3(PPEi,t/TAi ,t-1) + b4ROAi,t-1 + 
εi,t   
  
   
  
  
 
Predicted Mean    
 Independent Variables 
 
Sign Coefficient   
  
   
  
(1/TAi,t-1) 
  
-0.056***   
  
  
(-12.856)   
(ΔREVi,t - ΔRECi,t)/TAt-1 
 
+ 0.023**   
  
  
(2.581)   
PPEi,t/TAi,t-1 
 
- -0.043***   
  
  
(-2.926)   
ROAi,t-1 
 
+ 0.175***   
  
  
(11.124)   
  
   
  
Number of observations 
  
12,159   
Adjusted R-squares 
  
24.00%   
  
   
  
This table reports the empirical results for the performance-adjusted modified-Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005) that 
is used to determine the proxy for accrual-based earnings management. TACi,t is total accruals for firm i in year t, 
calculated as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI) and cash flow from operations. 
ΔREVi,t is change in total revenues for firm i between years t-1 and t.  ΔRECi,t is change in accounts receivable for 
firm i between years t-1 and t. PPEi,t is gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t. ROAt-1 is lagged 
return on assets calculated as EBEI scaled by average total assets both in year t-1. TAi,t-1 is lagged total assets for 
firm i.The sample consists of observations from 1995-2009 excluding 2001 observations. Observations for firms in 
the financial sector and those with sales below $500,000 are also excluded from the sample. Hence, there are 12,159 
observations. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All test results use a two-tailed 
t-test. T-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
 
5.5.4 Estimation of real earnings management – sales activities manipulation 
Table 5.8 reports the mean coefficients for the estimation of Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
real earnings management via sales activities model, estimated on a sample of 13,027 
firm-years from 1995 to 2009, excluding 2001 observations, all financial sector firms, 
and those with sales below $500,000. My measure of earnings management through 
sales manipulation (SLSMANt) is the negative of the residual from the Roychowdhury 
(2006) model of abnormal cash flow. The negative transformation is applied so that the 
measure is positively correlated with the direction of earnings management (i.e. a 
positive value for SLSMANt implies income increasing earnings management). 
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TABLE 5.8 
Real Earnings Management via Sales Activities 
(CFOi,t/TAi,t-1) = k1(1/TAi,t-1) + k2(SALESi,t/TAi,t-1) + k3 (ΔSALESi,t/TAi ,t-1) + εi,t     
  
 
Predicted 
  
  
 Independent Variables 
 
Sign Coefficient 
 
  
  
    
  
(1/TAi,t-1) 
  
-0.085*** 
 
  
  
  
(-13.47) 
 
  
SALESi,t/TAi,t-1 
 
+ 0.092*** 
 
  
  
  
(15.541) 
 
  
ΔSALESi,t/TAi,t-1 
 
- -0.025* 
 
  
  
  
(-1.84) 
 
  
 
Number of observations 
  
13,027 
 
  
Adjusted R-squares 
  
18.70% 
 
  
  
    
  
This table reports the empirical results for the model to examine the manipulation of sales activities that is used 
to determine the proxy for real earnings management via sales transactions based on models by Roychowdhury 
(2006). CFOi,t is cash flow from operations for firm i in year t. SALESi,t is sales for firm i in year t. ΔSALESi,t is 
change in total sales for firm i between years t-1 and t. TAi,t-1 is lagged total assets for firm i.The sample consists 
of observations from 1995-2009 excluding 2001 observations. Observations for firms in the financial sector and 
those with sales below $500,000 are also excluded from the sample. Hence, there are 13,027 observations. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. All test results use a two-tailed t-test. T-statistics 
are shown in parentheses.  
 
The coefficient for current period sales (SALESi,t) is significantly positively associated 
with CFOi,t (0.092, t = 15.541), consistent with prediction. An increase in sales results 
in a (temporary) increase in cash flow from operations. The coefficient for change in 
sales (ΔSALESi,t) is negative and is marginally significant (-0.025, t = -1.84), consistent 
with Dechow et al. (1998) but inconsistent with Roychowdhury (2006: 348, Table 2) 
who argues that “conditional on contemporaneous sales, a higher change in sales 
implies a higher cash from operation”. The descriptive statistics for the resulting 
measure of sales manipulation (SLSMANt) are provided later in the chapter (Tables 5.22 
- 5.24). 
5.5.5 Estimation of real earnings management – discretionary expenditure 
manipulation 
Table 5.9 reports the mean regression coefficients for the estimation of real earnings 
management via the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure. The 
regression is estimated on a total sample of 8,608 spanning 1995 to 2009 after excluding  
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TABLE 5.9 
Real Earnings Management via Discretionary Expenditure 
(DISXi,t/TAi,t-1) = k1(1/TAi,t-1) + k2(SALESi,t-1/TAi,t-1)  + εi,t   
 
  
  
 
Predicted 
  
  
  
 
Sign Coefficient 
 
  
  
    
  
(1/TAi,t-1) 
  
 -0.181*** 
 
  
  
  
(-15.348) 
 
  
SALESi,t-1/TA I,t-1 
 
+ 0.108** 
 
  
  
  
(10.718) 
 
  
  
    
  
Number of observations 
 
8,608 
 
  
Adjusted R-squared 
  
16.70% 
 
  
  
    
  
This table reports the empirical results for the model to examine the opportunistic reduction of discretionary 
expenses that is used to determine the proxy for real earnings management via discretionary expenditure 
based on models by Roychowdhury (2006). DISXi,t is discretionary expenditure for firm I, defined as the 
sum of research and development, advertising, and selling, general and administrative expenses in year t. 
SALESi,t is sales for firm i in year t. ΔSALESi,t is change in total sales for firm i between years t-1 and t. TAi,t-1 
is lagged total assets for firm i. .The sample consists of observations from 1995-2009 excluding 2001 
observations. Observations for firms in the financial sector and those with sales below $500,000 are also 
excluded from the sample. Hence, there are 8,608 observations. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. All test results use a two-tailed t-test. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
observations as in regressions for DA and sales manipulation. My measure of earnings 
management through the manipulation of discretionary expenses (DISXMANt) is the negative of 
the residuals from the Roychowdhury (2006) model reported in Table 5.9. 
Roychowdhury (2006) assumes that higher sales in the previous year may encourage 
firms to increase discretionary expenditure in year t, hence, a positive association is 
expected between DISXi,t and SALESi,t-1. The coefficient for SALESi,t-1 is significantly 
positive (0.108, t = 10.718), suggesting that current discretionary expenditure is 
positively associated with the level of prior year sales, consistent with Roychowdhury 
(2006).  
5.6 Descriptive statistics for variables used in tests of hypotheses 
5.6.1 Descriptive statistics for tests of H1a 
Table 5.10 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in tests of H1a, which 
predicts that classification shifting using AI reduces following the 2002 amendment. 
The sample for H1a includes firm-year observations from 1995 to 30 December 2005, 
but excludes 2001 observations for reasons explained previously; the sample period 
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ends on 30 December 2005 as there were further amendments to the relevant standard 
(AASB 1018 was replaced by AASB 101) effective for periods beginning on or after 1 
January 2005. Thus, the full sample to test H1a comprises 5,019 firm-year observations 
with available data.  
TABLE 5.10 
Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample Used in Tests for H1a 
for the Period 1995 – 30 December 2005 (excluding 2001 observations) 
All Morningstar firms with available data 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
SALESt (in millions) 593 50.20 2,450 12.10 231 
∆SALESt-1,t 24.30% 11.11% 0.516 -3.24% 36.29% 
CEt 0.024 0.101 0.449 0.027 0.214 
ΔCEt+1 -0.030 -0.001 0.352 -0.051 0.036 
UE_CEt  0.011 0.007 0.193 -0.056 0.093 
UE_ΔCEt+1 0.004 0.002 0.184 -0.062 0.077 
ABNORMAL ITEMS (in 
millions) -9.196 0.000 193.00 -0.636 0.000 
%AIt 2.51% 0.00% 0.055 0.00% 0.87% 
POSTt 
0.432 0.00 0.495 0.00 1.00 
SIZEt 18.036 17.782 1.889 16.653 19.214 
ROAt -0.029 0.036 0.200 -0.07 0.079 
CFOt 0.039 0.060 0.142 -0.008 0.119 
LEVt 0.209 0.186 0.181 0.046 0.321 
LOSSt 0.340 0.000 0.474 0.000 1.000 
AUDITORt 0.687 1.000 0.464 0.000 1.000 
N                                                        5,019 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the samples of firm-year observations used to test H1a comprising 
observations from 1995 to 2005 excluding observations for the year 2001. Firms in the financial sector (CRIF 
industries 16 to 20) are excluded from the sample because they are subject to different reporting regulations. Firm-
year observations with SALESt less than 500,000 are also excluded from the sample to avoid the presence of outliers 
as sales is the deflator for many of the variables in the regressions. CEt are core earnings in year t defined as earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) scaled by sales in year t. UE_CEt  is unexpected core 
earnings in year t and UE_∆CEt+1 is unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1 and are calculated as the 
difference between reported and predicted core earnings and reported and predicted change in core earnings, 
respectively, where the predicted core earnings and change in core earnings are estimated using the coefficients from 
the following models, estimated by fiscal year and industry: 
      CEt = β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt                                               (1) 
∆CEt+1 = β0 +  β1CEt + β2∆CEt+1 + β3∆ATOt+1 + β4ΔSALESt+1 + β5NEG_ΔSALESt+1 +νt+1                 (2)                                                                                                            
%AIt is income-decreasing abnormal items as a percentage of sales calculated as [abnormal itemst * -1]/Salest when 
abnormal items are income-decreasing, and 0 otherwise. All variables are winsorised at 5% and 95% levels. See 
Chapter Four, Section 4.3.3 for definitions of other variables. 
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Sales (SALESt) are highly skewed with a mean value of $593 million and a median 
value of approximately $50 million. The mean core earnings (CEt) is 0.024 which 
suggests that on average, core earnings for Australian firms are positive. This, however, 
is considerably lower than for US firms (0.070) reported in McVay (2006, Table 1). The 
mean change in core earnings (∆CEt+1) is -0.03, consistent with core earnings reversing 
in t+1. Mean unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) are 0.011, which indicates that 
Australian firms on average, report positive unexpected core earnings. The mean 
unexpected change in core earnings (UE_ΔCEt+1) is 0.004 which suggests that on 
average, unexpected core earnings do not reverse in t+1. Mean AI is -$9.196 million 
which indicates that on average, firms in this period report income-decreasing AI. The 
mean income-decreasing AI as a percentage of sales (%AIt) is 2.51 percent and is 
similar to that for US firms reported in McVay (2006, Table 1). 
The mean size of firms in the sample (SIZEt) is $593m suggesting that on average, firms 
in the sample are large firms (based on total assets) relative to the population of ASX 
companies, reflecting the fact that firms with sales below $500,000 are excluded from 
the sample. Mean ROAt is -0.029, consistent with sampled firms being poor performers. 
Thus, while on average, the firms are large firms, they are however, performing poorly. 
Mean cash from operation (CFOt) is 0.039, consistent with firms having positive 
operating cash flow, on average. Also, mean leverage (LEVt) is 0.209, consistent with 
firms’ total assets on average, being funded by debt. The mean for firms reporting 
negative earnings before extraordinary items (LOSSt) is 0.340 which suggests that 
sampled firms, on average, report losses. Finally, approximately 69% of firms are 
audited by a ‘Big N’ auditor (AUDITORr). 
5.6.2 Descriptive statistics for H1b test 
Table 5.11 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used to test H1b, which 
examines the effect of the 2005 reform that eased the requirements over the reporting of 
non-recurring items on the income statement. The main sample comprises 4,457 firm-
year observations. 
Sales (SALESt) are highly skewed with a mean value of $682 million and a median 
value of approximately $52 million. Both are higher than that for the period 1995-30 
December 2005 (H1a tests). The mean core earnings (CEt) is -0.044 which is much 
lower than that for the main sample for H1a tests (0.024). Thus, relative to the period 
1995 to 30 December 2005, firms report negative core earnings on average from 2002 
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to 2009. The mean change in core earnings in t+1 (∆CEt+1) is -0.023, which is larger 
than for firms in the 1995 to 30 December 2005 period (-0.030). 
The mean unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) is 0.013, consistent with Australian firms 
on average, reporting higher than expected core earnings in this period. The mean 
unexpected change in core earnings (UE_ΔCEt+1) is 0.004, suggesting that on average, 
higher than expected core earnings do not reverse in t+1 in the period 2002-2009. Also, 
the mean income-decreasing AI as a percentage of sales (%AIt) is 1.75 percent, thus, 
firms in this period report larger income-decreasing AI than income-increasing AI, on 
TABLE 5.11 
Descriptive Statistics For the Sample Used in Tests for H1b  
for the Period 2002 - 2009 
All Morningstar firms with available data 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
SALESt (in millions) 682.00 52.00 3,180.00 11.00 263.00 
∆SALESt-1,t 27.84% 12.78% 0.548 -3.20% 44.64% 
CEt -0.044 0.092 0.558 -0.026 0.214 
ΔCEt+1 -0.023 0.002 0.410 -0.059 0.057 
UE_CEt  0.013 0.019 0.228 -0.068 0.134 
UE_ΔCEt+1 0.004 0.004 0.206 -0.074 0.096 
ABNORMAL ITEMS (in 
millions) -6.850 0.000 318.000 0.000 0.000 
%AIt 1.75% 0.00% 0.047 0.00% 0.00% 
IFRSt 0.514 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
SIZEt 18.132 17.890 1.999 16.689 19.464 
ROAt -0.043 0.035 0.229 -0.112 0.091 
CFOt 0.027 0.060 0.164 -0.034 0.126 
LEVt 0.204 0.175 0.190 0.021 0.322 
LOSSt 0.373 0.000 0.484 0.000 1.000 
AUDITORt 0.626 1.000 0.484 0.000 1.000 
N                                                       4,457 
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TABLE 5.11 (continued) 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the full samples of firm-year observations used to test H1b comprising   
observations from 2002 to 2009. Firms in the financial sector (CRIF industries 16 to 20) are excluded from the 
sample because they are subject to different reporting regulations. Firm-year observations with SALESt less than 
$500,000 are also excluded from the sample to avoid the presence of outliers as sales are the deflator for many of the 
variables in the regressions. CEt are core earnings in year t defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation (EBITDA) scaled by sales in year t. UE_CEt  is unexpected core earnings in year t and UE_∆CEt+1 is 
unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1 and are calculated as the difference between reported and predicted 
core earnings and reported and predicted change in core earnings, respectively, where the predicted core earnings and 
change in core earnings are estimated using the coefficients from the following models, estimated by fiscal year and 
industry: 
     CEt = β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt                                     (1) 
∆CEt+1 = β0 +  β1CEt + β2∆CEt+1 + β3∆ATOt+1 + β4ΔSALESt+1 + β5NEG_ΔSALESt+1 +νt+1     (2) 
%AIt is income-decreasing abnormal items as a percentage of sales calculated as [abnormal itemst * -1]/Salest when 
abnormal items are income-decreasing, and 0 otherwise. All variables are winsorised at 5% and 95% levels. See 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4 for definitions of other variables. 
 
average. However, the mean is lower than that for H1a (2.51 percent), suggesting that 
firms in the 1995 to 30 December 2005 period report larger income-decreasing AI on 
average, than firms in the 2002 to 2009 period.  
5.6.3 Descriptive statistics for H1c test 
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the tests of H1c which examine 
whether firms using classification shifting via discontinued operations (DO) following 
the adoption of AASB 5 in 2005, are reported in Table 5.12. The main sample 
comprises 2,186 firm-year observations for the post-IFRS period only (31 December 
2005 - 2009).  
Sales are highly skewed (similar to tests for H1a and H1b), with a mean value of $718 
million and a median value of approximately $58.3 million, higher than the averages 
and medians for both H1a and H1b. The mean unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt_) is 
0.016, which suggests that on average, firms in the post-IFRS period report 
unexpectedly high core earnings. The mean UE_CEt for this sample is higher than those 
for the samples for H1a (0.011) and H1b (0.013). Mean unexpected change in core 
earnings ((UE_ΔCEt+1) is 0.007 which may indicate that, on average, abnormally high 
core earnings for firms in this period do not subsequently reverse. The mean DO as a 
percentage of sales (%DOt) is approximately 0.10 percent while the mean income-
decreasing DO as a percentage of sales (%DO_NEGt) is approximately 0.40 percent. 
Both are similar to those reported by Barua et al. (2010) for US firms.  
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TABLE 5.12 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample Used in Tests of H1c  
for the Period 31 December 2005 - 2009 
All Morningstar firms with available data 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
SALESt (in millions) 718.00 58.30 3,500.00 12.50 303.00 
∆SALESt-1,t 0.280 0.129 0.542 -0.029 0.446 
CEt -0.052 0.095 0.583 -0.034 0.222 
ΔCEt+1 -0.002 0.002 0.353 -0.041 0.051 
UE_CEt 0.016 0.025 0.236 -0.070 0.145 
UE_∆CEt+1 0.007 0.008 0.208 -0.481 0.095 
DO (in millions) 0.905 0.000 45.600 0.000 0.000 
%DOt 0.10% 0.00% 0.025 0.00% 0.00% 
%DO_NEGt 0.40% 0.00% 0.021 0.00% 0.00% 
SIZEt 18.316 18.073 1.983 16.879 19.633 
ROAt -0.031 0.041 0.226 -0.094 0.103 
CFOt 0.032 0.064 0.163 -0.022 0.131 
LEVt 0.209 0.183 0.193 0.019 0.330 
LOSSt 0.356 0.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 
AUDITORt 0.587 1.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Number of observations 2,186 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for firm-year observations with available data that are used to test whether 
firms engage in classification shifting using discontinued operations to increase core earnings following the 
introduction of AASB 5, effective for financial periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005 (H1c). The sample 
comprises of all firm-years from the period 2002 to 2009 (comprising of the period before and after the amendment in 
2005). %DOt is discontinued operations multiplied by -1, scaled by sales, in year t: (Discontinued operationst * -
1)/Salest. %DO_NEGt is discontinued operations multiplied by -1, scaled by sales, both in year t: (Discontinued 
operationst * -1)/Salest, when reported discontinued operations are income-decreasing, and 0 otherwise.  All variables 
are winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels except for %DOt, and %DO_NEGt which are winsorised at the 1% and 99% 
levels. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.5 for definitions of other variables. 
 
5.6.4 Correlation matrices for variables used in hypotheses tests (1995-2005 and 
2002-2009) 
In this section I present the matrices for the variables used in hypotheses tests. I first 
present the correlation matrix for the tests of H1a (1995-30 December 2005), and then 
for the tests of H1b (2002 – 2009) and H1c (31 December 2005-2009). Next I report the 
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correlation matrix for variables used in tests of H2a(i-iii) followed by that for H2b(i-iii) 
and H2c(i-iii). 
5.6.4.1 Correlation matrices for variables used in tests of H1a - H1c 
Table 5.13 reports the correlations among the variables for the models used to test H1a. 
Unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) are negatively correlated with %AIt in the pre-
2001/02 period (-0.056) indicating that as AI increases in this period, unexpected core 
earnings decreases, or vice versa. In addition, %AIt is not correlated with unexpected 
change in core earnings (UE_ΔCEt+1) pre-2001/02 (-0.006), thus abnormally high core 
earnings for firms that report income-decreasing AI do not subsequently reverse. 
UE_CEt are not correlated with AI in the pre-IFRS period (%AIt*POSTt = -0.031), and 
likewise there is no significant correlation between UE_ΔCEt+1 and AI in this period 
(%AIt = 0.013). Hence, at a univariate level, firms that report AI do not appear to have 
high unexpected core earnings post-IFRS, and there is no subsequent reversal of 
abnormally high core earnings for these firms in the post-IFRS period. Firm size 
(SIZEt), return on assets (ROAt) operating cash flow (CFOt) and leverage (LEVt) are all 
positively correlated with unexpected core earnings, suggesting that firms with 
unexpectedly high core earnings are large firms with positive performance, positive 
operating cash flows and are highly leveraged. Loss firms (LOSSt) are significantly 
negatively correlated with unexpected core earnings, suggesting that poor performers do 
not report unexpectedly high core earnings.  
Table 5.14 reports correlations between the variables in the models for H1b tests. 
UE_CEt and UE_ΔCEt+1 are once again not correlated with AI in the pre-IFRS period. 
Once more, firms that report AI do not appear to report abnormally high core earnings 
that reverse in t+1. UE_CEt and UE_ΔCEt+1 are also uncorrelated with AI in the post-
IFRS period, thus firms that report AI do not report abnormally high core earnings that 
subsequently reverse in the post-IFRS period. The correlations between UE_CEt and 
UE_ΔCEt+1 and control variables are similar to those in Table 5.13. 
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TABLE 5.13 
Spearman Correlation Matrix for H1a Test Variables 
 
UE_CEt UE_ΔCEt+1 %AIt POSTt %AIt*POSTt SIZEt ROAt CFOt LEVt LOSSt AUDITORt 
UE_CEt 1.000           
UE_ΔCEt+1 0.000 
(0.980) 
1.000          
%AIt -0.056 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(-0.659) 
1.000         
POSTt 0.004 
(0.785) 
0.001 
(0.920) 
-0.046 
(0.001) 
1.000        
%AIt*POSTt -0.031 
(0.027) 
0.013 
(0.347) 
0.590 
(0.000) 
0.300 
(0.000) 
1.000       
SIZEt 0.146 
(0.000) 
0.057 
(0.000) 
-0.138 
(0.000) 
-0.032 
(0.025) 
-0.093 
(0.000) 
1.000      
ROAt 0.344 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.861) 
-0.536 
(0.000) 
-0.096 
(0.000) 
-0.370 
(0.000) 
0.388 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFOt 0.315 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.234) 
-0.217 
(0.000) 
-0.087 
(0.000) 
-0.195 
(0.000) 
0.354 
(0.000) 
0.673 
(0.000) 
1.000    
LEVt 0.042 
(0.003) 
0.045 
(0.001) 
-0.013 
(0.356) 
-0.045 
(0.001) 
-0.014 
(0.328) 
0.251 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.429) 
-0.010 
(0.482) 
1.000   
LOSSt -0.261 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.477) 
0.505 
(0.000) 
0.083 
(0.000) 
0.302 
(0.000) 
-0.395 
(0.000) 
-0.756 
(0.000) 
-0.537 
(0.000) 
-0.035 
(0.014) 
1.000  
AUDITORt 0.046 
(0.001) 
0.035 
(0.012) 
-0.016 
(0.257) 
-0.042 
(0.003) 
-0.009 
(0.533) 
0.362 
(0.000) 
0.096 
(0.000) 
0.113 
(0.000) 
0.020 
(0.164) 
-0.113 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
This table reports correlations among the variables for the models used to test H1a. There are a minimum of 5,019 firm-year observations.  P-values are shown in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at 5 percent and 95 percent. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.3 for variables definitions.  
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TABLE 5.14 
Spearman Correlation Matrix for H1b Test Variables 
 UE_CEt UE_ΔCEt+1 %AIt IFRSt %AIt*IFRSt SIZEt ROAt CFOt LEVt LOSSt AUDITORt 
UE_CEt 1.000           
UE_ΔCEt+1 -0.018 
(0.223) 
1.000          
%AIt -0.009 
(0.560) 
0.015 
(0.315) 
1.000         
IFRSt 0.009 
(0.549) 
-0.003 
(0.845) 
-0.098 
(0.000) 
1.000        
%AIt*IFRSt 0.028 
(0.064) 
0.007 
(0.639) 
0.573 
(0.000) 
0.219 
(0.000) 
1.000       
SIZEt 0.192 
(0.000) 
0.025 
(0.089) 
-0.036 
(0.016) 
0.08 
(0.000) 
0.083 
(0.000) 
1.000      
ROAt 0.419 
(0.000) 
-0.043 
(0.004) 
-0.348 
(0.000) 
0.035 
(0.021) 
-0.127 
(0.000) 
0.468 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFOt 0.333 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.029) 
-0.155 
(0.000) 
0.012 
(0.407) 
-0.039 
(0.009) 
0.432 
(0.000) 
0.732 
(0.000) 
1.000    
LEVt 0.022 
(0.137) 
0.024 
(0.103) 
0.034 
(0.022) 
0.023 
(0.129) 
0.064 
(0.000) 
0.333 
(0.000) 
0.018 
(0.228) 
0.008 
(0.594) 
1.000   
LOSSt -0.333 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.018) 
0.332 
(0.000) 
-0.023 
(0.122) 
0.142 
(0.000) 
-0.431 
(0.000) 
-0.772 
(0.000) 
-0.596 
(0.000) 
-0.041 
(0.006) 
1.000  
AUDITORt 0.072 
(0.000) 
0.053 
(0.000) 
0.029 
(0.056) 
-0.078 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.453) 
0.423 
(0.000) 
0.156 
(0.000) 
0.174 
(0.000) 
0.074 
(0.000) 
-0.154 
(0.000) 
1.000 
This table reports correlations among variables for the models used to test H1b. There are a minimum of 4,457 firm-year observations.  P-values are shown in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at 5 percent and 95 percent. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.4 for variable definitions. 
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 TABLE 5.15 
Spearman Correlation Matrix for H1c Test Variables 
 UE_CEt UE_ΔCEt+1 %DOt SIZEt ROAt CFOt LEVt LOSSt AUDITORt 
UE_CEt 1.000         
UE_ΔCEt+1 -0.038 
(0.076) 
1.000        
%DOt -0.005 
(0.802) 
0.022 
(0.313) 
1.000       
SIZEt 0.211 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.310) 
-0.057 
(0.008) 
1.000      
ROAt 0.447 
(0.000) 
-0.092 
(0.000) 
-0.164 
(0.000) 
0.459 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFOt 0.330 
(0.000) 
0.026 
(0.228) 
-0.036 
(0.095) 
0.424 
(0.000) 
0.731 
(0.000) 
1.000    
LEVt 0.008 
(0.696) 
-0.014 
(0.523) 
0.020 
(0.353) 
0.357 
(0.000) 
0.021 
(0.335) 
0.002 
(0.913) 
1.000   
LOSSt -0.368 
(0.000) 
0.049 
(0.021) 
0.139 
(0.000) 
-0.409 
(0.000) 
-0.774 
(0.000) 
-0.597 
(0.000) 
-0.048 
(0.025) 
1.000  
AUDITORt 0.084 
(0.000) 
0.037 
(0.080) 
0.036 
(0.094) 
0.465 
(0.000) 
0.187 
(0.000) 
0.209 
(0.000) 
0.101 
(0.000) 
-0.180 
(0.000) 
1.000 
This table reports correlations among the variables used to test H1c. There are a minimum of 2,186 firm-year observations. P-values are shown in parentheses. All 
continuous variables are winsorised at 5 percent and 95 percent. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.5 for variables definitions. 
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Table 5.15 reports the correlations among the variables used in the tests of H1c. 
UE_CEt and UE_ΔCEt+1 are not correlated with %DOt in the post-IFRS period, 
consistent with reporting discontinued operations not leading to abnormally high core 
earnings that subsequently reverse. Once more, the correlations between the two 
dependent variables and control variables are similar to those in tests of H1a and H1b.      
5.6.4.2 Correlation matrices for variables used in tests of H2a(i-iii) through to H2c(i-
iii) 
Table 5.16 reports the correlations among the main-effect variables and control 
variables for the models used in H2a(i-iii) tests. Unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) are 
significantly positively correlated with accrual-based earnings management (DAt = 
0.069), indicating that as discretionary accruals increase, unexpected core earnings also 
increase. Similarly, UE_CEt is significantly positively correlated with both abnormal 
sales (SLSMANt = 0.363) and abnormal discretionary expenditure (DISXMANt = 0.073). 
Hence, unexpected core earnings increase with abnormal sales and abnormal 
discretionary expenditure. SIZEt, ROAt and CFOt are all significantly positively 
correlated with UE_CEt,, indicating that large firms, those with positive return on assets, 
and those with positive cash from operations all have abnormally high core earnings. 
LOSSt is significantly negatively correlated with UE_CEt, suggesting that poor 
performers report abnormally high core earnings. Finally, LEVt and AUDITORt are 
insignificant. 
Table 5.17 presents the correlations among the main-effect variables and control 
variables in the models for H2b(i-iii) tests. UE_CEt are significantly positively 
correlated with DAt (0.184), suggesting that when there is an increase in discretionary 
accruals, unexpected core earnings also increase. Also, UE_CEt are significantly 
positively correlated with SLSMANt (0.358) and DISXMANt (0.110), thus, unexpected 
core earnings increase with abnormal sales and abnormal discretionary expenditure. The 
correlations among the control variables and UE_CEt are similar to those for H2a(i-iii) 
variables. Finally, Table 5.18 reports the correlations among the main-effect variables 
and control variables in the H2c(i-iii) models. UE_CEt are significantly positively 
related with DAt (0.186), SLSMANt (0.379) and DISXMANt (0.123). This suggests that 
firms’ unexpected core earnings increase with discretionary accruals, abnormal operating cash 
flows, and abnormal discretionary expenditures. Correlations among control variables and 
UE_CEt are similar. 
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TABLE 5.16 
Spearman Correlation Matrix for H2a(i-iii) Test Variables 
 UE_CEt TREAT1t DAt SLSMANt DISXMANt POSTt SIZEt ROAt CFOt LEVt LOSSt AUDITORt 
UE_CEt 1.000            
TREAT1t -0.013 
(0.510) 
1.000           
DAt 0.069 
(0.001) 
0.047 
(0.020) 
1.000          
SLSMANt 0.363 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.410) 
-0.309 
(0.000) 
1.000         
DISXMANt 0.073 
(0.000) 
0.039 
(0.051) 
0.066 
(0.001) 
0.128 
(0.000) 
1.000        
POSTt -0.018 
(0.360) 
-0.168 
(0.000) 
-0.048 
(0.015) 
-0.024 
(0.225) 
-0.169 
(0.000) 
1.000       
SIZEt 0.120 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.484) 
0.017 
(0.387) 
0.165 
(0.000) 
0.037 
(0.067) 
0.006 
(0.750) 
1.000      
ROAt 0.356 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.072) 
0.286 
(0.000) 
0.529 
(0.000) 
0.156 
(0.000) 
-0.146 
(0.000) 
0.393 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFOt 0.347 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.480) 
-0.253 
(0.000) 
0.789 
(0.000) 
0.115 
(0.000) 
-0.089 
(0.000) 
0.345 
(0.000) 
0.728 
(0.000) 
1.000    
LEVt 0.027 
(0.169) 
-0.010 
(0.610) 
0.041 
(0.041) 
-0.047 
(0.018) 
0.05 
(0.014) 
-0.063 
(0.002) 
0.267 
(0.000) 
0.013 
(0.531) 
-0.018 
(0.379) 
1.000   
LOSSt -0.281 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.072) 
-0.175 
(0.000) 
-0.419 
(0.000) 
-0.141 
(0.000) 
0.158 
(0.000) 
-0.427 
(0.000) 
-0.767 
(0.000) 
-0.593 
(0.000) 
-0.076 
(0.000) 
1.000  
AUDITORt 0.047 
(0.019) 
-0.022 
(0.270) 
-0.051 
(0.011) 
0.044 
(0.030) 
-0.058 
(0.004) 
-0.043 
(0.030) 
0.341 
(0.000) 
0.094 
(0.000) 
0.106 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.716) 
-0.119 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
This table reports correlations among the main-effect variables and control variables for the models used in tests of H2a(i-iii). There are a minimum of 2,468 firm-year observations. P-values are 
shown in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorised at 5 percent and 95 percent. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.8 for variables definitions. 
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TABLE 5.17 
Spearman Correlation Matrix for H2b(i-iii) Test Variables 
 UE_CEt TREAT2t DAt SLSMANt DISXMANt IFRSt SIZEt ROAt CFOt LEVt LOSSt AUDITORt 
UE_CEt 1.000            
TREAT2t 0.081 
(0.000) 
1.000           
DAt 0.184 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.736) 
1.000          
SLSMANt 0.358 
(0.000) 
0.107 
(0.000) 
-0.217 
(0.000) 
1.000         
DISXMANt 0.110 
(0.000) 
0.058 
(0.001) 
0.026 
(0.147) 
0.18 
(0.000) 
1.000        
IFRSt 0.028 
(0.125) 
0.005 
(0.785) 
-0.006 
(0.758) 
-0.015 
(0.404) 
0.011 
(0.531) 
1.000       
SIZEt 0.212 
(0.000) 
0.394 
(0.000) 
0.047 
(0.010) 
0.260 
(0.000) 
0.081 
(0.000) 
0.111 
(0.000) 
1.000      
ROAt 0.429 
(0.000) 
0.129 
(0.000) 
0.364 
(0.000) 
0.584 
(0.000) 
0.165 
(0.000) 
0.050 
(0.006) 
0.445 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFOt 0.345 
(0.000) 
0.135 
(0.000) 
-0.187 
(0.000) 
0.818 
(0.000) 
0.167 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.140) 
0.402 
(0.000) 
0.734 
(0.000) 
1.000    
LEVt 0.003 
(0.887) 
0.180 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.525) 
-0.031 
(0.086) 
0.057 
(0.001) 
0.041 
(0.023) 
0.306 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.412) 
-0.014 
(0.437) 
1.000   
LOSSt -0.331 
(0.000) 
-0.144 
(0.000) 
-0.257 
(0.000) 
-0.442 
(0.000) 
-0.125 
(0.000) 
-0.030 
(0.095) 
-0.417 
(0.000) 
-0.764 
(0.000) 
-0.583 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.292) 
1.000  
AUDITORt 0.070 
(0.000) 
0.100 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.746) 
0.083 
(0.000) 
-0.069 
(0.0000) 
-0.040 
(0.025) 
0.43 
(0.000) 
0.132 
(0.000) 
0.143 
(0.000) 
0.051 
(0.005) 
-0.137 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
 
This table reports correlations among the main-effect variables and control variables for the models used in tests of H2a(i-iii). There are a minimum of 2,251 firm-year observations. P-values 
are shown in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorised at 5 percent and 95 percent. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.8 for variables definitions. 
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TABLE 5.18 
Spearman Correlation Matrix for H2c(i-iii) Test Variables 
 UE_CEt TREAT_DOt DAt SLSMANt DISXMANt IFRSt SIZEt ROAt CFOt LEVt LOSSt AUDITORt 
UE_CEt 1.000            
TREAT_DOt 0.039 
(0.064) 
1.000           
DAt 0.186 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.997) 
1.000          
SLSMANt 0.379 
(0.000) 
0.019 
(0.362) 
-0.184 
(0.000) 
1.000         
DISXMANt 0.123 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.482) 
0.055 
(0.009) 
0.163 
(0.000) 
1.000        
IFRSt 0.051 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.647) 
0.029 
(0.179) 
0.001 
(0.958) 
0.043 
(0.043) 
1.000       
SIZEt 0.214 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.739) 
0.035 
(0.100) 
0.311 
(0.000) 
0.108 
(0.000) 
0.136 
(0.000) 
1.000      
ROAt 0.408 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.331) 
0.430 
(0.000) 
0.556 
(0.000) 
0.177 
(0.000) 
0.094 
(0.000) 
0.486 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFOt 0.359 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.839) 
-0.123 
(0.000) 
0.802 
(0.000) 
0.154 
(0.000) 
0.051 
(0.017) 
0.473 
(0.000) 
0.729 
(0.000) 
1.000    
LEVt 0.016 
(0.451) 
0.012 
(0.584) 
-0.021 
(0.327) 
0.035 
(0.104) 
0.066 
(0.002) 
0.038 
(0.078) 
0.273 
(0.000) 
0.040 
(0.058) 
0.069 
(0.001) 
1.000   
LOSSt -0.307 
(0.000) 
0.020 
(0.348) 
-0.282 
(0.000) 
-0.433 
(0.000) 
-0.142 
(0.000) 
-0.057 
(0.007) 
-0.444 
(0.000) 
-0.756 
(0.000) 
-0.576 
(0.000) 
-0.046 
(0.032) 
1.000  
AUDITORt 0.073 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.822) 
-0.004 
(0.860) 
0.094 
(0.000) 
-0.070 
(0.001) 
-0.035 
(0.097) 
0.430 
(0.000) 
0.123 
(0.000) 
0.163 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.293) 
-0.138 
(0.000) 
1.000 
This table reports correlations among the main-effect variables and control variables used in tests of H2c(i-iii). There are a maximum of 2,196 firm-year observations. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorised at 5 percent and 95 percent. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.9 for variables definitions. 
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5.6.5 Properties of regressions used to generate propensity score matched samples 
In this section, I describe the results of the first stage regressions used to generate the 
propensity score matched (PSM) samples that are used in the hypotheses tests and the 
balance of the PSM samples (i.e. the means and difference in means across treatment 
and control firms). Table 5.19 reports the first stage PSM regression results where 
Column (1) reports the results for the PSM model for H1a and H2a(i-iii); Column (2) 
reports the results for the PSM model for H1b and H2b(i-iii); and Column (3) reports 
the results for the PSM model for H1c and H2c(i-iii). Table 5.20 reports the balance of 
the PSM samples while Table 5.21 reports the balance of PSM samples across the entire 
test sample. 
5.6.5.1 Results for propensity score matching regressions 
Column (1) of Table 5.19 shows that the coefficient for SIZEt is significantly positive 
(0.231, z = 6.468) indicating that the probability of a firm reporting AI in the pre-
2001/02 period (1995-2000) irrespective of their behaviour post-2001/02 amendments 
(2002 – 30 December 2005), increases with the size of the firm. ROAt is significantly 
negative (-3.644, z = -5.376), thus the probability of a firm reporting AI pre-2001/02 
increases with how poorly the firm performs. CFOt is significantly positive (1.335, z = 
2.294) which suggests that the probability that a firm reports AI pre-2001/02 increases 
with its operating cash flow. LEVt is also significantly positive (1.059, z = 3.265), 
consistent with the probability that a firm reports AI pre-2001/02, increasing with its 
total debt or leverage ratio. LOSSt is also significantly positive (0.480, z = 2.339), thus 
the probability that a firm reports AI pre-2001/02 increases if that firm has made a loss. 
Finally, AUDITORt is insignificant and has no effect on the probability of a firm 
reporting AI pre-a2001/02. 
Column (2) shows that the probability that a firm reports AI in the post-IFRS period (31 
December 2005 – 2009) increases with the size of the firm (SIZEt: 0.507, z = 12.089), 
how poorly it performs (ROAt: -1.157, z = -2.390), with its leverage ratio (LEVt: 0.914, 
z = 2.846), and when the auditor is not a big N firm (AUDITORt = -0.498, z= -3.772).  
CFOt and LOSSt have no effect on the probability of a firm reporting AI post-IFRS.  
Column (3) reveals that the probability of a firm reporting DO post-IFRS increases with 
the size of the firm (SIZEt: 0.131, z = 3.509), with its leverage ratio (LEVt: 0.779, z = 
2.540), and when the auditor is not a big N firm (AUDITORt = -0.498, z = -3.772).  The 
154 
 
probability of a firm reporting DO also increases with how poor its operating cash flow 
is (CFOt: -1.051, z = -2.008). 
TABLE 5.19 
Results of Propensity Score Matched (PSM) Model for Samples  
Used in Tests of All Hypotheses 
Variables 
(1) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistics) 
(2) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistics) 
(3) 
Coefficient 
(z-statistics) 
Intercept -3.470*** 
(-5.491) 
-9.382*** 
(-12.797) 
-3.498*** 
(-5.328) 
SIZEt 0.231*** 
(6.468) 
0.507*** 
(12.089) 
0.131*** 
(3.509) 
ROAt -3.644*** 
(-5.376) 
-1.157** 
(-2.390) 
-0.572 
(-1.235) 
CFOt 1.335** 
(2.294) 
0.459 
(0.858) 
-1.051** 
(-2.008) 
LEVt 1.059*** 
(3.265) 
0.914*** 
(2.846) 
0.779** 
(2.540) 
LOSSt 0.480** 
(2.339) 
-0.016 
(-0.085) 
0.088 
(0.486) 
AUDITORt -0.080 
(-0.660) 
-0.498*** 
(-3.772) 
0.272** 
(2.082) 
Number of observations 2,269 1,550 1,612 
Pseudo R-square 9.09% 13.3% 5.24% 
This table reports the empirical results for the first stage regressions used to generate the propensity score matched 
(PSM) samples that are used in hypotheses testing. Column (1) reports the coefficients for the PSM model for sample 
used in H1a and H2a(i-iii) tests. There are 2,269 observations for this sample from 1995 – 30 December 2005. 
Column (2) reports the coefficients for the PSM model for sample used in H1b and H2b(i-iii) tests. The number of 
observations is 1,550 spanning 2002 to 2009. Column (3) reports the coefficients for the PSM model for sample used 
in H1c and H2c(i-iii) tests. There are 1,612 observations for the period 2002 – 2009. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All test results use a two-tailed z-test. Z-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.6 for the variables definitions.   
 
5.6.5.2 Balance of the PSM samples  
Table 5.20 reports the means and the differences in the means of the PSM samples 
based on the period in which the firms were matched initially. For H1a and H2a(i-iii), 
treatment and control firm-years are matched in the pre-2001/02 amendments period; 
for H1b and H2b(i-iii), and H1c and H2c(i-iii) they are matched in the post-IFRS 
period. 
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Panel A of Table 5.20 shows the properties for PSM samples used to test H1a and 
H2a(i-iii), based in the pre-2001/02 period. The mean SIZEt for control firms (Column 
(1)) is 17.751 whereas Column (2) shows that the mean size for treatment firms it is 
17.646. Thus both control and treatment firms are on average, large firms. The 
difference between the means across treatment and control firms is insignificant at the 
10% confidence level hence, on average, control and treatment firms in the pre-2001/02 
period have similar sizes. Mean ROAt for control firms is 0.037 and for treatment firms 
is 0.042, and the difference in means is insignificant (-0.005) at the 10% confidence 
level. Hence, treatment and control firms in the pre-2001/02 period are similar, which 
on average, have healthy operations. Mean CFOt is also similar across control firms 
(0.056) and treatment firms (0.055) with the difference (0.001) being insignificant at the 
10% confidence level. Thus treatment and control firms on average, have positive 
operating cash flows. Mean leverage (LEVt) is also similar across control (0.197) and 
treatment (0.193) firms. The difference between the means (0.003) is insignificant at the 
10% confidence level, thus the matched firms, on average, have similar debt ratios. The 
mean LOSSt is also not significantly different across control (0.182) and treatment firms 
(0.168) at the 10% confidence level. Finally, mean AUDITORt is similar across 
treatment (0.697) and control (0.712) firms, with the difference in means (-0.014) being 
insignificant at the 10% confidence level. Hence, treatment and control firms pre-
2001/02 have big N auditors, on average. Overall, the firms in the sample for H1a and 
H2a(i-iii) tests have similar characteristics. 
Panel B of Table 5.20 shows the properties for PSM samples used to test H1b and 
H2b(i-iii), based on matching in the post-IFRS period. Column (3), Panel B shows that 
the differences in the means of the characteristics across treatment and control firms are 
all insignificant at the 10% confidence level. Thus, on average, firms that report AI 
post-IFRS (treatment) and those that do not (control) have similar size, performance, 
operating cash flow, leverage ratio, losses and have big N auditors.  
Similarly, Panel C reports that the PSM samples used to test H1c and H2c(i-iii) show 
similar averages in all their characteristics. Column (3) shows that the differences in the 
means for each characteristic are insignificant. 
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TABLE 5.20 
PSM Comparison of Means During Period in  
Which Treatment Variable is Defined 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Samples of H1a and H2a(i-iii) 
Variables 
Control Firms 
Mean 
(1) 
Treatment Firms 
Mean 
(2) 
Difference in 
Means 
(3) = (1) – (2) 
SIZEt 17.751 17.646 0.105 
ROAt 0.037 0.042 -0.005 
CFOt 0.056 0.055 0.001 
LEVt 0.197 0.193 0.003 
LOSSt 0.182 0.168 0.014 
AUDITORt 0.697 0.712 -0.014 
Number of observations 489 489  
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Samples of H1b and H2b(i-iii) 
SIZEt 18.305 18.231 0.074 
ROAt -0.013 -0.025 0.012 
CFOt 0.041 0.038 0.003 
LEVt 0.214 0.215 -0.001 
LOSSt 0.332 0.362 -0.030 
AUDITORt 0.559 0.561 -0.002 
Number of observations 506 506  
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Samples of H1c and H2c(i-iii) 
SIZEt 18.578 18.606 -0.028 
ROAt -0.045 -0.034 -0.010 
CFOt 0.013 0.023 -0.010 
LEVt 0.235 0.235 0.000 
LOSSt 0.369 0.354 0.015 
AUDITORt 0.661 0.667 -0.006 
Number of observations 531 531  
 
This table reports the means and differences in means of the properties of the propensity score matching (PSM) 
samples to test the hypotheses based on the period in which the firms were matched initially. For samples for 
H1a and H2a(i-iii) tests, the matching was initially made in the pre-amendment period (1995-2000). For 
samples for H1b, H2b(i-iii), H1c and H2c(i-iii), the matching was initially made in the post-IFRS period (31 
December 2005 – 2009). Panel A reports the means and differences in means for the properties of PSM samples 
to test H1a and H2a(i-iii). Panel B reports the means differences for the properties of PSM samples to test H1b 
and H2b(i-iii). Panel C reports the means and differences in means for the properties of PSM samples to test 
H1c and H2c(i-iii). All differences in means are insignificantly different from zero at the 10% confidence level.   
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5.6.5.3 Comparison of the means over the entire test sample 
Table 5.21 reports the means and the differences in the means of the PSM samples used 
in hypotheses tests. Recall that the matching of firms was determined according to firm 
attributes in the period in which classification shifting was hypothesised to be strongest, 
but that the ‘matches’ are then maintained across the sample period used to test the 
relevant hypothesis. Panel A of Table 5.21 reports statistics about the sample used for 
H1a and H2a(i-iii) tests; and Panel B reports statistics about the sample used for H1b 
and H2b(i-iii). No statistics are necessary for sample used in tests of H1c and H2c(i-iii) 
because it is the same as in Panel C of Table 5.20. 
Panel A of Table 5.21 reports the means for the characteristics of the firms in PSM 
regressions based on the entire sample for tests of H1a and H2a(i-iii). Column (3) shows 
that the difference in means across treatment and control firms for SIZEt, ROAt, CFOt, 
LEVt, and LOSSt, are insignificant at the 10% confidence level, thus on average, these 
particular characteristics across these firms are similar. The mean AUDITORt for control 
firms is 0.677 and that for treatment firms is 0.728. The difference in means for 
AUDITORt across the sample (-0.051) is significant at the 10% confidence level, thus on 
average, treatment firms use big N firms more than control firms. 
Panel B of Table 5.21 reports the means for PSM samples for H1b and H2b(i-iii) tests. 
The mean ROAt, LEVt and AUDITORt for treatment and control firms are similar, with 
the differences in means (-0.015, -0.012 and -0.017, respectively) being insignificant at 
the 10% confidence level. Thus treatment and control firms have these similar 
characteristics. Mean SIZEt for control firms is 17.813, and that for treatment firms is 
18.262, with the difference in mean (-0.449) being significant at the 10% confidence 
level. This suggests that on average, treatment firms post-IFRS are significantly larger 
than control firms. Also, mean CFOt is 0.031 for control firms and 0.043 for treatment 
firms, with the difference in means (-0.012) being marginally significant at 10% 
confidence level. Therefore, the treatment and control firms in this sample have 
significantly different operating cash flow, with treatment firms reporting significantly 
larger operating cash flows than control firms. Finally, mean LOSSt is 0.376 for control 
firms and 0.342, and the difference between these means (0.034) is significant at 10% 
confidence. This suggests that control firms in this sample report significantly higher 
losses than treatment firms. 
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TABLE 5.21 
PSM Comparison of Means Over the Entire Testing Sample 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Samples of H1a and H2a(i-iii) 
 
Variables 
Control Firms 
Mean 
(1) 
Treatment Firms 
Mean 
(2) 
Difference in 
Means 
(3) = (1) – (2) 
SIZEt 17.961 17.997 -0.036 
ROAt 0.006 0.013 -0.007 
CFOt 0.050 0.056 -0.006 
LEVt 0.195 0.197 -0.002 
LOSSt 0.254 0.242 0.012 
AUDITORt 0.677 0.728 -0.051*** 
Number of observations 981 1,220  
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Samples of H1b and H2b(i-iii) 
SIZEt 17.813 18.262 -0.449*** 
ROAt -0.037 -0.022 -0.015 
CFOt 0.031 0.043 -0.012* 
LEVt 0.199 0.211 -0.012 
LOSSt 0.376 0.342 0.034* 
AUDITORt 0.592 0.609 -0.017 
Number of observations 1,175 1,120  
 
This table reports the means and differences in means of the properties of the propensity score matching (PSM) 
samples to test the hypotheses based on the entire testing sample. For samples for H1a and H2a(i-iii) tests, the 
matching was for the period 1995 - 30 December 2005. For samples for H1b and H2b(i-iii), the matching was 
for the period 2002 - 2009. The matching for H1c and H2c(i-iii) tests are the same as initial matching reported 
in Table 5.20. Panel A reports the means and differences in means for properties of PSM sample to test H1a and 
H2a(i-iii). Panel B reports the means and differences in means for properties of PSM sample to test H1b and 
H2b(i-iii). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively using two-tailed tests.     
 
5.6.6 Descriptive statistics for H2a(i-iii) tests 
Table 5.22 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables in the tests of H2a(i-
iii),  which examine the impact of the 2002 amendment to restrict classification shifting, 
on the use of accrual-based and real earnings management to increase core earnings. 
The sample includes firm-year observations from 1995 to 30 December 2005 (excluding 
2001). The tests for H2a(i-iii) are examined using PSM samples of treatment and 
control firms with similar characteristics, estimated using the same models as applied to 
generate the matched samples for tests of H1a (described in Section 5.6.5). Treatment  
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TABLE 5.22 
Descriptive Statistics for the Main Tests of H2a(i-iii) 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
SALESt (in millions) 322 36.2 1,330 9.635 158 
∆SALESt 0.245 0.118 0.510 -0.026 0.372 
CEt 0.031 0.103 0.437 0.028 0.217 
ΔCEt-1,t 0.060 0.003 0.381 -0.036 0.055 
UE_CEt 0.016 0.012 0.193 -0.054 0.105 
ABNORMAL ITEMSt 
(millions) 
-2.730 0.000 52.800 0.000 0.000 
%AI 1.74% 0.00% 4.71% 0.00% 0.00% 
DAt -0.010 -0.001 0.142 -0.067 0.061 
SLSMANt 0.011 0.025 0.148 -0.047 0.095 
DISXMANt 0.049 0.001 0.227 -0.110 0.026 
TREAT1t 0.509 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
POSTt 0.526 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
SIZEt 17.740 17.484 1.798 16.470 18.799 
ROAt -0.009 0.043 0.188 -0.036 0.088 
CFOt 0.036 0.060 0.147 -0.016 0.119 
LEVt 0.183 0.150 0.172 0.025 0.293 
LOSSt 0.293 0.000 0.455 0.000 1.000 
AUDITORt 0.644 1.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 
Number of Observations      2,468 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for variables used in the main tests of H2a(i-iii). The main sample 
comprises 2,468 observations spanning 1995 to 30 December 2005 (excluding 2001) of propensity score matched 
treatment and control firms with similar characteristics. Treatment firms are those that exist in both the pre- (1995-
2000) and post-2001/02 amendments (2002-30 December 2005) periods but report AI in the pre- period irrespective 
of post-2001/02 amendments behaviour. Control firms are those that do not report abnormal items pre-2001/02 
amendments regardless of their post-2001/02 amendments behaviour. Observations for the year 2001 are excluded 
because the AASB 1018 was amended again in 2002, following the 2001 amendment, thus, the 2001 amendment was 
only operative for one year, and provided no meaningful analysis. In addition, unmatched firm-years are excluded 
from the sample. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.8 for definitions of variables. 
 
and control firms are required to exist for some part of both the pre- and post-2001/02 
amendment periods. Treatment firms are those that report income-decreasing AI in the 
pre-2001/02 period regardless of their behaviour post-2001/02 amendments (i.e. 
TREAT1t = 1), and control firms are those that do not report AI in the pre-2001/02 
period regardless of their post-2001/02 behaviour (i.e. TREAT1t = 0). The full sample to 
test all three hypotheses comprises 2,468 firm-year observations. Because tests of 
H2a(i-iii) do not require lead data for unexpected change in core earnings, this sample is 
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larger than the equivalent PSM sample used to test H1a. The statistical balance of the 
PSM samples is similar to that used in testing H1a. 
The mean sales is $322 million, showing that sales are highly skewed. The mean core 
earnings (CEt) is 0.031, thus, on average, sample firms report positive core earnings. 
The mean unexpected core earnings is 0.016, thus firms in the period 1995-30 
December 2005 report abnormally positive core earnings. The mean AI is -$2.73 
million, whilst the mean income-decreasing AI as a percentage of sales (%AIt = AI * -1) 
is 1.74 percent, indicating that on average, firms report negative AI. This is consistent 
with the high unexpected core earnings reported. The standard deviation of DAt is 0.142 
which may suggest that the performance-adjusted modified-Jones model used in this 
study is able to reliably model the accruals in the data. Similarly, the standard 
deviations for SLAMANt and DISXMANt are 0.148 and 0.227, respectively, indicating 
that the Roychowdhury (2006) models of sales manipulation and discretionary 
expenditure manipulation are able to reliably model the sales generation process and 
discretionary expenditure in Australian data.   
5.6.7 Descriptive statistics for H2b(i-iii) tests 
I report the descriptive statistics for the main variables in the tests of H2b(i-iii) in Table 
5.23. The sample comprises 2,251 PSM firm-year observations of treatment and control 
firms for the period 2002 to 2009.  Treatment firms are those that report income-
decreasing AI in the post-IFRS period (31 December 2005-2009) regardless of their 
pre-IFRS (2002-30 December 2005) behaviour, while control firms are those that do not 
report AI in the post-IFRS period regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour. 
The mean sales is $414 million which is higher than for the sample in the tests of H2a(i-
iii). Hence, the firms in the period 2002 – 2009 report on average, higher sales than 
those in the period 1995 – 30 December 2005. However, the mean core earnings (CEt) 
in this period 2002 – 2009 is -0.023 which suggests that on average, firms report 
negative core earnings, which is considerably lower than for the sample of firms in the 
period 1995 – 30 December 2005 for H2a tests (0.031). The mean unexpected core 
earnings (UE_CEt) is on average, positive (0.013), but is lower than that for H2a(i-iii) 
tests (0.016). The positive UE_CEt indicates that firms in this sample (2002-2009) 
report abnormally positive unexpected core earnings. Moreover, the mean AI for the 
H2b(i-iii) test sample is -$5.97 million which is higher in magnitude than -$2.73 for the  
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TABLE 5.23 
Descriptive Statistics for the Main Tests of H2b(i-iii) 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
SALESt (millions) 414 55.50 2,490 13.70 204 
∆SALESt 0.247 0.110 0.546 -0.053 0.401 
CEt -0.023 0.093 0.520 -0.022 0.215 
ΔCEt-1,t 0.071 0.002 0.462 -0.056 0.072 
UE_CEt 0.013 0.019 0.227 -0.064 0.126 
ABNORMAL ITEMSt 
(millions) 
-5.970 0.000 274 0.000 0.000 
%AIt 1.90% 0.00% 4.98% 0.00% 0.00% 
DAt -0.032 -0.015 0.164 -0.097 0.050 
SLSMANt 0.001 0.022 0.161 -0.060 0.098 
DISXMANt 0.076 0.051 0.289 -0.221 0.078 
TREAT2t 0.497 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
IFRSt 0.450 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
SIZEt 18.041 17.917 1.698 16.857 19.089 
ROAt -0.030 0.036 0.217 -0.089 0.093 
CFOt 0.038 0.061 0.151 -0.021 0.129 
LEVt 0.202 0.180 0.183 0.025 0.321 
LOSSt 0.362 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.321 
AUDITORt 0.601 1.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 
Number of Observations      2,251 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for variables used in the main tests of H2b(i-iii). The main sample 
comprises 2,251 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2009 of propensity score matched treatment and control firms 
with similar characteristics. Treatment firms are those that exist in both the pre- (2002-30 December 2005) and post-
IFRS (31 December 2005-2009) periods but report abnormal items in the post-IFRS period irrespective of pre-IFRS 
behaviour. Control firms are those that do not report abnormal items post-IFRS regardless of their pre-IFRS 
behaviour. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.8 for definitions of variables. 
 
H2a(i-iii) test sample. Hence, firms in the H2b(i-iii) sample report larger income-
decreasing AI than those in the H2a(i-iii) sample. This is consistent with %AIt which is 
1.90% for H2b(i-iii) tests relative to 1.74% for H2a(i-iii) tests. The standard deviations 
of DAt (0.164), SLSMANt (0.161) and DISXMANt (0.289) suggest, once more that the 
standard models of accruals, sales and discretionary expenditure manipulation employed 
in this study can reliably model the accruals, sales generation and discretionary 
expenditure in the study data.   
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5.6.8 Descriptive statistics for H2c(i-iii) tests 
In Table 5.24, I report the descriptive statistics for variables in the main tests of H2c(i-
iii). The sample comprises 2,196 PSM firm-year observations of treatment and control 
firms for the period 2002 – 2009. Treatment firms are those that report DO in the post- 
IFRS period (31 December 2005-2009) regardless of their pre-IFRS (2002-30 
December 2005) behaviour, while control firms are those that do not report DO in post-
IFRS regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour. 
TABLE 5.24 
Descriptive Statistics for the Main Tests of H2c(i-iii) 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
SALESt (in millions) 925 85 3,830 1.98 421 
ΔSALESt 0.242 0.105 0.530 -0.046 0.373 
CEt -0.007 0.091 0.483 0.003 0.200 
ΔCEt-1,t 0.079 0.002 0.441 -0.036 0.064 
UE_CEt 0.014 0.017 0.214 -0.058 0.120 
%DOt 0.10% 0.00% 2.15% 0.00% 0.00% 
DAt -0.016 -0.003 0.157 -0.073 0.061 
SLSMANt -0.007 0.016 0.154 -0.067 0.082 
DISXMANt 0.081 0.058 0.291 -0.299 0.069 
TREAT_DOt 0.499 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
SIZEt 18.427 18.266 2.037 16.946 19.921 
ROAt -0.043 0.033 0.217 -0.099 0.079 
CFOt 0.023 0.055 0.151 -0.028 0.112 
LEVt 0.225 0.219 0.182 0.062 0.335 
LOSSt 0.368 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
AUDITORt 0.678 1.000 0.467 0.000 1.000 
Number of observations 2,196    
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for variables used in the main tests of H2c(i-iii). The main sample 
comprises 2,196 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2009 of propensity score matched treatment and control firms 
with similar characteristics. Treatment firms are those that exist in both the pre- (2002-30 December 2005) and post-
IFRS (31 December 2005-2009) periods but report discontinued operations in the post-IFRS period irrespective of 
pre-IFRS behaviour. Control firms are those that do not report discontinued operations post-IFRS regardless of their 
pre-IFRS behaviour. See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.9 for the definitions of variables. 
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Table 5.24 reveals that mean sales is $925 million, higher than for both H2a(i-iii) ($322 
million) and H2b(i-iii) ($414 million) samples. The mean core earnings (CEt) is -0.007 
which suggests that on average, firms in the sample for H2c(i-iii) tests report negative 
core earnings. Mean core earnings for this sample is lower than for H2a(i-iii) tests 
sample but higher than for H2b(i-iii) tests. The mean unexpected core earnings 
(UE_CEt) is on average, positive (0.014) and is also lower than that for the H2a(i-iii) 
tests sample but similar to that for H2b(i-iii) tests. The positive mean suggests that firms 
on average, report higher than expected core earnings. The mean for %DOt (DO * -1) is 
positive (0.10%), thus, on average, firms in this sample report negative DO.   
5.7 Chapter summary and conclusion 
This chapter described the data sources and procedures used to derive the samples used 
to analyse firms’ non-recurring items (i.e. AI and DO) reporting behaviour and in 
hypothesis tests, and reported and discussed the estimation and descriptive statistics for 
the various measures of earnings management central to my thesis. While Australian 
firms are typically smaller and less profitable than their US counterparts, the models of 
core earnings (both levels and changes) estimated are broadly consistent with those for 
US firms reported in McVay (2006).  Similarly, the estimation of DA using the 
performance-adjusted modified-Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005) generated average 
coefficients consistent with prior evidence. That is, accruals are positively correlated 
with the difference in change in revenues and change in receivables, negatively 
correlated with PPE and positively correlated with lag ROA.  The specifications of both 
models of real earnings management are also similar to prior research (e.g. 
Roychowdury). In the next chapter, I continue my descriptive analysis, presenting a 
detailed analysis of firms’ behaviour regarding the incidence and nature of non-
recurring items (AI and DO) disclosures. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF FIRMS’ NON-RECURRING 
ITEMS REPORTING CHOICES 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides preliminary descriptive analyses of firms’ reporting of non-
recurring items (abnormal items (AI) and items relating to discontinued operations 
(DO)) in their financial reports across the three periods: the pre-2001/02 amendments 
(1995-2000), pre–IFRS (2002-30 December 2005) and post-IFRS (31 December 2005-
2009) periods.106 Specifically, it analyses: the number, and frequency of firm-years that 
report non-recurring items (AI and DO); precisely where these firms report non-
recurring items in their financial reports; and the specific types of non-recurring items 
that are reported. The data discussed in this chapter represents firm’s reporting 
behaviour whose existence is first identified by reference to the Morningstar data and is 
then checked against the firm’s financial report to determine the nature of the item(s) 
and the mode of reporting that item(s). This data is then used for the main regression 
analysis to test the hypotheses because it is not practical to use the firms’ presentation of 
non-recurring items in the Australian setting due to the restricted number of ‘events per 
variable’ and the mechanistic effects of the regulatory reforms on some reporting 
choices.  
One of the two central issues investigated in this thesis is whether regulatory reforms 
affecting the scope for opportunistic classification shifting impacted Australian firms’ 
actual classification shifting behaviour. In examining the impact of regulation on 
opportunistic classification shifting, I examine three regulatory changes. First, I 
examine whether the 2001/02 reforms to AASB 1018107 prohibiting the disclosure of 
106 In this chapter and all other chapters, when reference is made to non-recurring items (NI), it refers 
collectively to abnormal items (AI) and discontinued operations (DO). Thus, abnormal items are a subset 
of non-recurring items. 
107 Recall that although the 2001 reform removed reference to the term ‘abnormal items’ from AASB 
1018, it did not prohibit the reporting of AI or sub-totals of profit involving AI. The 2002 amendment 
introduced restrictions on the placement and prominence given to additional disclosures. Paragraph 4.2 
required that additional line items, sub-headings and sub-totals necessary for explaining the firm’s 
financial performance must be disclosed separately on the face of the income statement, so long as they 
were presented before and displayed less prominently than results from ordinary activities; net profit/loss; 
and net profit/loss attributable to members, and a sub-total of profit/loss may not be presented 
immediately before ‘material’ specific items. 
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profits before or after AI, decreased classification shifting using AI post- June 29 2002, 
relative to pre-2001/02 firm-years. Second, I examine whether AASB 101 (which 
superseded AASB 1018) following IFRS adoption (effective for financial years 
beginning 1 January 2005 and later), increased classification shifting in the post-IFRS 
period (31 December 2005–2009) relative to the pre-IFRS period (30 June 2002–30 
December 2005). The amended AASB 101 relaxed the restrictions on the reporting of 
additional line items, sub-totals and/or sub-headings necessary for understanding the 
financial reports by no longer requiring the reporting of these additional items before 
certain profit sub-totals (AASB 101 2004, para. 83, p.34). Finally, the adoption of IFRS 
also saw the introduction of AASB 5 which increased the scope for classifying items as 
DO on the face of the income statement, therefore increasing the scope for classification 
shifting via DO. Thus firms may have changed their reporting behaviour regarding non-
recurring items in accordance with these regulatory reforms.  
Prior to the 2001 and 2002 reforms, many firms reported a single aggregate amount of 
AI on the face of the profit and loss statement, with the details disclosed in the notes 
accompanying financial statements. The aggregate amount may either be positive or 
negative and may comprise a single item or several positive and negative specific AI. 
For example, in 1998 Blue Energy Limited reported an AI amount of $5,105,637 on the 
face of the income statement  comprising two specific items: gain on sale of investment 
= $5,383,137 and executive bonuses = -$277,500. In 1999, it reported an AI amount of -
$2,262,001 comprising a single item: provision for diminution in the value of 
investment. The 2001/02 reforms affecting the presentation and disclosure of AI and 
other non-recurring items in financial reports however, are likely to have changed the 
incentives for firms to disclose these items on the face of the income statement, because 
sub-totals of profit ‘before AI’ could no longer be presented. Conversely, the 2005 
reforms may have encouraged the reporting of non-recurring items on the face of the 
income statement, as these reforms once more allowed the reporting of profit sub-totals 
‘before AI’ (or similar).  
The precise manner in which firms report non-recurring items (hereafter NI) in the 
financial statements is a matter of interest because market participants price different 
earnings components separately. Generally, the closer (further) an income statement line 
item is to (from) sales, the more (less) permanent this item tends to be (Lipe 1986; 
Fairfield, Sweeny and Yohn 1996), and investors price each line item accordingly 
(Elliot and Hanna 1996; Francis et al. 1996; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Riedl and 
166 
 
Srivinisan 2010). Kinney and Trezevant (1997) show that managers wishing to 
highlight the transitory nature of expenses are more likely to show income-decreasing 
special items as line items on the income statement, whilst income-increasing special  
items are more likely to be reported in the notes to financial reports. Moreover, Riedl 
and Srinivasan (2010) reveal that managers tend to report less persistent special items as 
line items while more persistent items are presented in the footnotes. This evidence 
suggests that the categorisation of expenses into recurring and non-recurring items 
affects investors’ and other users’ analysis and valuation of firm performance. Thus, 
information on precisely where in the financial statements Australian firms tend to 
report non-recurring, and whether these practices change in relation to the reforms, is 
important.  
Information on the types of items most commonly involved in NI items and changes in 
these across time are also important to investors. However, specific items that are 
reported by firms as non-recurring, may in some cases differ from analysts’ judgement 
as recorded by Morningstar who provides a tracking service for the financial data of 
listed firms. For instance, a firm may identify a loss from asset sale as non-recurring but 
which analysts judge otherwise, or vice versa. Non-recurring items recorded in 
Morningstar are determined by the judgement of the individual analyst assigned (by 
Morningstar) to cover the firm, and this judgement is applied idiosyncratically.108 As 
such, the aggregate of NI reported by firms in their financial reports may in some cases 
differ from that recorded by Morningstar.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes the absolute and 
relative incidence of the reporting of non-recurring items across the sample. This 
includes a break-down of NI firm-years into firm-years reporting negative NI and those 
reporting positive NI. Section 6.3 documents the average amounts of NI reported each 
year while Section 6.4 describes time-series variation in the particular methods by 
which NI are identified within the financial reports. Section 6.5 identifies the specific 
types of NI reported by firms per regulation period and the frequency in which they are 
reported. Section 6.6 provides a chapter summary.  
 
108 Unlike the process used by I/B/E/S to determine a firm’s ‘continuing’ earnings, Morningstar records 
non-recurring items and core earnings of a firm as identified by the analyst following that firm.  
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6.2 Number, proportion and frequency of firm-years reporting non-
recurring items 
The sample described here is based on data extracted from the Morningstar database for 
financial years ending 1995 – 2009, comprising 9,707 firm-year observations. The 
sample is larger than that used in hypothesis testing, because the sample for hypothesis 
testing excludes firm-year observations without sufficient data to estimate all necessary 
variables (see Table 5.1 in Chapter Five). The descriptive analysis for this sample is 
reported in Table 6.1. 
Several points can be noted from Table 6.1. First, approximately 37.14% of the total 
firm-years within the total sample reported NI (Panel A, Column (5)). Second, Column 
(5) of Panel B shows that NI were more frequently reported in the pre-2001/02 period 
relative to pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods. The proportion of firm-years reporting NI 
relative to the total population in each period is 47.74% (pre-2001/02), 33.25% (pre-
IFRS) and 26.23% (post-IFRS). Third, reported aggregate NI are more often negative 
(i.e. income-decreasing) than positive (Panel A, Column (8)), consistent with prior 
evidence on Australian firm’s NI reporting behaviour (Houghton 1994; Cameron and 
Gallery 2008).109 An inspection of individual years in Column (8) shows that firms that 
report negative NI make up between 53.69% (2006) and 82.63% (2008) of total NI 
firms each year. Finally, Column (8) also shows a decreasing trend in the proportion of 
firm-years reporting negative NI from pre-2001/02 to pre-IFRS, before it rises again in 
post-IFRS.  Specifically, the proportion of negative NI firm-years declines from 78.72% 
in 2000 to 70.43% in 2002, dropping farther in the rest of pre-IFRS. It rose again in 
2007 (71.78%), the second year in the post-IFRS period, continuing in 2008 (82.63%) 
before declining in 2009 (70.79%). For the post-IFRS period, except for 46.31% in the 
initial IFRS adopt year, the proportions of firms reporting positive NI in all other post-
IFRS years were below 30%. These patterns are clearly evident in Figures 6.1(a) and 
6.1(b) which show the trends in the number of firm-years reporting NI and the 
proportions of firm-years reporting negative and positive NI relative to NI firms and 
total sample firms, respectively.  
These coarse observations suggest that the reporting of negative NI was a prevalent 
phenomenon in the pre-2001/02 period, which is not surprising as the recognition of 
109 Gu and Chen (2004) show a similar pattern for US firms in their sample which ranged from 1990 to 
2003.  
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TABLE 6.1 
Firm-Years Reporting Non-Recurring Items (NI) 
Panel A: Firm-Years Reporting Non-recurring Items 
Year 
 
Total 
Number 
of Firm-
Years in 
Sample 
(1) 
Number of 
Firm-Years 
Reporting 
NI 
(2) 
Number of 
Firm-Years 
Reporting 
Negative NI 
(3) 
Number of 
Firm-Years 
Reporting 
Positive NI 
(4) 
% NI Firm-
Years 
relative to 
Total 
Annual 
Sample 
(5) = (2)/(1) 
% Negative 
NI Firm-
Years 
Relative to 
Total Annual 
Sample 
(6) = (3)/(1) 
% Positive 
NI Firm-Years 
Relative to 
Total 
Annual 
Sample 
(7) = (4)/(1) 
% Negative NI 
Firm-Years 
relative to 
Total NI Firms 
(8) = (3)/(2) 
1995 532 271 190   81 50.94% 35.71% 15.23% 70.11% 
1996 595 308 218   90 51.76% 36.64% 15.13% 70.78% 
1997 659 331 240   91 50.23% 36.42% 13.81% 72.51% 
1998 707 347 254   93 49.08% 35.93% 13.15% 73.20% 
1999 734 340 240 100 46.32% 32.70% 13.62% 70.59% 
2000 738 296 233   63 40.11% 31.57%   8.54% 78.72% 
2002 721 301 212   89 41.75% 29.40% 12.34% 70.43% 
2003 721 249 159   90 34.54% 22.05% 12.48% 63.86% 
2004 744 230 133   97 30.91% 17.88% 13.04% 57.83% 
2005 707 182 113   69 25.74% 15.98% 9.76% 62.09% 
2006 687 149  80   69 21.69% 11.64% 10.04% 53.69% 
2007 733 163 117   46 22.24% 15.96%  6.28% 71.78% 
2008 736 236 195   41 32.07% 26.49%  5.57% 82.63% 
2009 693 202 143   59 29.15% 20.63%  8.51% 70.79% 
Total     9,707      3,605     2,527        1,078 37.14% 26.03% 11.11% 70.10% 
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TABLE 6.1 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Total Firm-Years per Regulation Period: 
 
(1995-2000)       3,965   1,893             1,375 518 47.74%     34.68%    13.06% 72.64% 
(2002-2005)       2,893      962    617 345 33.25%     21.33%    11.93% 64.14% 
(2006-2009)       2,849      750    535 215 26.33%     18.78%      7.55% 71.33% 
Total      9,707   3,605            2,527   1,078 37.14%     26.03%    11.11% 70.10% 
 
This table presents in Panel A the number and proportion of firm-years that report non-recurring items as identified by Morningstar based on the majority of analysts' judgement, Panel B 
presents the total and proportion of firm-years reporting non-recurring items per regulation period. The sample excludes foreign domicile firms; firms in the financial sector; firms with 
unconfirmed industries and domicile; those with no sales observations and those with sales < $500,000; and observations for the years 1994, 2001 and 2010. This leaves a sample 
comprising 9,707 firm-year observations, of which 3,605 report non-recurring items. The year 2005 excludes observations for periods ending 31 December 2005 which are included in the 
year 2006. 
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Fig 6.1(a) 
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Fig. 6.1(b) 
 
Fig. 6.1a shows the number of firms in a year which report non-recurring items, and the number of those firm-year non-recurring items that are negative or positive. Fig. 6.1b  
shows the proportions of firms in a year with negative or positive non-recurring items relative to the total number of firms reporting non-recurring items and relative to the total  
number of firms in the sample. Note: Both figures are based on 3,605 firm-years with non-recurring items (see Column (2) of Table 6.1). Observations for the years 1994, 2001  
and 2010 are omitted as these are omitted from the test samples. Observations with zero sales and sales below $500,000 are excluded from the sample as they do not contain  
sufficient information to determine variables for testing the hypotheses. Further exclusions from the sample include industry-years with less than 10 observations as this  
minimum number is required to run Fama-Macbeth regressions for the core earnings models to determine the variables for the main tests. 
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‘non-recurring items’ and sub-totals of profit before and after AI were allowed by the 
accounting standards in effect during this period. The reporting of negative NI became 
less prevalent after the 2002 reform. If one assumes that the reporting of negative NI is 
subject to greater opportunism than that of positive NI, the decline on negative NI in 
pre-IFRS may reflect the restrictions on reporting profit sub-totals before and after AI 
provided by the 2002 reform. The reversal of this trend post-IFRS (except in 2006)110 
might be due to the less restrictive regulation adopted in 2005 which might have 
encouraged firms to once again report negative NI separately on the income 
statement.111 Overall, the firms’ NI reporting behaviour appears to have been affected 
by the regulatory reforms. The next section provides further evidence of these trends. 
6.3 Absolute values of non-recurring items as a percentage of sales 
Table 6.2 reports the average absolute values of NI as a percentage of sales reported 
each year. These are expressed graphically in Fig. 6.2. Table 6.2, Column (4) shows that 
the average absolute value of NI as a percentage of sales overall has an upward trend in 
the pre-2001/02 amendments period, increasing steadly every year from 27.21% in 1995 
until it reaches a peak of 76.84% in 2000. The average then drops in the pre-IFRS 
period, falling from 76.84% in 2000 to 56.84% in 2002, continuing to fall until 2004 
(25.59%) before increasing again in 2005 (44.96%). It falls again in the first two years 
of the post-IFRS period before rising once more in 2008 (55.26%) and 2009 (55.04%).  
Columns (6) and (7) show that the average absolute values of negative NI as a 
percentage of sales, are much higher than the average absolute values of positive NI as a 
percentage of sales in the pre-2001/02 amendments period - between 32.38% and 
92.75% for negative NI and between 13.53% and 30.22% for positive NI. This is 
consistent with firms reporting much larger negative NI than positive NI on average, in 
the pre-2001/02 amendments period. The trend reverses in the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS 
periods whereby the average absolute values of positive NI as a percentage of sales are 
larger than the average absolute values of negative NI as a percentage of sales in all 
years except 2002. This is consistent with information on the average magnitude of non-
recurring itmes reported each year (not tabulated) showing that on average, firms report  
110 The decline in the proportion of firms reporting negative NI in 2006 could reflect a slow reaction by 
firms to the less restrictive reporting regime adopted for firms with period ending on or after 31 
December 2005. 
111 The increase could also have been triggered by the financial crisis during this period which either may 
have led to genuine asset write-downs by firms or may have forced firms to classify core expenses as 
non-recurring in order to show results that appeared unaffected by the crisis.  
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TABLE 6.2 
Average Absolute Value of Non-Recurring Items as a Percentage of Sales 
        
    
Average Median Average Average 
    
Absolute   Absolute   Absolute Value Absolute Value 
  
 Number of    Number of   Value of NI Value of NI of Negative NI of Positive NI 
 
 Number of    Negative NI    Positive NI  As a Percent As a Percent As a Percent As a Percent 
 
 NI Firms   Firms   Firms  of Sales of Sales of Sales of Sales 
Year  (1)   (2)   (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  
1995                 271                  190                   81                  27.21                    2.76                  33.00                  13.53  
1996                 308                  218                   90                  27.35                    3.76                  32.38                  14.18  
1997                 331                  240                   91                  34.93                    3.37                  41.54                  17.49  
1998                 347                  254                   93                  36.96                    3.86                  44.37                  16.78  
1999                 340                  240                 100                  47.59                    4.37                  54.83                  30.22  
2000                 296                  233                   63                  76.84                    6.48                  92.75                  21.26  
2002                 301                  212                   89                  56.89                    6.21                  56.69                  39.17  
2003                 249                  159                   90                  39.59                    3.73                  27.92                  61.65  
2004                 230                  133                   97                  25.59                    3.24                  23.40                  29.28  
2005                 182                  113                   69                  44.96                    2.78                  43.48                  47.52  
2006                 149                   80                   69                  35.86                    2.21                  12.89                  65.49  
2007                 163                  117                   46                  42.35                    2.64                  32.95                  68.32  
2008                 236                  195                   41                  55.26                    6.78                  52.41                  69.91  
2009                 202                  143                   59                  55.04                    6.95                  34.15                105.46  
This table presents the average absolute values of nonrecurring items reported as a percentage of sales. The sample excludes foreign domicile firms; financial 
sector firms (CRIF 16-20) which are subject to further reporting regulations; firms with sales less than $500,000; observations for 1994, 2001 and 2010; and firms 
whose domicile and industry could not be confirmed. This sample comprises 3,605 firm-years that report non-recurring items. The year 2005 excludes 
observations for firms with period ending 31 December 2005 which are included in the year 2006. 
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Fig. 6.2 
 
Fig. 6.2: Average absolute value of non-recurring items reported for the sample of 3,605 firm-years reporting non-recurring items.   
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larger negative NI than positive NI in the pre-2001/02 amendments period while they 
report larger positive NI than negative NI on average, in the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS 
periods. Moreover, in the post-IFRS period, the average percentages of non-recurring 
items to sales are large and increasing each year, which may reflect the effects of the 
global financial crisis (GFC) during which some firms may have decided to sell off 
large assets, resulting in larger positive average NI in these years relative to other years. 
6.4 Where and how non-recurring items are reported in financial reports 
This section describes the method by which firms report NI in the financial statements. 
Whether NIs are disclosed in the notes to accounts, or on the face of the income 
statement, and the position at which earnings components are reported on the profit and 
loss statement may be useful to investors. Evidence in the US has found that the 
proximity to sales of a line item on the profit and loss statement determines its 
permanent or temporary nature (e.g. Lipe 1986; Fairfield, Sweeny and Yohn 1996). 
There is also US evidence that managers tend to present negative special items as line 
items on the face of the income statement while positive special items are reported in 
the notes (e.g. Kinney and Trezevant 1997;). This section provides the first large sample 
descriptive evidence for Australian firms with respect to the method by which NIs are 
reported. 
I categorise firms’ reporting choices into four broad categories: (i) negative NI reported 
on the face of the income statement; (ii) negative NI reported in the notes to accounts; 
(iii) positive NI reported on the face of the income statement; and (iv), positive NI 
reported in the notes to accounts. Within these broad disclosure choices are sub-
categories reflecting changes to firms’ reporting behaviour following the 2002 reform 
and again after IFRS adoption in 2005. In particular, after the 2002 reform, firms started 
reporting NI in a variety of ways as follows: (a) listed as individual line items above 
operating profit; (b) listed as individual line items below operating profit; (c) shown as 
aggregate ‘abnormal’, ‘significant, ‘unusual’ or ‘non-recurring’ items above operating 
profit; (d) as aggregate ‘abnormal’, ‘significant, ‘unusual’ or ‘non-recurring’ items 
below operating profit; (e) listed under ‘significant, ‘unusual’ or ‘non-recurring’ items 
in the notes; or (f) listed under various notes to accounts. Sub-categories (a) to (d) make 
up the broad categories (i) and (ii) depending on whether they are negative or positive. 
Sub-categories (e) and (f) make up the broad categories (iii) and (iv) depending on the 
sign of the items. These reporting choices may suggest firms’ motivation behind 
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reporting NI, similar to US evidence that the classification of expenses into recurring 
and non-recurring items and where they are placed in the financial statements, affects 
investors’ and other users’ analysis and assessment of firm performance.  
Firms’ reporting choices under the four broad categories identified above are presented 
in Table 6.3 (distribution across time) and Table 6.4 (industry distribution). Figure 6.3 
presents graphically the proportions of negative and positive NI reported on the face of 
the income statement by industry (Column (7), Panels A and B of Table 6.4).  Table 6.3 
presents information on firms reporting NI on the face of the income statement and in 
the notes by regulation period. Two points of interest can be noted from Table 6.3. First, 
similar to US evidence (Kinney and Trezevant 1997; Riedl and Srivinisan 2010), firms 
predominantly reported negative NI on the face of the income statement relative to 
positive NI. Column (4) shows that 74.12% of all firm-years in the sample that reported 
NI on the face of the income statement had negative NI, with 25.88% having positive 
NI. In each regulatory period, there are more incidences of NI reported on the face of 
the income statement that are negative than those that are positive (see Column (4)).  
Second, there are variations across the regulatory periods in the proportion of NI (both 
negative and positive) that are reported on the face of the income statement relative to 
those disclosed in the notes. These likely reflect the impact of regulatory changes on 
firms’ NI reporting.  Columns (6) and (7) show that 95.85% (87.64%) of firm-years 
with negative (positive) NI in the pre-2001/02 amendments period reported them on the 
face of the income statement while only 4.15% (12.36%) reported them in the notes. 
The opposite occurred in the pre-IFRS period where the proportion of negative 
(positive) NI reported on the face of the income statement is 20.90% (14.49%) relative 
to 79.10% (85.51%) disclosed in the notes. The proportions of items reported on the 
face of the income statement compared to those in the notes are slightly more balanced 
in the post- IFRS period although there are still more NI disclosed in the notes than on 
the income statement (see Columns (6) and (7)).  
The change of behaviour in the pre-IFRS period suggests that the way Australian firms 
reported NI in this period may reflect the strict regulation that proscribed the reporting 
of profit sub-totals before and after AI.  The movement in proportion of reporting 
negative NI on the face of the income statement post-IFRS relative to pre-IFRS may be 
due to the 2005 change in regulation which relaxed the restrictions on reporting 
additional line items, sub-totals and sub-headings on the face of the income statement. 
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TABLE 6.3 
Where Firms Report Non-Recurring Items (NI) in the Financial Reports - By Regulation Period 
 
Reported  on 
Face of 
Income 
Statement 
(1) 
Reported in 
Notes to 
Accounts 
(2) 
Total NI 
Firm-
Years 
(3) 
% Relative 
to Total NI 
on Income 
Stmt (4) 
% Relative 
to Total NI 
in the Notes 
(5) 
 % Reported on 
Face of Income 
Statement  
(6) = (1)/(3) 
% Reported 
in the Notes 
to Accounts 
(7) = (2)/(3) 
Pre-2001/02 Amendments (1995 - 2000) 
Negative NI  1,318 57     1,375   74.38%   47.11% 95.85%   4.15% 
Positive NI     454 64  518   25.62%   52.89% 87.64% 12.36% 
Total Pre-2001/02  1,772 121     1,893 100.00% 100.00%         93.61%         6.39% 
 
Pre-IFRS (2002 – 30 December 2005) 
Negative NI   129 488 617  72.07%   63.32% 20.90% 79.10% 
Positive NI    50 295 345   27.93%   37.68% 14.49% 85.51% 
Total Pre-IFRS  179 783 962 100.00% 100.00%         18.61%      81.39% 
 
Post-IFRS (31 December 2005 - 2009) 
Negative NI 214 321 535  73.79%   69.78% 40.00% 60.00% 
Positive NI   76 139 215  26.21%   30.22% 35.35% 64.65% 
Total Post-IFRS 
 
Combined Totals 
         290              460       750    100.00%     100.00%         38.67%      61.33% 
       Negative NI       1,661 866    2,527   74.12%   63.49% 65.73% 34.27% 
Positive NI 580 498    1,078   25.88%   36.51% 53.80% 46.20% 
Total 
 
      2,241           1,364    3,605 100.00% 100.00%         62.16%      37.84% 
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TABLE 6.3 (continued) 
 
 
This table presents information about where in the financial statements firms report non-recurring items recorded by Morningstar. Firms may report non-recurring items either on the 
face of the income statement or in the notes to accounts. The information presented categorises items into negative and positive items and then into where they are presented per 
regulation period. Prior to the regulation reform in 2001/02 that prohibited the reporting of profits before and after abnormal items, firms mainly presented the aggregate non-recurring 
(abnormal) items on the face of the income statement with the details in the notes. After the reform, it was noted that firms used several ways and terms to present abnormal items in 
the financial statements which are as follows: as individual line items on the face of the income statement either above or below operating profit; as ‘abnormal’, ‘significant’, 'unusual' 
or 'non-regular' items on the face of the income statement either above or below operating profit; individual items listed under 'significant, 'unusual' or 'non regular' items only in the 
notes accompanying the financial report; and as general notes under no specific headings in the notes to financial report. Note that the year 2005 excludes observations for firms with 
period ending 31 December 2005 which are included in the year 2006. 
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Kinney and Trezevant (1997) find that US firms report negative NI more frequently on 
the face of the income statement than in the notes to signal their transitory nature. The 
same could be said about Australian firms’ reporting of NI. However, the movement in 
the proportions of where negative NIs are reported in the financial statement in relation 
to the changes in regulations, suggest that Australian firms’ reporting of NI might be 
motivated by opportunistic reasons. Not only is the reporting of negative NI more 
prevalent pre-2001/02 and post-IFRS than pre-IFRS, those negative NI are more 
frequently reported on the face of the income statement than in the notes, and more so 
than positive NI reported on the income statement, in both pre-2001/02 amendments 
and post-IFRS where the regulations are more relaxed, relative to pre-IFRS. Thus, 
similar to the information in the previous section, firms’ NI reporting practices may 
reflect the regulatory changes. 
Table 6.4 presents information by CRIF industry group on where firms disclose NI in 
the financial statements (information by year is presented in Appendix B). Panel A of 
Table 6.4 reports the number of firm-years per industry in the sample and the number 
and proportion of firm-years reporting non-recurring items (both negative and positive) 
per industry. Panel B presents the statistics for negative NI firm-years while Panel C 
presents those for positive NI. Panel A, Columns (1) and (3) show that Metals and 
Mining is the most represented industry in the sample, comprising 14.96% of the total 
sample, followed by Capital Goods with 11.05% of the sample. These two industries 
combined, make up 26% of the total sample firm-years. Although Metals & Mining has 
the highest population in the sample, Column (4) shows that it ranks fourth in the 
proportion of firm-years that report non-recurring items (46.12%) behind Food & 
Staples Retailing (55.10%), Utilities (48.76%) and Transportation (48.37%). Generally, 
37.14% (more than a third) of all firm-years in the sample report non-recurring items. 
Panel B Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6.4 reveal that two major industries (from the 
sample of 19 industries) comprise more than a third (31.19%) of the population of firm-
years relative to the total population that report negative NI on the face of the income 
statement. Metals & Mining comprises 20.29% (one fifth) of the firm-years that report 
negative NI on the face of the income statement, followed by Capital Goods with 
10.90% of negative NI reported on the face of the income statement. The rest of the 
industries each had less than 10% of negative NI reported on the face of the income 
statement.
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TABLE 6.4 
Where Firms Report Non-Recurring Items (NI) in the Financial Reports - By Industry 
Panel A: Total Number of Firms-Years per Industry in the Sample  
CRIF Industry Name 
Number of Firm-
Years per 
Industry 
(1) 
Number of Firm-
Years Reporting 
NI 
(2) 
% of Firm-Years 
per Industry 
(3) 
% NI Firm-Years to 
Total Firm-Years 
(4) 
Energy     761  249    7.84% 32.72% 
Materials     451  208    4.65% 46.12% 
Metals & Mining  1,452  646   14.96% 44.49% 
Capital Goods  1,073   381   11.05% 35.51% 
Commercial & Professional Services     671  207    6.91% 30.85% 
Transportation     215  104    2.21% 48.37% 
Automobiles & Components     155    65    1.60% 41.93% 
Consumer Durables & Apparels     248    78    2.55% 31.45% 
Consumer Services     489   191    5.04% 39.06% 
Media     569   246    5.86% 43.23% 
Retailing     451   131    4.65% 29.05% 
Food & Staples Retailing     196   108    2.02% 55.10% 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco     545   216    5.61% 39.63% 
Health Care Equipment & Services     487   164    5.02% 33.68% 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences     277     78    2.85% 28.16% 
Software & Services     844    229    8.69% 27.13% 
Technology Hardware & Equipment     351    114    3.62% 32.48% 
Telecommunication Services     271      92    2.79% 33.95% 
Utilities 
Total 
    201      98    2.07% 48.76% 
9,707 3,605 100.00% 37.14% 
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TABLE 6.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Negative Non-Recurring Items 
CRIF Industry Names 
  
Reported on  
Face of 
Income 
Statement 
(1) 
Percent 
per 
Industry 
 (2) 
Reported 
in the 
Notes to 
Accounts 
(3) 
Percent 
per 
Industry 
(4)  
Total  
Negative 
NI Firm-
Years 
(5) 
Percent 
per 
Industry 
(6)  
% NI on the 
Face of 
Income 
Statement 
(7) = (1)/(5) 
% NI in the 
Notes to   
Accounts 
(8) = (3)/(5) 
Energy  116 6.98%   34   3.93% 150   5.94%  77.33% 22.67% 
Materials    91 5.48%   63   7.27% 154   6.09%  59.09% 40.91% 
Metals & Mining 337 20.29%   98 11.32% 435 17.21%  77.47% 22.53% 
Capital Goods  181 10.90%   88 10.16% 269 10.65%  67.29% 32.71% 
Commercial & Prof. Services    71 4.27%   72   8.31% 143   5.66%  49.65% 50.35% 
Transportation    41 2.47%   22   2.54%   63   2.49%  65.08% 34.92% 
Automobiles & Components   27 1.63%   14   1.62%   41   1.62%  65.85% 34.15% 
Consumer D & Apparels   47 2.83%   20   2.31%   67   2.65%  70.15% 29.85% 
Consumer Services   83 5.00%   47   5.43%  130   5.14%  63.85% 36.15% 
Media  88 5.30%   86   9.93%  174   6.89%  50.57% 49.43% 
Retailing  64 3.85%   38   4.39%  102   4.04%  62.75% 37.25% 
Food & Staples  51 3.07%   25   2.89%   76   3.01%  67.11% 32.89% 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco  92 5.54%   54   6.24% 146   5.78%  63.01% 36.99% 
Health Care E & Services  72 4.33%   48   5.54% 120   4.75%  60.00% 40.00% 
Pharmaceuticals  43 2.59%   17   1.96%   60   2.37%  71.67% 28.33% 
Software & Services         114 6.86%   63   7.27%        177   7.00%  64.41% 35.59% 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment  53 3.19%   30   3.46%  83   3.28%  63.86% 36.14% 
Telecommunication   61 3.67%   13   1.50%  74   2.93%  82.43% 17.57% 
Utilities           29 1.75%   34   3.93%  63   2.49%  46.03% 53.97% 
Total      1,661  100.00%          866   100.00%     2,527 100.00%  65.73% 34.27% 
182 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.4 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Positive Non-Recurring Items 
     
% NI in the 
Notes to   
Accounts 
(8) = (3)/(5) 
CRIF Industry Names 
  
Reported on  
Face of 
Income 
Statement 
(1) 
Percent 
per 
Industry 
(2)  
Reported 
in the 
Notes to 
Accounts 
(3) 
Percent 
per 
Industry 
(4)  
Total 
Positive 
NI Firm-
Years 
(5) 
Percent 
per 
Industry 
(6)  
% NI on the 
Face of 
Income 
Statement 
(7) = (1)/(5) 
Energy   36  6.21% 63 12.65%  99  9.18% 36.36% 63.64% 
Materials   30  5.17% 24  4.82%  54  5.01% 55.56% 44.44% 
Metals & Mining 120 20.69% 91 18.27% 211 19.57% 56.87% 43.13% 
Capital Goods  60 10.34% 52 10.44% 112 10.39% 53.57% 46.43% 
Commercial & Prof. Services  24  4.14% 40  8.03%   64   5.94% 37.50% 62.50% 
Transportation  23  3.97% 18  3.61%   41   3.80% 56.10% 43.90% 
Automobiles & Components  12  2.07% 12  2.41%   24   2.23% 50.00% 50.00% 
Consumer D & Apparels    8  1.38%   3  0.60%   11   1.02% 72.73% 27.27% 
Consumer Services  41  7.07% 20  4.02%   61   5.66% 67.21% 32.79% 
Media  39  6.72% 33  6.63%  72   6.68% 54.17% 45.83% 
Retailing  16  2.76% 13  2.61%   29   2.69% 55.17% 44.83% 
Food & Staples  21  3.62% 11  2.21%   32   2.97% 65.63% 34.38% 
Beverage & Tobacco  41  7.07% 29  5.82%   70   6.49% 58.57% 41.43% 
Health Care E & Services  19  3.28% 25  5.02%   44   4.08% 43.18% 56.82% 
Pharmaceuticals   9  1.55%   9  1.81%   18   1.67% 50.00% 50.00% 
Software & Services  33  5.69% 19  3.82%   52   4.82% 63.46% 36.54% 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment  17  2.93% 14  2.81%   31   2.88% 54.84% 45.16% 
Telecommunication  11  1.90%   7  1.41%   18   1.67% 61.11% 38.89% 
Utilities  20  3.45% 15  3.01%   35   3.25% 57.14% 42.86% 
Total          580  100.00%         498   100.00%     1,078   100.00% 53.80% 46.20% 
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TABLE 6.4 (continued) 
This table presents industry-specific information about where in the financial statements firms report non-recurring items. Firms may report abnormal items either on the face of the 
income statement or in the notes to accounts. The information presented categorises items into negative and positive items and then into where they are presented.  Panel A reports the total 
number of firm-years per industry in the sample and the number and proportion of firm-years that report non-recurring items for the entire sample period (1995-2009). Panel B presents 
negative non-recurring items according to where in the financial reports they are disclosed. Panel C presents the positive non-recurring items based on where they are reported. Prior to the 
reform in 2002 that prohibited the reporting of profits before and after abnormal items, firms mainly presented the aggregate non-recurring items on the face of the income statement with 
the details in the notes. After the regulation, it was noted that firms used several terms to present non-recurring items in the financial statements which are as follows: as individual line 
items on the face of the income statement either above or below operating profit; as ‘abnormal’ ‘significant’, 'unusual' or 'non regular' items on the face of the income statement either 
above or below operating profit; individual items listed under 'significant, 'unusual' or 'non regular' items only in the notes accompanying the financial report; and as general notes under no 
specific headings in the notes to financial report.  
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Fig. 6.3 shows the frequency of firm-years reporting negative and positive non-recurring items on the face of the income statement per industry group.  
There are 19 industry groups after omitting the following industries: banks (CRIF code 16), diversified financials (CRIF 17), insurance (CRIF 18),  
real estate (CRIF 19) and real estate investment trusts (CRIF 20). The remaining industry groups are: 1: Energy; 2: Materials; 3: Metals & Mining;  
4: Capital Goods; 5: Commercial Services & Supplies; 6: Transportation; 7: Automobile & Components; 8: Consumer Durables & Apparel; 9:  
Consumer Services; 10: Media; 11: Retailing; 12: Food & Staples Retailing; 13: Food Beverage & Tobacco; 14 Health Care Equipment & Services;  
15: Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences; 21: Software & Services; 22: Technology Hardware & Equipment; 23: Telecommunication  
Services; 24: Utilities. 
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Panel B Columns (5) and (6) also show that the same two industries comprise almost a 
third (17.21% + 10.65% = 27.86%) of firm-years that report negative NI. The Metals & 
Mining industry group has the most number of firm-years reporting negative NI, 
comprising 17.21% of total negative NI firm-years in the sample period. This is 
followed by Capital Goods comprising 10.65% of total negative NI firm-years. The 
incidence of NI reporting in these industries is similar to the extent to which those 
industries are represented in the sample population as shown in Panel A.  
Panel C of Table 6.4 which reports the frequency of positive NI, and Fig. 6.3 reveal a 
similar pattern to that for negative NI. That is, Metals & Mining also leads the 
frequency of total firm-years that report positive NI on the face of the income statement 
(20.69%), followed again by Capital Goods with 10.34% of firm-years reporting 
positive NI on the face of the income statement. These two industry groups alone 
comprise approximately a third of total firm-years reporting positive NI on the face of 
the income statement (20.69% + 10.34% = 31.03%).  
Although the Metals & Mining industry group is the most represented in the sample, the 
proportion of NI reported on the face of the income statement versus those reported in 
the notes appear to be similar for most industries whereby firms report items (both 
negative and positive) more frequently on the face of the income statement than in the 
notes (Columns (7) and (8)). Thus, the more frequent reporting of both negative NI and 
positive NI on the face of the income statement compared to reporting in the notes is a 
phenomenon that occurs right across the industries (except Energy; Commercial & 
Professional Services and Health Care Equipment & Services. This can be seen from 
Table 6.4, Panel A Columns (7) and (8) where, except for two industries (Commercial 
& Professional Services and Utilities), the proportion of negative NI that is reported on 
the face of the income statement for all other industries is between 50% and 82%. In 
Panel B, the proportion of positive NI reported on the face of the income statement is 
between 50% and 73% except for two industries (Column (7)) (except for Energy and 
Health Care Equipment & Services which both have below 50%.  
Overall, the regulatory changes appear to have affected precisely how, and where firms 
report NI in the financial statements. In periods in which the reporting of NI is less 
restricted (i.e. pre-2001/02 amendment), firms report NI more frequently in general, and  
more frequently on the face of the income statement relative to the notes. Over the 
entire sample, firms report NI (both positive and negative) more frequently on the face 
of the income statement than in the notes, consistent with US evidence.  This trend of 
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firms reporting more NI on the face of the income statement than in the notes, 
particularly negative NI, is prevalent in the majority of industries in the sample. While 
this may reflect the desire of firms to provide useful information to investors about the 
transitory nature of NI, the movement in the proportions of where negative NI are 
reported in relation to the regulatory changes may suggest that firms’ NI reporting 
behaviour might be opportunistically motivated. 
6.5 Specific types of non-recurring items reported  
This section describes the types of revenue and expense items reported as NI. As 
discussed in Section 6.1, firms frequently report an aggregate amount of NI on the face 
of the income statement with the details of specific individual items in the notes. Some 
of the specific items reported by firms as non-recurring may be judged by analysts to be 
recurring (or vice versa). 
To ensure that the NI reported by firms are consistent with the aggregate amounts 
recorded by Morningstar, I perused the annual reports of firms and identified the 
individual items comprising all the aggregate NI amounts documented by this data 
provider. These are reported in Table 6.5 with the frequency for reporting each specific 
item across the three regulation periods shown in Fig. 6.4(a) and (b). 
Column (2) of Table 6.5 shows that approximately 65% of total specific NI reported 
comprises six types of financial statement item, four of which are negative while two 
are positive: write-offs (12.13%), write-downs and impairments (18.59%), provisions 
(8.99%), restructuring charges (9.44%), gain from disposal of business/investments 
(8.97%) and gain from disposal of other assets (6.55%). No other category has an 
incidence of greater than 5%. A review of the individual regulatory periods reveals 
some time-variation in the composition of NIs. Column (3) of Table 6.5 shows that the 
four most frequent NI in the pre-2001/02 period are the following negative items: write-
offs (17.42%), write-downs and impairments (14.72%), provisions (13.06%) and 
restructuring charges (10.16%).112 Together, they comprise 55% of the total NI reported  
112 Each category of specific NI consists of several sub-categories. For example, write-off include write-
off of goodwill, write-off of bad debts, write-off obsolete inventory, write-off property, plant & 
equipment, write-off investments, and write-off others. 
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TABLE 6.5 
Specific Non-recurring Items Reported in Financial Reports  
 
 
Total Sample   Pre-2001/02 Period   Pre-IFRS Period            Post-IFRS Period  
Type of Non-recurring Item 
 Number of   
 Items  
 Reported  
 % of 
Total NI  
 Number 
of   
 Items  
 Reported  
 % of 
Total NI 
 Number of   
 Items  
 Reported  
 % of 
Total NI 
 Number of   
 Items  
 Reported  
% of 
Total NI 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Negative Items 
        Write offs 1,207 12.13% 879   17.42% 244 10.21%   84   3.34% 
Write downs/impairments 1,850 18.59% 743   14.72% 454 19.00% 653  25.95% 
Provisions   895 8.99% 659   13.06% 175   7.32%   61    2.42% 
Loss from disposal of 
business/investments  323 3.25% 181     3.59%   75  3.14%   67    2.66% 
Loss from disposal of other  assets  289 2.90% 116    2.30%   96  4.02%   77    3.06% 
Loss from discontinued operations  234 2.35%     1    0.02%   3  0.13% 230    9.14% 
Loss from currency exchange  156 1.57%  78    1.55%   33  1.38%   45    1.79% 
Restructuring charges  940 9.44% 513    10.16% 221  9.25% 206    8.19% 
Acquisition and takeover expenses  233 2.34% 117    2.32%  49  2.05%  67    2.66% 
Capital raising costs  109 1.10%   87   1.72%   11  0.46%  11    0.44% 
Litigation charges and settlement 
costs  221 2.22% 122   2.42%   63  2.64%  36    1.43% 
Other professional/consultancy costs    81 0.81%   36   0.71%   21  0.88%  24    0.95% 
Amortisation   84 0.84%   40   0.79%   21  0.88%  23    0.91% 
Accounting change loss   28 0.28%   15   0.30%    8  0.33%    5    0.20% 
Tax adjustment loss   35 0.35%   23   0.46%    8  0.33%    4    0.16% 
Research and development costs   44 0.44%   23   0.46%  12  0.50%    9    0.36% 
Other negative non-recurring items 454 4.56%        227   4.50%        120  5.02%          107    4.25% 
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TABLE 6.5 (continued) 
Positive Items 
Increments in valuation of assets 111 1.12%   43   0.85%  24      1.00%  44     1.75% 
Reversal of write-downs, impairments 
and provisions 327 3.29% 197   3.90%  91      3.81%  39     1.55% 
Gain from disposal of 
business/investments 893 8.97% 446   8.84%        257    10.75% 190     7.55% 
Gain from disposal of other assets 652 6.55% 262   5.19%        234    9.79% 156     6.20% 
Gain from discontinued operations 234 2.35%     0   0.00%    0    0.00% 234     9.30% 
Gain from currency exchange 146 1.47%   56   1.11%  40    1.67%   50     1.99% 
Litigation & settlement gain   68 0.68%   33   0.65%  20    0.84%   15     0.60% 
Accounting change gain    6 0.06%     5   0.10%    0    0.00%     1     0.04% 
Tax adjustment gain    8 0.08%     2   0.04%    6    0.25%     0     0.00% 
Other non-recurring income 325 3.27% 143   2.83%        104    4.35%   78     3.10% 
Total Non-recurring Items      9,953 100.00%     5,047 100.00%     2,397 100.00%       2,516 100.00% 
         Total Negative Items     7,183   72.17%     3,860  76.48%     1,621  67.63%       1,709   67.93% 
Total Positive Items     2,770   27.83%     1,187  23.52%        776  32.37%          807    32.07% 
Total Non-recurring Items     9,953  100.00%     5,047 100.00%     2,397 100.00%       2,516 100.00% 
Percent per Regulation Period   
 
 50.71% 
 
  24.01% 
 
  25.28% 
  
This table presents the specific non-recurring items that firms report in their financial statements. Firms normally present on the face of their financial reports the aggregate amounts of 
non-recurring items that are often a combination of various negative and positive items.  Predominantly in the pre-2001/02 amendments period, the details of the specific items reported 
were usually in the notes to financial reports, although some companies itemise them on the face of the income statement. Following the 2001/02 regulatory reforms, firms reported 
abnormal items in a number of ways as follows:  as individual line items on the face of the income statement either above or below operating profit; as ‘abnormal’,  'significant, 
'unusual' or 'non regular' items on the face of the income statement either above or below operating profit; t; individual items listed under 'significant, 'unusual' or 'non regular' items 
only in the notes accompanying the financial report; and as general notes under no specific headings in the notes to financial report. Write-off include the write off of goodwill, bad 
debts, obsolete inventory, property plant and equipment, investments, other intangible assets, and other noncurrent assets. Write-down and impairments include the write down or 
impairment of goodwill, bad debts, obsolete inventory, property plant and equipment, investments, other intangible assets, receivables and other noncurrent assets. Losses from 
disposals include disposal of business/controlled entities, property plant and equipment, shares and other investments, intangible assets, discontinued operations. Gain on disposal of 
other assets includes disposal of property plant and equipment, other intangible assets, discontinued operations, and others. Other non-recurring income includes forgiveness of debts 
and other income not specified in the financial reports. 
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 Fig. 6.4 (a) 
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Fig. 6.4(a) shows the frequency of specific non-recurring items reported per regulation period: pre-2001/02 amendments; pre-IFRS and post-IFRS. 
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Fig. 6.4(b) 
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Fig. 6.4(b) shows the proportions of specific non-recurring items reported across the regulation periods: pre-2001/02 amendments; pre-IFRS and post-IFRS. 
. 
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in the pre-2001/02 period.113 The most frequent positive NI are gain from disposal of 
business/investments (8.84%) followed by gain from disposal of other assets (5.19%). 
In the pre-IFRS period (Column (6)), the most frequent NI remains the same as pre-
2001/02, however there are variations in the proportions of total NI that is represented 
by each item. For negative NI, write-downs (19.00%) are the most frequent item which 
were the second-most frequent item in the pre-2001/02 amendments period. The 
second-most reported item is write-offs which have dropped to 10.21% from 17.42% 
pre-2001/02. Next, restructuring charges comprise 9.25% of NI in pre-IFRS, down 
slightly from 10.16% in pre-2001/02. Write-downs and impairments round up the four 
most frequent items, dropping to 7.32% in pre-IFRS from 13.06% in pre-2001/02. For 
positive NI, gain from disposal of business/investments comprised 10.75% of total NI in 
pre-IFRS, increasing from 8.84% in pre-2001/02 and surpassing the proportions of NI 
that are restructuring charges and write-downs and impairments. Gain from disposal of 
other assets has also become a major composition of NI in this period, increasing to 
9.79% from 5.19% in pre-2001/02 amendments period. 
The most frequently reported NI post-IFRS are write-downs and impairments, 
comprising 25.95% of total NI. This is followed by loss from DO increasing 
significantly from 0.13% pre-IFRS to 9.14% post-IFRS. Gain from DO also increased 
significantly in post-IFRS (9.30%) from pre-IFRS (0%). The changes in frequency of 
reporting losses and gains from DO in the post-IFRS period reflects the introduction of 
AASB 5 in 2005 which increased the scope for reporting items as discontinued 
operations given the broader definition of DO which under AASB 5 also include assets 
‘held for sale’. Other frequently reported items this period include gain from disposal of 
business/investments (decreasing to 7.55% from 10.75% in pre-IFRS), and gain from 
disposal of other assets (down to 6.20% from 9.79% pre-IFRS). Write-offs and 
provisions comprise only 3.34% of NI, a significant reduction from the pre-2001/02 
period (17.42%) and pre-IFRS periods (10.21%). Provisions also reduced in frequency 
in post-IFRS (2.42%) relative to pre-2001/02 (13.06%) and pre-IFRS (7.32%).   
Although there are variations over time in the frequency of write-offs and write-downs, 
their sum is relatively similar across the regulation periods. Specifically write-offs and 
write-downs comprise 32.14% (17.42% + 14.72%) of NI in the pre-2001/02 period, 
113 Gu and Chen (2004) report that the specific NI reported by US firms from 1990-2003 were dominated 
by four categories: restructuring charges (22.13%), acquisition expense (13.59%), asset sale gain 
(10.90%) and realised investment gain (7.89%). 
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29.21% (10.21% + 19.00%) pre-IFRS and 29.29% (3.34% + 25.95%) post-IFRS (Table 
6.5, Columns (2), (4) and (6), respectively). Thus, the changes in frequency of these two 
individual items may be due to semantic differences in their names. The sum of the 
three gains from disposal items: disposal of business, other assets and DO, are relatively 
similar in frequency in pre- (10.75% + 9.79% + 0% =20.54%) and post-IFRS (7.55% + 
6.20% + 9.30% = 23.05%) (Table 6.5, Columns (6) and (8), respectively). A significant 
portion of this is due to the increase in gain from DO in post-IFRS, a result of the 
introduction of AASB 5 upon IFRS adoption which increased the scope for reporting 
DO items more frequently. There may also be some impact of the GFC on aggregate 
gains whereby firms may have disposed investments, assets and particularly DO in 
order to survive the GFC. Moreover, the sum of losses on disposals of business, other 
assets and DO significantly increased in frequency in post-IFRS from pre-IFRS. Similar 
to gains, this reflects the introduction of AASB 5 in 2005. In addition, the firms may 
have recognised actual disposal losses during the GFC, resulting in the reduction of 
provisions post-IFRS.  
Overall, this section reveals that, similar to US evidence (e.g. Gu and Chen 2004), the 
majority of NI reported by Australian firms throughout the entire sample period, are 
from only a small number of specific categories. These can be summed into three broad 
categories: write-offs and write-downs, losses from disposal, and gains from disposal. 
The frequency of write-offs and write-downs occurring is similar across the regulatory 
periods. The frequency of gains from disposals is also similar across the pre-and post-
IFRS periods whilst that for losses from disposals increases in every regulatory period. 
In the post-IFRS period, the impact of the introduction of AASB 5 and the GFC can be 
seen in both the losses and gains from disposals, particularly in the loss and gain from 
DO.  
6.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter provided descriptive analyses of Australian firms’ reporting behaviour 
regarding the classification and reporting of non-recurring items in financial reports 
across the three reform periods: pre-2001/02 (1995-2000), pre-IFRS (2002-30 
December 2005) and post-IFRS (31 December 2005-2009). The number and frequency 
of firm-years that report non-recurring items and the proportion of negative versus 
positive aggregate non-recurring items across three regulation periods were analysed to 
ascertain whether firms’ reporting behaviour vary with the reforms. The average 
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absolute value of non-recurring items as a percentage of sales for each period and how 
they change across the years; where and how non-recurring items are reported in 
financial reports; and specific items reported by firms were also analysed.  
Consistent with prior Australian evidence (e.g. Cameron and Gallery 2008), firms more 
often report negative non-recurring items. The frequency of reporting negative non-
recurring items across the three regulatory periods may reflect the regulations with firms 
reporting more negative non-recurring items in less restrictive periods (e.g. pre-2001/02 
amendments) than in more restrictive periods (e.g. pre-IFRS). The more frequent nature 
of negative non-recurring items is also reflected in average absolute value of of non-
recurring items which is larger for negative items relative to positive items in all years 
in the pre-2001/02 period. This trend is reversed in the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods 
whereby firms tend to have larger average absolute value of positive non-recurring 
items compared to negative non-recurring items.  
Where and how firms report non-recurring items in the financial reports may also have 
been influenced by the regulatory changes. Firms appear to have reported non-recurring 
items more on the face of the income statement in periods where there are less 
restrictions regarding non-recurring items’ reporting. This phenomenon is prevalent 
across the industries although two major industries comprise approximately a third of 
the items reported. Finally, similar to US evidence (e.g. Gu and Chen 2004) there are 
three broad items that firms frequently report as non-recurring: write-downs and write-
offs, losses from disposals, and gains from disposals. The frequency of the first broad 
group is similar across the three regulatory periods; the variation across the periods in 
the individual items’ reporting is due to semantic differences in their names than any 
other reason. While losses from disposals are similar across time, the loss from DO 
increases dramatically post-IFRS which reflects the impact of the introduction of AASB 
5 in 2005. The same observation is noted for gains from disposals. There is also a hint 
of GFC impact on firms’ reporting of losses and gains from disposals where firms may 
have recognised actual losses as a result of GFC and may have been forced to sell assets 
and investments to get through the GFC.    
Reporting non-recurring items could reflect the desire of management to signal their 
temporary nature, however, the patterns of reporting behaviour across the regulatory 
periods may suggest that non-recurring items are reported opportunistically to influence 
investors’ perceptions of firm performance. The empirical tests in the next chapter may 
provide more concrete evidence to support this preliminary analysis.     
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FOR TESTS OF THE IMPACT 
OF REGULATION ON CLASSIFICATION SHIFTING 
BEHAVIOUR 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates two central issues: whether regulatory reforms affecting the 
scope for opportunistic classification shifting impacted actual classification shifting 
behaviour, and whether these reforms affected firms’ use of alternative earnings 
management methods such as discretionary accruals and real transactions. This chapter 
reports and discusses the findings of tests derived from the first research issue - the 
impact of regulation on classification shifting behaviour using abnormal items (H1a and 
H1b) and discontinued operations (H1c). H1a predicts that the 2001/02 amendments to 
AASB 1018, proscribing the disclosure of profits ‘before or after abnormal items’ 
decreased classification shifting using abnormal items (AI). The amendment to 
AASB101 (upon IFRS adoption in 2005) for firms with financial period ending on or 
after 1 January 2005, relaxed the restrictions on the reporting of non-recurring items by 
removing prohibitions on the placement and the prominence given to additional line 
items, and firms were required to disclose the nature and amount of material income or 
expense items separately on the income statement (AASB 101 para. 97). These 
amendments may have encouraged firms to report additional line items 
opportunistically on the income statement. Thus, H1b predicts that firms engaged in 
significantly greater classification shifting using AI in the post-IFRS period (31 
December 2005 – 2009) relative to the pre-IFRS period (2002 – 30 December 2005). 
Finally, AASB 5 (also introduced with the adoption of IFRS) broadened the definition 
of discontinued operations (DO) by defining it as a component of an entity that has 
either been ‘disposed of’ or is classified as ‘held for sale’, and assets ‘held for sale’ 
were not part of the definition under AASB 1042. This broader definition increases the 
scope and propensity for firms to opportunistically manipulate core earnings through 
classification shifting. H1c therefore predicts that following the introduction of AASB 
5, firms engaged in significantly greater classification shifting using DO.   
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The balance of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 reports and analyses the 
findings for the main test of H1a, followed by the robustness test findings in Section 
7.3. Next, the findings for the main test of H1b are reported and analysed in Section 7.4, 
followed by the robustness test results in Section 7.5. Section 7.6 then presents and 
evaluates the results for the main test of H1c, followed by the robustness test results in 
Section 7.7. Finally, Section 7.8 provides a summary of the Chapter.  Tests of 
hypotheses concerning possible substitution between earnings management mechanisms 
are reported and analysed in the next chapter.  
7.2 Results for the main test of H1a 
H1a predicts that classification shifting using income-decreasing AI decreased as a 
result of the 2001/02 amendments to AASB 1018, which proscribed the disclosure of 
results ‘before and after abnormal items’ on the income statement. The main test of H1a 
comprises two regressions of the following general form:  
         UE_CEt  = α0 + α1%AIt + α2POSTt + α3%AIt*POSTt + Controls                         (3a)                                                        
    UE_∆CEt+1  = η0 + η1%AIt + η2POSTt + η3%AIt*POSTt + Controls           (3b)                                       
Where UE_CEt and UE_ΔCEt+1 are unexpected core earnings and unexpected change in 
core earnings generated by the modified McVay (2006) models (1) and (2) (see Chapter 
4). %AIt is income-decreasing AI as a percentage of sales. POSTt is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 for observations in the period 2002 to 30 December 2005 (the post-
2001/02 amendments period), and 0 otherwise. %AIt*POSTt is the interaction of %AIt 
and POSTt which measures whether there is greater (or lesser) classification shifting in 
the pre-IFRS period. Control variables are as defined in Chapter Four. 
The coefficient for the main effect (%AIt) captures the association between AI reported 
in the pre-2001/02 period and unexpected core earnings (unexpected change in core 
earnings). The coefficient for POSTt measures the average difference in the levels of 
each dependent variable in the post-2001/02 amendments period relative to pre-2001/02 
period, while the interaction (%AIt*POSTt) captures the incremental association 
between reported AI and unexpected core earnings (unexpected change in core 
earnings) for the post-2001/02 period.  H1a implies that a significant degree of 
classification shifting occurred in the pre-2001/02 amendments period. If this is the 
case, income-decreasing AI (%AIt) should be positively associated with unexpected core 
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earnings (UE_CEt) in the pre-2001/02 period (1995 – 2000) regressions based on 
Equation (3a). Any such positive association is, however, not a sufficient condition to 
suggest that firms engage in classification shifting in the pre-2001/02 period to improve 
core earnings. To ascertain that the unexpectedly high core earnings is due to 
opportunistic classification shifting rather than an economic improvement associated 
with AI (e.g. through restructuring), I expect this improvement in core earnings (i.e. 
positive association between UE_CEt and %AIt) to reverse in the subsequent period. 
Thus, evidence of opportunistic classification shifting requires both a significant 
positive association between UE_CEt and %AIt (Equation (3a)) and a significant 
negative association between %AIt and UE_∆CEt+1 (Equation (3b)). To test the 
predicted reduction in classification shifting following the 2001/02 amendments, I focus 
on the interaction term %AIt*POSTt which measures the incremental association 
(relative to the pre-2001/02 period) between AI and unexpected core earnings and 
unexpected change in core earnings. I expect %AIt*POSTt to be negatively correlated 
with UE_CEt in Equation (3a) (‘levels’ regression) and positively correlated with 
UE_∆CEt+1 in Equation (3b) (‘changes’ regression).  
Table 7.1 summarises the regression results for tests of H1a (’levels’ and ‘changes’ 
regressions) using the main and alternative samples. The three samples employed are: 
(1) all Morningstar firms with available data to test H1a, (2) only firms that report 
income-decreasing AI in at least one  year within the sample period, and (3) a 
propensity score matched (PSM) sample comprising all firm-years from firms that 
reported income-decreasing AI in the pre-2001/02 period irrespective of their post-
2001/02 amendments behaviour (treatment firm-years), and similar firm-years from 
firms that did not report income-decreasing AI pre-2001/02 regardless of their post-
2001/02 amendments behaviour (control firm-years). The results are presented in the 
first, second, and third columns, respectively.  
All models are reasonably well fitted. The adjusted R2 statistics for Equation (3a) are 
similar across the three samples, ranging from 15.80 percent for Samples 1 and 2 to 
18.2 percent for Sample 3. These are more than twice the adjusted R2 of 7.0 (and 7.1) 
percent for US firms reported in Barua et al. (2010, Table 3), the study closest in nature 
to this thesis. These adjusted R2 statistics are also higher than that reported for East 
Asian firms in Haw et al. (2011, Table 9: 3.16%) who excluded accruals from the 
determination of UE_CEt (as has been done in this study), but had no control variables 
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in their model.114 For Equation (3b), the adjusted R2 for all three samples (ranging from 
0.50 percent to 1.30 percent) are similar to those of 0.75 and 0.82 percent reported in 
Barua et al. (2010), and 0.6 percent and 1.08 percent in Haw et al. (2011).  
The coefficients for control variables are consistent with predictions (and with prior 
studies) except for AUDITORt. For the sample comprising all firms (Sample 1), SIZEt is 
significantly negatively correlated with UE_CEt, suggesting that large firms are less 
likely to report unexpectedly high core earnings. LOSSt is also significantly negative, 
consistent with loss firms reporting negative core earnings. ROAt, CFOt, and LEVt are 
all significantly positively correlated with UE_CEt. That is, unexpectedly strong 
performers, firms with unexpectedly large cash from operations, and highly leveraged 
firms are significantly more likely to report unexpectedly high core earnings. 
AUDITORt is insignificant, suggesting no impact of the quality of the auditor on firms’ 
core earnings. The results for alternative samples (Columns (2) and (3)) are 
substantively similar to these.    
I first discuss whether there is evidence of classification shifting in the pre-2001/02 
period (as implied in H1a), and then the findings for the test of H1a. Panel A of Table 
7.1 reports results for the ‘levels’ models, while results for the ‘changes’ models are 
reported in Panel B. Column (1) of  Panel A reports that %AIt is positively associated 
with UE_CEt in the pre-2001/02 period as predicted (α1 = 0.552, t = 8.055). Further, 
Column (1) of Panel B shows that, as predicted, %AIt is negatively associated with 
UE_∆CEt+1 (η1 = -0.172, t = -2.436). Thus, the positive association between %AIt and 
core earnings in year t, reverses in year t+1, consistent with firms classification shifting 
to increase core earnings prior to the 2002 reform.  
The results for the alternative sample in Column (2) are substantively similar to those 
for the main sample. That is, %AIt is positively associated with UE_CEt in Equation 
(3a) while %AIt is negatively associated with UE_∆CEt+1 in Equation (3b). Hence, the 
results for the two samples are consistent with managers engaging in opportunistic 
114 McVay’s (2006, Table 6) main results using regressions that included accruals in the determination of 
UE_CEt and UE_ΔCEt+1  but  did not have control variables show very low  adjusted R2 of 0.03 percent 
for the sample of all Compustat firms and 0.04 percent for the sample of firms with income-decreasing 
special (abnormal) items. When she removed accruals from her models in determining UE_CEt and 
UE_ΔCEt+1   the coefficient of %SIt in Equation (3a) became significantly positive against prediction, and 
significantly negative against prediction in Equation (3b) (Table 6). However, McVay (2006) explained 
that when she added a control to the regressions (untabulated results), she found evidence consistent with 
classification shifting. To that end, she proposed that her model was weak as a result of inadequate 
control of performance. The results from Equations (3a) and (3b) in this study which include controls for 
firm characteristics and performance attest to this explanation (see Table 7.1 below).    
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classification shifting to improve core earnings in the period prior to the reforms. These 
findings verify the concerns raised about the opportunistic classification of AI 
(McCahey 1999; McLean 1999; Parker and Porter 2000), justifying the need to 
constrain this practice. 
In Column (3), I tabulate the results of regressions estimated on a PSM sample of 
treatment and control firms with similar inherent likelihood to report AI. I define 
treatment firms as those that operate in both the pre- and post-2001/02 amendments 
periods and report income-decreasing AI in at least one year in the pre-2001/02 period 
(1995–2000) regardless of their post-2001/02 amendments behaviour. Control firms are 
those that exist in both test periods but do not report income-decreasing AI in the pre-
2001/02 period, irrespective of their post-2001/02 amendments behaviour. The firms are 
matched using first stage logit models with the following variables: firm size (SIZEt); 
return on assets (ROAt); cash from operations (CFOt); leverage (LEVt); whether they 
make a net loss or otherwise (LOSSt); and the size of their external auditor (AUDITORt). 
Thus the PSM sample comprises all firm-years for firms that reported income-
decreasing AI in at least one year in the pre-2001/02 period (treatment firm-years), 
matched to firm-years drawn from firms with similar characteristics but which did not 
report income-decreasing AI during the pre-2001/02 period (control firms-years) and all 
post-2001/02 reforms observations of the firms matched by this process.115 
Column (3) of Table 7.1 Panel A reveals that %AIt is positively associated with 
UE_CEt, (α1 = 0.654, t = 4.018) in the pre-2001/02 reforms period, consistent with the 
main analysis. Further, Column (3) of Panel B, shows that %AIt is significantly 
negatively associated with UE_ΔCEt+1 (η1 = -0.399, t = -2.313), indicating that 
unexpected core earnings in year t reverse in t+1. Once more, the results are consistent 
with firms opportunistically classifying core expenses as AI to improve core earnings in 
the pre-2001/02 period. 
To examine whether classification shifting is reduced following the regulatory 
amendment in 2002, I focus on the coefficients for the interaction term %AIt*POSTt, in 
each regression. If opportunistic classification is reduced after the 2002 amendment, the 
following conditions must hold: %AIt*POSTt is significantly negatively correlated with 
UE_CEt; and %AIt*POSTt is significantly positively correlated with UE_∆CEt+1. 
Referring to Column (1) of Table 7.1 Panel A, %AIt*POSTt is insignificant (α3 = 0.091, 
115 Including only the firm-years in which abnormal items were recorded during the pre-reform period 
leads to similar results to those discussed here.  
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t = 0.977), suggesting that there is no significant reduction in the association between 
unexpected core earnings and AI in the post-2001/02 reforms period, relative to the pre-
2001/02 period. Further, the combined coefficient (i.e. the effect size) for AI in the post-
2001/02 reforms period, remains positive and significant (0.091 + 0.552 = 0.643, t = 
6.907), consistent with the continued use of opportunistic AI disclosures to influence 
core earnings in the post-2001/02 reforms period. However, if the pre-2001/02 level of 
TABLE 7.1 
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings and Future Unexpected Change in Core 
Earnings on Abnormal Items as a Percentage of Sales for the Period 1995 – 30 
December 2005 (excluding 2001) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = UE_CEt 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink Firms 
 (1) 
Firms with  
Income-
Decreasing 
Abnormal 
Items 
 (2) 
Propensity 
Score Matched 
Sample 
 (3) 
Intercept 
 
0.033 
(1.137) 
0.017 
(0.544) 
0.110*** 
(2.765) 
%AIt + 0.552*** 
(8.055) 
0.553*** 
(7.882) 
0.654*** 
(4.108) 
%AIt*POSTt - 0.091 
(0.977) 
0.095 
(1.003) 
0.168 
(0.924) 
POSTt 
 
0.020*** 
(3.483) 
0.019*** 
(3.233) 
0.016** 
(2.221) 
SIZEt 
 
-0.003* 
(-1.848) 
-0.002 
(-1.187) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.462) 
ROAt 
 
0.342*** 
(14.502) 
0.347*** 
(14.190) 
0.419*** 
(11.260) 
CFOt 
 
0.150*** 
(6.016) 
0.155*** 
(5.932) 
0.122*** 
(3.452) 
LEVt 
 
0.069*** 
(4.7026) 
0.064*** 
(4.076) 
0.072*** 
(3.533) 
LOSSt 
 
-0.018* 
(-2.093) 
-0.014 
(-1.556) 
-0.014 
(-1.161) 
AUDITORt 
 
0.004 
(0.749) 
0.002 
(0.273) 
0.010 
(1.526) 
Industry Dummies  included included included 
Number of observations 5,019 4,521 2,201 
Adjusted R2 15.80% 15.80% 18.2% 
F-stat 66.81 64.83 62.99 
p-value of F-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE 7.1 (continued) 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = UE_∆CEt+1 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms 
 (1) 
Firms with 
Income-
Decreasing 
Abnormal 
Items 
 (2) 
Propensity 
Score Matched 
Sample 
(3) 
Intercept 
 
-0.119*** 
(-3.972) 
-0.132*** 
(-4.145) 
-0.112*** 
(-2.601) 
%AIt - -0.172** 
(-2.436) 
-0.147** 
(-2.020) 
-0.399* 
(-2.313) 
%AIt*POSTt + 0.166* 
(1.733) 
0.171* 
(1.744) 
0.373* 
(1.888) 
POSTt 
 
-0.005 
(-0.847) 
-0.004 
(-0.595) 
-0.004 
(-0.504) 
SIZEt 
 
0.006*** 
(3.421) 
0.007*** 
(3.742) 
0.006*** 
(2.301) 
ROAt 
 
-0.025 
(-1.041) 
-0.017 
(-0.663) 
-0.137*** 
(-3.399) 
CFOt 
 
0.046* 
(1.764) 
0.035 
(1.280) 
0.126*** 
(3.285) 
LEVt 
 
0.038** 
(2.4489) 
0.028* 
(1.740) 
0.060*** 
(2.694) 
LOSSt 
 
0.018** 
(2.104) 
0.018* 
(1.954) 
0.004 
(0.288) 
AUDITORt 
 
0.007 
(1.148) 
0.004 
(0.556) 
-0.011 
(-1.252) 
Industry dummies  included included included 
Number of observations 5,019 4,521 2,201 
Adjusted R2 0.60% 0.50% 1.30% 
F-stat 0.006 0.083 0.056 
p-value of F-stat 0.941 0.774 0.813 
 
Panel A reports results for the model of unexpected core earnings whereas Panel B reports results for the model of unexpected 
change in core earnings. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All the test results use a two-tailed t-
test except %AIt and %AIt*POSTt which use one-tailed t-test. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. The F-test shows the test for the 
sum of all coefficients. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. The full sample comprises 5,084 firm-
year observations with available data for the period 1995 to 30 December 2005 excluding 2001 observations (Column (1)). There 
are 4,580 firm-year observations for firms that report income-decreasing abnormal items in any sample year (Column (2)), and 
2,231 firm-year observations for the propensity score matched sample of all firm-years from firms that reported income-decreasing 
abnormal items in the pre-2001/02 amendments period irrespective of their post-2001/02 amendments behaviour (treatment firm-
years) and similar firm-years from firms that did not report income-decreasing abnormal items pre-/2001/02regardless of their post-
2001/02 amendments behaviour (control firm-years). Observations for 2001 are excluded because the first reform to AASB 1018 
was operative only for the financial period ending 30 June 2001. AASB 1018 was again amended, operative for financial periods 
ending on or after 30 June 2002. Hence, the first amendment was only effective for one year and do not provide meaningful 
analysis. Unexpected core earnings in year t (UE_CEt) and the unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1 (UE_∆CEt+1) are the 
differences between reported and predicted core earnings and change in core earnings, respectively, where the predicted values are 
calculated using the coefficients from the following models, estimated by fiscal year and industry excluding firm i: 
       CEt = β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt                                                                 (1) 
  ∆CEt+1 = β0 +  β1CEt + β2∆CEt+1 + β3∆ATOt+1 + β4ΔSALESt+1 + β5NEG_ΔSALESt+1 +νt+1                 (2) 
See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2 for the definitions and measurements of each of the variables in equations (1) and (2) and other 
variables in the above results.  
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opportunistic classification shifting persisted after the 2001/02 amendments, the 
coefficient for %AIt*POSTt in the ‘changes’ regression should be non- positive (given 
that the main effect for %AIt is significantly negative). Column (1) of Panel B, reveals 
that %AIt*POSTt is marginally significantly positively associated with UE_∆CEt+1 (η3 = 
0.166, t= 1.733), indicating that the reversal is less strong in the post-2001/02 reforms 
period relative to pre-2001/02. Additionally, the combined coefficient (effect size) for 
AI in the post-2001/02 reforms period is insignificantly different from zero (0.166 – 
0.172 = -0.006, t = -0.063), indicating that there is no association between %AIt and the 
reversal of unexpected core earnings in t+1. Therefore, while AI continue to be 
associated with unexpected core earnings after the reforms, there is no reversal of those 
improved core earnings in subsequent years, and consequently there is no evidence of 
classification shifting in the post-2001/02 reforms period.  
Although the result shows no evidence of classification shifting post-2001/02 reforms, 
this does not provide formal support for H1a because the lack of evidence for 
classification shifting post-2001/02 does not necessarily mean a reduction in 
classification shifting in that period relative to the pre-2001/02 period, because while 
the necessary condition from the ‘changes’ model to show a reduction in classification 
shifting is met (i.e. positive coefficient for %AIt*POSTt) the condition from the ‘levels’ 
model is not satisfied. That is, there is no significant negative correlation between 
%AIt*POSTt and UE_CEt, suggesting that there is no reduction in the misclassification 
of abnormal items post-2001/02.116 However, although the results show no evidence in 
direct support of H1a, the absence of classification shifting post-2001/02 reforms 
nevertheless provides sufficient potential interest to examine the presence of alternative 
earnings management methods (H2a(i-iii)). 
The results for the alternative samples tabulated in Columns (2) and (3) are 
substantively similar to those for the main sample. The coefficient for %AIt*POSTt is 
insignificant in the ‘levels’ model, but is marginally significantly positive in the 
‘changes’ model. In both alternative samples the sum of the coefficients for the main 
effect and interaction terms in the ‘changes’ model is insignificantly different from zero 
(Column (2): 0.171 – 0.147 = 0.024, t = 0.245; Column (3): 0.373 – 0.399 = -0.026, t = -
0.132). 
116 Future replication of this study may include controls in the core earnings model (Model (2)) such as 
prior and current market returns to control for firm performance as in Fan et al. (2010), and by including 
more controls in Models (3a) and (3b) to control for other factors such as alternative earnings 
management.  
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On balance, the findings reported in Table 7.1 suggest that there is no opportunistic 
classification shifting following the 2002 regulatory amendment. It appears likely that 
firms report AI in the post-2001/02 amendments period to highlight their transitory 
nature rather than for opportunistic reasons, and that improvement in core earnings may 
have resulted from real economic improvements associated with AI such as 
restructuring.117 This provides partial evidence consistent with the amendment resulting 
in no opportunistic classification shifting and should placate the concerns raised about 
the regulatory change constraining firms’ ability to signal the transitory nature of AI 
(e.g. Cameron and Gallery 2008).118 Although the results for tests of H1a provides 
support only for the absence of classification shifting post-2001/02 reforms rather than a 
reduction in classification shifting relative to the previous period, there is sufficient 
potential interest to investigate the impact on alternative earnings management methods. 
Moreover, there is potential to further investigate the reduction of classification shifting 
in the post-2001/02 amendments period with more controls in the core earnings and test 
models. 
7.3 Results for sensitivity tests of H1a 
My main tests assume that the coefficients for control variables are constant across my 
sample period. In this section, I discuss the results of separate (untabulated) regressions 
estimated within each of the pre-2001/02 (1995-2000) and post-2001/02 reform periods 
(2002-30 December 2005), which allow for a different model specification in each 
period.119 For this purpose I use the PSM sample from the main tests. In the pre-2001/02 
period %AIt is significantly positively associated with unexpected core earnings in the 
‘levels’ model (α1 = 0.665, t = 4.269) and is significantly negatively associated with 
unexpected change in core earnings in the ‘changes’ model (η1 = -0.250, t = -1.396) at 
the 10% confidence level in a one-tailed test. This is consistent with the main analysis 
that firms engage in opportunistic classification prior to the 2002 reform. Also 
consistent with the main analysis, regressions for the period 2002 to 30 December 2005 
show that %AIt is positive and significant in the ‘levels’ model (α1 = 0.825, t = 7.210 ), 
but is insignificant in the ‘changes’ model (η1 = -0.089, t = -0.754) . Therefore, although 
117 Future replication of this study may split the variable of interest into two variables, %AI_Restrcuturing 
and %AI_Other and use them in Equations (3a) and (3b) to examine how much of the improvement in CE 
is due to restructuring charges.. 
118Alternatively, the absence of classification shifting could be a result of the ASIC review during this 
period and /or the introduction of CLERP 9 in 2004 which improved the financial reporting environment.  
119 See Appendix C for table of results. 
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abnormally high unexpected core earnings continue to be associated with %AIt in the 
post-2001/02 reforms period, this does not appear to be due to classification shifting as 
these unexpectedly high core earnings do not reverse in year t+1.  
7.4 Results for the main test of H1b 
H1b proposes that the less stringent requirements on the reporting of non-recurring 
(abnormal) items under AASB 101, effective for financial periods ending on or after 31 
December 2005, resulted in firms engaging in greater classification shifting using AI in 
the post-IFRS period. Thus, I expect firms to engage in a greater degree of classification 
shifting using AI in the post-IFRS period (31 December 2005 – 2009) relative to the 
pre-IFRS period (2002 – 30 December 2005). Once more, I test my predictions using 
the coefficients from regressions of unexpected core earnings and unexpected change in 
core earnings described below: 
      UE_CEt = ψ0 + ψ1%AIt + ψ2IFRSt + ψ3%AIt*IFRSt + Controls                                        (4a)                                               
UE_∆CEt+1 = κ0 + κ1%AIt + κ2IFRSt + κ3%AIt*IFRSt + Controls       (4b) 
Where IFRSt is an indicator variable that equals 1 for the period 31 December 2005 to 
2009 (the post-IFRS years), and 0 otherwise. %AIt*IFRSt is the interaction of %AIt and 
IFRSt which measures whether there is increased classification shifting in the post-IFRS 
period. All other variables are as previously defined. 
To support H1b, %AIt*IFRSt should be significantly positively associated with UE_CEt 
and/or significantly negatively associated with UE_∆CEt+1. Table 7.2 reports the 
findings for tests of H1b (Equations (4a) and (4b)), which employ three samples similar 
to those in H1a tests: all firms with sufficient data to estimate the regressions (Column 
(1)),  firms with income-decreasing AI in at least one year (Column (2)), and the PSM 
sample of all firm-years for firms that reported income-decreasing AI in at least one 
year in the post-IFRS period (treatment firm-years) matched to firm-years drawn from 
firms with similar characteristics but which did not report income-decreasing AI during 
the post-IFRS period (control firm-years).120 The adjusted R2 statistics for Equation (4a) 
range from 19.40 percent for Sample 2 and 20.10 percent for Sample 1, which are 
higher than those reported in Table 7.1 for Equation (3a), and those reported in Barua et 
120 Similar to sensitivity analyses for H1a, I match the firms for H1b sensitivity tests based on first stage 
logit models in which SIZEt, ROAt, CFOt, LEVt, LOSSt and AUDITORt are the predictors. 
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al. (2010) for US firms and Haw et al. (2011) for East Asian firms. The adjusted R2 
statistics for Equation (4b) (1.20 percent and 1.10 percent for Samples 1 and 2, 
respectively) are similar to those for Equation (3b) and those reported in Barua et al. 
(2010) and Haw et al. (2011).  
I first discuss the results for the association between %AIt and classification shifting 
behaviour prior to the 2005 amendment, and then the results for firms’ behaviour post-
IFRS, measured by the interaction term, %AIt*IFRSt. Column (1) of Table 7.2 Panel A, 
shows that %AIt is positively associated with UE_CEt (ψ1 = 0.804, t = 9.048). In 
contrast, Panel B reveals that %AIt is insignificantly different from zero (κ1 = -0.124, t = 
-1.388). Therefore, the high unexpected core earnings in t do not reverse in t+1. Hence, 
I find no evidence that firms engage in classification shifting in the pre-IFRS period. 
The results for the alternative samples in Columns (2) and (3) (both Panels A and B) are 
substantively similar to those for the sample of all firms. That is, while %AIt is 
significantly positively associated with UE_CEt (Panel A), %AIt is not negatively 
associated with UE_∆CEt+1 (Panel B). Thus, none of the regressions tabulated find 
evidence of classification shifting in the pre-IFRS period. Instead, firms may have 
continued to report AI on the face of the income statement to signal their transitory 
nature to investors, and that improvements in core earnings may be a result of real 
economic activities associated with non-recurring transactions. These findings 
complement those for tests of H1a which find no evidence of classification shifting in 
the 2002 to 30 December 2005 period. 
To directly examine H1b, I focus on the interaction term %AIt*IFRSt which measures 
the incremental association (relative to the pre-IFRS behaviour) between AI and 
unexpected core earnings and unexpected change in core earnings. I expect %AIt*IFRSt 
to be positively correlated with UE_CEt and %AIt*IFRSt to be negatively correlated 
with UE_∆CEt+1. For the sample of all firms, Column (1) of Table 7.2 Panel A reveals 
that contrary to my prediction, %AIt*IFRSt is  not significant (ψ3 = -0.024, t = -0.176), 
which suggests that there is no significant increase in the association between UE_CEt 
and %AIt in the post-IFRS period, relative to the pre-IFRS period. The combined 
coefficient for AI in the post-IFRS period, remains positive and significant (0.804 – 
0.024 = 0.78, t = 5.718), consistent with firms reporting abnormally positive unexpected 
core earnings in the post-IFRS period. However, Column (1) of Panel B, reveals that the 
significant combined coefficient in Panel A does not derive from classification shifting 
as both the coefficient for %AIt*IFRSt (κ3 = 0.021, t = 0.154) and the combined 
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coefficient for AI in the post-IFRS period 0.021 – 0.124 = -0.103, t = -0.755) remain 
insignificant. The results generated by the sample of firms that ever report AI (Column  
 
TABLE 7.2 
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings and Future Unexpected Change in Core 
Earnings on Abnormal Items as a Percentage of Sales for the Period 2002 - 2009 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = UE_CEt 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms 
 (1) 
Firms with 
Income-
Decreasing 
Abnormal 
Items 
 (2) 
Propensity 
Score Matched 
Sample  
 (3) 
Intercept  0.143*** 
(3.875) 
0.102*** 
(2.571) 
0.105* 
(1.921) 
%AIt ? 0.804*** 
(9.048) 
0.765*** 
(8.498) 
0.770*** 
(6.506) 
%AIt*IFRSt + -0.024 
(-0.176) 
-0.063 
(-0.466) 
-0.304* 
(-1.663) 
IFRSt  0.006 
(0.934) 
0.011 
(1.535) 
0.005 
(0.532) 
SIZEt  -0.007*** 
(-3.241) 
-0.005** 
(-2.116) 
-0.005 
(-1.663) 
ROAt  0.442*** 
(17.010) 
0.414*** 
(14.414) 
0.470*** 
(13.004) 
CFOt  0.028 
(1.002) 
0.081** 
(2.564) 
0.018 
(0.467) 
LEVt  0.041** 
(2.304) 
0.019 
(0.990) 
0.043* 
(1.814) 
LOSSt  -0.031*** 
(-2.974) 
-0.023** 
(-2.032) 
-0.011 
(-0.809) 
AUDITORt  0.004 
(0.501) 
0.003 
(0.406) 
0.001 
(0.138) 
Industry Dummies  Included Included Included 
Number of observations 4,457 3,616 2,295 
Adjusted R2 20.10% 19.40% 19.10% 
F-stat 50.79 40.59 9.650 
p-value of F-stat 0.000 0.000 0.002 
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TABLE 7.2 (continued) 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = UE_∆CEt+1 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms 
 (1) 
Non-zero 
Income-
Decreasing 
Abnormal 
Items 
 (2) 
Propensity 
Score Matched 
Sample  (3) 
Intercept  -0.074** 
(-1.989) 
-0.088** 
(-2.210) 
-0.107** 
(-1.977) 
%AIt ? -0.124 
(-1.388) 
-0.092 
(-1.017) 
-0.154 
(-1.305) 
%AIt*IFRSt - 0.021 
(0.154) 
-0.017 
(-0.124) 
-0.112 
(-0.618) 
IFRSt  -0.000 
(-0.063) 
0.002 
(0.258) 
-0.006 
(-0.690) 
SIZEt  0.003 
(1.214) 
0.003 
(1.436) 
0.005 
(1.535) 
ROAt  -0.133*** 
(-5.082) 
-0.098*** 
(-3.398) 
-0.093*** 
(-2.590) 
CFOt  0.172*** 
(6.049) 
0.155*** 
(4.892) 
0.127*** 
(3.251) 
LEVt  0.020 
(1.116) 
0.028 
(1.445) 
0.011 
(0.454) 
LOSSt  0.013 
(1.287) 
0.023** 
(2.040) 
0.042*** 
(3.132) 
AUDITORt  0.020*** 
(2.847) 
0.019** 
(2.416) 
0.009 
(1.010) 
Industry Dummies  Included included included 
Number of observations 4,457 3,616 2,295 
Adjusted R2 1.20% 1.00% 1.10% 
F-stat 0.877 0.965 3.175 
p-value of F-stat 0.349 0.326 0.075 
 
Panel A reports results for the model of unexpected core earnings whereas Panel B reports results for the model of 
unexpected change in core earnings. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All the test 
results use a two-tailed t-test except %AIt and %AIt*IFRSt which use one-tailed t-test. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. The full sample (Column (1)) 
comprises firm-year observations with available data for the period 2002 to 2009. There are firm-year observations 
for firms that report income-decreasing abnormal items (Column (2)), and firm-year observations for the propensity 
score matched sample of all firm-years from firms that reported income-decreasing abnormal items in at least one 
year in the post-IFRS period (31 December 2005-2009) irrespective of their pre-IFRS behaviour (treatment firm-
years) and similar firm-years from firms that did not report income-decreasing abnormal items post-IFRS (2002-30 
December 2005) regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour (control firm-years) (Column (3)). The sample period begins 
from 2002, the year in which the second amendment to AASB 1018 became operative for financial periods ending on 
or after 30 June 2002. The first amendment in 2001 was only operative for the financial period ending on or after 30 
June 2001, thus it was effective for only one financial period, and are therefore excluded from the study period. 
Unexpected core earnings in year t (UE_CEt) and the unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1 (UE_∆CEt+1) 
are the differences between reported and predicted core earnings and change in core earnings, respectively, where the 
predicted values are calculated using the coefficients from the following models, estimated by fiscal year and industry 
excluding firm i: CEt = β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt        (1);  
∆CEt+1 = β0 +  β1CEt + β2∆CEt+1 + β3∆ATOt+1 + β4ΔSALESt+1 + β5NEG_ΔSALESt+1 +νt+1     (2) 
See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2 for the definitions and measurements of each of the variables in equations (1) and (2) 
and other variables in the above results.  
207 
 
2) are substantively similar to results from Sample 1. That is, the combined coefficients 
for %AIt*IFRSt for Samples 2 in the ‘levels’ equation (Panel A of Table 7.2) are 
significantly positive (0.765 – 0.063 = 0.702, t = 5.192). 
Further, the combined coefficients for %AIt*IFRSt in the ‘changes’ equation (Panel B) 
are insignificantly different from zero (-0.092 – 0.017 = -0.109, t = -1.019). Hence, 
there is no subsequent reversal of the unexpectedly high core earnings in the post-IFRS 
period. Considered together, the results using the first two samples suggest that 
increased potential for classification shifting provided by the adoption of AASB 101 did 
not induce firms to misclassify core expenses as AI.121  
The results for the PSM sample (Column 3), however, are subtly different. Panel A, 
Column (3) shows that, against prediction %AIt*IFRSt for PSM treatment and control 
firms is significantly negatively associated with UE_CEt (ψ3 =-0.304, t = -1.663). 
However, consistent with the main analysis, the combined coefficient for AI post-IFRS 
remains positive and significant (0.770 – 0.304 = 0.466, t = 2.549), suggesting that AI 
remained positively associated with unexpected core earnings post-IFRS. In Panel B, 
while %AIt*IFRSt is insignificant (κ1 = -0.112, t = -0.618), the combined coefficient 
(effect size) for AI in the post-IFRS period, is significantly negative (-0.154 – 0.112 = -
0.266, t = -1.468), which suggests that in the post-IFRS period unexpected core earnings 
associated with AI in year t reverse in t+1. Thus, as the sum of the coefficients for %AIt 
and %AIt*IFRSt is significantly positive in the ‘levels’ model, and significantly negative 
in the ‘changes’ model, there is some evidence of opportunistic classification shifting in 
the post-IFRS period.122 While this does not represent formal support for H1b, it does 
demonstrate that although there is no evidence of classification shifting in the pre-IFRS 
period, there is some evidence of significant classification shifting occurring in the post-
IFRS period, providing sufficient potential interest to study the impact on alternative 
earnings management methods (H2b(i-iii)). 
Overall, the results for the first two samples provide no evidence to suggest that there is 
a significant change in classification shifting across the pre-IFRS or the post-IFRS 
period. Thus, H1b is not supported. However, the results for the PSM sample provides 
121 This could also reflect the regulatory review by ASIC post 2001 and the introduction of CLERP 9 in 
2004 which allegedly improved the financial reporting environment by strengthening auditor 
independence and ASIC’s monitoring role, therefore resulting in firms not exploiting the standard.   
122 Similar to H1a findings, caution must be exercised in interpreting these results since the necessary 
conditions for the existence of classification shifting are not satisfied. Future studies could examine 
specific abnormal items that are (not) amenable to classification shifting and are relating to future 
performance improvement to try and obtain more convincing results. 
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some evidence that firms opportunistically classify core expenses as abnormal 
following the introduction of less restrictive amendments for firms with period ending 
on or after 31 December 2015. Although this does not represent formal support for H1b, 
it shows that there is sufficient potential interest to examine the impact on alternative 
earnings management methods and to further investigate classification shifting in a 
post-IFRS period that extends beyond the period examined in this thesis (31 December 
2005-2009). 
7.5 Results for sensitivity tests of H1b 
Similar to H1a, my main tests for H1b assume that the coefficients for control variables 
are constant across my sample period. In this section, I discuss the results of separate 
(untabulated) regressions estimated within each of the pre-IFRS (2000 to 30 December 
2005) and post-IFRS periods (31 December 2005 to 2009), which allow for a different 
model specification in each period. In the pre-IFRS period, unexpectedly high core 
earnings reported in the current period (ψ1 = 0.638, t = 5.372) do not reverse in the 
subsequent period (κ1 = -0.066, t = -0.552), whereas the opposite occurs in the post-
IFRS period (ψ1 = 0.555, t = 3.389; κ1 = -0.309, t = -1.935) (See Appendix C for table 
of results). Consistent with the PSM sample results in Table 7.2, single-period tests 
show no evidence of classification shifting in the pre-IFRS period but produce evidence 
for its presence in the post-IFRS period. Thus, although the main tests find no direct 
support for the change in behaviour predicted under H1b, these sensitivity tests present 
evidence of the presence of classification shifting behaviour in the post-IFRS period, 
and the absence of this behaviour pre-IFRS.  
7.6 Results for the main test of H1c 
H1c examines whether the introduction of AASB 5 (effective for financial years ending 
on or after 31 December 2005) induced firms to engage in classification shifting using 
discontinued operations (DO). H1c predicts that the introduction of AASB 5 which 
increased the scope for firms to classify items as DO with the inclusion of assets ‘held 
for sale’ in the definition of DO, encouraged firms to engage in classification shifting 
using DO post-IFRS. To investigate this, I estimate equations of the following general 
form on post-IFRS data (31 December 2005-2009) only, because the very strict criteria 
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for recognising DO in the pre-IFRS period resulted in very few firms reporting DO on 
the face of the income statement in that period (3 cases):  
UE_CEt  = γ0 + γ1%DOt + Control                        (5a)                                                                                   
UE_∆CEt+1  = ω0 + ω1%DOt + ω2%DOt+1 + Controls             (5b) 
Where %DOt is the value of the net gains from DO (i.e. gains less expenses from DO) in 
year t multiplied by -1, and scaled by sales in year t. %DOt+1 is added to Equation (5b) 
to control for DO in year t+1. Other variables are as previously defined.  
Following Barua et al. (2010), I then re-estimate the above regressions replacing %DOt 
with a variable that measures the incidence of income-decreasing DO only 
(%DO_NEGt,) because a firm’s classification shifting behaviour could vary depending 
on the sign of DO. For example, managers might have more incentive or greater 
discretion to shift a greater amount of operating expenses when DO already represent 
net losses (Barua et al. 2010). I therefore estimate the following general Equations: 
UE_CEt  = π0 + π1%DO_NEGt + + CONTROLS        (6a)        
UE_∆CEt+1  = λ0 + λ1%DO_NEGt + λ2%DO_NEGt+1 + Controls    (6b)                                                                       
Where %DO_NEGt is DO multiplied by -1 scaled by sales, both in year t if reported 
aggregate DO are income-decreasing, and 0 otherwise.  All other variables are as 
defined previously.  
If the introduction of AASB 5 induced classification shifting using DO, %DOt 
(%DO_NEGt) should be positively associated with UE_CEt, and negatively associated 
with UE_∆CEt+1. The results for tests of H1c are reported in Table 7.3. The main 
sample used to test H1c (Columns 1 and 2) comprises all firm-years between 31 
December 2005 and 2009 with sufficient available data to estimate the regressions. I do 
not consider a sample of only firm-years reporting DO because the number of firm-
years with available data that report DO is very small (285). The findings for the 
regressions where the test variable is based on all DO are presented in Column (1) and 
those for the regressions measuring income-decreasing DO only (%DO_NEGt) are 
reported in Column (2).  Columns (3) and (4) report the results of regressions based on a 
PSM sample of treatment and control firms. Treatment firms are defined as firms that 
existed in both the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods and reported DO at any time within 
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the post-IFRS period. Control firms are those that existed in both periods but did not 
report DO post-IFRS.123 
The models are reasonably well fitted. The adjusted R2  statistics of between 19.10 
percent and 20.80 percent for the ‘levels’ regressions are higher than those reported in 
Barua et al. (2010) for US firms (7.0 percent and 7.1 percent, respectively). For the 
‘changes’ regressions, the adjusted R2 of between 2.10 percent and 2.60 percent are 
similar to those reported in Barua et al. (2010). 
I first discuss the results for %DOt, and %DO_NEGt for the main sample and then for 
the alternative PSM sample. In Column (1) of Panel A, the coefficient for %DOt is 
significantly positively associated with UE_CEt in the ‘levels’ model (γ1 = 0.364, t = 
3.835). In contrast, Panel B reveals that %DOt is insignificantly different from zero (ω1 
= -0.062, t = -0.674). Therefore, the high unexpected core earnings in t do not reverse in 
t+1. Similar to Column (1), Column (2) reveals that %DO_NEGt is also significant in 
the ‘levels’ model (π1 = 0.980, t = 4.556) but insignificant in the ‘changes’ model (λ1 = -
0.079, t = -0.374). Once more, the high unexpected core earnings in t do not reverse in 
t+1. Hence, my full sample tests find no evidence that firms engage in classification 
shifting using DO following the introduction of AASB 5.124 
The results for the alternative sample of PSM firms in Columns (3) and (4), however, 
are notably different. In Column (3) of Panel A, the coefficient for %DOt is positively 
associated with UE_CEt (γ1 = 0.616, t = 3.020), and in Panel B, %DOt is negatively 
associated with UE_∆CEt+1 (ω1 = -0.422, t = -2.101). Therefore, the high unexpected 
core earnings in t reverse in t+1, consistent with firms engaging in classification shifting 
using DO in the post-IFRS period.  The results for the regression that examines income-
decreasing DO only (%DO_NEGt,) in Column (4) are substantively similar to those in 
Column (3). That is, %DO_NEGt is significantly positively associated with UE_CEt (π1 
= 0.756, t = 3.045) while it is significantly negatively associated with UE_∆CEt+1 (λ1 = -
0.431, t = -1.761). Therefore, the results for regressions estimated on PSM samples 
provide evidence that firms classify DO opportunistically to improve core earnings. 
Given that the PSM tests are arguably less subject to bias from observables, the fact that 
these tests find evidence of classification shifting provide sufficient interest to justify 
123 I require firms to exist in the pre-IFRS period to control for the inherent likelihood that firms will 
actually have discontinued operations on which to report. As in sensitivity tests for H1a and H1b, the 
firms are matched based on SIZEt, ROAt, CFOt, LEVt, LOSSt, and AUDITORt. The results are reported in 
Table 7.3 Columns (3) and (4), alongside the main test results. 
124 Again, this may reflect the improved financial reporting environment as a result of the ASIC review 
post 2001 and the introduction of CLERP 9 in 2004. 
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the study of the impact of AASB 5 on alternative earnings management methods 
(H2c(i-iii)). 
Overall, the results for the main sample of all Morningstar firms provide no evidence to 
suggest that firms opportunistically misclassify core expenses as DO to inflate core 
earnings following the introduction of AASB 5. However, the results for the PSM 
sample provides some evidence in support of H1c, that firms engage in classification 
shifting using DO to improve core earnings. That is, the increased scope for 
classification shifting provided by the introduction of AASB 5 encouraged firms to 
misclassify core expenses as DO.   
  
TABLE 7.3 
Regressions of Unexpected Core Earnings and Unexpected Change in Core 
Earnings on Discontinued Operations for the period 31 December 2005 - 2009 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = UE_CEt 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms 
 (1) 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms 
 (2) 
 
Propensity 
Score 
Matched 
Sample 
 (3) 
 
Propensity 
Score 
Matched 
Sample 
 (4) 
Intercept 
 
0.060* 
(1.082) 
0.066 
(1.207) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
-0.006 
(-0.078) 
%DOt + 0.364*** 
(3.835) 
 0.616*** 
(3.020) 
 
%DO_NEGt +  0.980*** 
(4.556) 
 0.756*** 
(3.045) 
SIZEt  -0.001 
(-1.174) 
-0.001 
(-0.342) 
0.002 
(0.564) 
0.003 
(0.600) 
ROAt  0.444*** 
(11.603) 
0.440*** 
(11.654) 
0.433*** 
(8.262) 
0.426*** 
(8.166) 
CFOt  -0.027 
(-0.645) 
-0.018 
(-0.430) 
-0.015 
(-0.235) 
-0.006 
(-0.101) 
LEVt  0.004 
(0.161) 
0.012 
(0.464) 
-0.021 
(-0.606) 
-0.018 
(-0.510) 
LOSSt  -0.038** 
(-2.501) 
-0.006 
(-0.556) 
-0.011 
(-0.542) 
-0.011 
(-0.548) 
AUDITORt  -0.005 
(-0.477) 
-0.006 
(-0.556) 
0.007 
(0.422) 
0.007 
(0.432) 
Number of observations 2,186 2,266 1,062 1,062 
Adjusted R2 20.70% 20.80% 19.10% 19.10% 
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TABLE 7.3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = UE_∆CEt+1 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms 
 (1) 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms  
(2) 
Propensity 
Score 
Matched 
Sample 
 (3) 
Propensity 
Score 
Matched 
Sample 
 (4) 
Intercept 
 
0.016 
(0.301) 
-0.002 
(-0.039) 
-0.088 
(-1.163) 
-0.084 
(-1.113) 
%DOt - -0.062 
(-0.674) 
 -0.422** 
(-2.101) 
 
%DOt+1 ? -0.060 
(-0.696) 
 -0.031 
(-0.160) 
 
%DO_NEGt -  -0.079 
(-0.374) 
 -0.431* 
(-1.761) 
%DO_NEGt+1 ?  -0.054 
(-0.565) 
 0.001 
(0.009) 
SIZEt 
 
-0.002 
(-0.547) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
0.004 
(0.870) 
0.004 
(0.864) 
ROAt 
 
-0.249*** 
(-6.656) 
-0.253*** 
(-6.850) 
-0.204** 
(-3.877) 
-0.198*** 
(-3.787) 
CFOt 
 
0.253*** 
(6.124) 
0.247*** 
(6.064) 
0.192*** 
(3.131) 
0. 185*** 
(3.023) 
LEVt 
 
-0.011 
(-0.414) 
-0.014 
(-0. 541) 
-0.039 
(-1.135) 
-0.041 
(-1.185) 
LOSSt 
 
-0.016 
(-1.089) 
-0.015 
(-1.039) 
0.024 
(1.161) 
0.023 
(1.120) 
AUDITORt 
 
0.021** 
(2.070) 
0.021** 
(2.062) 
0.018 
(1.160) 
0.017 
(1.126) 
Number of observations 2,186 2,266 1,062 1,062 
Adjusted R2 2.50% 2.60% 2.20% 2.10% 
 
Panel A reports results for the model of unexpected core earnings whereas Panel B reports results for the model of 
unexpected change in core earnings. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All the test 
results use a two-tailed t-test except for %DOt, %DO_NEGt, %DOt+1, and %DO_NEGt+1 which use a one-tailed t-test. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels except for %DOt,  
%DO_NEGt,  %DOt+1, and %DO_NEGt+1 which use winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. The samples consist of 
observations between 2006 and 2009 (post-IFRS). The samples in Columns (1) and (2) comprise 2,186 and 2,266 firm-
year observations, respectively, from firms with sufficient available data to estimate the regressions. The samples in 
Columns (3) and (4) comprise 1,062 firm-year observations based on a propensity score matching of treatment and 
control firms with similar characteristics, where treatment firms are those that report discontinued operations in the 
post-IFRS period and control firms are those that do not report discontinued operations . %DOt is discontinued 
operation multiplied by -1, scaled by sales, both in year t: (Discontinued operationst * -1)/Salest.. %DO_NEGt is 
discontinued operation multiplied by -1, scaled by sales, both in year t: (Discontinued operationst * -1)/Salest, if 
reported discontinued operations are income-decreasing, and 0 otherwise. Unexpected core earnings in year t 
(UE_CEt) and the unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1 (UE_∆CEt+1) are the differences between reported 
and predicted core earnings and change in core earnings, respectively, where the predicted values are calculated using 
the coefficients from the following models, estimated by fiscal year and industry excluding firm i:  
CEt = β0 + β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt                                                                                  (1)  
UE_ ∆CEt+1 = β0 + β1CEt + β2∆CEt+1 + β3∆ATOt+1 + β4ΔSALESt+1 + β5NEG_ΔSALESt+1 +νt+1              (2) 
All other variables are as defined in Chapter Four, Sections 4.3.2 to 4.3.4. 
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7.7 Results for sensitivity tests of H1c. 
Similar to the main tests, I estimate ‘levels’ and ‘changes’ regressions and add %AIt to 
both equations to control for the possibility that firms that reported DO 
opportunistically are likely to be the same firms that reported AI opportunistically. Thus 
adding %AIt to the models separates the effects of using DO from AI.  The results 
(reported in Appendix C) are discussed below. I first discuss the results for %DOt, and 
%DO_NEGt for the main sample and then for the alternative PSM sample. 
The results for the main sample are substantively similar to those reported for the main 
tests (Table 7.3). %DOt is significant in the ‘levels’ model (γ1 = 0.406, t = 4.327) 
however, it is insignificant in the ‘changes’ model (ω1 = -0.074, t = -0.800). Similarly, 
%DO_NEGt is also significant in the ‘levels’ model (π1 = 0.964, t = 4.481) but 
insignificant in the ‘changes’ model (λ1 = -0.064, t = -0.303). Therefore, the high 
unexpected core earnings in t do not reverse in t+1, giving no evidence of opportunistic 
classification shifting using DO. Interestingly, %AIt is significant in both the ‘levels’ 
(0.881, t = 7.442; 0.860, t = 7.278) and ‘changes’ (-0.242, t = -2.073; -0.238, t = -2.038) 
models indicating that firms are more likely to misclassify AI than DO in order to 
improve core earnings. 
Consistent with the PSM sample results in Table 7.3, the results for the same sample in 
sensitivity analysis, however, are subtly different from those for the main sample, 
showing that %DOt is significantly positive in the ‘levels’ model (γ1 = 0.658, t = 3.238) 
and is significantly negative in the ‘changes’ model (ω1 = -0.454, t = -2.268). The 
regression that investigates income-decreasing DO only, also provides substantively 
similar results where the unexpectedly high core earnings reported in the current period 
(π1 = 0.771, t = 3.119) reverse in the subsequent period (λ1 = -0.443, t = -1.818). Thus, 
the results for regressions estimated on PSM samples therefore provide evidence in 
support of H1c, that firms classify DO opportunistically to improve core earnings. It is 
also interesting that %AIt is significant in both the ‘levels’ (0.563, t = 3.596; 0.542, t = 
3.467) and ‘changes’ (-0.431, t = -2.811; -0.417, t = -2.715) regressions. This may 
indicate that firms in this sample classify both DO and AI opportunistically to boost 
earnings.  
On balance, whilst the main sample provides no support for H1c, the PSM sample does 
support the hypothesis.  
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7.8 Other robustness tests applied to all hypotheses 
I estimated additional tests applicable to all hypotheses, which I describe below. 
The adoption of AASB 101 and AASB 5 were effective for periods ending on or after 
31 December 2005, and required the restatement of prior year earnings to IFRS 
equivalents. Hence, there was a one-year transition period that could have impacted 
firms’ reporting behaviour. Consequently, I re-estimated the interaction models used in 
the main tests for each hypothesis on data that excludes financial years ending between 
31 December 2004 and 30 December 2005 so that the POSTt (pre-IFRS) period is from 
2002 to 30 December 2004. This did not substantively affect my tabulated results for 
tests of any hypothesis. 
Next, I estimated expected core earnings and expected change in core earnings using 
models that incorporated total accruals, as per McVay (2006), and used the resulting 
measures of classification shifting in additional tests of each hypothesis. These tests 
generate similar results to my main tests. 
7.9 Summary, discussion of results and conclusion 
This chapter reported the findings for the tests of hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H1c. H1a 
examined whether classification shifting is reduced following the 2002 amendment that 
prohibited the separate reporting of results before and after AI. H1b examined the 
impact of AASB 101 (effective on or after 31 December 2005) which relaxed the 
restrictions on the reporting of additional line items on the face of the income statement, 
on firms’ classification shifting behaviour. H1c examined the classification shifting 
behaviour of firms following the introduction of AASB 5 in 2005 which increased the 
scope for classifying items as discontinued operations, increasing the scope for 
classification shifting.  
I tested H1a by estimating regressions of unexpected level of core earnings and 
unexpected change in core earnings on AI recognised in the pre- and post-2001/02 
amendment periods (%AIt and %AIt*POSTt, respectively) and control variables. I 
considered three samples in my main tests: (1) all Morningstar firms with sufficient 
available data to test H1a, (2) firms that reported income-decreasing AI, and (3) a 
propensity score matched sample comprising all firm-years from firms that reported 
income-decreasing AI in the pre-2001/02 amendments period irrespective of their post-
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2001/02 amendments behaviour (treatment firm-years), and similar firm-years from 
firms that did not report income-decreasing AI pre-2001/02 regardless of their post-
2001/02 amendments behaviour (control firm-years).  
 
TABLE 7.5 
Summary of Results For All Hypotheses Tests 
 H1a  
(Tests of 2002 
Reforms) 
H1b 
(Tests of AASB 
101) 
H1c 
(Tests of AASB 5) 
Supported by main 
sample tests 
No No No 
Supported by 
alternative sample 
tests 
No Yes Yes 
Supported by 
robustness tests 
No – using all 
samples 
Yes – using the 
alternative 
propensity score 
matched sample 
Yes – using the 
alternative 
propensity score 
matched sample 
Other remarks Other minor 
sensitivity tests 
corroborate the 
main test results. 
Other minor 
sensitivity tests 
support the 
alternative sample 
and robustness test 
results. 
Other minor 
sensitivity tests 
support the 
alternative sample 
and the robustness 
test results. 
 
H1a implied that there was a significant degree of classification shifting occurring in the 
pre-2001/02 amendments period.  Hence, the tests of H1a first established the extent of 
classification shifting in the pre-2001/02 period before examining the reduction in 
classification shifting in the post-2001/02 amendments period. In this regard, tests using 
the three samples produced findings that were substantively similar, each generating a 
significant positive association between %AIt and UE_CEt in the ‘levels’ model, and 
evidence of subsequent reversal in year t+1 in the ‘changes’ model. Thus there are 
strong grounds on which to conclude that opportunistic classification shifting was 
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prevalent in the pre-2001/02 period, consistent with general US evidence (e.g. McVay 
2006; Fan et al. 2010). These findings provided empirical evidence (not previously 
available) to verify the concerns raised about the opportunistic classification of AI (e.g. 
McCahey 1999; McLean 1999; Parker and Porter 2000). 
Tests of H1a focused on the interaction term %AIt*POSTt. To support H1a, the 
coefficient for %AIt*POSTt must be significantly negative in the ‘levels’ model, and 
significantly positive in the ‘changes’ model. The three samples produced substantively 
similar results. For the ‘levels’ model, %AIt*POSTt was insignificant, suggesting that 
there was no significant reduction in the association between unexpected core earnings 
and AI in the post-2001/02 amendments period, relative to the pre-2001/02 period. 
However, for the ‘changes’ model, %AIt*POSTt was marginally significantly positively 
associated with the unexpected change in core earnings, indicating that the reversal was 
less strong in the post-2001/02 amendments period relative to pre-2001/02. Importantly, 
the combined coefficient (effect size) for AI in the post-2001/02 reforms period 
remained positive and significant, indicating that improved core earnings in t did not 
reverse in t+1. Hence, there was no evidence of classification shifting in the post-
2001/02 reforms period.  
Sensitivity tests focused on a set of separate regressions estimated on the propensity 
score matched sample within each of the pre-2001/02 and post-2001/02 reform periods, 
allowing for a different model specification in each period. Results corroborate the main 
test findings that firms opportunistically reported AI in the pre-2001/02 period. For tests 
of H1a on whether classification shifting is reduced post-2001/02 amendments, the 
sensitivity tests produced substantively similar results to those of the main test. Other 
robustness tests (not tabulated) where regressions were run on data that excludes 
financial years ending between 31 December 2004 and 30 December 2005  and in 
which accruals were included in the models of core earnings (both ‘levels’ and 
‘changes’) produced substantively similar results. 
Considered together, these results are consistent with no classification shifting 
following the 2001/02 regulatory amendments. It appears likely that the continued 
reporting of AI after the 2002 reform was for the purpose of informing stakeholders 
about their temporary nature, rather than to opportunistically influence core earnings. 
Although the results do not provide evidence to support H1a of a reduction in 
classification shifting following the reforms, they however provide justification for the 
reform in that there is no evidence of classification shifting post-2001/02 which should 
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mitigate the concerns raised (e.g. Cameron and Gallery 2008) that this and similar 
future amendments could constrain firms’ ability to highlight the temporary nature of 
AI. I examined H1b by estimating unexpected ‘levels’ of core earnings and unexpected 
‘changes’ in core earnings on AI reported in the pre- (2002 – 30 December 2005) and 
post-IFRS (31 December 2005 – 2009) periods (%AIt  and %AIt*IFRSt, respectively) 
using three samples similar to those in H1a tests. The tests of H1b examined whether 
there is evidence of greater classification shifting in the post-IFRS period following the 
implementation of the less restrictive AASB 101 in 2005. This involved determining 
first the extent of classification shifting in the pre-IFRS period. All three samples 
produced substantively similar results, each showing a significantly positive coefficient 
for %AIt in the ‘levels model, but insignificant coefficient in the ‘changes’ model, 
suggesting no subsequent reversal of unexpectedly high core earnings in t+1. Thus there 
is no evidence of classification shifting in the pre-IFRS period. These findings 
complement results for tests of H1a which found no evidence of classification shifting 
in the 2002 to 30 December 2005 period.  
For the tests of H1b, I focused on the interaction term %AIt*IFRSt and expected its 
coefficient to be either significantly positive in the ‘levels’ model, or significantly 
negative in the ‘changes’ model. The first two samples produced substantively similar 
results. For the ‘levels’ model, %AIt*IFRSt was negative against prediction suggesting 
no significant increase in association between AI and unexpected core earnings. 
However, the combined coefficient for AI in the post-IFRS period was positive and 
significant for both samples, consistent with firms continuing to report AI 
opportunistically post-IFRS. Results from the ‘changes’ model revealed that 
unexpectedly high core earnings reported for the ‘levels’ models (for both samples) did 
not reverse post-IFRS as both the coefficient for %AIt*IFRSt and its combined 
coefficient in post-IFRS remained insignificant. Thus, the main tests provided no 
evidence of firms engaging in opportunistic classification shifting in the post-IFRS 
period hence, H1b was not supported. 125  On the other hand, the propensity score 
matched sample produced subtly different results. Against prediction, %AIt*IFRSt is 
significantly negatively associated with UE_CEt, however, consistent with the main 
sample, the combined coefficient for AI pre-IFRS remained positive and significant, 
suggesting that firms continued to report abnormally high unexpected core earnings 
125 Once more, the introduction of CLERP 9 in 2004 and positive effects of IFRS adoption could also 
have contributed to the absence of classification shifting during the post-IFRS period. 
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post-IFRS. Results from the ‘changes’ model shows that although %AIt*IFRSt is 
insignificant, the combined coefficient (effect size) for AI in post-IFRS is significantly 
negative. The results suggest that unexpected core earnings in t reverse in t+1, providing 
evidence in support of H1b that firms engage in classification shifting following the 
amendment to AASB 101.  
Sensitivity analysis, in which separate regressions were estimated within each of the 
pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods, produced substantively similar results to those for the 
three samples in the main test. Other robustness tests (not tabulated) in which accruals 
were included in the first stage models to determine unexpected core earnings and 
unexpected change in core earnings support these robustness interaction based model 
results.  
Overall, although the first two samples provided no evidence of the existence of 
classification shifting in the post-2001/02 reforms period, the propensity score matched 
sample (both in the main and in robustness tests) identified classification shifting using 
AI in that period. Although the results from the propensity score matched sample did 
not provide formal support for H1b, it revealed that there is sufficient interest in 
examining the impact on alternative earnings management methods.  
I examined H1c by estimating regressions of unexpected ‘level’ of core earnings and 
unexpected ‘change’ in core earnings on DO and control variables in the post-IFRS 
period (31 December 2005-2009) only because firms only started reporting DO 
prominently following the introduction of AASB 5. I also estimated the above 
regressions on variables that measure income-decreasing DO only (%DO_NEGt) to 
identify whether any classification shifting observed in the above regressions 
concentrates in income-decreasing DO. I considered two samples: all firm-years 
between 31 December 2005 and 2009 with sufficient available data to estimate the 
regressions (main sample), and a propensity score matched sample of treatment and 
control firms based on whether or not they report DO, and with similar characteristics. 
H1c examined whether firms engaged in classification shifting using DO following the 
introduction of AASB 5 for periods ending on or after 31 December 2005.  
Tests of H1c focused on %DOt and %DO_NEGt, both of which must be significantly 
positive in the ‘levels’ model or significantly negative in the ‘changes’ model to show 
evidence of classification shifting post-IFRS. The results showed that for the ‘levels 
model, %DOt and %DO_NEGt were positive and significant, whereas in the ‘changes’ 
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model, they were insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence that firms misclassify core 
expenses as DO in the post-IFRS period. The results for the alternative sample of 
propensity score matched firms, however, revealed that there was some evidence of 
opportunistic classification shifting using DO. Both %DOt and %DO_NEGt were 
significantly positive in the ‘levels’ models and were significantly negative in the 
‘changes’ models. Thus firms were motivated to exploit AASB 5 to boost earnings 
opportunistically.  
I provided sensitivity tests for H1c employing the two samples used in the main test. In 
the sensitivity tests I estimated the ‘levels’ and ‘changes’ regressions and added %AIt to 
both models as a control variable so as to separate the effects of classification shifting 
using DO from using AI. The sensitivity results provided substantially similar results to 
the main test. The sample of all Morningstar firms provided no evidence of 
classification shifting whereas the propensity score matched sample produced evidence 
that is consistent with classification shifting using DO. Thus, the alternative sample 
provided support for H1c. Also, the results revealed that %AIt was significantly positive 
in the ‘levels’ model and significantly negative in the ‘changes’ model, indicating that 
firms were more likely to misclassify AI opportunistically compared to DO. Similar 
results were also produced for regressions with a variable that measures the income-
decreasing DO only.  Other robustness tests in which accruals were included in the 
models of core earnings (both ‘levels’ and ‘changes’) produced substantively similar 
results. 
Overall, the empirical evidence clearly supports the implication of H1a that firms 
engaged in classification shifting pre-2001/02, and there is no evidence of classification 
shfiting following the 2001/02 amendments. Further examination of H1a using test 
models with more controls on performance and alternative earnings management is 
therefore warranted. There was no evidence from the main sample to suggest that the 
less restrictive AASB 101 introduced in 2005 on IFRS adoption, induced greater 
classification shifting post-IFRS, however, the propensity score matched sample found 
some evidence of the use of classification shifting post-IFRS. This calls for further 
investigation of H1b using an extended post-IFRS period.  Finally, the main sample for 
tests of H1c provides no evidence to suggest that the introduction of AASB 5 in 2005 
resulted in classification shifting using DO, however, once more the propensity score 
matched sample provides evidence in support of H1c. Further investigation of H1c 
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using an extended post-IFRS period and/or some other models is also called for to try 
and reconcile these results.  
Whether firms offset these effects of the amendments by using other earnings 
management methods such as accrual-based and real earnings management may provide 
a different assessment on the effectiveness of these amendments. In the next chapter, I 
examine whether the amendments resulted in firms using alternative earnings 
management methods to increase core earnings.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FOR TESTS OF SUBSTITUTION 
BETWEEN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT METHODS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports and discusses the findings of tests derived from one of the two 
central issues examined in this thesis: whether regulatory reforms affecting the scope for 
opportunistic classification shifting affected firms’ use of alternative earnings 
management methods such as discretionary accruals and real transactions. The issues 
examined in this chapter follow from those examined in Chapter Seven, which 
investigated whether the regulatory reforms affecting the scope for classification 
shifting impacted actual classification shifting behaviour in each of those reform 
periods.  
The findings for tests of H1a, which examined whether opportunistic classification 
shifting was reduced following the 2001/02 reforms, provided evidence that there was 
no classification shifting following the reforms. Although this does not provide formal 
support for H1a, it provides sufficient interest to examine the use of other earnings 
management. A question that arises from these findings is whether the restrictions on 
classification shifting imposed by the amendment to AASB 1018 in 2001/02 induced 
firms to use alternative earnings management methods such as discretionary accruals 
and real earnings management to improve core earnings. This conjecture leads to the 
first three hypotheses examined in this chapter. H2a(i-iii) predict that the 2001/02 
prohibition of the separate reporting of profit before and after abnormal items (AI) 
resulted in an increased use of discretionary accruals (H2a(i)),  and/or real earnings 
management via sales activities (H2a(ii)) and/or discretionary expenditure (H2a(iii)) to 
manage earnings upward.  
Chapter Seven also examined whether the  replacement of AASB 1018 with AASB 101 
(upon IFRS adoption in 2005), which effectively relaxed the restrictions on reporting 
additional material line items on the income statement, may have encouraged 
classification shifting (H1b). The results were inconsistent, whereby the main sample 
provided no evidence of classification shifting, and while the propensity score matched 
sample (both the main and sensitivity tests) found no significant change in behaviour, 
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there was evidence of a significant level of opportunistic classification shifting using AI 
following the 2005 amendment that did not previously exist. While these ‘levels’ 
findings for the propensity score matched (PSM) sample may not represent formal 
support for H1b, they provide sufficient potential interest to study the impact on 
alternative earnings management methods, thus leading to the next set of hypotheses. 
H2b(i-iii) predict that the use of discretionary accruals (H2b(i)), and/or sales activities 
manipulation (H2b(ii)), and/or the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure 
(H2b(iii)) to improve core earnings, decreases after the adoption of AASB 101 in 2005.  
Finally, Chapter Seven also examined whether the introduction of AASB 5 in 2005 
(also upon IFRS adoption), which increases the propensity of discontinued operations 
(DO) arising more often than under the previous standard (AASB 1042) due to the 
inclusion of assets ‘held for sale’ as a DO item, resulted in greater classification shifting 
via DO to improve core earnings (H1c) after the reform. The findings in the previous 
chapter were also mixed, although the main sample provided no evidence of 
opportunistic classification shifting, the PSM sample (both main and sensitivity tests) 
showed evidence of firms classification shifting using DO. Once more, the PSM sample 
results provided sufficient potential interest to examine the impact of AASB 5 on 
alternative earnings management methods. Therefore, H2c(i-iii) predicts that the use of 
discretionary accruals (H2c(i)) and/or sales activities (H2c(ii)) and/or discretionary 
expenditure (H2c(iii)) to improve core earnings, decreases after the 2005 reform.  
The balance of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 presents the main test 
findings for H2a(i-iii), followed by the sensitivity test results in Section 8.3. The main 
findings for tests of H2b(i-iii) are reported in Section 8.4, followed by the robustness 
test results in Section 8.5. Next, the main findings for H2c(i-iii) tests are reported in 
Section 8.6, followed by the robustness test findings applied to all hypotheses in Section 
8.7. Section 8.8 provides an explanation for results that are inconsistent with the 
hypotheses. Finally, Section 8.9 provides a chapter summary and conclusion.  
8.2 Results for main tests of H2a(i-iii) – substitution effects after the 2002 
reform 
H2a examines whether the 2001/02 amendments to AASB 1018 that restricted the scope 
for classification shifting induced an increased use of accrual-based earnings 
management (H2a(i) and/or real earnings management (H2a(ii) and H2a(iii)) to improve 
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core earnings. I examine these predictions by estimating regressions of unexpected core 
earnings on an indicator of opportunistic AI reporting behaviour in the pre-2001/02 
amendments period (TREAT1t), a post-2001/02 reforms indicator (POSTt), measures of 
alternative earnings management behaviour (DAt, SLSMANt, DISXMANt) and 
interactions thereof, using a PSM sample of treatment and control firms.126 The PSM 
samples are generated using the same first stage regression as used in tests of H1a. 
Treatment firms are firms that exist in some part of both the pre-2001/02 (1995-2000) 
and post-2001/02 amendments periods (2002-30 December 2005) and report negative 
AI at any time in the pre-2001/02 period irrespective of their post-2001/02 amendments 
behaviour, and control firms are those that do not report AI pre-2001/02 regardless of 
post-2001/02 amendments behaviour. Thus, I test whether treatment firms are more 
likely to manage accruals, sales activities and/or discretionary expenditure after the 
2001/02 amendments relative to i) their pre-2001/02 behaviour, and ii) the behaviour of 
control firms post-2001/02 amendments. The general form of the regression used to test 
H2a(i-iii) is described below: 
UE_CEt = φ0 + φ1TREAT1t + φ2DAt + φ3SLSMANt + φ4DISXMANt + φ5POSTt + 
     φ6TREAT1t*POSTt + φ7POSTt*DAt + φ8POSTt*SLSMANt + φ9POSTt*DISXMANt +  
     φ10TREAT1t*DAt + φ11TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt + φ12TREAT1t*SLSMANt + 
     φ13TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt + φ14TREAT1t*DISXMANt +  
     φ15TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt + CONTROLS + εt                      (11) 
Where (UE_CEt) is unexpected core earnings generated by the modified McVay models 
(1) and (2) (see Chapter 4).  TREAT1t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm 
operates in both the pre-2001/02 (1995-2000) and post-2001/02 (pre-IFRS: 2002-30 
December 2005) periods, and reports income-decreasing AI in the pre-2001/02 period, 
and 0 if a firm reports no income-decreasing AI in the pre-2001/02 period.  DAt is 
discretionary accruals in year t, calculated as the estimated residuals from Equation (8) 
(see Chapter Four). SLSMANt is the manipulation of sales to increase income, measured 
by the negative of residuals from Equation (9) (see Chapter Four). DISXMANt is the 
manipulation of discretionary expenditure to increase income, measured by the negative 
126 I do not estimate a model of unexpected change in core earnings for tests of H2a(i) through to H2c(iii) 
because the impact of earnings management via methods such as discretionary accruals is not expected to 
fully reverse in a single period and may take many years to reverse. This approach is consistent with Siu 
and Faff (2013).   
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of residuals from Equation (10) (Chapter Four). POSTt = 1 for observations in the years 
2002 to 30 December 2005 (post-2001/02 amendments or pre-IFRS), and 0 otherwise. 
The three-way interaction terms, which are the variables of interest, 
TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt, TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt and TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt, 
are the interaction of TREAT1t, POSTt and each of DAt, SLSMANt, and DISXMANt, 
respectively. Control variables are defined as in Chapter Four.  
Before testing the full model described above, I separately test variants of the model 
which each focus on a single alternative earnings management method. In the regression 
for accruals management substitution, the relevant three-way interaction term, 
TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt should be positively associated with UE_CEt if treatment firms 
(those reporting AI in pre-2001/02 amendments period) exhibit an abnormal propensity 
to manage accruals to manipulate core earnings following the 2001/02 amendments. 
The relevant three-way interaction terms for real earnings management substitution, 
TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt and TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt should each also be 
positively associated with UE_CEt, because manipulating sales upward increases core 
earnings (subsequently reducing cash flow from operations) while the opportunistic 
reduction of discretionary expenditure is expected to increase core earnings. 
The results for the separate tests of H2a(i-iii) using the simpler models are reported in 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8.1, whilst those using the full model are reported in 
Column (3). I discuss these results in order of presentation. In Column (1), which 
reports tests of substitution of accruals management for classification shifting,  the 
coefficient for discretionary accruals (DAt), which measures the association between 
unexpected core earnings (UE_CEt) and income-increasing accruals management for 
control firms pre-2001/02, is positive and significant (φ2 = 0.110, t = 1.632). This is 
consistent with control firms managing accruals to influence core earnings in the pre-
2001/02 amendments period. The coefficient for POSTt*DAt which measures the 
association between UE_CEt and accruals management for control firms in the post-
2001/02 amendments period, relative to their pre-2001/02 performance, is insignificant 
(φ7 = -0.020, t = -0.268), suggesting that there is no significant increase in the 
association between UE_CEt and DAt in the post-2001/02 reforms period relative to pre-
2001/02 period for these firms. The combined coefficient (i.e. the effect size) for 
POSTt*DAt is insignificant (0.110 – 0.020 = 0.090, t = 1.206), indicating that control 
firms do not manage accruals in the post-2001/02 amendments period to improve core 
earnings. 
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TABLE 8.1 
Regression of  Unexpected  Core Earnings (UE_CEt) 
on  Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management 
Using a Propensity Score Matched Sample of Treatment and Control Firms  
(1995 – 30 December 2005) 
Dependent Variable: UE_CEt 
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
H2a(i) 
 (1) 
H2a(ii-iii) 
 (2) 
Combined 
Test 
 (3) 
Intercept  0.092** 
(2.183) 
0.047 
(1.104) 
0.022 
(0.511) 
TREAT1t  0.018* 
(1.699) 
0.027** 
(2.566) 
0.027** 
(2.522) 
POSTt  0.037*** 
(3.410) 
0.038*** 
(3.536) 
0.036*** 
(3.314) 
TREAT1t*POST t  -0.045*** 
(-3.075) 
-0.050*** 
(-3.397) 
-0.050*** 
(-3.386) 
DAt  0.110 
(1.632) 
 0.218*** 
(3.066) 
POSTt*DAt  -0.020 
(-0.268) 
 -0.078 
(-0.979) 
TREAT1t*DAt  0.029 
(0.350) 
 -0.038 
(-0.433) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt + 0.158* 
(1.496) 
 0.239** 
(2.147) 
SLSMANt   -0.409*** 
(-6.520) 
-0.456*** 
(-6.903) 
POSTt*SLSMANt   0.072 
(1.029) 
0.102 
(1.361) 
TREAT1t*SLSMANt   0.145** 
(1.989) 
0.169** 
(2.156) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt +  -0.139 
(-1.434) 
-0.212** 
(-2.070) 
DISXMANt   -0.081 
(-1.127) 
-0.086 
(-1.210) 
POSTt*DISXMANt   0.064 
(0.862) 
0.067 
(0.908) 
TREAT1t*DISXMANt   0.110 
(1.160) 
0.113 
(1.207) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt +  -0.049 
(-0.489) 
-0.055 
(-0.554) 
SIZEt  -0.007*** 
-2.790 
-0.004 
(-1.567) 
-0.003 
(-1.116) 
ROAt  0.128*** 
(2.793) 
0.255*** 
(7.303) 
0.097** 
(2.149) 
TABLE 8.1 (continued) 
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CFOt  0.400*** 
(7.977) 
-0.036 
(-0.729) 
0.127** 
(2.216) 
LEVt  0.050** 
(2.260) 
0.051** 
(2.345) 
0.047** 
(2.191) 
LOSSt  -0.010 
(-0.788) 
-0.008 
(-0.659) 
-0.009 
(-0.740) 
AUDITORt  0.014* 
(1.706) 
0.012 
(1.491) 
0.014* 
(1.723) 
Number of observations  2,468 2,468 2,468 
Adjusted R2  16.01% 17.81% 19.05% 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; all the test results use a two-tailed t-test except 
for the three-way interaction terms which use one-sided tests. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. The sample consists of treatment and control firms. Treatment 
firms are firms that exist in pre- and post-2001/02 amendment periods (1995-30 December 2005) and report income-
decreasing abnormal items in the pre-2001/02 period regardless of their behaviour post-2001/02 amendments (2002-
30 December 2005). Control firms are firms that exist in both periods but do not report income-decreasing abnormal 
items in the pre-2001/02 period regardless of their behaviour post-2001/02 amendments. The firms are matched using 
the nearest neighbour propensity score matching with a caliper of 0.015. Observations for the year 2001 are excluded 
because the first amendment to AASB 1018 was operative only for the financial period ending 30 June 2001. AASB 
1018 was again amended, operative for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002. Hence, the first amendment 
was only effective for one year. UE_CEt  is unexpected core earnings calculated as the difference between reported 
and predicted core earnings, where the predicted value is calculated using the coefficients from the following 
equation: CEt + β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt +  β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt      (1). TREAT1t is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for treatment firms and 0 for control firms. DAt is discretionary accruals calculated using the 
performance adjusted modified Jones model by Kothari et al. (2005): (TACCt/TAt-1) = b1 (1/TAt-1) + b2[(ΔREVt - 
ΔRECt)/TAt-1] + b3(PPEt/TAt-1) + b4ROAt-1  + εt.         (8). Discretionary accruals are then aclaculated as the residuals 
from Equation (8). SLSMANt is sales manipulation, measured as the negative of the residuals from the following 
equation: (CFOt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt/TAt-1) + k3(SALESt/TAt-1 + εt       (9). DISXMANt is the manipulation 
of discretionary expenses, which are measured as the negative of the residuals from the following equation: 
(DISXt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt-1/TAt-1) + εt     (10). See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.8 for the definition of 
variables in Equations (1), (8), (9) and (10) and control variables above.  
 
The coefficient for the interaction term TREAT1t*DAt, which measures the association 
between UE_CEt and accrual-based earnings management for treatment firms relative to 
control firms in the pre-2001/02 period, is insignificant (φ10 = 0.029, t = 0.350). This 
indicates that there is no significant difference in the association between UE_CEt and 
DAt for treatment firms relative to control firms in the pre-2001/02 period. The 
combined coefficient for TREAT1t*DAt size is positive and significant (0.110 + 0.029 = 
0.139, t = 1.677), consistent with treatment firms manipulating core earnings via 
accrual-based earnings management in the pre-2001/02 amendments period. 
The primary variable of interest, TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt, which measures the association 
between UE_CEt and accrual-based earnings management for treatment firms in the 
post-2001/02 amendments period, relative to their behaviour pre-2001/02 and the 
behaviour of control firms post-2001/02 amendments, is significantly positively 
associated with UE_CEt (φ11 = 0.158, t = 1.496) in a one-tailed test. Thus, unexpectedly 
high core earnings are significantly more likely to be associated with income-increasing 
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discretionary accruals in the post-2001/02 amendments period for treatment firms, 
relative to i) their pre-2001/02 behaviour, and ii) the behaviour of control firms in the 
post-2001/02 amendments period. Moreover, the combined effect for 
TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt size is also significant (0.110 + 0.029 + 0.158 = 0.297, t = 1.576). 
Hence, there is evidence that firms who reported AI in the pre-2001/02 period are 
significantly more likely to have managed accruals in the post-2001/02 amendments 
period to improve core earnings, consistent with H2a(i). To that end, it seems that while 
the 2001/02 amendments constrained the use of classification shifting, this positive 
outcome on financial statement reliability has been offset by firms’ engagement in 
accrual-based earnings management to improve perceived profitability.127  
The findings for the singular test of H2a(ii) which concerns substitution of  real 
earnings management via sales manipulation for classification shifting, are reported in 
Column (2) of Table 8.1. The coefficient for SLSMANt, which measures the association 
between UE_CEt and the income-increasing management of sales activities for control 
firms in the pre-2001/02 period, is negatively associated with UE_CEt (φ3 = -0.409, t = -
6.520). Thus, there is no evidence that control firms significantly manage sales activities 
to improve core earnings pre-2001/02 amendments. In fact the observed negative 
association suggests that firms that are significantly less likely to opportunistically 
manage sales transactions are likely to have abnormally high core earnings. This could 
be due to the potential interrelation between models of unexpected core earnings and 
abnormal unexpected cash flows (i.e. sales manipulation) which may derive from the 
fact that both are regressed on change in sales.128  
The coefficient for the interaction term POSTt*SLSMANt which measures the 
association between UE_CEt and the income-increasing management of sales activities 
for control firms in the post-2001/02 amendments period relative to pre-2001/02, is 
insignificant (φ6 = 0.072, t = 1.029). Thus, for control firms, there is no significant 
increase in the association between UE_CEt and SLSMANt in the post-2001/02 
127 I control for other factors that may influence firms’ core earnings, and the coefficients on these factors 
are reported in Table 8.1. In column (1), SIZEt is significantly negatively associated with UE_CEt which 
indicates that large firms are less likely to report high unexpected core earnings. ROAt, CFOt, and LEVt 
are all significantly positively associated with UE_CEt, indicating that firms that report positive return on 
assets, positive cash flow from operations, and high leverage, have high unexpected core earnings. 
AUDITORt is also significant which indicates that firms using a big N auditor report large unexpected 
core earnings.  
128 This may also derive from using abnormal cash from operations as a measure of sales since cash from 
operation can be affected in different directions by other real activities manipulations like discretionary 
expenses reductions or overproductions. Future research can use a measure of overproduction as an 
alternative measure of earnings management. 
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amendments period compared to pre-2001/02. The combined coefficient for 
POSTt*SLSMANt size is significantly negative (-0.409 + 0.072 = -0.337, t = -4.821), 
indicating that control firms do not manipulate sales transactions to influence core 
earnings post-2001/02 amendments. For treatment firms, although the coefficient for 
TREAT1t*SLSMANt size is positive and significant (0.145, t = 1.989), the combined 
coefficient is negative and significant (-0.409 + 0.145 = -0.264, t = -3.621), reinforcing 
the counter-intuitive sign of the relationship between SLSMANt and UE_CEt.   
The primary variable of interest, TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt, which measures the 
association between UE_CEt and sales transaction manipulation for treatment firms in 
the post-2001/02 amendments period, relative to their behaviour pre-2001/02 and the 
behaviour of control firms post-2001/02 amendments, is insignificant (φ13 = -0.139, t = -
1.434).  The combined effect for sales manipulation post-2001/02 amendments is 
negative and significant (-0.409 + 0.145 - 0.139 = -0.403, t = -2.373). Hence, there is no 
evidence of earnings management via sales manipulation, and thus no support for 
H2a(ii).    
Column (2) of Table 8.1 also reports the results regarding whether firms manipulate 
discretionary expenditure to influence core earnings (H2a(iii)). The coefficient for 
DISXMANt, which measures the association between UE_CEt and the opportunistic 
reduction of discretionary expenditure for control firms in the pre-2001/02 period, is 
insignificant (φ3 = -0.081, t = -1.127), thus control firms do not manage discretionary 
expenditure pre-2001/02 to improve core earnings. The coefficient for the interaction 
term POSTt*DISXMANt is also insignificant (φ7 = 0.064, t = 0.862), indicating that for 
control firms, there is no significant increase in the association between unexpected core 
earnings and abnormally high discretionary expenditure in the post-2001/02 reforms 
period relative to pre-2001/02. The interaction term TREAT1t*DISXMANt is 
insignificant (φ14 = 0.110, t = 1.160), suggesting that there is no significant difference in 
the association between UE_CEt and DISXMANt for  treatment firms  relative to control 
firms in the pre-2001/02 amendments period.129  
The test variable, TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt, is insignificantly different from zero 
(φ15 = -0.049, t = -0.489). This indicates that there is no association between high 
129 The combined coefficient for POSTt*DISXMANt size is insignificant (0.064 – 0.081 = -0.017, t = -
0.229), thus, control firms do not manage discretionary expenses to influence core earnings in the post-
amendment period.  The combined coefficient for TREAT1t*DISXMANt size is also insignificant (-0.081 
+ 0.110 = 0.029, t = 0.306), consistent with no opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure by 
treatment firms in the pre-reform period to increase core earnings.  
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unexpected core earnings and income-increasing discretionary expenditure for treatment 
firms in the post-2001/02 reforms period, relative to i) their pre-2001/02 behaviour, and 
ii) the behaviour of control firms post-2001/02 amendments.130 In summary, there is no 
evidence of significant manipulation of discretionary expenditure by either treatment or 
control firms at any time during the sample period. 
As there are likely to be dependencies among the variables for accruals management 
and real earnings management (REM), my full model includes all proxies for these 
phenomena, and the results are reported in Column (3) of Table 8.1. These results are 
similar in essence to those reported in Columns (1) and (2) and, importantly, the 
significance of the test coefficient TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt  is greater than in the simpler 
model (and is now significant at the 99% confidence level). Once more, there is no 
evidence of the abuse of either sales or discretionary expenditure for earnings 
manipulation purposes, and in fact the relation between unexpected core earnings and 
sales manipulation remains of a counter-intuitive sign and significantly different from 
zero in this regression. 
Overall, the findings in Table 8.1 provide evidence to support H2a(i), which predicts 
that restricting the scope for classification shifting is associated with the increased 
manipulation of discretionary accruals to increase core profits. This suggests that firms 
may use classification shifting and accrual-based earnings manipulation as substitutes, 
consistent with Lin et al. (2006).  However, there is no evidence that the opportunistic 
increase of sales activities and reduction of discretionary expenditure increased core 
earnings. Thus, H2a(ii) and H2a(iii) are not supported. These results for H2a(ii) and 
H2a(iii) may be due to measurement error affecting the sales manipulation and 
discretionary expenditure manipulation variables, or simply that this form of earnings 
manipulation is impractical for many Australian firms (many of the avenues for sales 
manipulation do not appear to be feasible for mining firms, for instance). The results 
further suggest that while the 2002 amendment restricted classification shifting, any 
potential benefit to investors of more transparent financial statements as a result may be 
reduced by firms resorting to accrual-based earnings management to improve earnings. 
Therefore, regulations are sometimes akin to a two-edged sword and must be considered 
carefully before they are implemented. 
130 The combined effect for TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt size is also insignificant (-0.081 + 0.110 – 0.049 
= -0.020, t = -0.103). Therefore, treatment firms do not reduce discretionary expenditure opportunistically 
in the post-reform period to improve core earnings, providing no support for H2a(ii).  
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 8.3 Sensitivity analyses for H2a(i-iii) 
To examine the robustness of the results discussed above, I re-estimate the singular and 
full models of substitution behaviour using an alternatively defined sample of PSM 
treatment and control firms. I define treatment firms as firms that exist in both the pre- 
and post-2001/02 amendment periods but report income-decreasing AI in the pre-
2001/02 amendments period only. Control firms are those that exist in both periods but 
do not report income-decreasing AI pre-2001/02, irrespective of their post-2001/02 
amendments behaviour (i.e. they are defined as per the main test). The variables of 
interest as well as the predictions are the same as for the main tests.   
The findings for the robustness tests are reported in Table 8.2. Column (1) reports 
findings of H2a(i) test where the coefficients for the behaviour of control firms in the 
pre- and post-2001/02 reform periods,  DAt (φ2 = 0.137, t = 1.570) and POSTt*DAt (φ7 = 
0.027, t = 0.273), are substantively similar to those of the main test. That is, control 
firms manage accruals to increase core earnings in the pre-2001/02 period but there is 
no significant incremental association between UE_CEt and DAt in the post-2001/02 
reforms period relative to the pre-2001/02 period for these firms. The combined 
coefficient for POSTt*DAt size, however is significant (0.137 + 0.027 = 0.164, t = 
1.658), suggesting that control firms manage accruals to improve core earnings in the 
post-2001/02 amendments period. Similarly, there is evidence that treatment firms 
manipulate core earnings via accruals management in the pre-2001/02 period (φ10 = 
0.055, t = 0.534; combined effect: 0.137 + 0.055 = 0.192, t = 1.864). 
The main variable of interest, TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt is also substantively similar to that 
for the main test (φ11 = 0.287, t = 2.115; combined effect: 0.137 + 0.055 + 0.287 = 
0.479, t = 2.007), but of greater statistical significance. Consistent with the main results, 
these findings suggest that restricting the scope for classification shifting has 
encouraged an increased use of accruals manipulation to increase core earnings, 
providing support for H2a(i). 
Robustness tests of the singular model of real earnings management substitution 
(H2a(ii) and H2a(iii) are reported in Column (2) of Table 8.2. Coefficients for main 
effects are similar to those in the main results and for brevity are not discussed again 
here. The coefficient for the test variable, TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt, is also 
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TABLE 8.2 
Regression of  Unexpected  Core Earnings on  Accrual-Based and Real Earnings 
Management Using an Alternative Propensity Score Matched Sample of 
Treatment and Control Firms (1995–30 December 2005) 
Dependent Variable: UE_CEt 
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
H2a(i) 
 (1) 
H2a(ii-iii) 
 (2) 
Combined 
Test 
 (3) 
Intercept 
 
0.122** 
(1.982) 
0.078 
(1.257) 
0.050 
(0.813) 
TREAT1t 
 
0.011 
(0.814) 
0.023 
(1.634) 
0.018 
(1.326) 
POSTt 
 
0.050*** 
(3.482) 
0.045*** 
(3.057) 
0.040*** 
(2.751) 
TREAT1t*POST t 
 
-0.048** 
(-2.423) 
-0.045** 
(-2.246) 
-0.033* 
(-1.684) 
DAt 
 
0.137 
(1.570) 
 0.204** 
(2.296) 
POSTt*DAt 
 
0.027 
(0.273) 
 -0.007 
(-0.070) 
TREAT1t*DAt 
 
0.055 
(0.534) 
 0.008 
(0.074) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt + 0.287** 
(2.115) 
 0.382*** 
(2.773) 
SLSMANt 
 
 -0.360*** 
(-4.612) 
-0.383*** 
(-4.847) 
POSTt*SLSMANt 
 
 0.071 
(0.794) 
0.069 
(0.757) 
TREAT1t*SLSMANt 
 
 0.165* 
(1.927) 
0.181** 
(2.066) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt +  -0.234* 
(-1.952) 
-0.330*** 
(-2.712) 
DISXMANt   -0.111 
(-1.401) 
-0.120 
(-1.536) 
POSTt*DISXMANt   0.067 
(0.794) 
0.076 
(0.915) 
TREAT1t*DISXMANt   0.149 
(1.389) 
0.164 
(1.556) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMA
Nt 
+  -0.039 
(-0.334) 
-0.069 
(-0.601) 
Control Variables 
 
Included Included Included 
Number of observations  1,630 1,630 1,630 
Adjusted R2  22.13% 22.30% 24.81% 
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TABLE 8.2  (continued) 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; all the test results use a two-tailed t-test except 
for the three-way interaction terms which use one-sided tests. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. The sample consists of treatment and control firms. Treatment 
firms are firms that exist in pre- and post-2001/02 amendments (POST) periods and report income-decreasing 
abnormal items only in the pre-2001/02 period (1995-2000) and not in the post-2001/02 amendments period (2002-30 
December 2005). Control firms are firms that exist in both periods but do not report income-decreasing abnormal 
items in the pre- period regardless of their post-2001/02 amendments behaviour. All other firms that do not fit these 
categories are excluded from the sample. The firms are matched using the nearest neighbour propensity score 
matching with a caliper of 0.015. Observations for the year 2001 are excluded because the first amendment to AASB 
1018 was operative only for the financial period ending 30 June 2001. AASB 1018 was again amended, operative for 
the financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002. Hence the first amendment was only effective for one year. 
UE_CEt is unexpected core earnings calculated as the difference between reported and predicted core earnings, where 
the predicted value is calculated using the coefficients from the following equation: CEt + β0 + β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + 
β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt      (1). TREAT1t is a dummy variable that equals 1 for treatment firms and 0 for 
control firms. DAt is discretionary accruals calculated using the performance adjusted modified Jones model by 
Kothari et al. (2005): (TACCt/TAt-1) = b1 (1/TAt-1) + b2[(ΔREVt - ΔRECt)/TAt-1] + b3(PPEt/TAt-1) + b4ROAt-1  + εt.         
(8). Discretionary accruals are then aclaculated as the residuals from Equation (8). SLSMANt is the manipulation of 
sales, measured as the negative of the residuals from the following equation: (CFOt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + 
k2(SALESt/TAt-1) + k3(SALESt/TAt-1 + εt       (9). DISXMANt is the manipulation of discretionary expenditure, 
calculated as the negative of residuals from the following equation: (DISXt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt-1/TAt-1) + 
εt     (10). See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.8 for the definition of variables in Equations (1), (8), (9) and (10) and control 
variables above. 
 
substantively similar with the main results (φ13 = -0.234, t = -1.952; combined effect: -
0.360 + 0.165 - 0.234 = -0.429, t = -2.088). These findings indicate that restricting the 
scope for classification shifting did not encourage a greater manipulation of sales 
activities by firms reporting AI in the pre-2001/02 period, to improve core earnings 
post-2001/02 amendments. Once more, there is no evidence of manipulation of 
discretionary expenditure to increase core earnings, and for brevity the specific 
coefficients are not discussed again here.  
Overall, the results from the robustness tests are consistent with the main tests that 
restricting the scope for classification shifting in 2001/02, encouraged firms that 
reported income-decreasing AI in the pre-2001/02 period only, to significantly manage 
discretionary accruals in order to improve core earnings post-2001/02. This provides 
evidence to support H2a(i). There was no such evidence regarding the opportunistic 
increase of sales activities and the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure 
to increase core earnings, thus H2a(ii) and H2a(iii) were not supported.  
8.4 Main empirical findings for tests of H2b(i-iii) – substitution effects 
after the introduction of AASB 101 upon IFRS adoption 
In Chapter Seven, I examined the effect on classification shifting behaviour of the 2005 
replacement of AASB 1018 by AASB 101, which relaxed the restrictions on the 
placement of additional line items and sub-totals on the income statement (H1b).  
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Empirical tests of the change in classification shifting behaviour after the reforms found 
no significant results. However results using a PSM sample found evidence consistent 
with firms using AI to engage in classification shifting in the post-IFRS period. While 
this test of the ‘level’ of classification shifting in the post-IFRS period does not provide 
formal support for H1b, it does provide sufficient interest to study the potential impact 
of the reforms on other earnings management associated with the manipulation of core 
earnings. To this end, H2b(i) proposes that the manipulation of discretionary accruals to 
improve core earnings reduces after the 2005 introduction of AASB 101 on IFRS 
adoption, which likely increased the scope for classification shifting. Similarly, H2b(ii) 
and H2b(iii) propose that manipulating sales activities and discretionary expenditure, 
respectively, to improve core earnings reduce post-IFRS.  
To examine these hypotheses, I use a difference-in-differences design and estimate 
Equation (12) on a PSM sample of treatment and control firms. Treatment firms are 
those that operate in both the pre- and post-IFRS periods, and report income-decreasing 
AI post-IFRS irrespective of their pre-IFRS behaviour, while control firms are those 
that exist in both periods but do not report AI post-IFRS. Thus, I test whether treatment 
firms are less likely to manage accruals and/or real transactions post-IFRS relative to i) 
their pre-IFRS behaviour, and ii) the behaviour of control firms post-IFRS. The general 
form of the regression used to test H2b(i-iii)  is described below: 
UE_CEt   =  χ0 + χ1TREAT2t + χ2DAt + χ3SLSMANt + χ4DISXMANt  +  χ5IFRSt  +  
        χ6TREAT2t*IFRSt  + χ7IFRSt*DAt + χ8IFRSt*SLSMANt + χ9IFRSt*DISXMANt + 
       χ10TREAT2t*DAt + χ11TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt  + χ12TREAT2t*SLSMANt +  
       χ13TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt + χ14TREAT2t*DISXMANt + 
       χ15TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt + Controls + εt               (12)            
Where TREAT2t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm operates in both the pre-
IFRS and post-IFRS periods, and reports income-decreasing AI in the post-IFRS period 
irrespective of their pre-IFRS behaviour (treatment firms), and 0 if a firm reports no 
income-decreasing AI in the post-IFRS period (control firms).  DAt, SLSMANt and 
DISXMANt are as defined for Equation (11) in Section 8.2.  IFRSt is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 for observations in the periods ending 31 December 2005 to 2009 (post-
IFRS), and 0 otherwise. Control variables are as previously defined. The remaining 
234 
 
variables are the various two- and three-way interactions between TREAT2t IFRSt and 
the earnings management measures. 
I first examine the impact of the amendment on the use of alternative earnings 
management individually by estimating separate regressions for each alternative 
earnings management, before testing the full model described above. The test variables 
are the three-way interaction terms TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt (H2b(i)), 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt (H2b(ii)) and TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt (H2b(iii)) which 
should all be negatively associated with UE_CEt if treatment firms are less likely to use 
alternative earnings management methods to increase core earnings post-IFRS, (as the 
implementation of AASB 101 likely resulted in the increased scope for classification 
shifting).  
The results for the separate tests using the singular models are reported in Table 8.3, 
Columns (1) (H2b(i)) and (2) (H2b(ii) and H2b(iii)). Results for the full model are 
reported in Column (3). I discuss these results in order of presentation. Column (1) 
which reports the results for accrual-based earnings management substitution reveals 
that the coefficient for DAt which measures the association between unexpected core 
earnings and income-increasing accruals management for control firms pre-IFRS, is 
positively associated with UE_CEt (χ2 = 0.113, t = 2.009). This is consistent with 
control firms manipulating accruals to increase core earnings in the pre-IFRS period.  
The coefficient for IFRSt*DAt is positively associated with UE_CEt (χ5 = 0.312, t = 
4.408), indicating that for control firms, there is a significant increase in the association 
between UE_CEt and DAt in the post-IFRS period relative to pre-IFRS. The combined 
coefficient for IFRSt*DAt remains significant (0.113 + 0.312 = 0.425, t = 6.003), 
consistent with control firms manipulating accruals to improve core earnings post-IFRS.  
The coefficient for the interaction term TREAT2t*DAt, which measures the association 
between UE_CEt and DAt for treatment firms relative to control firms in the pre-IFRS 
period, is insignificantly different from zero (χ5 = -0.047, t = -0.670).  Hence, there is no 
significant difference in the association between UE_CEt and DAt for treatment firms 
relative to control firms in the pre-IFRS period. The combined coefficient for 
TREAT2t*DAt size remains insignificant (0.113 – 0.047 = 0.066, t = 0.942), consistent 
with no accruals manipulation by treatment firms in the pre-IFRS period.  
The main variable of interest, TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt, which measures the association 
between UE_CEt and accrual-based earnings management for treatment firms in the 
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post-IFRS period, relative to their pre-IFRS behaviour and the behaviour of control 
firms post-IFRS, is  negatively associated with UE_CEt (χ7 = -0.219, t = -2.121), 
supporting H2b(i). This suggests that unexpectedly high core earnings are less likely to 
be associated with income-increasing discretionary accruals in the post-IFRS period for 
firms that report AI post-IFRS, relative to i) those firms’ pre-IFRS behaviour, and ii) the 
behaviour of control firms in the post-IFRS period. Further, the combined effect for 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt size is insignificant (0.113 – 0.047 – 0.219 = -0.153, t = -0. 882). 
Hence, firms that reported AI in the post-IFRS period do not improve core earnings in 
the post-IFRS period via accruals manipulation.131   
The findings for the simpler tests of H2b(ii) concerning the substitution of sales 
activities’ manipulation for classification shifting are reported in Column (2) of Table 
8.3. The coefficient for SLSMANt, which measures the association between UE_CEt and 
the income-increasing management of sales activities for control firms in the pre-IFRS 
period, is negatively associated with UE_CEt (χ2 = -0.412, t = -6.765). Hence, control 
firms are significantly less likely to manipulate sales transactions to increase core 
earnings in the pre-IFRS period. The coefficient for the interaction term 
IFRSt*SLSMANt which measures the association between UE_CEt and the income-
increasing management of sales activities for control firms in the post-IFRS period 
relative to pre-IFRS, is significantly positive (χ8 = 0.108, t = 1.548). Thus, there is a 
significant increase in the association between UE_CEt and SLSMANt for control firms 
post-IFRS relative to pre-IFRS. The combined coefficient for IFRSt*SLSMANt size, 
however, is negative and significant (-0.412 + 0.108 = -0.304, t = -2.203), suggesting 
that control firms are less likely to manipulate sales transactions to influence core 
earnings post-IFRS.   
The coefficient for the interaction term TREAT2t*SLSMANt which measures the 
association of UE_CEt and SLSMANt for treatment firms in the pre-IFRS period, is 
significantly positive (χ12 = 0.102, t = 1.422), indicating that there is a significant 
increase in the association between UE_CEt and SLSMANt for treatment firms compared 
to control firms pre-IFRS. The combined coefficient for TREAT2t*SLSMANt size is 
significantly different from zero (-0.412 + 0.102 = -0.310, t = -2.330), thus, treatment 
firms are significantly less likely to manipulate sales activities to improve core earnings 
in the pre-IFRS period.  
131 Alternatively, the decrease in abnormal accruals during the post-IFRS period could reflect the positive 
effects of IFRS on accruals manipulation rather than a substitution effect since there was no formal 
support for H1a of an increase in classification shifting post-IFRS. 
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TABLE 8.3 
Regression of  Unexpected  Core Earnings (UE_CEt)on  Accrual-Based and Real 
Earnings ManagementUsing a Propensity Score Matched Sample of Treatment 
and Control Firms (2002 - 2009) 
Dependent Variable: UE_CEt 
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
H2b(i) 
(1) 
H2b(ii-iii) 
 (2) 
Combined 
Test 
 (3) 
Intercept  0.093 
1.401) 
0.036 
(0.542) 
-0.000 
(-0.001) 
TREAT2t  0.002 
(0.187) 
-0.003 
(-0. 286) 
-0.005 
(-0.394) 
IFRSt  -0.005 
(-0.187) 
-0.014 
(-1. 141) 
-0.007 
(-0.557) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt  0.014 
(0.838) 
0.023 
(1.294) 
0.022 
(1.261) 
DAt  0.113** 
(2.009) 
 0.194*** 
(3.388) 
IFRSt*DAt  0.312*** 
(4.408) 
 0.256*** 
(3.592) 
TREAT2t*DAt  -0.047 
(-0.670) 
 -0.089 
(-1.235) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt - -0.219** 
(-2.121) 
 -0.103 
(-0.982) 
SLSMANt   -0.412*** 
(-6.765) 
-0.443*** 
(-7.157) 
IFRSt*SLSMANt   0.108 
(1.548) 
0.084 
(1.199) 
TREAT2t*SLSMANt   0.102 
(1.422) 
0.118 
(1.608) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt -  -0.266** 
(-2.455) 
-0.272** 
(-2.446) 
DISXMANt   0.059** 
(2.382) 
0.058** 
(7. 157) 
IFRSt*DISXMANt   -0.049 
(-1.321) 
-0.056 
(-1.512) 
TREAT2t*DISXMANt   -0.037 
(-0.967) 
-0.033 
(-0.868) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt -  0.069 
(1.182) 
0.091 
(1.560) 
SIZEt  -0.002 
(-0.459) 
0.001 
(0.189) 
0.002 
(0.753) 
ROAt  0.246*** 
(5.026) 
0.405*** 
(11. 369) 
0.196*** 
(4.050) 
CFOt  0.293*** 
(5.080) 
-0.260*** 
(-4.328) 
-0.042 
(-0.622) 
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LEVt  0.046* 
(1.824) 
0.043 
(1.742) 
0.041* 
(1.668) 
LOSSt  -0.009 
(-0.695) 
-0.009 
(-0.686) 
-0.013 
(-1.015) 
AUDITORt  -0.002 
(-0.245) 
0.003 
(0.333) 
0.002 
(0.170) 
Number of observations  2, 251 2,251 2,251 
Adjusted R2  21.10% 22.10% 24.10% 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; all the test results use a two-tailed t-test except 
for the three-way interaction terms which use one-sided tests. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. The sample is based on a propensity score match of treatment and 
control firms, where treatment firms are those firms that exist in some part of each of the test periods (2002-2009), 
and reports income-decreasing abnormal items in the post-IFRS period (31 December 2005-2009) regardless of their 
pre-IFRS behaviour (2002-30 December 2005), and 0 for firms that do not report income-decreasing abnormal items 
in the post-IFRS period regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour. The firms are matched using the nearest neighbour 
propensity score matching with a caliper of 0.015. UE_CEt is unexpected core earnings calculated as the difference 
between reported and predicted core earnings, where the predicted value is calculated using the coefficients from the 
following equation: CEt + β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt +  β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt      (1). TREAT2t is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for treatment firms and 0 for control firms. DAt is discretionary accruals calculated 
residuals from the performance adjusted modified Jones model by Kothari et al. (2005): (TACCt/TAt-1) = b1 (1/TAt-1) 
+ b2[(ΔREVt - ΔRECt)/TAt-1] + b3(PPEt/TAt-1) + b4ROAt-1  + εt.         (8). SLSMANt is the manipulation of sales, 
measured as the negative of residuals from the following regression: (CFOt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt/TAt-1) + 
k3(SALESt/TAt-1 + εt  (9). DISXMANt is the manipulation of discretionary expenditure, calculated as the negative of 
residuals from the following regression: (DISXt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt-1/TAt-1) + εt    (6). See Chapter Four, 
Section 4.3.8 for the definition of variables in Equations (1), (8), (9) and (10) and control variables above. 
 
The main variable of interest, TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt, which measures the 
association between UE_CEt and sales manipulation for treatment firms in the post-
IFRS period, relative to their behaviour pre-IFRS,  and to the behaviour of control firms 
post-IFRS, is significantly negatively associated with UE_CEt (χ13 = -0.266, t = -2.455). 
This indicates that high unexpected core earnings are significantly less likely to be 
associated with income-increasing real sales manipulation in the post-IFRS period for 
treatment firms, relative to i) their pre-IFRS behaviour, and ii) the behaviour of control 
firms in the post-IFRS period. The combined effect for TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt size 
is also negative and significant (-0.412 + 0.102 - 0.266 = -0.576, t = -3.198), providing 
evidence that firms who reported AI in the post-IFRS period were significantly less 
likely to opportunistically manipulate real sales activities to manage core earnings post-
IFRS. These results therefore provide support for H2b(ii).132  
Column (2) of Table 8.3 also reports the findings regarding whether firms who report 
AI in the post-IFRS period are less likely to manipulate discretionary expenditure to 
improve core earnings (H2b(iii)). The coefficient for DISXMANt, which measures the 
132 Similar to H2b(i), the reduction in sales manipulation could reflect positive effects of IFRS 
implementation on real earnings management. 
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association between UE_CEt and the opportunistic reduction of discretionary 
expenditure for control firms in the pre-IFRS period, is positive and significant (χ3 = 
0.059, t = 2.382), implying that control firms manipulate discretionary expenditure to 
improve core earnings pre-IFRS. 133  The coefficient for the interaction term 
IFRSt*DISXMANt is insignificant (χ6 = -0.049, t = -1.321), hence, there is no difference 
in the association between UE_CEt and DISXMANt for control firms in the post-IFRS 
period compared to their behaviour pre-IFRS. The coefficient for TREAT2t*DISXMANt 
is also insignificant (χ9 = -0.037, t = -0.967), as is the combined coefficient for 
TREAT2t*DISXMANt size (0.059 - 0.037 = 0.022, t = 0.574), which suggest that firms 
that report AI post-IFRS do not reduce discretionary expenditure opportunistically to 
increase core earnings pre-IFRS. 
The test variable,  TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt, which measures the association between 
UE_CEt and DISXMANt for treatment firms in the post-IFRS period, relative to their 
behaviour pre-IFRS and the behaviour of control firms post-IFRS, is insignificant (χ10 = 
0.069, t = 1.182), providing no support for H2b(iii). Thus, there is no significant 
difference in the association between UE_CEt and DISXMANt for firms who report AI 
post-IFRS, relative to their pre-IFRS behaviour and the behaviour of control firms post-
IFRS. The combined coefficient for TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt size is also 
insignificant (0.059 - 0.037 + 0.069 = 0.091, t = 0.719). The findings from the full 
model, reported in Column (3), are substantively similar to the results in Column (2) for 
REM measures. However, the coefficient for the test variable TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt is 
insignificant whereas it was significant in the simpler model. The insignificant result 
may be due to dependencies among DAt and real earnings management variables in the 
full model.  
On the whole, the findings in Table 8.3 provide evidence to support H2b(i) and H2b(ii) 
that increasing the scope for classification shifting by relaxing the restrictions on 
reporting separate line items and sub-headings on the income statement, is associated 
with the reduction in accruals management and real sales manipulation, respectively, to 
increase core earnings. With the opportunity for opportunistic classification shifting to 
improve core earnings presented by AASB 101 in 2005, firms (in the PSM sample) 
would have opted for classification shifting (as reported in Chapter Seven) which is less 
133 The observed positive association suggests that firms with abnormally high discretionary expenditure 
are likely to have abnormally high core earnings. This may reflect the interrelations between models of 
unexpected core earnings and abnormal unexpected discretionary expenditure where both are regressed 
on change in sales.  
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costly, possibly resulting in the reduced manipulation of accruals and real sales 
activities. Alternatively however, because evidence of classification shifting as reported 
in Chapter Seven is weak, one plausible explanation for the decrease in accruals 
management and sales manipulation rather than a substitution effect is that they reflect 
positive effects of implementing IFRS,134 a more active role of ASIC in enforcing 
regulations, and more alert and independent auditors in promoting compliance with 
accounting standards as a result of CLERP 9.   
8.5 Sensitivity analysis for H2b(i-iii) 
Similar to H2a(i-iii), I test the robustness of results in Table 8.3 by re-estimating the 
models of substitution behaviour using an alternatively defined sample of PSM 
treatment and control firms. I define treatment firms as firms that exist in both the pre- 
and post-IFRS periods but report income-decreasing AI in the post-IFRS period only. 
Control firms are those that exist in both periods but do not report income-decreasing 
AI post-IFRS, irrespective of their pre-IFRS behaviour (i.e. they are defined as per the 
main test). The variables of interest as well as the predictions are the same as for the 
main tests.   
The findings for the first robustness tests are reported in Table 8.4. Column (1) reports 
findings of H2b(i) test where the coefficient for the behaviour of control firms in the 
pre- IFRS period, DAt (χ2 = 0.014, t = 0.239) is insignificant, indicating that control 
firms do not manage accruals to increase core earnings pre-IFRS. The coefficient for the 
behaviour of control firms post-IFRS, IFRSt*DAt (χ7 = 0.293, t = 4.078) is substantively 
similar to that for the main test, suggesting that there is a significant increase in the 
association between UE_CEt and DAt for control firms in the post-IFRS period relative 
to pre-IFRS. The combined coefficient for IFRSt*DAt size is positive (0.014 + 0.293 = 
0.307, t = 4.276), hence, control firms significantly manage accruals to improve core 
earnings post-IFRS. There is no evidence that treatment firms manipulate accruals to 
increase core earnings in the pre- IFRS period (χ10 = 0.084, t = 0.670; combined 
coefficient for TREAT2t*DAt: 0.014 + 0.084 = 0.098, t = 0. 781). 
The coefficient for the test variable, TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt is also substantively similar to 
that for the main test (χ11 = -0.233, t = -2.263; combined effect: 0.014 + 0.084 – 0.233 = 
134 Prior studies provide evidence that the application of IFRS is associated with higher accounting quality 
as evidenced by less earnings management (Barth et al. 2008; Florou and Pople 2012; Horton, Serafeim 
and Serafeim 2013)  
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-0.135, t = -0.591). There is a significant reduction in the association between UE_CEt 
and DAt for treatment firms post-IFRS, relative to their pre-IFRS behaviour and the 
behaviour of control firms post-IFRS. Moreover, firms that report AI post-IFRS do not 
manipulate accruals to improve core earnings post-IFRS. Consistent with the main 
results, these findings suggest that the increased scope for classification shifting in the 
post-IFRS period is associated with a reduction in the manipulation of accruals to 
increase core earnings.135  
Robustness tests of the simple model of sales activities’ management substitution 
(H2b(ii)) and discretionary expenditure management substitution (H2b(iii)) are reported 
in Column (2) of Table 8.4. Coefficients for the main effects are similar to those in the 
main results and are not discussed again here for brevity. In contrast to the main test, the 
coefficient for the primary variable of interest, TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt is 
insignificant (χ13 = 0.001, t = 0.008), suggesting that there is no incremental difference 
in the association between UE_CEt and SLSMANt for firms that reported AI post-IFRS, 
relative to (i) their pre-IFRS behaviour, and (ii) the behaviour of control firms in the 
post-IFRS period.  However, the combined effect is significantly negative (-0.342 + 
0.006 + 0.001 = -0.335, t = -1.634), consistent with the main analysis, and providing 
evidence that AI reporting firms in the post-IFRS period were less likely to manipulate 
real sales activities to manage core earnings post-IFRS.  Consistent with the main test, 
the coefficient for TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt is insignificant (χ13 = 0.035, t = 0.578), 
and the combined effect remains insignificant (0.014 + 0.011 + 0.035 = 0.060, t = 
0.596). These results suggest that there is no association between UE_CEt and 
DISXMANt firms that report AI post-IFRS relative (i) to their pre-IFRS behaviour and 
(ii) the behaviour of control firms post-IFRS. Moreover, firms that reported AI in the 
post-IFRS period do not manipulate discretionary expenditure to influence core 
earnings.  The results from the full model are substantively similar to those reported in 
Columns (1) and (2). 
On balance, consistent with the main analysis, Table 8.4 provides evidence to support 
H2b(i) that the increased scope for classification shifting following the implementation 
of AASB 101 is associated with the reduction in accrual-based earnings management. 
Alternatively, the reduction in accrual-based earnings management may reflect positive 
135 Once more, the reduction in accruals manipulation may reflect the effects of IFRS implementation 
rather than a substitution effect since evidence of classification shifting in Chapter Seven is weak. 
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effects of IFRS adoption on accruals quality and the more active role played by ASIC 
and external auditors in promoting compliance as a result of CLERP 9, rather than a  
TABLE 8.4 
Regression of  Unexpected  Core Earnings (UE_CEt) on  Accrual-Based and Real 
Earnings Management Using a Propensity Score Matched Sample of Treatment 
and Control Firms (2002 - 2009) 
Dependent Variable: UE_CEt 
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
H2b(i) 
(1) 
H2b(ii-iii) 
 (2) 
Combined 
Test 
 (3) 
Intercept  0.054 
0.771) 
0.019 
(0.276) 
-0.008 
(-0.114) 
TREAT2t  0.004 
(0.321) 
-0.003 
(-0. 216) 
0.000 
(0.024) 
IFRSt  -0.012 
(-0.927) 
-0.020 
(-1.609) 
-0.010 
(-0.789) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt  0.029 
(1.644) 
0.038** 
(2.146) 
0.032* 
(1.818) 
DAt  0.014 
(0.239) 
 0.073 
(1.216) 
IFRSt*DAt  0.293*** 
(4.078) 
 0.257*** 
(3.540) 
TREAT2t*DAt  0.084 
(0.670) 
 0.077 
(1.034) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt - -0.233** 
(-2.263) 
 -0.188* 
(-1.779) 
SLSMANt   -0.342*** 
(-5.111) 
-0.340*** 
(-5.011) 
IFRSt*SLSMANt   -0.014 
(-0.512) 
-0.002 
(-0.032) 
TREAT2t*SLSMANt   0.006 
(0.075) 
-0.022 
(-0.291) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt -  0.001 
(0.008) 
0.025 
(0.223) 
DISXMANt   0.014 
(0.512) 
0.015 
(0.549) 
IFRSt*DISXMANt   0.002 
(0.039) 
-0.002 
(-0.058) 
TREAT2t*DISXMANt   0.011 
(0.273) 
0.007 
(0.173) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMA
Nt 
-  0.035 
(0.578) 
0.044 
(0.726) 
 
Control Variables 
  
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Number of observations  2, 341 2,341 2,341 
Adjusted R2  17.40% 18.00% 19.10% 
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TABLE 8.4 (continued) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; all the test results use a two-tailed t-test except 
for the three-way interaction terms which use one-sided tests. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. The sample is based on a propensity score matching of treatment 
and control firms, where treatment firms are those that exist in some part of each of the test periods (2002-2009), and 
reported income-decreasing abnormal items in post-IFRS (31 December 2005-2009) only but did not report them pre-
IFRS (2002-30 December 2005), and 0 for firms that did not report income-decreasing abnormal items post-IFRS 
regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour. The firms are matched using the nearest neighbour propensity score matching 
with a caliper of 0.015. UE_CEt is unexpected core earnings calculated as the difference between reported and 
predicted core earnings, where the predicted value is calculated using the coefficients from the following equation: 
CEt + β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt +  β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt      (1). TREAT2t is a dummy variable that equals 
1 for treatment firms and 0 for control firms. DAt is discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the 
performance adjusted modified Jones model by Kothari et al. (2005): (TACCt/TAt-1) = b1 (1/TAt-1) + b2[(ΔREVt - 
ΔRECt)/TAt-1] + b3(PPEt/TAt-1) + b4ROAt-1  + εt.         (8). . SLSMANt is the manipulation of sales, which are measured 
as the negative of residuals from the following equation : (CFOt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt/TAt-1) + 
k3(SALESt/TAt-1 + εt  (9). . DISXMANt is the manipulation of discretionary expenditure, and are measured as the 
negative of residuals from the following equation: (DISXt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt-1/TAt-1) + εt    (10). See 
Chapter Four for definition of variables in Equations (1), (8), (9) and (10) and control variables above. 
 
substitution effect given the weak evidence for classification shifting in Chapter Seven. 
Future studies should sufficiently control for these contemporaneous events. The 
robustness results show no association between UE_CEt and each of 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt and TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt, suggesting that the 
increase in scope for classification shifting post-IFRS had no effect on the manipulation 
of sales activities and discretionary expenditure, respectively.   
8.6 Main empirical findings for H2c(i-iii) – substitution effect after the 
introduction of AASB 5 
In Chapter Seven, I reported the results of tests of H1c, which investigated whether 
firms opportunistically misclassify core expenses as DO, to increase core earnings 
following the introduction of AASB 5 in 2005. The results for two of the samples used - 
all firms with sufficient data to estimate regressions, and firms with income-decreasing 
DO – indicated that firms do not engage in classification shifting using DO post-IFRS. 
However, tests using a PSM sample of firms that reported DO post-IFRS and firms with 
similar characteristics but did not report DO, provided evidence consistent with firms 
engaging in opportunistic classification shifting via DO in the post-IFRS period. This 
section reports the results of tests of whether this newly available opportunity for 
classification shifting reduced earnings management by other methods. H2c(i) predicts 
that the use of discretionary accruals to increase core earnings is reduced following the 
introduction of AASB 5. Similarly, H2c(ii) and H2c(iii) propose that the manipulation 
of sales activities and discretionary expenditure, respectively, to increase core earnings 
are reduced post-IFRS. Each of these hypotheses is tested using a difference-in-
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differences design that compares the behaviour of otherwise similar firms partitioned on 
their use of DO in the post-IFRS period.  
In similar spirit to earlier tests, I estimate regressions of unexpected core earnings on an 
indicator of DO reporting behaviour, measures of alternative earnings management 
behaviour and interactions thereof, using a PSM sample of treatment and control firms. 
Treatment firms are firms that reported DO post-IFRS, and control firms are those that 
did not report DO post-IFRS.136 The general form of the regression used to test H2c(i) 
and H2c(ii)  is described below: 
UE_CEt = θ0 + θ1TREAT_DOt + θ2DAt + θ3SLSMANt + θ4DISXMANt + θ5IFRSt +  
     θ6TREAT_DOt*IFRSt + θ7IFRSt*DAt + θ8IFRSt*SLSMANt + θ9IFRSt*DISXMANt +  
    θ10TREAT_DOt*DAt + θ11TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DAt  + θ12TREAT_DOt*SLSMANt +  
    θ13TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*SLSMANt + θ14TREAT_DOt*DISXMANt +  
     θ15TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DISXMANt + Controls + εt                                               (13) 
Where TREAT_DOt is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm operates in both the pre-
IFRS and post-IFRS periods, and reports income-decreasing DO post-IFRS (treatment 
firms), and 0 if a firm reports no income-decreasing DO in the post-IFRS period 
(control firms). The test variables are the three-way interactions between the treatment 
indicator, the post-IFRS indicator and each alternative earnings management measure: 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DAt,  TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*SLSMANt, and TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DISXMANt. 
Other variables are as previously defined. If the use of alternative earnings management 
to improve core earnings is reduced following the introduction of AASB 5, then I 
expect all three-way interaction terms, TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt (H2c(i)) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt (H2c(ii)), and TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt (H2c(iii)) to be 
negative.  
The results for the tests of hypotheses are reported in Table 8.5.  Once more, Columns 
(1) and (2) report the results of accrual-based and real earnings management models 
separately, while the full model is reported in Column (3). Column (1), which reports 
the results for accruals management substitution reveals that the coefficient for DAt, 
136 Because the separate reporting of DO as an earnings sub-total was proscribed prior to the adoption of 
AASB 5, there are no firm-years in the pre-IFRS sample for which income from DO is separately 
reported. Prior to 2005, DO were required to be reported within ordinary activities which were part of 
continuing operations, unlike AASB 5 which is silent on where on the income statement DO is presented. 
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which measures the association between UE_CEt and income-increasing accruals 
management for control firms pre-IFRS, is positively associated with UE_CEt (θ2 = 
0.248, t = 3.517). This suggests that control firms increase core earnings by 
manipulating accruals in the pre-IFRS period.  
The coefficient for IFRSt*DAt is insignificant (θ7 = 0.059, t = 0.61 2), indicating that 
there is no incremental increase in the association between UE_CEt and DAt post-IFRS 
relative to pre-IFRS. The combined coefficient for IFRSt*DAt size, however, is 
significantly different from zero (0.248 + 0.059 = 0.307, t = 3.198), indicating that 
control firms manipulate accruals to increase core earnings post-IFRS. The coefficient 
for the interaction term TREAT_DOt*DAt, which measures the association between 
UE_CEt and DAt for treatment firms relative to control firms pre-IFRS, is significantly 
negative (θ10 = -0.184, t = -1.844). Hence, there is a significant reduction in the 
association between UE_CEt and DAt for treatment firms relative to control firms pre-
IFRS. The combined effect for TREAT_DOt*DAt size, is insignificant (0.248 – 0.184 = 
0.064, t = 0.640), consistent with treatment firms not manipulating accruals in the pre-
IFRS period. 
The test variable, TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DAt, which measures the association between 
UE_CEt and accrual-based earnings management for treatment firms in the post-IFRS 
period, relative to their behaviour pre-IFRS and the behaviour of control firms post-
IFRS, is insignificantly different from zero (θ11 = 0.212, t = 1. 312), providing no 
support for H2c(i). This suggests that there is no significant difference in the association 
between UE_CEt and income-increasing discretionary accruals in the post-IFRS period 
for firms that reported DO, relative to i) their pre-IFRS behaviour, and ii) the behaviour 
of control firms in the post-IFRS period. The combined effect for 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DAt size remains insignificant (0.248 – 0.184 + 0.212 = 0.276, t = 
1.053), suggesting that firms that reported DO in the post-IFRS period, do not manage 
accruals to improve core earnings post-IFRS.   
The findings for the singular tests of H2c(ii), which investigates whether there is a 
reduction in the manipulation of sales activities after the introduction of AASB 5 are 
reported in Column (2) of Table 8.5. The coefficient for SLSMANt, which measures the 
association between UE_CEt and sales manipulation for control firms pre-IFRS is 
significantly negative (θ2 = -0.305, t = -3.416), consistent with control firms being 
significantly less likely to manipulate sales activities to improve core earnings in the 
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TABLE 8.5 
Regression of  Unexpected  Core Earnings (UE_CEt) 
on  Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management 
Using a Propensity Score Matched Sample of Treatment and Control Firms  
 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = UE_CEt 
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
H2c(i)  
(1) 
H2c(ii-iii)  
(2) 
Combined 
Test  
(3) 
Intercept  -0.041 
(-0.689) 
-0.017 
(-0.297) 
-0.077 
(-1.389) 
TREAT_DOt  0.019* 
(1.733) 
0.014 
(1.235) 
0.010 
(0.915) 
IFRSt  0.014 
(1.232) 
0.011 
(1.011) 
0.017 
(1.574) 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt  -0.009 
(-0.567) 
0.001 
(0.073) 
-0.005 
(-0.300) 
DAt  0.248*** 
(3.517) 
 0.309*** 
(4.264) 
IFRSt*DAt  0.059 
(0.612) 
 0.081 
(0.851) 
TREAT_DOt*DAt  -0.184* 
(-1.844) 
 -0.161 
(-1.601) 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DAt - 0.212 
(1.312) 
 0.141 
(0.864) 
SLSMANt   -0.305*** 
(-3.416) 
-0.366*** 
(-4.218) 
IFRSt*SLSMANt   -0.040 
(-0.454) 
-0.051 
(-0.570) 
TREAT_DOt*SLSMANt   -0.157 
(-1.480) 
-0.121 
(-1.209) 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*SLSMANt -  0.251 
(1.421) 
0.196 
(1.310) 
DISXMANt   0.067*** 
(2.833) 
0.066*** 
(2.921) 
IFRSt*DISXMANt   -0.012 
(-0.296) 
-0.007 
(-0.185) 
TREAT_DOt*DISXMANt   -0.080** 
(-1.959) 
-0.077* 
(-1.955) 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DISXMA
Nt 
-  0.067 
(1.108) 
0.050 
(0.824) 
SIZEt  0.002 
(0.609) 
0.002 
(0.50 6) 
0.005 
(1.425) 
ROAt  0.136** 
(2.054) 
0.336*** 
(7.031) 
0.087 
(1.302) 
CFOt  0.418*** 
(5.444) 
-0.136* 
(-1.748) 
0.104 
(1.185) 
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TABLE 8.5 (continued) 
LEVt  0.011 
(0.348) 
0.015 
(0.486) 
0.004 
(0.152) 
LOSSt  -0.004 
(0.296) 
-0.003 
(-0.179) 
-0.004 
(-0.316) 
AUDITORt  0.002 
(0.142) 
0.012 
(1.031) 
0.007 
(0.562) 
Number of observations  2,196 2,196 2,196 
Adjusted R2  20.60% 21.60% 23.80% 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All the test results use a two-tailed t-test except 
the three-way interactions, TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DA,t TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*SLSMANt and 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DISXMANt  which use a one-talied t-test. T-statistics are in parentheses. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. The sample is based on a propensity score matching of treatment and 
control firms, where treatment firms are firms that operate in both the pre-IFRS (2002-30 December2005) and post-
IFRS (31 December 2005-2009) periods and report discontinued operations in the post-IFRS period regardless of 
their pre-IFRS behaviour. Control firms are firms that operate in both test periods but do not report discontinued 
operations post-IFRS. The firms are matched using the nearest neighbour propensity score with a caliper of 0.015. 
UE_CEt  = unexpected core earnings calculated as the difference between reported and predicted core earnings, 
where the predicted value is calculated using the coefficients from the following equation: CEt + β0 +  β1CEt-1 + 
β2ATOt +  β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt      (1). TREAT_DOt is a dummy variable = 1 if a firm exists in some 
years in both pre- and post-IFRS and reports DO in post-IFRS regardless of pre-IFRS behaviour (treatment firms), 
and 0 if a firm exists in both periods but does not report DO post-IFRS irrespective of their pre-IFRS behaviour 
(control firms). DAt is discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the performance adjusted modified 
Jones model by Kothari et al. (2005): (TACCt/TAt-1) = b1 (1/TAt-1) + b2[(ΔREVt - ΔRECt)/TAt-1] + b3(PPEt/TAt-1) + 
b4ROAt-1  + εt.       (8). SLSMANt is the manipulation of sales, calculated as the negative of residuals from the following 
regression: (CFOt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt/TAt-1) + k3(SALESt/TAt-1 + εt       (9). DISXMANt is the 
manipulation of discretionary expenditure, which are measured as the negative of residuals from the following 
regression: (DISXt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt-1/TAt-1) + εt     (6). See Chapter Four, Section 4.3.9 for definition of 
variables in Equations (1), (8), (9) and (10) and control variables above. 
 
pre-IFRS period. The coefficient for the interaction term IFRSt*SLSMANt, which 
measures the association between UE_CEt and the income-increasing management of 
sales activities for control firms in the post-IFRS period, is insignificant (θ8 = -0.040, t = 
-0.454). Therefore, there is no significant difference in the association between UE_CEt 
and SLSMANt for control firms post-IFRS relative to pre-IFRS. However, the combined 
effect for IFRSt*SLSMANt is significantly negative (-0.305 - 0.040 = -0.345, t = -3.920), 
suggesting that control firms are significantly less likely to manipulate sales activities to 
influence core earnings post-IFRS. 
The coefficient for the interaction term TREAT_DOt*SLSMANt, which measures the 
association between UE_CEt and SLSMANt for treatment firms in the pre-IFRS period, 
is insignificant (θ12 = -0.157, t = -1.480) suggesting that there is no significant 
difference in the association between UE_CEt and SLSMANt for treatment firms 
compared to control firms pre-IFRS. The combined effect for TREAT_DOt*SLSMANt is 
significantly negative (-0.305 - 0.157 = -0.462, t = -4. 358), indicating that treatment 
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firms are significantly less likely to manipulate sales activities to increase core earnings 
post-IFRS.  
The test variable, TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*SLSMANt, is insignificant (θ13 = 0.215, t =1. 
421), providing no support for H2c(ii). Hence, there is no significant difference in the 
association between unexpected core earnings and real sales manipulation for treatment 
firms post-IFRS, relative to their own behaviour pre-IFRS, and the behaviour of control 
firms post-IFRS. The combined coefficient for TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*SLSMANt size 
remains insignificant (-0.305 - 0.157 + 0.215 = -0. 247, t = -0.961), indicating that firms 
that reported DO post-IFRS, are unlikely to manipulate sales activities to increase core 
earnings in the post-IFRS period.  
Column (2) of Table 8.5 also reports the findings for H2c(iii) tests, whether the 
opportunistic manipulation of discretionary expenditure is reduced following the 
introduction of AASB 5, which likely increased the scope for classification shifting via 
DO. The coefficient for DISXMANt is positively associated with UE_CEt (θ3 = 0.067, t 
= 2.833), consistent with the manipulation of discretionary expenditure by control firms 
to improve core earnings pre-IFRS. The coefficient for IFRSt*DISXMANt is 
insignificant (θ9 = -0.012, t = -0. 296), indicating that there is no significant difference 
in the association between UE_CEt and DISXMANt for control firms pre-IFRS relative 
to treatment firms pre-IFRS. The combined coefficient for IFRSt*DISXMANt size 
remains insignificant (0.067 – 0.012 = 0.055, t = 1.341), suggesting that control firms 
are unlikely to opportunistically reduce discretionary expenditure to increase core 
earnings in the post-IFRS period. The coefficient for TREAT_DOt*DISXMANt is 
significantly negative (θ14 = -0.080, t = -1.959), suggesting that there is a significant 
reduction in the association between UE_CEt and DISXMANt for treatment firms in the 
pre-IFRS period, relative to control firms in that period.  The combined coefficient for 
TREAT_DOt*DISXMANt size is insignificant (0.067 – 0.080 = -0.013, t = -0.317), thus, 
firms that report DO post-IFRS do not manipulate discretionary expenditure in the pre-
IFRS period.  
The test variable, TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DISXMANt, which measures the association 
between UE_CEt and DISXMANt for treatment firms in the post-IFRS period, relative to 
their pre-IFRS behaviour and the behaviour of control firms post-IFRS is insignificant 
(θ10 = 0.067, t = 1.108),  inconsistent with H2c(iii). This suggests that there is no 
significant difference in the association between unexpected core earnings and the 
opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenditure for firms who reported DO post-
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IFRS, relative to their pre-IFRS behaviour and, the behaviour of control firms post-
IFRS. The combined coefficient for TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*DISXMANt size is also 
insignificant (0.067 – 0.080 + 0.067 = 0.054, t = 0.535), thus, firms that reported DO 
post-IFRS do not manipulate discretionary expenditure in the post-IFRS period. The 
findings from the full model which includes all proxies for accrual-based and real 
earnings management, reported in Column (3), are similar in essence to the results in 
Columns (1) and (2).  
Overall, the findings in Table 8.5 provide evidence that are not consistent with H2c(i-
iii). The results show that there is no incremental difference in the association between 
unexpected core earnings and each of the alternative earnings management techniques 
for firms that reported DO post-IFRS, and these firms did not engage in any of these 
earnings management techniques in the post-IFRS period.  Therefore, the increased 
scope for opportunistic classification shifting through DO did not significantly affect 
firms’ behaviour with respect to manipulating accruals and real earnings activities.   
8.6.1 Sensitivity analysis for H2c(i-iii) – Alternative measures of DAt, SLSMANt 
and DISXMANt 
In sensitivity tests for H2c(i-iii) tests, I re-estimate Equation (13) and add %AIt  in each 
of the regressions to control for the possibility that DO and AI are substitutes and that 
firms that report DO opportunistically are likely to be the same firms that report AI for 
the same purpose. These regressions are estimated on the same PSM samples as for the 
main test. The results (untabulated), show that all test variables remain insignificant, 
consistent with the main findings. 
8.7 Robustness tests applied to all hypotheses – alternative measure of 
DAt, SLSMANt and DISXMANt 
As second robustness tests for H2a(i-iii) through to H2c(i-iii), I re-estimate Equations 
(11), (12), and (13) and replace the ‘signed’ observations of accruals and real earnings 
management with indicator variables that equal 1 if DAt are positive and 0 otherwise, 
and 1 if SLSMANt and DISXMANt are negative, and 0 otherwise, similar to Matsumoto 
(2002) and other subsequent studies (e.g. Lin et al. 2006; Haw et al. 2011).  I estimate 
these regressions on the same PSM samples used in the main tests.  
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The results for these sensitivity tests are reported in Appendix D.  Similar to the main 
tests, the variables of interest for tests of H2a(i-iii) are the three-way interactions 
TREAT1t*POSTt*POS_DAt, TREAT1t*POSTt*NEG_SLSMANt and 
TREAT1t*POSTt*NEG_DISXMANt. Each of these interaction terms are expected to be 
positive if firms that reported AI pre-IFRS engage in accrual-based, sales manipulation 
and/or discretionary expenditure manipulation to increase core earnings. The use of 
these measures provided no significant results. Overall, all results from the robustness 
tests for H2a(i-iii) are inconsistent with the main test results.  
In H2b(i-iii) tests, the test variables, TREAT2t*IFRSt*POS_DAt, 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt and TREAT2t*IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt, are each 
expected to be negative if firms that reported AI post-IFRS are significantly less likely 
to engage in alternative earnings management to improve core earnings. The results 
show that the results for H2b(i-iii) are  insignificant, providing no support for H2b(i-iii). 
Finally, the robustness test results for H2c(i-iii) focused on the interaction terms 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*POS_DAt, TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt and 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt, each of which is expected to be negative if firms 
that reported DO post-IFRS are significantly less likely to engage in any of these 
alternative methods to improve core earnings. The results show that 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*POS_DAt is significantly positively associated with unexpected 
core earnings, inconsistent with main test results and with H2c(i). The results for the 
test variables for H2c(ii) and H2c(iii) are insignificant, consistent with the main test 
results. These results show that the increased scope for classification shifting presented 
by the introduction of AASB 5 do not affect firms’ real earnings manipulation.  Overall, 
the use of dichotomous measures of alternative earnings management provided evidence 
that are mainly inconsistent with main test results. These results may reflect the cruder 
nature of these dichotomous measures. 
I also performed as third robustness tests for H2a(i), H2b(i) and H2c(i), tests using 
measures of discretionary working capital accruals (by excluding depreciation and 
amortisation accruals) rather than total discretionary accruals. I re-estimate Equations 
(11), (12) and (13) and replace DAt with discretionary working capital accruals 
(DWACt) on the same PSM samples as in the main tests. The results (untabulated) for 
the main test variable show slightly weaker (than main test results) but still significant 
support for H2a(i), that firms engage in discretionary working capital accruals 
manipulation when the scope for classification shifting is reduced. Results show no 
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evidence to support H2b(i) and H2c(i), that is, there is no significant reduction in 
discretionary working capital accruals following the adoption of AASB 101 and AASB 
5. 
8.8 Explanation for counter-intuitive results in the tests of hypotheses 
Some tests reported above include test coefficients which are significant in the opposite 
direction to that predicted. Specifically in H2a(ii) tests (in both main and robustness), 
the coefficient for the test variable TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt is significantly negative, 
implying that there is significant reduction in sales manipulation in the post-IFRS 
period to improve core earnings by firms that reported AI post-IFRS. This may be due 
to a number of reasons. First, real earnings management is considered to be the most 
costly of the three types of earnings management methods (e.g. reduction in future 
profits if R&D are cut) because it must be implemented during the financial period (e.g. 
McVay 2006; Zang 2012). Hence, firms may have opted to manipulate accruals which 
can be done after the financial period end, significantly reducing the incidence of sales 
manipulation. Moreover, mechanisms through which firms may be able to manipulate 
sales, such as discounting or relaxation of credit terms, or channel stuffing are unlikely 
to be feasible for a significant proportion of Australian firms (e.g. mining firms) which 
sell commodities at prices dictated by international markets. Moreover, abnormal cash 
from operations which is used as a proxy for sales manipulation can be affected in 
different directions by other real activities manipulations such as the reduction of 
discretionary expenses and overproductions. Alternatively, the result may reflect noise 
in the estimation of SLSMANt.   
8.9 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter reported the findings of hypotheses tests for H2a(i) through to H2c(iii). 
H2a(i-iii) examine whether the restriction on the scope for classification shifting 
imposed by the amendments to AASB 1018 in 2002 resulted in an increased use of 
accrual-based or real earnings management to increase core earnings. H2b(i-iii) 
examine whether the increased scope for AI-based classification shifting resulting from 
the 2005 implementation of AASB 101, which permitted firms to report additional line 
items and sub-headings on the income statement, reduced the use of accrual-based and 
real earnings management to increase core earnings. Finally, H2c(i-iii) examine whether 
251 
 
a further increase to the scope for classification shifting via AASB 5 which  increased 
the scope for classifying items as DO, may have reduced firms’ management of 
accruals, sales activities and/or discretionary expenditure to improve core earnings. A 
summary of the findings of hypothesis tests are reported in Table 8.6. 
Tests comprise regressions of unexpected level of core earnings on accrual-based 
earnings management and the two proxies for real earnings management, sales 
manipulation and discretionary expenditure in the pre- and post-reform periods, in 
which dummy variables indicating firms which reported AI or DO in the period 
hypothesised to have the greater opportunity for AI/DO-based classification shifting 
(treatment firms) were interacted with each earnings management proxy, and a post-
reform dummy variable. All tests used a PSM sample of firms that reported AI or DO in 
the period hypothesised to allow greater scope for the abuse of AI/DO, and 
fundamentally similar firms that did not report AI/DO in that period. The three-way 
interactions between the treatment indicator, the post-reform indicator and the earnings 
management proxies represented the test variables.  
Tests of H2a(i) focused on the interaction term TREAT1t*POSTt*DAt. The coefficient 
for this interaction term is significantly positive, consistent with the 2002 reform 
inducing substitution from AI-based classification shifting to accrual-based shifting, 
supporting H2a(i). Re-estimating these tests on an alternatively defined PSM sample, in 
which treatment firms are defined as those that exist in both pre- and post-2001/02 
amendments and report AI only in the pre-2001/02 period (not in the post-2001/02 
amendments period) generated similar results.  The use of dichotomous measures of 
accruals based and real earnings management (as per Matsumoto (2002) and Haw et al. 
(2011)) found no significant results, which may reflect the cruder nature of these 
measures. 
Taken together with H1a results, I interpret these findings as being consistent with the 
restriction on the scope for classification shifting in 2001/02 inducing an increased 
manipulation of accruals to improve earnings, therefore providing support for H2a(i). 
Hence, whilst the amendment to discourage the use of AI for opportunistic classification 
shifting appeared to have achieved its purpose, it inadvertently created another potential 
concern for regulators, by inducing the use of accrual-based earnings management as a 
substitute classification shifting method.  
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Tests of H2a(ii) and H2a(iii) focused on the interaction terms 
TREAT1t*POSTt*SLSMANt and TREAT1t*POSTt*DISXMANt, which must be positive if 
firms who had previously reported AI increased their propensity to manipulate sales 
activities or discretionary expenses for classification shifting purposes following the 
2002 reform. Neither the main tests, nor robustness tests found any evidence of 
substitution from AI-based classification shifting to real earnings management-based 
shifting. This may reflect noise in estimation of the real earnings management proxies, 
the costliness of managing real transactions (e.g. reduction in future profits if R&D are 
cut),  and/or the fact that the related decisions must be made during the fiscal year 
whereas the manipulation of accruals may occur after the fiscal year end (Zang 2012).  
Overall, the results for tests of the impact of the 2002 reforms provided evidence that 
firms substituted accrual-based earnings manipulation for classification shifting to 
manipulate core earnings, following the constraint in the scope for classification 
shifting. Thus, while the 2002 reform restricted AI-based classification shifting, any 
potential benefit of more transparent financial reports as a result may be offset by firms 
manipulating accruals to improve core earnings. No evidence was found regarding the 
opportunistic manipulation of sales activities and discretionary expenditure. 
The tests of H2b(i-iii) focused on the interaction term TREAT2t*IFRSt*DAt, which 
should be negative (i.e. the association between unexpected core earnings and DAt is 
less positive for firms who reported AI) if the adoption of AASB 101 reduced the need 
for firms to engage in accrual-based earnings management to manipulate core earnings. 
The coefficient for this three-way interaction term is significantly negative, consistent 
with a significant reduction in the manipulation of accruals as a result of the greater 
scope for classification shifting allowed by AASB 101, providing support for H2b(i). 
Given the weak results for classification shifting reported in Chapter Seven however, a 
plausible explanation for this result other than a substitution effect is that accruals 
manipulation reduced as a result of IFRS and the more active role of ASIC and auditors 
in promoting compliance with regulations. This calls for further examination in the 
future which sufficiently controls for the effects of IFRS and corporate governance. 
Re-estimating these tests on an alternatively defined PSM sample in which treatment 
firms are defined as those that existed in both pre- and post-IFRS and reported AI in 
post-IFRS only, generated substantially similar results. The use of dichotomous  
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TABLE 8.6 
Summary of Results For All Hypotheses Tests 
 
 H2a(i) H2a(ii) H2a(iii) H2b(i) H2b(ii) H2b(iii) H2c(i) H2c(ii) H2c(iii) 
Supported by main test Yes No  No Yes Yes No No No No 
Supported by robustness 
test 1: alternative treatment 
sub-sample 
Yes No  No Yes No No Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Supported by robustness 
test 2: alternative measures 
of accruals management 
and real earnings 
management 
No No No No No No No No No 
254 
 
measure of accrual-based earnings management produced no significant results which, 
again, may reflect the cruder nature of these measures. Although H1b results showed 
that firms who reported AI post-IFRS engaged in classification shifting in the post-IFRS 
period, caution should be exercised in interpreting H2b(i) test results together with H1b 
test results as providing evidence of the substitutive use of earnings management 
methods, since H1b results did not provide evidence of greater classification shifting 
post-IFRS relative to pre-IFRS. 
Tests of H2b(ii) and H2b(iii) focused on the interaction terms 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*SLSMANt, and TREAT2t*IFRSt*DISXMANt which must both be 
negative if the increased scope for classification shifting resulted in a reduction in the 
manipulation of sales and discretionary expenditure by firms that reported AI following, 
the 2005 reform. The main test for H2b(ii) provided evidence of a significant reduction 
in sales manipulation, consistent with H2b(ii). Re-estimating these tests on an 
alternatively defined PSM sample (similar to H2b(i)), and the use of dichotomous 
measure of sales manipulation, however, produced no such evidence.  Tests of H2b(iii) 
provided no evidence of a significant reduction in the manipulation of discretionary 
expenditure from neither the main nor the robustness tests, which once more, may 
reflect noise in the estimation of DISXMANt and the costliness of real transactions (in 
terms of the effect on future benefits and/or the need to make decisions during the 
financial year).  
Overall, the results for the tests of the impact of the replacement of AASB 1018 by 
AASB 101 provided evidence that firms that reported AI post-IFRS, significantly 
reduced accrual-based and real sales manipulation to increase core earnings, following 
the increase in scope for classification shifting provided by the reform.  Although these 
findings appear to suggest that firms that reported AI post-IFRS may have substituted 
accrual-based and real sales manipulation with classification shifting following the 
adoption of AASB 101, caution should be exercised when interpreting these results 
because the results from tests on whether there was greater classification shifting post-
IFRS following the amendment, produced no evidence to that effect although there is 
some evidence of classification shifting in that period. 
Tests of H2c(i-iii) focused on the interaction  terms TREAT_DOt*IFRS*DAt,  
TREAT_DOt*IFRS*SLSMANt  and TREAT_DOt*IFRS*DISXMANt, which must all be 
negative if the increased scope for classification shifting via DO resulted in the 
decreased manipulation of accruals and real activities following the introduction of 
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AASB 5 in 2005. Neither the main, nor the robustness tests produced any evidence of 
the substitution from accruals and real earnings management to AI-based classification 
shifting.   
In summary, the findings for H2a(i) showed that while the amendment to inhibit 
classification shifting was warranted, it resulted in other consequences such as the 
increased use of alternative earnings management methods such as accrual-based 
manipulation. Thus, any positive outcome from the amendment may have been offset 
by accrual-based earnings management. The results suggest that these effects must be 
considered when amendments to financial reporting regulations are proposed. Also, the 
findings of H2b(i) and H2b(ii) revealed that firms did not engage in alternative earnings 
management when the scope for classification shifting was increased. This may 
corroborate McVay’s (2006) claim that classification shifting is the least costly of the 
earnings management methods. Finally, the findings for H2c(i-iii), provide no evidence 
in support of the hypotheses, hence, the increased scope for classification shifting via 
DO had no effect on firms’ alternative earnings management behaviour. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis examined the impact of three Australian regulatory amendments affecting 
the scope for classifying and presenting non-recurring components of earnings, upon 
firms’ classification shifting practices to improve core earnings, and on the propensity 
to use alternative earnings management such as accrual-based and real earnings 
management. My first research question investigated whether amendments to the 
standard AASB 1018, effective for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002 
and which restricted the scope for reporting and classifying abnormal items on the 
income statement (following prior amendment to the same standard, effective for 
financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2001), reduced the incidence of 
classification shifting. My next research question examined whether AASB 101, 
effective for financial periods ending on or after 1 January 2005, and which relaxed 
prior restrictions on classifying and reporting non-recurring items, induced greater 
classification shifting. I then examined whether the introduction of another standard, 
AASB 5, which increased the scope for classifying and reporting discontinued 
operations on the income statement (effective at the same time as AASB 101), resulted 
in greater classification shifting to increase core earnings. My final research question 
examined the impact of each of the three regulatory amendments on firms’ use of 
alternative earnings management methods to improve core earnings. There is evidence 
(e.g. Cohen et al. 2008) that the reduction in one type of earnings management 
following the enactment of regulation may not provide evidence of effective regulation 
but that firms have simply substituted such earnings management type with another. 
Similarly, it is possible that increasing the scope for classification shifting may have an 
impact on firms’ use of alternative earnings management tools, since McVay (2006) 
claims that classification shifting is a low-cost method of earnings management. Thus I 
examined whether the regulatory amendments affecting the scope for classifying and 
reporting earnings components affected the use of accrual-based and/or real earnings 
manipulation.     
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These questions are interesting and important for the following reasons. First, there is 
evidence (in the US and UK) that firms engage in classification shifting using special 
and exceptional items to improve core earnings to meet earnings targets, providing 
evidence of another viable earnings management mechanism that firms can use. Such 
manipulation affects the quality of earnings and subsequently the decisions of 
stakeholders however, there has been no comprehensive empirical investigation of this 
type of earnings management in Australia even though there were concerns about the 
abusive reporting of abnormal items by firms that partly led to the regulatory 
amendments to prohibit the reporting of profit sub-totals before and after abnormal 
items (AASB 1018). Opponents argued that this amendment could constrain the ability 
of firms to signal the temporary nature of abnormal items. Further amendments were 
effected upon the adoption of IFRS (AASB 101 and AASB 5) which also affected the 
classification and reporting of earnings components. Whilst AASB 1018 may reduce the 
scope for classification shifting, AASB 101 and AASB 5 may increase the scope for 
classification shifting through abnormal items and discontinued operations, 
respectively. All these amendments have the potential to affect firms’ earnings 
management behaviour which may potentially impair the quality of earnings, and 
subsequently affect users’ decision making. However, the impact of these amendments 
has not yet been examined.  
Furthermore, prior evidence suggests that restricting one type of earnings management 
may induce the greater use of an alternative type of earnings management (e.g. Cohen et 
al. 2008).  Hence, it is possible that the 2002 restriction on the scope for classification 
shifting may have encouraged the increased use of accruals and/or real earnings, which 
may have greater adverse impact on the quality of earnings than classification shifting. 
On the other hand, it is interesting to know whether the increased scope for 
classification shifting through the 2005 amendments resulted in firms substituting 
accrual-based and real earnings management with classification shifting, which has 
been argued to be the least costly of the three methods. Examining these issues provides 
evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of these regulations and whether firms use a 
portfolio of earnings management tools as substitutes to improve core earnings. Once 
more, no prior research has investigated these issues directly, and as such my research 
may help enhance our understanding of firms’ earnings management behaviour so that 
regulations can be carefully considered, and so that investors and other stakeholders are 
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made aware of the effects of these issues on the quality of financial reports for their 
decision making.   
In this chapter, I summarise my study starting with a summary of findings in Section 
9.2. I then discuss the implications of my findings in Section 9.3, followed in Section 
9.4 by the contributions of my study. Finally, Section 9.5 discusses the limitations of 
this study and makes suggestions for future research.  
9.2 Summary of findings  
Tests of the extent of classification shifting in the pre-2001/02 period and the impact on 
classification shifting behaviour of the reforms to AASB 1018 (H1a), generate evidence 
consistent with my prediction. In the pre-2001/02 period, abnormal items are 
significantly positively associated with unexpected core earnings, and are significantly 
negatively associated with unexpected change in core earnings in that period, consistent 
with abnormal items being used to engage in opportunistic classification shifting pre-
2001/02. While I find no significant change in the association between abnormal items 
and the levels of core earnings after the 2001/02 reforms, there is a significant reduction 
in the extent to which effects of abnormal items on core earnings reverse in the 
following year. Further, examination of the combined effect size of abnormal items in 
the ‘changes’ model that there is no evidence of significant opportunistic classification 
shifting in the post-2001/02 amendments period. 
I interpret these findings as suggesting that classification shifting using abnormal items 
is prevalent in the pre-2001/02 period, consistent with US evidence (e.g. McVay 2006; 
Fan et al. 2010), but that this opportunistic behaviour is absent post-2001/02 
amendments. Although this does not directly support of H1a, there is some indirect 
evidence that firms did not engage in classification shifting post-2001/02 and that the 
reforms at least restricted this opportunistic behaviour. Sensitivity tests produced 
substantively similar results. The findings provide empirical evidence not previously 
available to validate the concerns about the opportunistic classification of abnormal 
items. It appears that the firms that continued to report abnormal items post-2001/02 did 
so for the purpose of signalling the temporary nature of those items than to influence 
core earnings.  
H1b predicts that firms engage in greater classification shifting using abnormal items 
post-IFRS following the adoption of AASB 101, which relaxed restrictions over the 
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reporting of additional line items, headings and sub-totals on the income statement. I 
estimated test regressions on three samples similar to those for H1a. Results from tests 
based on the first two samples find no evidence of a change in the association between 
abnormal items and unexpected core earnings following the 2005 reform (AASB 101), 
but that a significant association between abnormal items and unexpected core earnings 
persists. Results from the ‘changes’ model also find no evidence of the predicted impact 
of the introduction of AASB 101. 
For tests of H1b based on the propensity score matched sample, I find no evidence of a 
reduced association between unexpected core earnings and abnormal items following 
the 2005 reform, although a significant relationship between these variables persists in 
the post-IFRS period. Thus firms reporting abnormal items continue to report 
abnormally high unexpected core earnings post-IFRS. While there is no significant 
difference in the extent to which the impact on unexpected core earnings of abnormal 
items reverses post-reform relative to pre-reform, the combined effect size for abnormal 
items is negative and significant in the post-IFRS period. Thus, the results for the 
propensity score matched sample suggest that firms engaged in classification shifting 
via abnormal items to increase core earnings following the adoption of AASB 101, and 
that no significant classification shifting behaviour existed prior to IFRS adoption. 
While this does not directly support H1b, there is some indirect (and weak) evidence 
that classification shifting may have been encouraged by relaxing the restrictions on the 
reporting of additional line items and sub-totals on the income statement.      
H1c predicts that firms engage in classification shifting via discontinued operations 
following the adoption of AASB 5 which increased the scope for classifying items as 
discontinued operations. This hypothesis is tested by observing behaviour in the post-
IFRS period only, because the incidence of reported discontinued operations in the pre-
IFRS period was too low to use as the basis for meaningful tests of changes. Tests based 
on an unrestricted sample find a significant association between discontinued operations 
and current year unexpected core earnings, but find no evidence of reversal in the 
following year. However, results based on the propensity score matched sample, which 
are arguably less affected by statistical noise, support my prediction: abnormal items are 
significantly positive in the ‘levels’ regression and significantly negative in the 
‘changes’ model. The propensity score matched sample findings therefore suggest that 
firms engage in classification shifting via discontinued operations to increase core 
earnings post-IFRS. The results are substantively similar for tests using an alternative 
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measure of discontinued operations which considers only firm-years with income-
decreasing discontinued operations. Sensitivity analyses also provide substantially 
similar results to the main findings from both samples. The findings from the propensity 
score matched sample therefore provide indirect evidence in support of H1c, and 
provide sufficient interest to examine the impact of AASB 5 on the use of alternative 
earnings management methods.  
Overall, the findings support the implications that firms engaged in classification 
shifting prior to the 2001/02 amendments which restricted the scope for classifying and 
reporting of abnormal items, and that this behaviour was not prevalent in the period 
immediately following the amendments. Although there is no evidence from the main 
samples to confirm that less restrictive regulations introduced in 2005 induced greater 
classification shifting using either abnormal items or discontinued operations, the 
propensity score matched samples provide indirect (and weak) evidence of firms 
engaging in classification shifting post-IFRS using abnormal items, and quite strong 
evidence of the use of discontinued operations to manipulate core earnings in this 
period. The results provide sufficient interest to investigate the impact of these 
regulations on the use of alternative earnings management methods.  
Tests of possible substitution effects of the reforms on alternative earnings management 
mechanisms were estimated on propensity score matched samples of firms that reported 
abnormal items (or discontinued operations) in the period hypothesised to have greater 
scope for classification shifting (treatment firms) and similar firms that did not report 
abnormal items or discontinued operations in that period (control firms). In H2a(i-iii), I 
predict that the AASB 1018 restriction on the scope for classification shifting induced 
greater use of accrual-based and/or real earnings management to improve core earnings 
post-2001/02 amendments. I find consistent evidence that firms which reported 
abnormal items pre-2001/02 have a greater association between discretionary accruals 
and unexpected core earnings post-2001/02 reforms, than they did pre-2001/02, and that 
this effect is stronger than for control firms. These findings provide evidence that firms 
who report abnormal items pre-2001/02 are significantly more likely to have 
manipulated accruals post-2001/02 amendments to improve core earnings compared to 
other firms. I interpret these as providing evidence that the 2001/02 reforms induced 
substitution of abnormal items-based classification shifting with accrual-based shifting.  
I find no evidence that the 2001/02 reforms induced firms to substitute either sales 
manipulation or a reduction in discretionary expenditure for classification shifting. In 
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fact, in the post-2001/02 reforms period, sales manipulation appears to be less strongly 
associated with unexpected core earnings for treatment firms than it is for control firms. 
The combined effect is significant in the opposite direction. Thus, there is no evidence 
of significant increase in the manipulation of either sales transactions or discretionary 
expenditure by firms that reported abnormal items prior to the 2001/02 amendments, 
following the restriction on classification shifting practices. 
H2b(i-iii) predict that the increased scope for classification shifting using abnormal 
items following the introduction of AASB 101 resulted in a reduction in the use of 
accrual-based and/or real earnings management to increase core earnings. I find 
evidence that firms reporting abnormal items in the post-IFRS period exhibit a weaker 
association between discretionary accruals and unexpected core earnings in the post-
IFRS period than is the case for control firms. I find similar results for tests of 
substitution away from sales manipulation, but find no significant change in behaviour 
regarding reduced discretionary expenditure. These results provide support for H2b(i) 
and H2b(ii), but reject H2b(iii).  
Overall, the results appear to suggest that firms that reported abnormal items post-IFRS 
may substitute classification shifting for accrual-based manipulation and real earnings 
management using sales manipulation to improve core earnings. However, caution 
should be exercised in interpreting these results given that there was no evidence from 
H1b of greater incidence of classification shifting in the post-IFRS period relative to the 
pre-IFRS period. There is only indirect evidence of the presence of classification 
shifting post-IFRS using abnormal items. The fact that IFRS adoption may have had 
multiple other unobserved effects of the scope for earnings management cannot be 
discounted. 
H2c(i-iii) predict that increasing the scope for classification shifting via discontinued 
operations following the introduction of AASB 5 resulted in the reduction in the 
manipulation of accruals and/or real transactions. However, none of my main tests or 
sensitivity analyses find evidence of greater substitution away from accrual-based or 
real earnings management for firms reporting discontinued operations in the post-IFRS 
period. Overall, H2c(i-iii) are rejected.   
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9.3 Implications of the findings 
My findings have several implications. First, findings of H1a tests provide empirical 
evidence not previously available in Australia to validate the concerns about the 
opportunistic classification of abnormal items that partly prompted the amendment to 
restrict the scope for classifying and reporting abnormal items. Second, the findings 
provide evidence that, in a sufficiently lax regulatory environment, classification 
shifting is a viable earnings management tool that is also used by Australian firms to 
improve core earnings, confirming findings of recent studies based in the US (McVay 
2006; Barua et al. 2010; Fan et al. 2010; Siu and Faff 2013).  
My findings are also useful in evaluating the effectiveness of standards and whether it 
was (and potentially is) worth restricting opportunistic classification. From the findings 
of H1a tests, the incidence of classification shifting that was evident for the pre-2001/02 
period was absent following the amendment to AASB 1018 in 2001/02, to the extent 
that  in the post-2001/02 reforms period there was no evidence of the significant 
reversal of unexpected core earnings associated with abnormal items, indicating that 
firms that continued to identify and report abnormal items post-restriction did so for the 
purpose of signalling the temporary nature of those items than to influence core 
earnings. These findings appear to provide justification for the amendment to AASB 
1018. However, results from tests of H2a(i) present an unfavourable assessment of the 
amendment. Although the 2002 amendment achieved the desired effect of restricting 
classification shifting to artificially improve core earnings, the amendment induced an 
undesirable effect by encouraging the substitution of accrual-based earnings 
management for classification shifting. Thus, the positive outcome of the 2002 
amendment on financial statement credibility has been offset by firms’ engagement in 
accrual-based earnings management to improve perceived profitability. The increased 
use of accrual-based earnings management is likely to be a potentially bigger threat than 
classification shifting on the quality of reported financial information because accrual-
based earnings management mechanically affects future earnings, whereas classification 
shifting only directly impacts current core earnings. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), 
the reduction in classification shifting is not in itself evidence of effective regulation. 
Rather, firms have simply substituted one form of earnings management with another. 
To that end, restricting the scope for classification shifting may not have been worth 
pursuing. Therefore, standard setters may be informed by the findings of this study to 
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carefully consider the substitution effect when proposing future regulations and/or 
amendments.  
The results of tests of H1b and H1c and their corresponding tests of earnings 
management substitution have less clear implications for regulators and investors. 
While there is evidence of firms engaging in classification shifting using abnormal 
items and discontinued operations following the adoption of AASB 101 and AASB 5, 
there is significant evidence of a change in behaviour only in the case of AASB 101. 
The behaviour observed in tests relating to discontinued operation does not appear to 
have been countered by a reduction in other earnings management behaviour. Whilst 
standard setters may consider amending these standards to restrict the scope for 
classification shifting, they should carefully consider the potential for substitution 
across alternative earnings management methods, and an evaluation of each method’s 
impact on the credibility of earnings must be undertaken.   
Also, although classification shifting does not affect GAAP earnings, it can significantly 
impact investor expectations since managers have discretion over the classification of 
expenses (McVay 2006), and core earnings are more directly associated with investment 
decisions and stock prices (Kinney and Trezevant 1997; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Gu 
and Chen 2004). My findings inform investors by highlighting the extent to which and 
the methods by which firms manipulate core earnings to influence investor 
expectations. Other regulators such as ASIC would also find this information useful to 
help better allocate their resources in ensuring a more transparent reporting 
environment. Likewise, since McVay (2006) claims that auditors might not be able to 
verify the appropriate classification of items because the allocation of expenses to 
specific accounts can be subjective, auditors may use the information in this study to 
help with their audit planning and resource allocation. Other corporate monitors such as 
board directors may take notice of this study’s findings to help with their assessment of 
firm and management performance so that more appropriate contracting benchmarks 
can be determined. Finally, countries who are looking towards convergence with IFRS 
may find this study’s results useful when considering amendments and/or new 
accounting standards to restrict earnings management. Overall, users of financial reports 
should scrutinise reported core earnings and non-recurring items more carefully.     
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9.4 Contributions of the study 
This study has both practical and theoretical contributions. First, as discussed in Section 
9.4, the primary significance of this study is to provide evidence to inform standard 
setters on the effectiveness of the regulations affecting classification shifting. My 
findings show that it appears that restricting the scope for classification shifting might 
be more harmful to earnings’ credibility than if it was not restricted. Hence, standard 
setters need carefully consider the earnings management substitution effect of 
regulations before they are implemented. The findings are also quite useful to investors, 
other regulators such as ASIC and other stakeholders such as auditors and board 
directors who rely on financial reports for decision making. Countries that are looking 
at converging with IFRS may want to consider the implications of this study’s findings 
when discussing standards relating to the classification and reporting of earnings’ 
components. 
This study also contributes to the earnings management literature in several ways. It 
extends the current limited literature on classification shifting (both in Australia and 
abroad) by providing evidence not previously available that classification shifting is 
also prevalent in Australia, as well as evidence on the impact of regulations affecting 
the scope for classification shifting which furthers our knowledge about classification 
shifting and adverse consequences of restrictive regulations. Moreover, my study 
provides further support for the soundness of the McVay (2006) models of expected 
core earnings that have been criticised as being subject to design bias (Barua and 
Cready 2008) and that McVay herself states was imperfect. In my study, I remove 
accruals from the expected core earnings and change in core earnings models and 
produce results similar to McVay (2006), and in my test models I include control 
variables resulting in some significant results. Consistent with Barua et al. (2010), my 
results suggest that McVay’s (2006) insignificant results when she removed accruals 
from her models of core earnings may be due to the lack of adequate control variables in 
her test models rather than a model bias. Finally, this study provides support for current 
limited evidence that firms substitute between a portfolio of earnings management 
techniques to opportunistically increase earnings (e.g. Lin et al. 2006; Cohen et al. 
2008; Haw et al. 2011; Zang 2012; Siu and Faff 2013).  
Overall, this study enhances our understanding and knowledge of firms’ earnings 
management practices.  
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9.5 Study limitations and suggestions for further research 
The findings of this study may be interpreted with caution due to some research design 
limitations. First, the exclusion of observations with sales below $500,000 to reduce the 
impact of outliers because sales are used as the scalar for variables in the core earnings 
model may reduce the generality of the findings. This sample selection procedure 
eliminates small firms and firms that do not report sales but report other revenues and 
income-decreasing non-recurring items and may therefore engage in classification 
shifting, yet prior research documents that firms with low sales are often poor 
performers. Therefore, the exclusion may bias the results towards large and more 
successful firms because the effect of those firms with sales below $500,000 but that 
report income-decreasing abnormal items, are technically eliminated. This bias, 
however, is expected to reduce the variation in my measure of classification shifting 
(McVay 2006). 
Second, the observations of abnormal items and other non-recurring items examined in 
this study are as reported by Morningstar which is based on the judgement of analysts 
following each firm. They do not necessarily reflect in all cases the non-recurring items 
reported by firms in their financial reports. Hence, my research method may only 
capture firms’ classification shifting behaviour reflected in core earnings identified by 
Morningstar analysts. Third, the validity of my results may also be affected by the 
model of discretionary accruals used which has also been a subject of concern in the 
literature. There is a possibility that the results may not fully capture discretionary 
accrual-based earnings management. Similarly, the models of real earnings management 
may not fully capture real earnings management practices. Specifically, the use of 
abnormal cash from operations as a measure of sales manipulation can be problematic 
in that abnormal cash from operations can be affected by other real activities 
manipulation such as overproduction or discretionary expense reduction. These 
limitations however, are not expected to have serious implications for the validity of the 
results of this study.  I believe my study does not suffer from the potential bias of 
including accruals in the models of expected core earnings acknowledged by McVay 
(2006) in her study because I exclude accruals from my models. 
The findings of my study regarding the effect of AASB 101 and AASB 5 upon IFRS 
adoption could have been weakened by the fact that the 2005 reforms coincided with 
changes to many standards, which could have affected the scope for different forms of 
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earnings management. The potential for multiple simultaneous effects may have 
reduced the chance of identifying an effect of the 2005 reforms on either classification 
shifting or accrual-based and/or real earnings manipulation. Moreover, in my analyses, I 
assumed that the activities of ASIC, auditors and board of directors did not change over 
the study period in a way that would affect firms’ financial reporting. However, other 
reforms post 2001/02 such as the ASIC review and CLERP 9 brought about changes 
that could have strengthened the financial reporting environment including prompting 
auditors to promote compliance with accounting standards as well as increasing the 
monitoring role of ASIC. These could have affected the opportunistic behaviour of 
firms other than accounting standards particularly in cases where there is no evidence of 
opportunistic behaviour.   
There are avenues for possible future research to extend this study and confirm its 
findings. First, the main tests of H1a only establish that there is no evidence of 
classification shifting as opposed to a reduction in classification shifting, thus further 
investigation of H1a using a model that sufficiently controls for performance such as 
including prior and current market returns is warranted.  Further examination of H1b 
and H1c are also warranted on an extended post-IFRS period beyond 2009. The main 
test results for these hypotheses find no evidence of classification shifting although the 
propensity score matched samples provide evidence to that effect. The detailed analysis 
of firms’ reporting of non-recurring items show that there was a reduction in the 
frequency of non-recurring items reported in 2005 and 2006 although there was greater 
scope for reporting these items compared to the preceding periods. The frequency of 
reporting non-recurring items only started increasing again in 2007. This trend may 
have had an impact on the main results as the potential for classification shifting may 
not have come to managers’ attention until later in the post-IFRS period. A longer study 
period may provide more robust results. Moreover, further investigation of H1b could 
examine specific abnormal items that are (not) amenable to classification shifting and 
relating to future performance improvement. 
Second, future studies may explore other measures of discretionary accruals and real 
earnings management such as overproduction as there is a possibility that the measures 
employed in this study may not have fully captured accrual-based and real earnings 
manipulation. Third, this study implies that discretionary accrual manipulation and real 
earnings management may have greater adverse impacts on the quality of earnings than 
classification shifting because both accrual-based and real earnings management affect 
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future earnings and cash flow. I leave empirical confirmation of this argument to future 
research. Fourth, it would be interesting to know whether classification shifting is 
concentrated around firms that serially report abnormal items or discontinued 
operations. Finally, no study has yet investigated the possibility of using income-
increasing non-recurring items to improve core earnings which has the potential to 
mislead investors about firm performance.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Alternative model of expected core earnings and expected 
change in core earnings 
The following tables, Table A1 and Table A2 report results of models of expected core 
earnings and expected changes in core earnings, respectively, replicating McVay (2006) 
which includes current and lagged accruals (ACCRUALSt , ACCRUALSt+1). The 
findings are similar to McVay’s (2006) results. 
Model of Expected Core Earnings with Accruals included 
TABLE A1 
Model of Expected Core Earnings - Levels 
Dependent Variable: CEt 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Mean 
coefficient 
(one-tailed 
t-statistics) 
Percent 
Significant 
t-statistics 
one-tailed 
tests 
Percent with 
Sign in the 
Predicted 
Direction 
Intercept 
 
0.074*** 
(6.012) 
  CEt-1 
+ 
0.512*** 
(20.712) 
89.47 94.74 
ATOt 
- 
-0.007 
(-1.047) 
57.89 78.95 
ACCRUALSt-1 
- 
-0.159*** 
(-6.124) 
57.89 63.16 
ACCRUALSt  
+ 
0.354*** 
(11.393) 
89.47 94.74 
ΔSALESt 
+ 
0.070*** 
(4.191) 
63.16 84.21 
NEG_ΔSALESt+1 
+ 
0.101 
(0.432) 
52.63 78.95 
Number of observations 
 
7,309 
  Adjusted R2 
 
82.10% 
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TABLE A1 (continued) 
There are 7,309 observations and 252 industry-year regressions for the period 1995 to 2009 excluding 2001 
observations. Observations for the year 2001 are excluded because they are omitted from the hypotheses tests as the 
first amendment to AASB 1018 was operative only for the financial period ending 30 June 2001. AASB 1018 was 
again amended, operative for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002. Hence, the first amendment was only 
effective for one year. Regressions are estimated by industry and fiscal year following equation (1) that is based on 
the model of expected core earnings developed by McVay (2006): CEt = β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ACCRUALSt-1 + 
β4ACCRUALSt + β5ΔSALESt + β6NEG_ΔSALESt + εt   (1); where CEt is core earnings, calculated as EBITDAt/Salest, 
where EBITDAt is earnings before interest, income tax, depreciation, amortisation, abnormal items and discontinued 
operations. ATOt is asset turnover ratio, defined as Salest/((NOAt + NOAt-1)/2), where NOA, net operating assets, is 
equal to operating assets - operating liablities.  
Operating assets is calculated as total assets - cash and short-term investments. Operating liabilities is calculated as 
total assets - total debt - book value of common and preferred equity - minority interests, where average net operating 
assets is required to be positive. ACCRUALSt is operating accruals, calculated as ((Net Income before extraordinary 
items – cash from operations)/Sales). ∆SALESt is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t: ((Salest - 
Salest-1)/Salest-1). NEG_∆SALESt is ∆SALESt if ∆SALESt is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Test results use a one-tailed t-test. T-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorised at 5% and 95% level.  
 
Model of Expected Change in Core Earnings with Accruals included 
TABLE A2 
Model of Expected Core Earnings - Changes 
Dependent Variable: ∆CEt+1 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Mean 
coefficient 
(one-tailed 
t-statistics) 
Percent 
Significant 
t-statistics 
one-tailed 
tests 
Percent with 
Sign in the 
Predicted 
Direction 
Intercept  0.034*** 
(3.526) 
  
CEt - -0.171*** 
(0.000) 
89.74 94.74 
ΔCEt - -0.030 
(-4.175) 
57.89 78.95 
ΔATOt+1 + 0.035* 
(1.684) 
36.84 57.89 
ACCRUALSt - -0.141*** 
(-3.696) 
52.63 89.47 
ACCRUALSt+1  + 0.261*** 
(9.107) 
100.00 100.00 
ΔSALESt+1 + 0.094* 
(1.672) 
36.84 57.89 
NEG_ΔSALESt+1 + 0.214** 
(2.350) 
73.68 84.21 
Number of observations  7,309   
Adjusted R2  76.60%   
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TABLE A2 (continued) 
There are 7,309 observations and 252 industry-year regressions for the period 1995 to 2009 excluding 2001 
observations. Observations for the year 2001 are excluded because they are omitted from the hypotheses tests as the 
first amendment to AASB 1018 was operative only for the financial period ending 30 June 2001. AASB 1018 was 
again amended, operative for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002. Hence, the first amendment was only 
effective for one year. Regressions are estimated by industry and fiscal year following equation (1), based on the 
model of expected change in core earnings developed by McVay (2006): ∆CEt+1 = β0 +  β1CEt + β2∆CEt+1 + 
β3∆ATOt+1 + β4ΔACCRUALSt + β5ACCRUALSt+1 + β6ΔSALESt+1 + β7NEG_ΔSALESt+1 + νt+1 (2); where CEt is core 
earnings, calculated as EBITDAt/Salest, where EBITDAt is earnings before interest, income tax, depreciation, 
amortisation, abnormal items and discontinued operations. ATOt is asset turnover ratio, defined as Salest/((NOAt + 
NOAt-1)/2), where NOA, net operating assets, is equal to operating assets - operating liabilities. Operating assets is 
calculated as total assets - cash and short-term investments. Operating liabilities is calculated as total assets - total 
debt - book value of common and preferred equity - minority interests, where average net operating assets is required 
to be positive. ACCRUALSt is operating accruals, calculated as ((Net Income before extraordinary items - cash from 
operations)/Sales). ∆SALESt+1 is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t: ((Salest - Salest-1)/Salest-1). 
NEG_∆SALESt+1 is ∆SALESt+1 if ∆SALESt+1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. Test results use a one-tailed t-test. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at 5% and 95% level.  
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APPENDIX B: Reporting non-recurring items in the financial reports by year 
 
 
 
TABLE B1 
Where Firms Report Non-Recurring Items in the Financial Reports - By Period 
 
Panel A: Negative Non-Recurring Items 
Year 
  
Reported on  
Face of the 
Income  
Statement 
(1) 
Percent 
per Year 
(2)  
Reported in 
the Notes to 
Accounts 
(3) 
Percent 
per Year 
(4)  
Total  
NI 
Firm-Years 
(5) 
Percent  
per Year 
(6)  
% NI Reported 
on the Face 
of the Income 
Statement 
(7) = (1)/(5) 
% NI 
Reported 
in the Notes  
to Accounts 
(8) = (3)/(5) 
1995                 178  10.72%  12  1.39% 190  7.52% 93.68%   6.32% 
1996                 204  12.28%  14  1.62% 218  8.63% 93.58%   6.42% 
1997                 229  13.79%  11  1.27% 240  9.50% 95.42%   4.58% 
1998                 247  14.87%    7  0.81% 254 10.05% 97.24%   2.76% 
1999                 231  13.91%    9  1.04% 240  9.50% 96.25%   3.75% 
2000                 229  13.79%    4  0.46% 233  9.22% 98.28%   1.72% 
2002                   41  2.47% 171 19.75% 212  8.39% 19.34% 80.66% 
2003                   31  1.87% 128 14.78% 159 6.29% 19.50% 80.50% 
2004                   23  1.38% 110 12.70% 133 5.26% 17.29% 82.71% 
2005                   34  2.05%  79  9.12% 113 4.47% 30.09% 69.91% 
2006                   23  1.38%   57  6.58%  80 3.17% 28.75% 71.25% 
2007                   36  2.17%   81  9.35% 117 4.63% 30.77% 69.23% 
2008                   85  5.12%  110 12.70% 195 7.72% 43.59% 56.41% 
2009                   70  4.21%   73  8.43% 143 5.66% 48.95% 51.05% 
Total              1,661         100.00%         866   100.00%     2,527   100.00% 65.73% 34.27% 
         293 
 
 
 
TABLE B1 (continued) 
 Panel B: Positive Non-recurring Items 
      
Year 
 
Reported on  
Face of the 
Income  
Statement 
(1) 
Percent 
per Year 
(2)  
Reported in 
the Notes to 
Accounts 
(3) 
Percent  
per Year 
 (4) 
Total  
NI 
Firm-Years 
(5) 
Percent 
per Year 
(6)  
% NI Reported 
on the Face 
of the Income 
Statement 
(7) = (1)/(5) 
% NI 
Reported 
in the Notes  
to Accounts 
(8) = (3)/(5) 
1995      64 11.03%   17  3.41%     81  7.51%   79.01%   20.99% 
1996      82 14.14%    8  1.61%    90  8.35%   91.11%   8.89% 
1997      86 14.83%    5  1.00%    91  8.44%   94.51%   5.49% 
1998      89 15.34%    4  0.80%    93  8.63%   95.70%   4.30% 
1999      97 16.72%    3  0.60%  100  9.28%   97.00%   3.00% 
2000      36  6.21%  27  5.42%    63  5.84%   57.14%  42.86% 
2002      10  1.72%  79 15.86%    89  8.26%   11.24%  88.76% 
2003        9  1.55%  81 16.27%    90  8.35%   10.00%  90.00% 
2004     11  1.90%  86 17.27%    97  9.00%   11.34%  88.66% 
2005     20  3.45%  49  9.84%    69  6.40%   28.99%  71.01% 
2006     27  4.66%  42  8.43%    69  6.40%   39.13%  60.87% 
2007     13  2.24%  33  6.63%    46  4.27%   28.26%  71.74% 
2008     12  2.07%  29  5.82%    41  3.80%   29.27%  70.73% 
2009     24  4.14%  35  7.03%    59  5.47%   40.68%  59.32% 
Total    580         100.00%        498  100.00%        1,078   100.00%   53.80% 46.20% 
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TABLE B1 (continued) 
 
This table presents information about where in the financial statements firms report non-recurring items by year as recorded by Morningstar analysts. Firms may report non-recurring items 
either on the face of the income statement or in the notes to accounts. The information presented categorises items into negative and positive items and then into where they are presented.  Panel 
A presents yearly negative non-recurring items according to where in the financial reports they are disclosed. Panel B presents the yearly positive non-recurring item' based on where they are 
reported. Prior to the 2001/02 regulation reforms that prohibited the reporting of profits before and after abnormal items, firms mainly presented the aggregate non-recurring items on the face of 
the income statement with the details in the notes. After the reform, it was noted that firms used several ways and terms to present non-recurring items in the financial statements which are as 
follows: as individual line items on the face of the income statement either above or below operating profit; as significant, 'unusual' or 'non regular' items on the face of the income statement 
either above or below operating profit; as 'abnormal' items on the face of the income statement either above or below operating profit; individual items listed under 'significant, 'unusual' or 'non 
regular' items only in the notes accompanying the financial report; and as general notes under no specific headings in the notes to financial report.  
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APPENDIX C: Sensitivity test results for H1a, H1b and H1c 
Sensitivity test for H1a 
Sensitivity tests for H1a involves estimating separate regressions within each of the pre-
reform (1995-2000) and post-reform (2002-30 December 2005) periods, to allow for a 
different model specification in each period. I use propensity score matched samples of 
treatment and control firms, where treatment firms are those that reported abnormal 
items pre-reform regardless of their post-reform behaviour, and control firms are those 
that did not report abnormal items pre-reform irrespective of their post-reform 
behaviour. The results are reported in Table C1 below. 
TABLE C1 
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings and Future Unexpected Change 
in Core Earnings as a Percentage of Sales for each of the Reform Periods 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = UE_CEt 
Independent Variables 
Pre-reform Period  
(1995-2000) 
Post-reform Period 
(2002-30 December 
2005) 
Intercept 0.085 
(1.431) 
0.149*** 
(2.648) 
%AIt 0.665*** 
(4.269) 
0.825*** 
(7.210) 
SIZEt -0.006* 
(-1.919) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.888) 
ROAt 0.363*** 
(5.320) 
0.440*** 
(9.431) 
CFOt 0.206*** 
(3.925) 
0.090* 
(1.869) 
LEVt 0.042 
(1.530) 
0.093*** 
(3.082) 
LOSSt -0.021 
(-1.061) 
-0.011 
(-0.669) 
AUDITORt 0.015 
(1.406) 
0.007 
(0.633) 
Industry Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 978 
 
1,253 
Adjusted R2 17.20% 
 
 
18.40% 
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TABLE C1(continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = UE_∆CEt+1 
Independent Variables 
Pre-reform Period 
(1995-2000) 
Post-reform Period 
(2002-30 December 
2005) 
Intercept -0.111 
(-1.621) 
-0.141** 
(-2.431) 
%AIt -0.250* 
(1.396) 
-0.089 
(-0.754) 
SIZEt 0.005 
(1.325) 
0.007** 
(2.240) 
ROAt -0.033 
(-0.427) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.336) 
CFOt 0.072 
(1.201) 
0.129*** 
(2.598) 
LEVt 0.051 
(1.602) 
0.068** 
(2.185) 
LOSSt -0.010 
(-0.423) 
0.013 
(0.778) 
AUDITORt 0.001 
(0.064) 
-0.022* 
(-1.888) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Number of observations 978 1,253 
Adjusted R2 0.80% 1.60% 
 
Panel A reports results from the ‘levels’ model whereas Panel B reports results from the ‘changes’ model. 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. Samples for each period are based on propensity score matching of 
treatment and control firms, where treatment firms are those that reported abnormal items in the pre-
reform (1995-2000) period regardless of their post-reform (2002-30 December 2005) period, and control 
firms are those that did not report abnormal items in the pre-reform period regardless of their post-reform 
behaviour.   
 
Sensitivity test for H1b 
Sensitivity tests for H1b involves estimating separate regressions within each of the pre-
IFRS (2002-30 December 2005) and post-IFRS (31 December 2005-2009) periods, to 
allow for a different model specification in each period. I use propensity score matched 
samples of treatment and control firms, where treatment firms are those that reported 
abnormal items post-IFRS regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour, and control firms are 
those that did not report abnormal items post-IFRS irrespective of their pre-IFRS 
behaviour. The results are reported in Table C2 below. 
 
297 
 
 TABLE C2 
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings and Future Unexpected Change 
in Core Earnings as a Percentage of Sales for each of the Reform Periods 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = UE_CEt 
Independent Variables 
Pre-IFRS Period  
(2002-30 December 
2005) 
Post-IFRS Period 
(31 December 2005-
2009) 
Intercept 0.077 
(1.205) 
0.085 
(0.933) 
%AIt 0.638*** 
(5.372) 
0.555*** 
(3.389) 
SIZEt -0.004 
(-1.030) 
-0.004 
(-0.676) 
ROAt 0.408*** 
(8.816) 
0.507*** 
(8.922) 
CFOt 0.119** 
(2.349) 
-0.053 
(-0.871) 
LEVt 0.060** 
(2.033) 
-0.004 
(-0.110) 
LOSSt 0.007 
(0.419) 
-0.022 
(-1.034) 
AUDITORt -0.016 
(-1.362) 
0.018 
(1.199) 
Industry Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 1,321 
 
1,012 
Adjusted R2 18.30% 
 
20.00% 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = UE_∆CEt+1 
Independent Variables 
Pre-reform Period 
(1995-2000) 
Post-reform Period 
(2002-30 December 
2005) 
Intercept -0.112* 
(-1.748) 
-0.051 
(-0.572) 
%AIt -0.066 
(-0.552) 
-0.309* 
(-1.935) 
SIZEt 0.005 
(1.404) 
0.002 
(0.310) 
ROAt -0.026 
(-0.559) 
-0.168*** 
(-3.038) 
CFOt 0.037 
(0.729) 
0.220*** 
(3.732) 
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TABLE C2 (continued) 
LEVt 0.074** 
(2.497) 
-0.060* 
(-1.731) 
LOSSt 0.044*** 
(2.617) 
0.035* 
(1.700) 
AUDITORt -0.006 
(-0.470) 
0.032** 
(2.136) 
Industry Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of observations 1,321 
 
1,012 
Adjusted R2 1.30% 
 
2.90% 
 
Panel A reports results from the ‘levels’ model whereas Panel B reports results from the ‘changes’ model. 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. Samples for each period are based on propensity score matching of 
treatment and control firms, where treatment firms are those that reported abnormal items in the post-IFRS 
(31 December 2005-2009) period regardless of their pre-IFRS (2002-30 December 2005) period, and 
control firms are those that did not report abnormal items in the post-IFRS period regardless of their pre-
IFRS behaviour.   
 
Sensitivity test for H1c 
For sensitivity tests of H1c I add %AIt to both the ‘levels’ and ‘changes’ regressions to 
control for the possibility that firms that report DO opportunistically are likely to be the 
same firms that report AI opportunistically. I use the main sample and PSM samples as 
in the main test (See Chapter Seven, Section 7.6). The results are reported in Table 7.3A 
below. 
TABLE C3 
Regressions of Unexpected Core Earnings and Unexpected Change in Core 
Earnings on Discontinued Operations for the period 31 December 2005 - 2009 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = UE_CEt 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms 
 (1) 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms 
 (2) 
Propensity 
Score 
Matched 
Sample 
(3) 
Propensity 
Score 
Matched 
Sample 
(4) 
Intercept 
 
0.135** 
(2.435) 
0.136* 
(2.447) 
0.044 
(0.563) 
0.034 
(0.444) 
%DOt + 0.406*** 
(4.327) 
 0.658*** 
(3.238) 
 
%DO_NEGt +  0.964*** 
(4.481) 
 0.771*** 
(3.119) 
%AIt  0.881*** 
(7.442) 
0.860*** 
(7.278) 
0.563*** 
(3.596) 
0.542*** 
(3.119) 
SIZEt  -0.005 
(-1.520) 
-0.005 
(-1.578) 
-0.000 
(-0.002) 
0.000 
(0.051) 
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ROAt  0.487*** 
(12.732) 
0.484*** 
(12.700) 
0.467*** 
(8.808) 
0.457*** 
(8.677) 
CFOt  -0.060 
(-1.433) 
-0.055 
(-1.308) 
-0.040 
(-0.652) 
-0.030 
(-0.483) 
LEVt  0.003 
(0.127) 
0.005 
(0.204) 
-0.027 
(-0.991) 
-0.023 
(-0.667) 
LOSSt  -0.053*** 
(-3.481) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.517) 
-0.021 
(-0991) 
-0.020 
(-0.969) 
AUDITORt  -0.003 
(-0.338) 
-0.003 
(-0.315) 
0.009 
(0.589) 
0.009 
(0.603) 
Number of observations 2,186 2,186 1,062 1,062 
Adjusted R2 22.60% 22.70% 20.00% 19.90% 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = UE_∆CEt+1 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms 
 (1) 
All 
Morningstar 
Datalink 
Firms  
(2) 
Propensity 
Score 
Matched 
Sample 
 (3) 
Propensity 
Score 
Matched 
Sample 
 (4) 
Intercept 
 
-0.005 
(-0.083) 
-0.005 
(-0.087) 
-0.120 
(-1.570) 
-0.115 
(-1.503) 
%DOt - -0.074 
(-0.800) 
 -0.454** 
(-2.268) 
 
%DOt+1 ? -0.063 
(-0.732) 
 -0.038 
(-0.197) 
 
%DO_NEGt -  -0.064 
(-0.303) 
 -0.443* 
(-1.818) 
%DO_NEGt+1 ?  -0.085 
(-0.889) 
 -0.007 
(-0.059) 
%AIt 
 
-0.242** 
(-2.073) 
-0.238** 
(-2.038) 
-0.431*** 
(-2.811) 
-0.417*** 
(-2.715) 
SIZEt 
 
-0.001 
(-0.163) 
-0.000 
(-0.146) 
0.006 
(1.298) 
0.006 
(1.278) 
ROAt 
 
-0.261*** 
(-6.899) 
-0.258*** 
(-6.841) 
-0.231*** 
(-4.341) 
-0.224*** 
(-4.222) 
CFOt 
 
0.262*** 
(6.311) 
0.258*** 
(6.248) 
0.213*** 
(3.458) 
0.204*** 
(3.323) 
LEVt 
 
-0.010 
(-0.404) 
-0.010 
(-0.397) 
-0.035 
(-1.010) 
-0.037 
(-1.066) 
LOSSt 
 
-0.012 
(-0.808) 
-0.012 
(-0.812) 
0.031 
(1.498) 
0.029 
(1.438) 
AUDITORt 
 
0.021** 
(2.032) 
0.020** 
(2.004) 
0.015 
(1.013) 
0.015 
(0.978) 
Number of observations 2,186 2,186 1,040 1,040 
Adjusted R2 2.60% 2.60% 2.90% 2.70% 
Panel A reports results for the model of unexpected core earnings whereas Panel B reports results for the model of unexpected change in core 
earnings. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All the test results use a two-tailed t-test except for %DOt, 
%DO_NEGt, %DOt+1, and %DO_NEGt+1 which use a one-tailed t-test. T-statistics are in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorised 
at the 5% and 95% levels except for %DOt,  %DO_NEGt,  %DOt+1, and %DO_NEGt+1 which use winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. All 
variables are as defined in Chapter Four, Sections 4.3.2 to 4.3.4. 
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APPENDIX D: Robustness test regression models and results - 
alternative measures of DA, SLSMAN and DISXMAN 
Robustness test for H2a(i-iii) 
In addition to the robustness tests shown in Chapter Eight, I also re-estimate Equation 
(11) on the same sample of PSM treatment and control firms as in the main test. 
However, I replace the ‘signed’ measures of DA, SLSMAN, and DISXMAN with 
indicator variables POS_DA, NEG_SLSMAN, and NEG_DISXMAN, respectively. The 
full model is of the following general form: 
UE_CEt  =  φ0 + α1TREAT1t + φ2POS_DAt + φ3NEG_SLSMANt + φ4NEG_DISXMANt 
                   + φ5POSTt + φ6TREAT1t*POSTt + φ7POSTt*POS_DAt +  
        φ8POSTt*NEG_SLSMANt + φ9POSTt*NEG_DISXMANt +  
        φ10TREAT1*POS_DAt +   φ11TREAT1t*POSTt*POS_DAt + 
        φ12TREAT1t*NEG_SLSMANt  + φ13TREAT1t*POSTt*NEG_SLSMANt  
          + φ14TREAT1t*NEG_DISXMANt + φ15TREAT1t*POSTt*NEG_DISXMANt  
          + Controls + εt                    (15) 
 
Where, POS_DAt = 1 if discretionary accruals are positive, and 0 otherwise. 
NEG_SLSMANt = 1 if abnormal cash from operations are negative, and 0 otherwise. 
NEG_DISXMANt = 1 if abnormal discretionary expenses are negative, and 0 otherwise. 
TREAT1t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm exists in both pre- and post-
amendment periods and reports income-decreasing abnormal items in the pre- period 
irrespective of its post-amendment behaviour. Finally, UE_CEt is as defined in all other 
regressions. The variables of interest are the three-way interactions 
TREAT1t*POSTt*POS_DAt, TREAT1t*POSTt*NEG_SLSMANt, and 
TREAT1t*POSTt*NEG_DISXMANt which are expected to be positive if the 2002 
amendment resulted in an increased management of accruals and real transactions to 
influence core earnings.  
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TABLE D1 
Regression of  Unexpected  Core Earnings (UE_CEt) 
on  Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management 
using a PSM Sample of Treatment and Control Firms (1995 – 30 December 2005) 
Dependent Variable: UE_CEt 
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
H2a(i) 
 (1) 
H2a(ii) 
 (2) 
Combined 
Test 
 (3) 
Intercept  0.089** 
(2.067) 
0.133*** 
(3.099) 
0.109** 
(2.496) 
TREAT1t  0.009 
(0.579) 
-0.003 
(-0.210) 
-0.004 
(-0.240) 
POSTt  0.037** 
(2.499) 
0.024 
(1.442) 
0.025 
(1.349) 
TREAT1t*POSTt  -0.041** 
(-1.985) 
-0.011 
(-0.492) 
-0.011 
(-0.421) 
POS_DAt  0.022 
(1.336) 
 0.039** 
(2.249) 
POSTt*POS_DAt  0.001 
(0.029) 
 -0.011 
(-0.520) 
TREAT1t*POS_DAt  0.017 
(0.818) 
 0.000 
(0.018) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*POS_DAt + -0.009 
(-0.295) 
 0.004 
(0.134) 
NEG_SLSMANt   0.081*** 
(4.396) 
0.088*** 
(4.594) 
POSTt*NEG_SLSMANt   -0.022 
(-0.984) 
-0.027 
(-1.203) 
TREAT1t*NEG_SLSMANt   -0.055** 
(-2.484) 
-0.056** 
(-2.426) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*NEG_SLSMAN
t 
+  0.038 
(1.281) 
0.040* 
(1.290) 
NEG_DISXMANt   -0.023 
(-1.134) 
-0.022 
(-1.101) 
POSTt*NEG_DISXMANt   0.030 
(1.218) 
0.031 
(1.249) 
TREAT1t*NEG_DISXMANt   0.027 
(1.061) 
0.024 
(0.966) 
TREAT1t*POSTt*NEG_DISXMA
Nt 
+  -0.060* 
(-1.850) 
-0.060* 
(-1.849) 
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
Number of observations  2,468 2,468 2,468 
Adjusted R2  15.66% 16.34% 16.78% 
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TABLE D1 (continued) 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; all the test results use a two-tailed t-test except 
for the three-way interaction terms which use one-sided tests. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. The sample consists of treatment and control firms. Treatment 
firms are firms that exist in pre- and post-reform periods (1995-2005) and report income-decreasing abnormal items 
in the pre-reform period regardless of their post-reform behaviour.  Control firms are firms that exist in both periods 
but do not report income-decreasing abnormal items in the pre-period regardless of their post-reform behaviour. The 
firms are matched using the nearest neighbour propensity score matching with a caliper of 0.015. Observations for the 
year 2001 are excluded because the first amendment to AASB1018 was operative only for the financial period ending 
30 June 2001. AASB 1018 was again amended, operative for financial periods ending on or after 30 June 2002. 
Hence, the first amendment was only effective for one year. UE_CEt is unexpected core earnings calculated as the 
difference between reported and predicted core earnings, where the predicted value is calculated using the 
coefficients from the following equation: CEt + β0 + β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt + β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt      (1). 
TREAT1t is a dummy variable that equals 1 treatment firms and 0 for control firms. POS_DAt is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if discretionary accruals in year t are positive, 0 otherwise. Discretionary accruals are measured as 
residuals from the performance adjusted modified Jones model by Kothari et al. (2005): (TACCt/TAt-1) = b1 (1/TAt-1) + 
b2[(ΔREVt - ΔRECt)/TAt-1] + b3(PPEt/TAt-1) + b4ROAt-1  + εt.          (8). NEG_SLSMANt is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if SLSMANt in year t are negative, and 0 otherwise. SLSMANt are measured as the residuals from the following 
model: (CFOt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt/TAt-1) + k3(SALESt/TAt-1 + εt       (9). NEG_DISXMANt is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if abnormal discretionary expenses (DISXMANr) in year t are negative, and 0 otherwise. 
DISXMANt are the residuals from the following regression:  (DISXt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt-1/TAt-1) + εt        
(10). See Chapter Four for the definition of variables in Equations (1), (8), (9) and (10) and control variables above. 
 
Robustness test for H2b(i-iii) 
I re-estimate Equation (11) on the same sample of PSM treatment and control firms as 
in the main test. However, I  replace the ‘signed’ measures of DA, SLSMAN and 
DISXMAN with indicator variables POS_DAt, NEG_SLSMANt, and NEG_DISXMANt, 
respectively. The full model is of the following general form:  
UE_CEt = χ0 + χ1TREAT2t + χ2POS_DAt + χ3NEG_SLSMANt + χ4NEG_DISXMANt +  
      χ5IFRSt +   χ6TREAT2t*IFRSt + χ7IFRSt*POS_DAt + 
      χ8IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt +χ9IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt +  
      χ10TREAT2t*POS_DAt +χ11TREAT2t*IFRSt*POS_DAt +  
      χ12TREAT2t*NEG_SLSMANt +χ13TREAT2t*IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt + 
      χ14TREAT2t*NEG_DISXMANt +χ15TREAT2t*IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt + 
       Controls + εt                         (16) 
                                                                                                                                
Where POS_DAt = 1 if discretionary accruals are positive, and 0 otherwise. 
NEG_SLSMANt = 1 if abnormal cash from operations are negative, and 0 otherwise. 
NEG_DISXMANt = 1 if abnormal discretionary expenditures are negative, and 0 
otherwise. TREAT2t and UE_CEt are as defined in Equations (11). The key variables of 
interest are the three-way interaction terms TREAT2t*IFRSt*POS_DAt which is 
expected to be negative and TREAT2t*IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt, and 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt which are expected to be positive if the 2005 
303 
 
amendment which increased the scope for classification shifting resulted in a reduction 
in accruals and real activities manipulation.  
TABLE D2 
Regression of  Unexpected  Core Earnings (UE_CEt) 
on  Accrual-based and Real Earnings Management 
Using a PSM Sample of Treatment and Control Firms (2002 - 2009) 
Dependent Variable: UE_CEt 
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
H2b(i) 
(1) 
H2b(ii) 
(2) 
Combined 
Test 
 (3) 
Intercept  0.000 
(-0.002) 
0.049 
(0.845) 
0.043 
(0.738) 
TREAT2t  0.005 
(0.329) 
-0.007 
(-0.336) 
-0.005 
(-0.226) 
IFRSt  -0.053*** 
(-3.257) 
0.001 
(0.044) 
-0.031 
(-1.295) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt  0.049** 
(2.162) 
0.032 
(1.069) 
0.051 
(1.542) 
POS_DAt  0.000 
(0.013) 
 0.003 
(0.140) 
IFRSt*POS_DAt  0.078*** 
(3.171) 
 0.079*** 
(3.250) 
TREAT2t*POS_DAt  -0.001 
(-0.052) 
 -0.003 
(-0.135) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*POS_DAt - -0.048 
(-1.389) 
 -0.040 
(-1.165) 
NEG_SLSMANt   0.087*** 
(4.587) 
0.084*** 
(4.393) 
IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt   0.009 
(0.355) 
0.021 
(0.868) 
TREAT2t*NEG_SLSMANt   -0.020 
(-0.829) 
-0.020 
(-0.842) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt -  0.022 
(0.642) 
0.016 
(0.472) 
NEG_DISXMANt   -0.031* 
(-1.780) 
-0.032* 
(-1.826) 
IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt   -0.023 
(-0.907) 
-0.020 
(-0.790) 
TREAT2t*NEG_DISXMANt   0.002 
(0.069) 
0.002 
(0.081) 
TREAT2t*IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt -  0.004 
(0.124) 
0.001 
(0.040) 
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
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TABLE D2 (continued) 
Number of observations  2,352 2,352 2,352 
Adjusted R2  17.06% 18.90% 19.58% 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; all the test results use a two-tailed t-test except 
for the three-way interaction terms which use one-sided tests. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels. The sample is based on a propensity score match of treatment and 
control firms, where treatment firms are those firms that exist in some part of each of the test periods, and reports 
income-decreasing abnormal items in the post-IFRS period regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour, and 0 for firms 
that do not report income-decreasing abnormal items in the post-IFRS period regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour. 
The firms are matched using the nearest neighbour propensity score matching with a caliper of 0.015. UE_CEt is 
unexpected core earnings calculated as the difference between reported and predicted core earnings, where the 
predicted value is calculated using the coefficients from the following equation: CEt + β0 +  β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt +  
β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt      (1). TREAT2t is a dummy variable equals 1 for treatment firms and 0 for 
control firms. POS_DAt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if discretionary accruals in year t are positive, 0 otherwise. 
Discretionary accruals are measured as residuals from the performance adjusted modified Jones model by Kothari et 
al. (2005): (TACCt/TAt-1) = b1 (1/TAt-1) + b2[(ΔREVt - ΔRECt)/TAt-1] + b3(PPEt/TAt-1) + b4ROAt-1  + εt.          (8). 
NEG_SLSMANt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if SLSMANt in year t are negative, and 0 otherwise. SLSMANt are 
measured as the residuals from the following model: (CFOt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt/TAt-1) + k3(SALESt/TAt-1 
+ εt       (9). NEG_DISXMANt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if abnormal discretionary expenses (DISXMANr) in 
year t are negative, and 0 otherwise. DISXMANt are the residuals from the following regression:  (DISXt/TAt-1) = 
k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt-1/TAt-1) + εt        (10). See Chapter Four for the definition of variables in Equations (1), (8), (9) 
and (10) and control variables above. 
 
Robustness test for H2c(i-iii) 
To provide robustness tests for H2c, I re-estimate the singular and full models of 
substitution behaviour  and replace the ‘signed’ observations of accruals and real 
earnings management (as done for H2a and H2b) with indicator variables that equal 1 if 
DAt are positive and 0 otherwise, and 1 if SSLSMANt and DISXMANt are negative and 
zero otherwise. I estimate this regression on the same sample of PSM treatment and 
control firms as in the main test. The full model is of the following general form:  
UE_CEt = θ0 + θ1TREAT_DOt + θ2POS_DAt + θ3NEG_SLSMANt + 
       θ4NEG_DISXMANt +θ5IFRSt + θ6TREAT_DOt*IFRSt + θ7IFRSt*POS_DAt    
      + θ8IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt + θ9IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt +  
       θ10TREAT_DOt*POS_DAt + θ11TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*POS_DAt +  
       θ12TREAT_DOt*NEG_SLSMANt + θ13TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt  
       + θ14TREAT_DOt*NEG_DISXMANt  
        +θ15TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt + Controls + εt      (17)            
Where TREAT_DOt is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm operates in both the pre-
IFRS and post-IFRS periods, and reports income-decreasing DO in post-IFRS 
irrespective of their pre-IFRS behaviour (treatment firms), and 0 if a firm reports no 
income-decreasing DO in post-IFRS regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour (control 
firms). POS_DAt = 1 if DA is positive and 0 otherwise, NEG_SLSMANt = 1 if SLSMAN 
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is negative and 0 otherwise, and NEG_DISXMANt = 1 if DISXMAN is negative and 0 
otherwise. IFRS is as defined previously, and other variables are interactions of two or 
more of the variables described above. The variables of interest are the three-way 
interaction terms TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*POS_DAt, TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt 
and TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt.  
TABLE D3 
Regression of  Unexpected  Core Earnings (UE_CEt) on Accrual-Based and Real 
Earnings Management Using a PSM Sample of Treatment and Control Firms 
(2002-2009) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = UE_CEt 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
H2c(i)  
(1) 
 
H2c(ii)  
(2) 
Combined 
Test  
(3) 
Intercept  -0.034 
(-0.583) 
0.043 
(0.754) 
0.004 
(0.070) 
TREAT_DOt  0.041*** 
(2.748) 
0.019 
(0.973) 
0.035 
(1.574) 
IFRSt  0.012 
(0.764) 
0.033* 
(1.774) 
0.032 
(1.451) 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt  -0.047** 
(-1.970) 
-0.006 
(-0.245) 
-0.037 
(-1.209) 
POS_DAt  0.041 
(2.658) 
 0.040*** 
(2.586) 
IFRSt*POS_DAt  -0.005 
(-0.227) 
 -0.002 
(-0.108) 
TREAT_DOt*POS_DAt  -0.041* 
(-1.960) 
 -0.041 
(-1.917) 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*POS_DAt - 0.081*** 
(2.446) 
 0.094*** 
(2.822) 
NEG_SLSMANt   0.051*** 
(3.189) 
0.054*** 
(3.346) 
IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt   0.025 
(1.086) 
0.023 
(0.992) 
TREAT_DOt*NEG_SLSMANt   0.011 
(0.486) 
0.004 
(0.158) 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt -  -0.016 
(-0.461) 
0.011 
(0.308) 
NEG_DISXMANt   -0.028** 
(-2.049) 
-0.027** 
(-1.999) 
IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt   -0.023 
(-0.969) 
-0.021 
(-0.919) 
TREAT_DOt*NEG_DISXMANt   0.008 
(0.346) 
0.007 
(0.304) 
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_DISXMA
Nt 
-  -0.005 
(-0.159) 
-0.009 
(-0.009) 
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TABLE D3 (continued) 
 
Control Variables  Included Included Included 
Number of observations  2,196 2,196 2,196 
Adjusted R2  19. 80% 19.80% 20.60% 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. All the test results use a two-tailed t-test except 
the three-way interactions, TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*POS_DA,t TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_SLSMANt and  
TREAT_DOt*IFRSt*NEG_DISXMANt  which use a one-tailed test. T-statistics are in parentheses. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels, however, %DOt, %DO_NEGt, %DOt+1, and %DO_NEGt+1 are 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. The sample is based on a propensity score matching of treatment and control 
firms, where treatment firms are firms that operate in both the pre-IFRS (2002 – 30 December 2005) and post-IFRS 
(31 December 2005 - 2009) periods and report discontinued operations post-IFRS regardless of their pre-IFRS 
behaviour. Control firms are firms that operate in both test periods but do not report discontinued operations post-
IFRS regardless of their pre-IFRS behaviour. The firms are matched using the nearest neighbour prospensity score 
with a caliper of 0.015. %DOt is discontinued operation multiplied by -1, scaled by sales, both in year t: 
(Discontinued operationst * -1)/Salest. %DO_NEGt is discontinued operation multiplied by -1, scaled by sales, both in 
year t: (Discontinued operationst * -1)/Salest, when reported discontinued operations are income-decreasing, and 0 
otherwise. UE_CEt = unexpected core earnings calculated as the difference between reported and predicted core 
earnings, where the predicted value is calculated using the coefficients from the following equation: CEt + β0 + 
β1CEt-1 + β2ATOt +  β3ΔSALESt + β4NEG_ΔSALESt + εt      (1). TREAT_DOt is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
treatment firms and 0 for control firms. POS_DAt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if discretionary accruals in year t 
are positive, 0 otherwise. Discretionary accruals are measured as residuals from the performance adjusted modified 
Jones model by Kothari et al. (2005): (TACCt/TAt-1) = b1 (1/TAt-1) + b2[(ΔREVt - ΔRECt)/TAt-1] + b3(PPEt/TAt-1) + 
b4ROAt-1  + εt.          (8). NEG_SLSMANt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if SLSMANt in year t are negative, and 0 
otherwise. SLSMANt are measured as the residuals from the following model: (CFOt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + 
k2(SALESt/TAt-1) + k3(SALESt/TAt-1 + εt       (9). NEG_DISXMANt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if abnormal 
discretionary expenses (DISXMANr) in year t are negative, and 0 otherwise. DISXMANt are the residuals from the 
following regression:  (DISXt/TAt-1) = k1(1/TAt-1) + k2(SALESt-1/TAt-1) + εt        (10). See Chapter Four for the 
definition of variables in Equations (1), (8), (9) and (10) and control variables above. 
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